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Abstract: 
Examining Britain’s position in 1920s East Asia at a point amid changes in the international balance 
of power, this thesis bridges the gap between the existing imperial and naval accounts of a key 
transition point in global history. In doing so, it focuses upon the foremost organisation involved in 
maintaining and supporting the peripheral regions of imperial influence, the Royal Navy’s China 
Station. The thesis provides an important new segment to help in explaining the wider story of the 
slow decline of British imperial and naval dominance in the 1920s.  
Foremost among the findings is an emphasis on how heavily inter-related Britain’s strategies for 
China and Japan were during the decade. Indeed, China was expected by the Admiralty to play a 
pivotal role in any future relationship between the British Empire and the increasingly expansionist 
Japan, which adds a significant new angle to existing discussion of Britain’s far eastern defence 
strategy. Providing fresh insights into how those grand strategies were implemented in practice, the 
thesis shows how naval officers serving in the region willingly and repeatedly deviated from official 
policy on a day-to-day basis in order to assist their counterparts from friendly powers. Likewise, the 
evolving threats posed by state and sub-state actors in China are shown to have led to the 
deployment of vast Royal Navy task force to Shanghai in 1927, which is now generally overlooked 
and misunderstood. That event marked the last time Britain was able to confidently display its global 
naval dominance to the world. 
Among the more controversial findings, the thesis reveals how the Admiralty secretly circumvented 
the Washington Treaty by developing military aviation capabilities at Hong Kong under the guise of 
imperial policing. In doing so it provides the first clear evidence that alongside Germany and Japan, 
Britain was also actively contravening the post-1918 disarmament treaties it had only recently 
signed. Away from preparations for another major conflict, the thesis also provides a fresh 
examination of the contrasting accounts of two violent clashes involving Britain in 1920s China. In 
doing so, the thesis shows that it is possible to establish a more balanced understanding of events 
such as the Nanjing and Wanxian incidents, despite the highly polarised accounts of what happened. 
Finally, the human side of the story is explored, during which the thesis discusses changing attitudes 
towards and use of Victorian gunboat diplomacy. Moreover, the stresses of commanding gunboats 
in such isolated circumstances are shown to have pushed some young officers beyond breaking 
point, with disastrous consequences for themselves and others. 
Archival material that is entirely new to histories of the Royal Navy has been used throughout the 
thesis, adding crucial details such as the important role of Treaty Port volunteer corps in influencing 
warship deployments. Likewise, by delving deep into the naval archives, the thesis helps to move the 
imperial histories beyond the wall of steel and blue uniforms to consider the Royal Navy as a 
complex entity containing a diverse set of individuals. In combination the thesis provides the first 
detailed examination of the Royal Navy’s everyday work maintaining the British Empire in East Asia 
against the wider backdrop of the transformative changes in world geopolitics.  
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In recent years, discussion about the global balance of power has resurfaced amid China’s 
economic challenge to the United States of America (USA), questions about the relevance of 
post-1945 multilateral conventions, and renewed gunboat diplomacy. This is not the first 
time the world has seen such debates. Comparisons have already been drawn with the 
interwar period as a key phase in the previous transition between superpowers.1 British 
economic dominance had been broken by America’s rise. The British Empire hit its peak in 
size and influence, after which it began a slow decline that led to increasingly desperate 
attempts at maintaining the status quo, often using Britain’s key global power asset; the 
Royal Navy. Those inter-related transitions were particularly pronounced in East Asia, where 
British imperial influence came under sustained pressure. This thesis will explore the 
changes and challenges that affected the Royal Navy’s China Station, as it worked to 
maintain and defend the British Empire’s interests in and around China, over the course of 
that tumultuous decade. 
There have been some excellent studies of the two contrasting elements to developments 
in East Asia during the 1920s. In the field of imperial history, a recent flurry of accounts has 
explored specific elements of the economic, sociological, and diplomatic aspects of Britain’s 
relationship with China.2 Perhaps most notably, Robert Bickers has moved forward our 
understanding of the British Empire’s relationship with China and the ‘diplomacy of imperial 
retreat’, as Edmund Fung once described it, by a number of significant steps.3 In particular, 
                                                          
1 John H. Maurer and Christopher Bell, ‘Introduction’, in At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The 
London Naval Conference in 1930 ed. by John H. Maurer and Christopher Bell, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2014), pp.1-6. 
2 E.g. Ian Phimister, 'Foreign Devils, Finance and Informal Empire: Britain and China c. 1900-1912', Modern 
Asian Studies 40/3 (2006), 737-759; Zhang Jianguo and Zhang Junyong, trans. by Alec Hill, Weihaiwei Under 
British Rule, (Jinan City: Shandong Pictorial, 2006); Zwia Lipkin, Useless to the State: "Social Problems" and 
Social Engineering in Nationalist Nanjing 1927-1937, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2006); Zhongping Chen, 'The May 
Fourth Movement and Provincial Warlords: A Reexamination' Modern China, 27/2 (2011), 135-169; Isabella 
Jackson, 'Expansion and defence in the International Settlement at Shanghai', Sherman X. Lai, 'Nationalistic 
enthusiasm versus imperialist sophistication: Britain from Chiang Kai-shek's perspective', and Chen Qianping, 
'Foreign investment in modern China: An analysis with a focus on British interests', which are all in Britain and 
China, 1840-1970: Empire, finance and war, ed. by Robert Bickers and Jonathan J. Howlett (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2016). 
3 Robert Bickers, ‘The Colony’s Shifting Position in the British Informal Empire in China’, in Hong Kong’s 
Transitions 1842-1997, ed. by Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Robert 
Bickers, 'Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937' 
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Bickers has added depth to the human side of the topic, highlighting the diversity of actors 
involved and their backgrounds. On the military side, discussion has long been framed by 
debate over the Admiralty’s naval strategy in relation to Japan, and to a lesser extent the 
USA. Christopher Bell’s work has been particularly pivotal in that area, re-aligning previous 
assumptions and providing greater context, notably by emphasising that Hong Kong was still 
expected to play a pivotal role in British defence strategy after the shift towards Singapore.4 
Those two lines of research have run almost entirely separately, despite both featuring the 
Royal Navy’s China Station, one of the British Empire’s two main institutional cogs in East 
Asia, its third largest fleet, and the focus of this study. Through an examination of what 
Britain’s ‘Far Eastern’ fleet did and how it evolved during the period, this thesis will show 
the degree to which events in China were linked into Britain’s calculations for the defence of 
Empire. In turn, the role that naval developments had during the period in Britain’s 
relationship with China and the Navy’s indirect influence upon the fortunes of Britain’s 
furthest outposts of Empire, will both be highlighted. Where one branch of the 
historiography has largely rested ashore, and the other one at sea, the thesis will act as a 
pier connecting the two. 
Bridging the decades between two of the most destructive conflicts the world has seen, the 
interwar period as a whole has sometimes been treated as little more than a pause in which 
the major powers recovered their strength, before almost inevitably resuming hostilities.5 
Indeed the very use of the ‘interwar’ title highlights the extent to which the 1920s and 30s 
are defined by the wars at either end of the period. David Reynolds went so far as to 
describe the pre-war and interwar eras as being ‘punctuation marks’ in our understanding 
                                                          
Past and Present 159 (1998), 161-211; Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai, 
(London: Penguin, 2004); Robert Bickers, ‘Ordering Shanghai: Policing a treaty port, 1854-1900’, in Maritime 
Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, 
and Nigel Rigby, (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2004); Edmund S.K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's 
South China Policy, 1924-1931, (Oxford: OUP, 1991). 
4 Christopher M. Bell,' "Our Most Exposed Outpost": Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941' 
Journal of Military History 60/1 (1996), 61-88; Christopher M. Bell, ‘“How are we going to make war?” Admiral 
Sir Herbert Richmond and British Far Eastern War Plans’, Journal of Strategic Studies 20/3 (1997), 123-141; 
Christopher M. Bell, The Royal Navy: Sea-power and Strategy between the Wars, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000); Christopher M. Bell, ‘The 'Singapore Strategy' and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the 
Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z’ English Historical Review 116/467 (2001), 604-634. 
5 John R. Ferris, 'The Greatest Power on Earth: Great Britain in the 1920s', International History Review 13/4 
(1991), 726-750. 
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of the first half of the twentieth century.6 In the context of the history of the Royal Navy’s 
role within the British Empire, that idea of an interwar interlude has been a core theme in 
the historical discussion of the power struggles with the other major players of the period: 
the USA, the Soviet Union, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan.7 As a result, research on naval 
operations during the 1920s was often neglected, with a tendency to treat the period as the 
background to the major power struggles in the 1930s. More recently, there have been new 
discussion about rising tensions and the threat of a major power conflict during the 1920s, 
notably Bell’s examination of a potential war with Japan, but otherwise the decade is still 
largely viewed as one of peace.8  
Little research has gone into the potential for Britain to have been drawn into a modest 
initial conflict, such as the civil wars in China, and how important those wider developments 
were in shaping British defence policy. Perhaps the only significant exception to that rule 
has been discussion of the 1922 Chanak Affair, when Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement 
challenged some of the conditions laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres. 9 Kemal ordered the re-
occupation of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace, culminating in a stand-off between Turkish 
troops and the Allied force stationed to hold the Çanakkale (Chanak) region, controlling the 
strategically important Dardanelles Straits. Ultimately war was only narrowly avoided.10 The 
fact that war did not result from such interventions in the 1920s does not mean that the 
events were peaceful, or that the threat of force by a major power was sufficient to ensure 
the peaceful capitulation of a lesser power. Indeed, in the case of the Chanak Crisis, the 
lesser power, Turkey, was seemingly willing to fight and it was Britain that eventually backed 
down. The ‘Great War’ may have ended, but the world had not moved on to a ‘Great Peace’. 
                                                          
6 David Reynolds, ‘The Origins of the Two “World Wars”: Historical Discourse and International Politics’, 
Journal of Contemporary History 38/1 (2003), 29. 
7 E.g. Brian Bond, British military policy between the two World Wars, (Oxford: OUP, 1980), pp.36-40; Brian 
Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, (Stroud: Sutton, 1998), pp.142-150; Lawrence J. Butler, 'The 
British Empire, 1918-1945: Interwar change and wartime pressures', pp.18-21, in Crises of Empire: 
Decolonisation and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975, ed. by Lawrence J. Butler, Bob Moore and Martin 
Thomas, (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 17-46; Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, ‘Military Innovation in 
Peacetime’, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996), pp.371-373. 
8 Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire, (Yale: YUP, 2004), p.290; Bell, The Royal Navy, pp.60-69 & p.184. 
9 Stephen W. Roskill, Naval policy between the wars. Vol.1, The period of Anglo-American antagonism 1919-
1929, (London: Collins, 1968), pp. 188-200; Joseph Moretz, The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar 
Period, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p.162. 
10 John G. Darwin, ‘The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet’, History 65/213 (1980), 32-48. 
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Discussion of this ‘violent peace’ has been largely limited to events in Eastern Europe and 
the former Ottoman Empire, particularly between the Russian Revolution and the 
conclusion of the Chanak Crisis.11 Otherwise areas such as the Mediterranean have been 
described as having seen occasional crises, but were for the most part ‘relatively quiet’.12 
This peaceful narrative has been particularly true within the naval historiography of events 
East of Suez. James Neidpath makes just a passing reference, for example, to British forces 
being drawn into a sustained war due to events in 1920s China as having been ‘thinkable’, if 
undesirable, as part of his explanation for why the Admiralty felt it vital to build a major 
naval base in eastern Asia.13 This may reflect the field’s long-running hangover from Arthur 
Marder and his tendency to continue fighting Herbert Richmond’s battles over preparations 
for a future major conflict. This has come at the expense of discussing what the mainstream 
Royal Navy was actually doing in the 1920s, something this thesis will address.14  
Marder’s contemporary, Stephen Roskill, generally followed a similar pattern, but he did 
mention of a number of events during this period that highlight how the remainder of the 
decade was far from peaceful for Britain’s navy, particularly in East Asia.15 The Royal Navy 
and other branches of the British imperial establishment were involved in violent clashes in 
China, throughout most of the decade. Indeed, the country was the scene of the Navy’s 
most sustained active deployment over the entire interwar period.16 By examining the China 
Station during the 1920s, this study will therefore significantly improve our understanding of 
the day-to-day work done by the Royal Navy. It will show how in dealing with a range of 
state and sub-state threats, the Navy was involved in multiple violent clashes and how close 
events in China came to disrupting Britain’s peace. In doing so the thesis will consider how 
new developments in technology, tactical and strategic thinking, and changing attitudes to 
the British Empire affected the China Station’s disposition and behaviour. The overall aims 
                                                          
11 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why The First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923, (London: Penguin, 
2017), pp.4-9; Duncan Redford and Philip D. Grove, The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900, (London: Tauris, 
2014), pp.109-111. 
12 John D. Grainger, The British Navy in the Mediterranean, (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2017), pp.225-
235. 
13 James Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire 1919-1941, (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1981), p.15. 
14 E.g. Arthur J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915-1940, 
(London: OUP, 1974); Arthur J. Marder, ‘The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the 
Lessons of 1914-1918’, Pacific Historical Review 41/4, (1972), 413-443. 
15 Roskill, Naval policy between the wars. 
16 Moretz, The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship, pp.258-259. 
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are to highlight the Royal navy’s significant role in Britain’s interwar foreign policy, beyond 
the major power struggles, and to demonstrate the relationship between the Navy’s 
preparations for ‘big wars’ while it was busy fighting the Empire’s ‘little wars’.  
Research on the interwar Royal Navy was, and to some extent still is, dominated by a few 
key overarching topics, notably the disarmament and arms limitation conferences, and the 
associated cruiser arms race between Britain, the USA, and Japan.17 Core to those 
discussions has been the debate over the seriousness with which Britain treated the Ten 
Year Rule. Issued by the British government in 1919, that ‘rule’ effectively guided the three 
armed services and the Treasury to assume that no war would occur in the following 
decade. Over the years, assessments of the rule have gained nuance, notably with Brian 
Bond’s work in the 1980s and more recently by Elizabeth Kier. Both argued that the rule 
only really applied to major wars that would require an expeditionary force to be sent to 
mainland Europe, but not to minor expeditions and policing operations elsewhere around 
the world.18 By examining the China Station’s involvement in the little wars of Empire, this 
study will go beyond the Ten Year Rule debates, to consider the Royal Navy’s full spectrum 
of strategic deployments and challenges.  
The Royal Navy’s role in dealing with potential minor power conflicts during the 1920s fits 
with what Anthony Clayton has termed the work of an ‘imperial gendarmerie’, particularly 
in his discussion of the Navy’s responses to escalating violent outbursts in Palestine 
between Arab Nationalists, British garrison forces, and Zionists.19 While Clayton considered 
the Royal Navy in a broad context, his focus was on the dynamics of the empire as a whole, 
and so his treatment of the Navy is relatively one dimensional, as a tool of empire. There are 
only brief mentions of new developments, such as faster ships, and how there was a 
                                                          
17 E.g. Andrew Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East 1919-1939: Preparing for War against Japan, (London: 
Frank Cass, 2006); Greg Kennedy, ‘Britain's Policy-Making Elite, the Naval Disarmament Puzzle, and Public 
Opinion, 1927-1932’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 26/4 (1994), 623-644; Carolyn 
J. Kitching, Britain and the problem of International Disarmament: 1919-1934, (London: Routledge, 1999); Joe 
A. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp.5-19; Philips P. 
O'Brien, 'The Washington Treaty era, 1919-1936: Naval Arms Limitation', in The Sea In History: The Modern 
World, ed. by N.A.M. Rodger (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2017); Bell, The Royal Navy; Roskill, Naval policy 
between the wars. 
18 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars, (Princeton: PUP, 
1997), p.93; Bond, British military policy, pp.26-38. 
19 Anthony Clayton, ‘Deceptive Might: Imperial Defence and Security 1900-1968’, in The Twentieth Century: 
Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. by Judith M. Brown, and William R. Louis (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p.289. 
Page | 10  
 
relationship between the changes to the Navy and those in the empire, and vice versa.20 In 
effect, this has become a hallmark of how imperial histories of Britain’s relationship with 
China treat the Royal Navy’s role, which sometimes rely on Clayton’s work as their 
background to the naval aspects.21  
If the imperial histories of the British Empire in East Asia take a rather simplistic view of the 
1920s Royal Navy, the naval histories have been guilty of almost completely forgetting 
China. For example, while Bell provides a convincing argument about the importance of 
Hong Kong as a forward operating base in the developing power struggle between Britain 
and Japan, he makes no mention of the relationship between the naval base and events in 
China itself.22 This is largely a result of how the historiography of the 1920s Royal Navy east 
of Suez focuses heavily upon tracing the path to the Second World War. Andrew Field’s 
examination of Britain’s interwar Far Eastern naval strategy, for example, is built around a 
core argument that Japan was almost certain to end up at war with one or both of the USA 
and Great Britain, given its ‘Asia for Asians’ rhetoric and expanding commercial interests.23 
As a result, most of Field’s study is spent discussing how the Royal Navy was planning for a 
Pacific war involving Japan from the early 1920s, with no consideration of its other priorities 
for the region. Concentrating upon Japan is logical as a contribution to the long-running 
debates about the origins of the Second World War, in terms of East Asia, but when 
examining the interwar period itself such a focus risks ignoring those events that did not 
ultimately result in conflict. Gregory Kennedy does mention China’s significant role in British 
strategic planning, but after three sentences even he moved back to existing debates, barely 
mentioning events in the 1920s.24 
During the 1920s, the British Empire still had considerable interests in China, which had 
been built up after Britain had forced open China’s borders to western merchants through 
                                                          
20 Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-1939, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), p.80 and 
pp.141-227. 
21 Jürgen Osterhammel, 'China', in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume IV: The Twentieth Century, 
ed. by Judith Brown, William R. Louis, (Oxford: OUP, 1999), pp.647-649. 
22 Bell, "Our Most Exposed Outpost", 61-88. 
23 Field, Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, pp.5-11. 
24 Greg Kennedy, 'British Sea Power and imperial defence in the Far East: Sharing the Seas with America' in Sea 
Power and the Asia-Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune?, ed. by Geoffrey Till and Patrick C. Bratton (London: 
Routledge, 2012), p.206. 
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the Opium Wars of 1839-42 and 1856-60.25 In purely nominal terms, British firms had 
investments totalling roughly £200 million in China in 1927, equivalent to roughly £12 billion 
in 2017 when adjusted for inflation.26 As shall be explored in this thesis, those assets and 
trade routes were of sufficient importance for the British government to risk sparking a war, 
over the course of the decade. China was not just an economic concern for the British 
Empire, however, with the country representing a vital tile in the jigsaw of Britain’s global 
grand defensive strategy. In addition to the well-known imperial outpost at Hong Kong, the 
Royal Navy also maintained another formal base at Weihai (Weihaiwei) in northern China, 
and saw China as a key factor both as a potential trigger for a future war with Japan, but 
also as a source of victory in such a war.  
The Royal Navy’s China Station 
During the interwar period, the Royal Navy maintained a single fleet north-east of 
Singapore, patrolling Britain’s most exposed outposts of Empire. As one of a global chain of 
naval commands (see Figure 1), the China Station played a vital role in enabling Britain to 
project its power around East Asia and the western Pacific Rim, both as a tool for promoting 
British foreign policies and to counter any emergent state or sub-state threats. The main 
duties had therefore long involved; regular flag-waving tours of the region, as a deterrent 
against the Russian Pacific Fleet (pre-1905), the German East Asia Squadron (pre-1914) and 
then the Imperial Japanese Navy (post-1921), supporting the defence of Britain’s scattered 
imperial possessions, and protecting British mercantile shipping against piracy.27  
                                                          
25 See: Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of China, (London: Picador, 2011); Robert 
Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire 1832-1914, (London: Penguin, 2012). 
26 Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, p.4. The 2017 figure was calculated using the Bank of England historical 
inflation converter: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/inflationtools/calculator/. 
27 W.C. Bridgeman, Admiralty memorandum to Cabinet about the Navy Estimates, 4 February 1925, The 
National Archives (henceforth TNA), CAB 24/171/68; Philips P. O'Brien, ‘The Titan Refreshed: Imperial 
Overstretch and the British Navy before the First World War’, Past & Present 172 (2001), 150; Bell, 'Singapore 
Strategy', p.610. 
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Figure 1: Royal Navy ‘stations’ during the 1920s (simplified)28 
 
Prior to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) and First Sea Lord Sir John ‘Jackie’ Fisher’s 
subsequent decision to concentrate the Royal Navy in home waters, Britain maintained a 
sizable force around the Pacific Ocean to achieve those aims. It had not been a single 
command, however, and was divided between the ‘China’, ‘Australia’, and ‘Pacific’ 
commands.29 The China command had always been the largest of the three, after its 
predecessor ‘East Indies and China Station’ was split in two in 1865.30 As a result of Fisher’s 
reforms the Pacific Station was disbanded in 1905, with a decision made not to renew it in 
1912. Likewise, the Australia Station was dissolved in 1913 with the creation of the Royal 
Australian Navy.31 As a result, by the 1920s, the China Station formed the Royal Navy’s only 
significant standing formation beyond Singapore, although during crises it could be 
supported by the fledgling Royal Australian Navy, the Royal New Zealand Navy division, and 
by the East Indies Station. 
With its focus on the South China and Yellow Seas, the China Station was nominally based 
around three main naval bases; Hong Kong at its centre, Weihai in the north, and Singapore 
in the south. Given the vast geographic expanse of the command and the numerous small 
                                                          
28 Produced by the author. 
29 O’Brien, ‘The Titan Refreshed’, 149-156; Peter Padfield, Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy, 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), pp.209-222. 
30 Scott Lindgren, ‘A station in transition: The China Squadron, Cyprian Bridge and the first-class cruiser, 1901-
1904’, International Journal of Maritime History 27/3 (2015), 466. 
31 Nicholas A. Lambert, 'Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman-Bridgeman (1911-1912)', in The First Sea Lords, ed. by 
Malcolm H. Murfett (Westport: Praeger, 1995), p.68; Peter Overlack, ‘The Force of Circumstance: Graf Spee's 
Options for the East Asian Cruiser Squadron in 1914’ Journal of Military History 60/4, (1996), 661; Padfield, 
Rule Britannia, p.222. 
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coal-fuelled warships present in the region, the Royal Navy had also established a network 
of coaling stations around the Chinese coast and along the River Yangtze. Covering such a 
large area, command of the station was highly mobile, with the Commander-in-Chief (an 
Admiral or Vice-Admiral) spending most of his time at sea touring with the cruisers. Indeed, 
a requisitioned vessel, HMS Alacrity, was provided as an Admiral’s yacht at the end of the 
First World War in order to improve the mobility of command around the station. Alacrity 
was then replaced in 1923 by a First World War minesweeper, HMS Petersfield, which had 
been converted especially for the role.32 His deputy (a Rear-Admiral) was a little more 
settled and usually present working aboard the gunboat HMS Bee, either patrolling the 
Yangtze or moored at Hankou (Hankow).33 To ensure that there was always a reliable 
contact point, a Commodore was permanently stationed at Hong Kong, in charge of the 
naval dockyard and local naval forces. Likewise, numerous less-senior officers were posted 
at other shore facilities around the region, particularly at Singapore and Shanghai, working 
in administrative and duty roles. Given their relative operational detachment, two 
Commanders were also given the designation ‘Senior Naval Officer’ for the Upper Yangtze 
and West River areas, with responsibility for guiding their junior colleagues and providing 
immediate leadership during moments of crisis. 
                                                          
32 Admiral Arthur Leveson to Admiralty, 11 October 1923, TNA, ADM 1/8665/142. 
33 See: TNA, ADM 53/75691; Ship’s log of HMS Hawkins 1923-1924, TNA, ADM 53/78593. The Vice-Admiral is 
recorded as switching regularly between the flagship Hawkins and ‘Admiral’s yacht’ HMS Petersfield to tour 
the other cruisers. 
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Figure 2: 1920s China Station command structure34 
 
 
Given that it was Britain’s third largest naval deployment and remained so over a period of 
decades, the China Station has been the feature of surprisingly little direct historical 
discussion. Most existing research about the Royal Navy in interwar East Asia has been 
focused on the change in strategic focus from Hong Kong to Singapore, as the primary line 
of defence against Japan, and issues to do with the battle fleet.35 This has further 
accentuated the wider problems in the historiography of the peacetime interwar Royal 
Navy. Even Mark Felton’s recent history of the command and its work in China largely skips 
over the 1920s, to focus upon the major conflicts in the Station’s history.36 While Felton 
does highlight the important role the China Station had Britain’s expansion of informal 
empire during the Victorian era and in the two world wars, he misses the many pivotal 
moments where the Royal Navy was involved in the turn of empire in the region. Indeed, his 
                                                          
34 Produced by the author. 
35 E.g. Orest Babij, 'The Royal Navy and the defence of the British Empire: 1928-1939' in Far Flung Lines, ed. by 
Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (London: Cass, 1996), pp.171-186; Kent Fedorowich, ‘”Cocked Hats and 
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account overlooks one of the largest peacetime deployments of British naval force in the 
twentieth century. Likewise, Jonathan Parkinson’s biographical approach, exploring the lives 
of the Commanders-in-Chief provides some interesting colour to the topic, but provides 
little context about the command itself.37 As a result, Malcolm Murfett’s recent discussion 
of interwar naval warfare provides the best insights into what the China Station actually did 
during the 1920s, but only during one tantalisingly brief passage.38 
Built up during the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain’s imperial presence in 
China epitomises Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher’s assessment of the British Empire’s 
unstated strategy of ‘trade with informal rule if possible; trade with rule when necessary’.39 
In essence, as long as Britain got what it wanted in terms of expanding its economic and 
strategic interests, then there was no underlying desire to expand formal control, given the 
cost of maintaining armies against potential wars of independence. While critics have raised 
questions over the applicability of the theory when used over such a diverse entity at the 
late Victorian British Empire, it works well to explain the Empire’s long term position in 
China.40 Jürgen Osterhammel gives Britain’s stewardship of China’s Salt Administration and 
Customs Service, as an example of how much control Britain was able to wield over China in 
order to reap the economic benefits, despite China remaining an independent sovereign 
nation.41 There have been questions about whether informal imperialism was a deliberate 
policy, but within the dynamics of Britain’s relationship with China there was a long term 
pragmatic acceptance of arms-length mercantile trade via informal rule, so long as no other 
power tried to dominate the country.42 Likewise, David Cannadine argues that it was the 
relative lack of British business investment in China, when compared to elsewhere in the 
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world, which limited the British government’s interest in territorial expansion. Cannadine 
goes on to highlight that trade and military concessions were also obtained on an informal 
footing, with the overall argument effectively agreeing with Robinson and Gallagher’s core 
premise.43 
In 1911, the Xinhai Revolution brought about the collapse of the Qing Empire and presented 
a series of challenges for those powers with interests in China. After the failure of the 
subsequent Provisional Government of the Republic of China and resulting collapse of 
central government, a range of threats to British interests emerged. In particular, there was 
a significant increase in piracy and banditry. The warring also brought with it the growing 
possibility that violence would impact upon foreign residents directly, through warlord 
armies wrestling for control of the treaty port cities.44 As trading centres those ports offered 
a significant potential source of income for the different factions, and many were located in 
strategically important locations. For much of the 1920s, the Foreign Office attempted to 
follow a strategy of non-intervention in China, hoping for the emergence of a new central 
regime, which could be pressured into addressing Britain’s concerns.45 Nonetheless, given 
the uncertainty resulting from the fluid situation in China, the Royal Navy was tasked with 
defending against the perceived and actual threats against Britain’s interests.46 
The Royal Navy beyond the battle-fleet 
More often than not, when Great Britain took part in these expeditions, in China or 
elsewhere, it was not the battle-fleet that shaped the events. Instead, the Royal Navy’s light 
cruisers, destroyers, sloops, and gunboats conducted most of its interwar peacetime work, 
which were only reinforced by larger vessels when necessary.47 Even then, most of the light 
cruisers would spend their time either held at a strategic port, or on a flag waving tour of 
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the region they were stationed on.48 In the aftermath of the First World War, it was those 
smaller vessels that formed an increasingly important part of the Royal Navy. While only a 
gradual process, capital ships slowly declined in value with the development of new threats 
to their dominance, such as the submarine, higher quality torpedoes, and effective military 
aircraft.49 Despite the considerable activity of the ordinary fleet, the historiography of the 
Royal Navy in the period is almost exclusively focused upon the main battle fleet, populated 
by its capital ships – battleships and battlecruisers and those heavy cruisers capable of 
fighting in a fleet action.  
Joseph Moretz divides the interwar Royal Navy into three sections: 1) the main fleet – 
centralised in order to destroy an enemy battle fleet, 2) detached cruiser forces – to protect 
the sea arteries of the empire, and 3) local defence forces – performing the day-to-day work 
of empire.50 However, Moretz focuses almost exclusively on the first two sections and 
therefore the efforts of the Admiralty to prepare for a future major war, assigning the local 
defence force the role of freeing up the main fleet to provide an over-arching imperial 
defence. Indeed, this is just one of many excellent assessments of the interwar Royal Navy 
that have been produced in recent years, but have followed a similar course.51 This is not a 
new feature, with previous generations of historians of the interwar Royal Navy equally 
focused upon the battle fleet, particularly Roskill and Marder.52 Given that over 400 of the 
Royal Navy’s roughly 475 armed, sea-going vessels in service in the mid-1920s were types 
used for regional defence, this represents a notable oversight in the existing 
historiography.53 It will be that day-to-day segment that this thesis will explore and in doing 
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so will highlight its crucial role in supporting the full range of the Royal Navy’s roles in British 
defence policy. 
The lack of existing research on those smaller vessels is noteworthy when compared with 
studies of the pre-1914 Royal Navy. Naval historians of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
eras almost all make far greater reference to the global deployment and use of the Navy’s 
smaller vessels for trade defence and imperial policing.54 This is despite the centralisation of 
the battle fleet under John ‘Jacky’ Fisher as First Sea Lord 1904-1910 often being a key 
feature of their research. John Linge’s article examining the Royal Navy’s policing of 
Ireland’s coastline, during the formal establishment of the Irish Free State in 1921-1922, 
provides an exception to the rule. Linge argues that the deployment of a moderately sized 
local defence force into Irish waters influenced the development of the situation in Ireland. 
His article goes on to discuss how the number of vessels employed in blockading the 
importing of weapons into Ireland restricted the initial naval response to the Chanak Crisis.55 
Expanding this tentative examination of the day-to-day work of the ordinary fleet, during 
moments of calm and crisis, will therefore enable a more nuanced understanding of the 
Royal Navy’s role in shaping the British Empire’s interwar foreign policy. The ordinary fleet 
was spread across the entire empire, in contrast to the battle fleet, which by the 1920s was 
concentrated in the ‘Home’ theatre and Mediterranean. Studying the role of the 
mainstream Navy will also shed light on Britain’s influence over more peripheral global 
developments, not directly related to the major power struggles of the era. In doing so, it 
will shift the historiographical focus away from examining the theoretical development at 
the top level of the Navy, to examining what was happening in practice with the bulk of the 
fleet. 
This study will achieve this by examining the way that the Royal Navy dealt with the 
challenges posed by the new situation in China, looking at how the mainstream actively 
deployed part of the service developed during the 1920s. In particular, the thesis will assess 
how the Navy adapted to its post First World War environment. Understanding the extent 
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of the changes it underwent, will then allow an assessment of how the Royal Navy impacted 
Britain’s relationships with countries, other than the major powers, on a day-to-day basis. In 
doing so a variety of factors will be considered, such as the financial restrictions imposed 
upon the Navy, the emergence of new technology and equipment, as well as changes in 
both institutional and wider social attitudes and ideas. 
The Royal Navy’s role in Britain’s Interwar foreign policy 
Great Britain’s early Interwar foreign policy can be broadly divided into three key priorities: 
to maintain its status as the superpower of the era, to keep its newly further-enlarged 
empire secure, and to ensure the smooth flow of global trade and finance.56 One of the 
most important tools available to the policy-makers in Whitehall in order to meet the 
demands of all three goals was the Royal Navy, in Greg Kennedy’s words: ‘Britain's most 
important diplomatic and military asset’.57 The Royal Navy was key to the first of those 
foreign policy goals: maintaining superpower status. Since airpower was still in its infancy, 
the navy’s position as the world’s largest and most powerful sea-power force was therefore 
the ultimate guarantor of Great Britain’s global status.58 
Core to maintaining the British Empire’s overall superpower status was the Royal Navy’s 
battle fleet. As previously mentioned, there have been numerous studies about the 
development of the battle fleet during the 1920s, most of which are linked to the threat of 
an arms race between the main naval powers. John Jordan and Jon Sumida, for example, 
both provide technical accounts of the comparative capabilities of the major powers’ 
vessels.59 Similarly, Karl Lautenschläger and Arthur Hezlet consider the impact of newer 
military aircraft upon the relative strength of the major naval powers’ fleets, both arguing 
that carrier based aircraft had limited value in the 1920s.60 While those technical accounts 
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are of great value in discussions of major power conflict in the 1930s, the study of the battle 
fleet is of more limited value in direct regards to the 1920s. Designed and intended for 
decisive engagements against other naval powers, capital ships were of minimal use in 
dealing with the land based conflicts and confrontations that occurred in the earlier 
decade.61 While larger vessels were prominent in the diplomatic wrangling over arms 
limitation treaties during the period, their practical military role was effectively limited to 
deterrent status.62 Moreover, in line with the strategy first introduced by Lord Fisher to 
concentrate the battle fleet, few of the Royal Navy’s major vessels were deployed outside of 
the North Atlantic or the Mediterranean in peacetime.63 A notable exception was the global 
tour made by HMS Hood and the Special Service Squadron of 1923-1924, which was 
intended to impress upon both allies and potential enemies alike the scale of Great Britain’s 
naval power.64 The only real threat to Britain’s superpower status was from the USA. 
Despite its rapid growth, however, the United States Navy (USN) still fell far short of the 
Royal Navy overall (although in some particular areas such as destroyers the USN was 
already dominant) and would not overtake it until the Second World War.65  
A growing rivalry with the USA was not the only potential disruptive force to the global 
naval power balance. The collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, with its official expiration 
in 1923, also contributed to growing concern about the emergent threat to the British 
Empire’s East Asian territories. Worsening Anglo-Japanese relations in the 1920s have been 
a strong feature in Interwar historiography, which has focused on the direct long-term 
threat of war posed by an imperialist Japan, particularly after the Manchuria Crisis in 1931, 
and the fortification of Singapore to counter that perceived threat.66 It was not until the 
1930s that the threat from Japan became far more serious and the nominal power of the 
1920s Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) relative to the Royal Navy and USN should not be 
overstated. Nonetheless, the expansion of the IJN during the First World War and its 
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immediate aftermath had changed the global balance of power.67 In particular, the 
launching of the two Nagato-class battleships (1919 & 1920), the aircraft carriers Hosho, 
Agagi, and Kaga (1919-1920), the six Sendai, Yubari, and Furutaka-class cruisers (1922), and 
34 new submarines (1919-23), changed the Pacific naval equation to a significant extent. 
The threat posed to the established world order by Japan’s rise was highlighted by the effort 
placed into the 1922 Washington Treaty by Britain and the USA, to restrict the IJN, even if 
the limits were of little practical value.68 Containing a range of restrictions on the number 
and size of various warships that each signatory was allowed to possess, in addition to a 
variety of additional clauses covering naval base enhancement among others, the treaty was 
intended to prevent a major arms race and curtail international rivalries. In the years 
following the Washington Conference, debates between the Admiralty and Cabinet show 
that despite caution about the threat posed by Japan to British colonies and the dominions 
of Australia and New Zealand, government ministers repeatedly dismissed it as a peripheral 
issue to the British Empire.69 The British government felt safe in the belief that the IJN did 
not have the resources to achieve a decisive victory in East Asia, before the Royal Navy’s 
battle fleet could reinforce the China Station.70 This only started to change to a significant 
extent after General Tanaka Giichi’s hawkish government was elected in Japan in 1927, with 
its expansionist attitude towards China.71 There were concerns during the 1920s, however, 
within both the Admiralty and Foreign Office that Japan sought to lure Britain into a military 
response in China, as a means to facilitate a further expansion of Japan’s commercial 
interests in the country.72 While British officials were undoubtedly concerned about the 
direct long-term threat posed by Japan to the Empire as a whole, they were primarily wary 
of the indirect consequences of Japanese foreign policy in China. 
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The simultaneous growth in power of the USA and Japan, challenging Britain’s complete 
global dominance, was not a significant strategic concern. In naval terms, Whitehall had 
already abandoned the ‘two power standard’ in 1911, whereby the Royal Navy was 
expected to be larger than the next two navies. Instead a ‘one power standard’ had been 
adopted, where Britain simply needed to maintain the world’s single largest navy.73 There 
are even some questions about the seriousness with which the Admiralty treated the one 
power standard, with suggestions in some documents that it was only seriously used during 
discussions with the Treasury and publically in Parliament.74 Over the course of the 1920s 
the USN’s growing strength also started to be regarded more widely around Whitehall as a 
positive development, given that neither nation really saw the other as a potential 
aggressor.75 As a result, the other two major naval powers were growing stronger, but 
neither seriously threatened the British Empire’s superpower status. Indeed, Bell has argued 
that when considering the Royal Navy’s power in the 1920s against its potential enemies, 
i.e. not including the USA, Britain was no less dominant in global naval power than it had 
been before the First World War.76 Likewise, recent economic assessments highlight that 
Britain maintained the highest level of military expenditure of any major power in the world 
during the 1920s, with its naval budget at a comparable level to the 1890-1910 period.77 
Maintaining Great Britain’s prominent position may therefore have been a feature of the 
top-level diplomatic wrangling at various disarmament and naval conferences. Nonetheless, 
the Royal Navy’s day to day concerns during the first half of the interwar period were 
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focused upon the other two areas of imperial concern, maintaining the security of the 
Empire and protecting its arteries.78 
Keeping the British Empire secure was no small challenge. One of the defining 
characteristics of the 1920s was the extent to which the Empire was over-stretched in a 
variety of ways. After obtaining stewardship of various territories after the First World War, 
primarily in the Middle-East, the British Empire had reached its peak size, covering twelve 
million square miles - roughly one quarter of the global land mass.79 As a result, there were 
countless potential threats worldwide, both internal and external, to the maintenance of 
the status quo.80 The war had also left Great Britain’s economy drained, with a pressing 
need for the government to reduce expenditure, making the defence and maintenance of 
order in the Empire as much a challenge for accountants as admirals and generals.81 At its 
most basic the Royal Navy was being asked to do more, while simultaneously making 
cutbacks and finding what would now be called ‘efficiency savings’.82 
These challenges provided a strong case for the Royal Navy to make structural, strategic and 
tactical changes, and where possible to adopt new technologies, although sometimes there 
was a reluctance among the Service’s officers to do so. This thesis will focus upon the 
challenges facing the China Station and how they forced it to evolve over the period. 
However, top-down proposals and measures will also be considered, including the planned 
re-organisation of the Royal Marines, discussed by the Madden Committee in 1924, to turn 
the marines into a rapid response force.83 The Madden Committee had been formed to 
conduct a review of the function and structure of the Royal Marines. The intention being to 
assess whether the functions of the Royal Marines could be fulfilled at a lower cost by the 
mainstream navy, or alternatively whether greater value could be secured from the existing 
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structure. Ultimately the committee proposed the latter approach, to modernise and adapt 
the Royal Marines into fulfilling a rapid response role, allowing a few carefully located units 
around the Empire to settle swiftly the majority of threats to imperial stability. Kenneth 
Clifford suggested that while the committee’s recommendations were dropped due to 
concerns about the up-front costs of such a reorganisation, the Royal Marines had 
nonetheless developed into the proposed force by the time of the 1927 crisis in China.84 His 
conclusions have since been contested, however, by arguments that the 12th Battalion Royal 
Marines was formed and dispatched in the ‘old way’ to Shanghai in January 1927.85 
Exploring the events of that crisis in particular, this study will shed light on whether any 
progress had been made to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Navy in its role 
as an ‘imperial gendarmerie’ during the decade, and what the consequences were for the 
wider British Empire. 
Many of the early and influential historical accounts of the Royal Navy during the period 
tended to outline how early interwar military thought was guided by what were felt to be 
the lessons of the preceding war.86 Roskill, for example, stated that the only pro-active naval 
planning in the 1920s was intended to solve the problems encountered in the First World 
War, such as the development of Asdic to counter the submarine threat.87 Later accounts 
have gone a little further to explore whether or not the Royal Navy learned any lessons from 
the First World War, but generally dismiss any developments from the 1920s.88 This 
discussion has been strongly influenced by the background debate about the extent to 
which there was an institutional culture of anti-intellectualism within the interwar Navy.89 
Through its examination of the Service’s peacetime frontline work in China, this thesis will 
add an entirely new element to this field by considering how willing officers were to adopt 
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new ideas and approaches in active service. In doing so, it will provide the other half of the 
picture to Moretz’s recent work on the education of the Navy’s officer corps, by looking at 
how some of those men behaved in practice.90 
While not a focal point for the study, this thesis will take into account the background of 
inter-service rivalry during the period. Not all developments were necessarily as simple as 
they first may seem. The Admiralty not only had its battles with the Treasury and Cabinet 
over funding, and Foreign Office over strategy, but also with the other services, a period 
summed up concisely in Higham’s Armed Forces in Peacetime.91In 1929, for example, a 
proposal was levelled by the Royal Air Force (RAF) to the Cabinet for flying boats to replace 
four Royal Navy sloops in the Persian Gulf, taking on their anti-piracy and slave trafficking 
tasks.92 The logic presented to cabinet was that flying boats would be cheaper to operate 
than sloops. Such schemes, however, came as part of a long term campaign started by the 
first Marshal of the RAF, Hugh Trenchard, to secure a more prominent role for the fledgling 
RAF against the two long-established services.93 Indeed, the displacement of conventional 
military capabilities with what was still novel air power began even before the First World 
War had ended. Air Vice-Marshall Sir Frederick Sykes argued this clearly in 1918, that the 
RAF would provide ‘a rapid and economical instrument’ for securing the Asian and African 
frontiers of the British Empire.94 In addition to considering the significance of such frictions, 
this thesis will explore the extent to which the Navy found ways to prove its value to the 
British Empire, while simultaneously finding ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of its 
work against the challenge posed by the RAF. 
Britain’s China conundrum 
The Xinhai Revolution was met with comparatively muted concern from Britain and other 
western nations. The events in 1911 represented a major shift in China’s domestic political 
situation, but initially it was less significant for global events. For those foreign powers with 
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interests in the country the revolution appeared similar, at least superficially, to earlier large 
scale rebellions, such as the Taiping Rebellion and Boxer Uprising.95 With efforts in the mid-
1910s to form a new republican government in China and little hostility directed against 
foreign powers, the Xinhai Revolution appeared a minor concern when compared with the 
events seen just over a decade earlier. During the Boxer Uprising, popular discontent in 
Northern China between 1897 and 1899 became increasingly focused against foreigners 
living in the region. That tension exploded into open conflict when a British-led multi-
national military force attempted to reach Beijing in June 1900, which was seen as an 
invasion by the local population.96 The subsequent humiliating terms imposed by the 
international coalition changed the path of Chinese politics. In contrast, the British 
establishment in 1911 agreed that as the revolution was not anti-foreign, the best course of 
action was to remain neutral and wait for order to be restored.97 
The First World War soon distracted Britain and the other major powers, but the situation 
worsened in China with the failure of the Provisional Government and subsequent schism 
between the two main Beiyang (northern) and Guomindang (southern) regimes in 1917. 
Nonetheless, prior to the mid- 1920s the threat to British interests was relatively mild, 
mostly in the form of piracy and banditry, resulting from the lack of effective governance in 
many areas.98 For the Royal Navy, this posed the challenge of trying to provide an effective 
policing presence over large areas where British shipping and communities were present. 
Not only did the China Station face global, top-down challenges in terms of cost-cutting and 
inter-service rivalry, but it was also required to meet the regional problem posed by piracy. 
The growing number and severity of attacks on merchant shipping threatened the smooth 
flow of trade in the region, which was so important to the economy of the wider British 
Empire.99 China accounted for roughly 3% of total goods exports from Great Britain in the 
mid-1920s, making it a modest but valuable external market for British manufacturers, 
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although the links with the Empire as a whole were far greater. With those additional 
exports from Britain’s colonies, the British Empire was still China’s largest trading partner, 
despite growing competition from Japan and the USA.100 Prior to the First World War British 
businesses and banks had also invested heavily in and around the treaty ports, backing the 
construction of railways for example. As the different factions and local warlords 
intermittently resorted to conflict, the violence potentially put the security of both their 
staff and the assets at risk.101 Beyond the formal boundaries of the Empire, with only a small 
British Army presence in East Asia, the Royal Navy offered the primary source of direct 
protection. 
As the years passed and the conflict continued to erupt in bursts, the Shanghai press in 
particular started to draw parallels between the Boxer Uprising and growing anti-foreign 
rhetoric, warning of potentially catastrophic violence.102 The murder of foreign missionaries 
and their families in that earlier crisis and horrific accounts of how they were killed, often 
exaggerated, had been seared into the collective memories of the treaty ports’ foreign 
populations. At first the fears of the British expatriate population were soothed by Royal 
Navy warship visits, but the situation became far worse after the May Thirtieth Incident in 
1925. British-led policemen in Shanghai shot and killed twelve Chinese civilians, who had 
been protesting against the prior death of a Chinese factory worker.103 As a result, Britain 
became the focus of anti-imperial sentiment in China, a process catalysed by the Shanghai 
Municipality Police’s frequently heavy-handed approach to policing.104 The situation 
worsened further in 1926, when the Guomindang launched its Northern Expedition towards 
the valuable treaty ports and strategic cities along the Yangtze.105 Not only was there the 
risk of British persons and property suffering as collateral damage in the fighting, but the 
Guomindang was still linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whose rhetoric was 
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profoundly anti-imperialist. 106 As a result, British officials believed that the threat was far 
more direct and so the China Station was tasked with a further challenge, to adjust its 
approach against the emergent and evolving threat of war. 107 
The link to the CCP meant that the China Station’s localised challenge in dealing with the 
China’s civil wars also fitted into the Royal Navy’s and British Empire’s general battle against 
communism.108 A string of real and fictional scandals at home and abroad fuelled a fear that 
the newly formed Soviet Union was attempting to undermine the British Empire from 
‘Dublin to Peking’.109 The effectiveness of a naval response to a localised incident in 
Shanghai, for example, was therefore felt to have a much wider potential impact upon the 
security of the British Empire. Examining the nature of the British response in 1926-27 will 
therefore provide insights into how the Royal Navy adapted to deal with the unconventional 
threats posed by anti-imperial violence in the post-First World War era. In doing so, the 
thesis will consider the extent to which the service appreciated the wider implications of its 
actions on the British Empire’s informal outposts. It will also expand upon the brief and 
somewhat tentative assertion made by Greg Kennedy, that the rise of Chinese nationalism 
in the 1920s was key to defining the security of the British Empire in East Asia.110 As a result, 
the thesis will place the events around the China Station in context, examining their 
significance in relation to the Royal Navy as a whole. 
China was certainly not the only country where Britain’s armed forces were tasked with 
protecting the extended interests of the Empire during the 1920s, with deployments to 
Archangelsk and Chanak earlier in the decade. Likewise, the emergence of Pan-Arab 
nationalism and Zionism posed significant threats to the stability of the not-so-carefully 
constructed Anglo-French mandated Middle East. In some cases the resulting violence far 
exceeded that seen in similar incidents in China.111 The uprisings in Iraq against the award of 
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the British mandate over the country in 1920, for example, resulted in the deaths of 426 
British and Indian servicemen and over 8,000 ‘insurgents’.112 Mark Mazower has argued, 
however, that what occurred in Iraq was, to some extent, exceptional in its severity when 
considered in a wider context, and that the British Empire generally attempted to follow a 
doctrine of minimum force.113 While the use of such levels of lethal violence was relatively 
rare, threats of force were used and prepared more regularly. A large naval force was 
stationed at Malta in 1925, for example, when Mosul province was awarded by the League 
of Nations to the British mandate in Iraq.114 As this thesis will show, however, events in 
China resulted in the deployment of a far more significant force, providing an excellent 
insight into how the Royal Navy changed over the decade and responded to threats to the 
British Empire.  
What occurred in China was not shaped by grand strategy between major powers, or the 
residual impact of the First World War, but by domestic changes as some warlord groups 
attempted to build a new China and others acted simply for personal gain. It therefore 
tested the Royal Navy’s ability to react to unforeseen circumstances, where it was difficult 
to form a pro-active strategy given the lack of clearly defined opponents and allies, and 
obvious strategies that could be countered. Examining a reactionary scenario, such as the 
one in China, is therefore more likely to provide an insight into whether the Royal Navy had 
developed its capability for responding to and securing the British Empire against potential 
threats pitted against it. 
Not only did the events of the mid-1920s pose a challenge in response to which the China 
Station needed to adapt, but it added to the global picture of pressure upon the Royal 
Navy’s stretched finances. The First World War had been a severe drain on Britain’s coffers. 
Indeed, the burden of debt interest payments alone had rocketed from £16.7m (9.6% of 
budget receipts) pre-war, to £308.7m (22.4%) in 1920-21.115 Earlier historical accounts 
tended to emphasise the significance of the resulting swathing cutbacks to Britain’s defence 
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budget after the First World War, particularly through the ‘Geddes Axe’ – a planned 
reduction in public expenditure chaired by Sir Eric Geddes.116 Over the years this has been 
tempered, however, with a better understanding that while there were significant cutbacks, 
they were designed to reduce the exceptionally high wartime levels and Britain maintained 
the largest defence budget in the world throughout the 1920s.117 Nonetheless, the cutbacks 
did occur and amid inflationary stresses the Navy had greater financial concerns than it had 
done in many years.  
It was against that background that the Admiralty came under sustained pressure from the 
Foreign Office to boost its resources on China’s waterways.118 As a result, the Admiralty 
decided to finance the construction of four new gunboats and a further four motor boats 
purpose-built for use on the Yangtze from the 1925-1926 estimate, when finances were 
increasingly tight for the Royal Navy.119 While the total construction cost for these boats of 
£81,000 was hardly extraordinary in comparison to a capital ship, it represented a 
noteworthy level of expenditure on such a specific element for defending the British 
Empire’s wider interests. It was also made at a point when the Admiralty had to justify even 
the £1,600 bill for new motor boats for Singapore in direct correspondence with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.120 
The Foreign Office’s concerns about the Royal Navy’s capabilities on the China Station 
ranged from the basic monetary concern about losing an export market worth over £12 
million a year, to the growing rivalry with former ally Japan.121 There were also broader 
concerns about what impact the way in which Britain responded to the situation in China 
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would have upon the perception of the power of the British Empire among its colonial 
populations. The protests against the British presence in Shanghai were felt to be 
intrinsically linked to similar protests in Singapore, for example.122 This was to directly 
impact the work of the Royal Navy, with the cruiser HMS Dauntless being held at Singapore 
in early 1927, awaiting the arrival of the Shanghai Defence Force at its destination, in order 
to make a visible statement about British power in the region.123 Within the Foreign Office 
discussion of the decision to retain Dauntless there is clear concern that protests in China 
could easily spread to Singapore and then Malaysia, and was therefore a significant threat 
to the safety and integrity of the British Empire as a whole. 
Chapter outlines 
The China Station was the Royal Navy’s largest commitment outside of Europe, whose core 
task was to mitigate the threats posed to Britain’s interests in China. This thesis will examine 
the Royal Navy’s day-to-day work in China’s littoral regions, in order to provide new insights 
into the interwar Navy, and how it went about policing and defending the furthermost 
outposts of the British Empire. Bringing together various themes, the thesis will consider 
what impact the challenges and changes affecting the China Station in the 1920s had upon 
Britain’s foreign policy and the Royal Navy’s strategy for dealing with the full range of 
threats to the British Empire. 
The first chapter will tie together the two established, but currently separate, themes in the 
existing historiography of Britain’s position in Interwar Asia; the turning point for Britain’s 
informal empire in China, and the shift to the ‘Singapore Strategy’. After the First World War 
the Admiralty chose to retain its gunboat force on the Chinese coast, and a string of naval 
bases to support them, despite significant pressures on the naval budget. This chapter will 
therefore, in part, consider what relationship those resources had to the wider strategic 
concerns about defending against Japanese expansion in the region, and the threat that 
posed to British imperial interests. In doing so, it will show the key inter-relationship 
between Britain’s strategy for China and its corresponding one for Japan, particularly in 
terms of the viability of defending Hong Kong during the first half of the interwar period. 
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Many of the challenges faced by the Royal Navy in peacetime along China’s coastline and 
rivers were also dilemmas for the other major powers operating in the region, as well as for 
China’s local and regional authorities. With almost all the main countries affected having 
worked together previously as allies during the First World War, continued cooperation in 
peacetime could prove beneficial for all concerned. This section will focus on the China 
Station’s interactions with America’s Asiatic Fleet and Japan’s First Expeditionary Fleet. 
While the problems faced by the three powers were often identical, government policy 
frequently dictated different responses. However, this thesis will show how service 
personnel in East Asia sometimes interacted in contrast, rather than in parallel, to those at 
the top-level. In doing so, it will examine what frontline cooperation occurred and why naval 
personnel sometimes chose to go against their nation’s official policies. It should not be 
assumed that officers, trained in following orders, always acted obediently and exactly in 
line with their instructions. This is all crucial in order understand more precisely the role of 
navies in interwar international relations, when they often served as extensions of their 
nations’ diplomatic corps. The conduct of naval officers on deployment could shape foreign 
policy and define how countries were perceived worldwide. 
With that strategic position established, the second chapter will then consider the China 
Station’s peacetime role in interwar British foreign policy, along with the challenges posed 
by the revolution and subsequent civil wars in China. It will look at what Britain sought to 
influence, control, and protect, and how those priorities translated into requirements for 
the Royal Navy. The lightweight sloops and gunboats that formed two thirds of the China 
Station’s standing force were clearly not there to counter the IJN, which regularly sent 
battlecruisers and cruisers on tours of the Chinese ports.124 The peacetime work against 
piracy and banditry, and the efforts to keep Britain’s imperial outposts in China secure 
during a period of turmoil, must therefore be considered to fully understand the 
development of Britain’s naval presence in East Asia. The second chapter will provide the 
context as to why so many local defence vessels were posted to China and how that force 
evolved over the 1920s. In particular, it will outline how the piracy problem was a relatively 
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new one, and how the Royal Navy attempted to work with both British imperial and Chinese 
authorities in dealing with it. 
The second chapter will then go on to examine how the evolving crisis in China from 1925 
pushed the Navy’s stretched resources to breaking point. What happened in and around 
Shanghai in 1927 may feature heavily in histories of the British Empire’s relationship with 
China, but it also triggered the most significant peacetime deployment of naval power by 
the Admiralty in the entire interwar period. This will address the near-complete absence of 
that task force from the existing naval historiography, putting events into greater context, 
and taking another step further away from the ‘Road to 1939’ narrative of interwar 
developments. The chapter will then move on to show why the events in China were 
considered important enough to elicit such a pronounced response, both in their own rights 
and against a background fear in Whitehall of a global Soviet plot to undermine the British 
Empire. 
With the 1920s Royal Navy required to respond to those challenges, the third chapter will 
examine the operational impact of new technology on the China Station, as one source of 
solutions to the emergent problems. The development of wireless communication, faster 
vessels, and effective military aircraft provided the potential to transform the way in which 
the post-First World War Navy went about its role in supporting the British Empire. 
Technology played an important role in reinforcing the international prestige of both the 
Navy and the wider British Empire. Research on military innovation during the interwar 
period has frequently focused upon major power conflicts, to the neglect of its role in ‘little 
wars’ and peace, which is something this chapter will address.125 
This chapter will examine the adoption and use of new technology on the China Station 
during the 1920s, in three key areas. Firstly, it will consider the role technology played 
during the decade in reinforcing imperial prestige, ‘waving the flag’, as a means of 
strengthening Britain’s influence in the region. Secondly, exploring the roll-out of wireless 
equipment, for example, the chapter will consider how technology affected the Navy’s 
ability to both understand and control how its warships went about their peacetime work at 
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the periphery of empire.126 In doing so, it will also consider to what extent the outcomes 
were intentional, as a result of deliberate efforts by the Royal Navy to address the 
challenges it faced in East Asia. HMS Hermes’ deployment will be assessed as a part of this, 
exploring how public explanations for sending Britain’s first purpose-built aircraft carrier to 
China did not match the Admiralty’s secret motivation. Events in China played an important 
role in providing an excuse to contravene the terms of the Washington Treaty, with the 
findings of great significance to existing discussions about the later ‘Allied’ nations’ attitudes 
towards the Treaty. Finally, the bombardments conducted by British warships at Wanxian 
(Wanhsien) and Nanjing (Nanking) will be assessed from a technical perspective. Those 
events were pivotal moments in Britain’s relationship with China, but so far no-one has 
attempted objectively to weigh the wildly different casualty estimates or to consider the 
wider naval factors behind the outcomes. This may not change our understanding of the 
outcomes of those events, but it will provide significantly greater depth to our knowledge of 
what happened and why. 
The fourth chapter will go beyond technology and finance to consider the human factor and 
how willingly naval officers adopted new tactics and ideas. The chapter will consider three 
key questions: Did the China Station display any indication of pro-actively adopting new 
ideas and tactics? What impact did the presence of new ideas, or continued use of outdated 
approaches, have on the work done by the China Station? Lastly, were the tactics used 
selected by junior officers in the course of their work, the Commander in Chief of the China 
Station, or were they imposed by the Admiralty? The chapter will therefore feed into the 
existing discussion both of anti-intellectualism in the Royal Navy and Nicholas Lambert’s 
argument about the speed with which centralised command and control was adopted.127  
A key feature of that discussion will be a review of when the Royal Navy’s attitude towards 
using Victorian ‘gunboat diplomacy’ tactics in China changed and how. This chapter will give 
an indication of the extent to which the Austen Chamberlain’s 1926 December 
Memorandum influenced the China Station’s operating procedures, and so how tangible the 
link was between changing diplomatic and military approaches to China. In doing so, it will 
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look at the three different levels involved – the Foreign Office, the Royal Navy’s senior 
command, and those junior officers on the scene. While many imperial histories treat the 
Royal Navy as a uniform entity, there was considerable variety in officers’ attitudes and 
behaviour, influenced by human and institutional factors. This chapter will then go on to 
explore the surge in the number of officers who arrived on the scene in 1927 and the 
significance they had upon events. The introduction of so many ship captains who were 
unused to the local circumstances, and who had minimal knowledge of Britain’s strategy for 
China, was highly influential in the outcome of key events and is one that has previously 
been overlooked. 
In making these assessments, the main source of official files has been The National 
Archives at Kew, particularly those from the Admiralty, Cabinet, Foreign Office, and War 
Office. Along with Hansard, those files play a vital role in establishing the official accounts of 
the British government and Royal Navy, as well as revealing the discussions behind those 
top-level decisions. As this thesis is intended to examine what was happening on the scene 
in East Asia, however, and those files tend to only provide an official, British narrative and 
view of global developments, a much wider selection of source material has been examined. 
This has been particularly important when dealing with controversial events, such as the 
Nanjing Incident, where officers appear to have been less inclined to discuss aspects that did 
not reflect well on the Royal Navy or British government, or might prove overly damaging to 
an officer’s career. 
To provide that broader picture, this thesis makes considerable use of the private papers – 
including diaries, letters, memoirs, and photographs – belonging to a range of individuals 
present in China during the 1920s. To get the granularity of detail about specific decisions, 
attitudes, and events, as well as gauge to the wider feeling among the fleet’s personnel, a 
concerted effort has been made to use a wide variety of accounts. These have come from 
several different archives: The National Museum of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine 
Museum in Portsmouth; the special collections held by King’s College London, the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Leeds University, and the National Maritime Museum. 
The Imperial War Museum in London, however, has been particularly important both given 
the depth of the resources available, but also as its Oral History series enables the historian 
to actually hear the voices of the past and get a better sense of an individual’s feelings. 
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While examining all these accounts, this thesis has taken a spread from across all naval 
ranks from Boy Seamen to Admiral of the Fleet, as well as those of civilians living and 
working in the region. That variety has demonstrated the significant differences of opinion 
held by various naval officers, at times, and how that affected key decisions. The ADM 196 
series of Admiralty personnel files held at The National Archives played an important role in 
these assessments, by providing background aptitudes and attitudes of the officers whose 
views and actions were being considered. 
There have been frequent incidences where information in official files has not completely 
tallied with that in private papers, or vice versa, where it has been necessary to look to 
alternative sources for verification. The China Station’s ships logs - ADM 53 series – held at 
The National Archives has been one such example, providing basic but often vital details 
about each ship’s day-to-day duties and how they responded at times of crisis. Newspaper 
archives have also played an important role, along with photograph collections, in providing 
the general colour of what key groups felt or were doing. There have been cases where the 
accuracy of the newspapers, particularly those produced in Britain’s imperial outposts, has 
been decidedly questionable. Where newspaper articles have made false and exaggerated 
claims exceeding those of even irascible naval officers defending their reputations, such as 
Captain Hugh England, it has further supported arguments by Robert Bickers’ and Nicholas 
Clifford about the extreme attitudes of Britain’s ‘Spoilt Children of Empire’.128 
The defence of Britain’s expatriate population in China was a core role for the Royal Navy, 
and so the interactions between the two required studying from both perspectives. A key 
source of that correspondence has been the council papers of Shanghai’s International 
Settlement, held by the Shanghai Municipal Archives. Along with the files of the China 
Association held at SOAS, these have never previously been reviewed by a naval or military 
historian and provide a range of insights about how the defence of informal Empire actually 
operated. From revealing the pressure placed upon the Navy’s officers as pseudo-diplomats 
in addressing the concerns of those expatriate populations, to the effectiveness of the 
various Treaty Port volunteer corps, these are entirely new details to the field. Where 
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possible, efforts have been made to utilise non-British sources to add to this wider 
perspective, particularly through American and French accounts. Gaining access to and 
translating Chinese accounts from the period has proven problematic, in practical terms, 
and so the thesis relies heavily on the works of other historians to provide that perspective. 
It has been possible, however, to obtain valuable new insights into Chinese, Japanese, and 
Dutch viewpoints through the use of the Government Code and Cypher School decrypted 
files in the National Archives’ HW 12 series.
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Chapter One: Between China and Japan, the China Station’s strategic balance 
 
An exploration of the Royal Navy’s China Station and its main deployments during the 1920s 
should consider how those operational demands were balanced against wider strategic 
concerns. There are already many histories about the nature of Britain’s interwar 
relationship with Japan and how the China Station was positioned to counter Japan’s 
growing power in the region.1 That historiography examines the gradually worsening ties as 
the two countries moved slowly towards the ultimate clash during the Second World War. 
Few accounts, however, consider the naval and geo-political implications of Britain’s 
changing involvement in China and the inter-relationship between the various power 
struggles occurring in East Asia at the time. In discussing Hong Kong’s position within the 
Royal Navy’s long term planning, for example, even Bell’s broader approach to the topic did 
not explore the extent to which maintaining that naval base had to do with neighbouring 
China.2 This chapter will avoid delving too far into existing debates about the shift towards a 
Singapore-focused grand strategy, but will add to the discussion over why Britain 
maintained a modest force at such a relatively exposed outpost. In particular, it will look to 
explore how events involving the second-tier powers influenced the grand strategies of the 
major powers, bringing together the often-detached realms of imperial and naval history. 
Some of the key events involving the 1920s China Station, which will be explored in greater 
detail during later chapters, will be also placed in context, identifying their significance in 
wider regional developments. 
There are four broad areas that will be explored to consider fully China and the China 
Station’s position within the 1920s East Asian naval power struggles. Firstly, the nature, 
disposition, and operational employment of the China Station will be examined, looking at 
what it was intended to achieve in relation to the two regional rivals. Secondly, Britain’s 
changing strategy for maintaining bases in the region, which has been a feature of existing 
discussion, will be expanded to explore their role in relation to China, including the often-
overlooked withdrawal from Weihai. Thirdly, the chapter will explore the degree of 
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cooperation and conflict that occurred between Britain, China, Japan, and the other 
European powers with interests in the region. Lastly, it will be considered what role America 
played as a rising influence over regional events and the extent to which Anglo-American 
naval interactions around China influenced Britain’s East Asian strategy. Together the four 
sections will provide more depth to the existing understanding of Britain’s interwar plans for 
East Asia, and how naval strategy was influenced by concerns about China as well as Japan. 
In doing so, the chapter will delineate between Britain’s Far Eastern strategy and Anglo-
Japanese relations, to treat events in the 1920s in context rather than with the hindrance of 
hindsight about what happened in 1941. 
The geo-strategic environment 
Britain’s diplomatic relationship with Asia’s two main powers, China and Japan, developed 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century along quite different lines. Whereas there 
remained a degree of official intransigence and sometimes outright hostility between Britain 
and China, events with Japan slowly moved towards the signing of the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty in 1902. That alliance, however, was in reality little more than a marriage of 
convenience and gives a false impression about the strength of the bond between the two 
countries. Britain faced the conflicting aims of wanting to keep its East Asian interests 
secure, while simultaneously concentrating the Royal Navy’s power in and around European 
waters to mitigate worsening ties with Germany.3 In return, Japan sought a powerful ally to 
help strengthen its hand against Russia, particularly by removing the threat of third-party 
interference from France or Italy.4  
Almost before the ink was dry, the global power balance was shifting to undermine the 
common perceived threats that lay at the heart of the alliance. Beginning with Japan’s 
victory over Russia in 1905, the temporary incentives binding Japan and Britain together 
started to dissipate. The complete naval victory gained at Tsushima by the IJN eliminated 
what was previously the second largest naval force in East Asia, after the Royal Navy, and 
with it cemented Japan’s position as a serious regional power.5 Germany’s East Asian Cruiser 
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Squadron would eventually fill the gulf left by Russia as a prominent third naval power in the 
region, but only really in 1914 during the march to war.6 More immediately, the complete 
victory at Tsushima triggered growing concern within the British establishment about Japan 
itself. That debate was stoked by the sudden realisation that Japan had emerged as a 
growing military power, but much of the fuel came from a deep underlying racial distrust of 
the Japanese in general. As early as 1909, for example, reports of Japanese agents operating 
in the Xinjiang province of China provoked near-paranoia among British officials, concerned 
about a threat to the northern border of India.7 While with hindsight it seems unlikely those 
agents, if indeed they actually were spies, might have been exploring invasion routes, the 
incident serves to highlight British suspicion about Japan’s strategic plans. Britain did not 
expect the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to be a permanent arrangement.8 
The alliance survived into the First World War as situations still arose where it proved 
invaluable to both nations, particularly in China where their interests overlapped. 
Throughout the Wuchang Uprising, forming the first months of the Xinhai Revolution, the 
two navies cooperated to protect their interests in the treaty ports from riot damage. While 
that mutual assistance was not extended without reservations, it occurred against a 
backdrop where the various foreign powers in China were generally not on cordial terms. 
Compared with the alternative potential allies, continued Anglo-Japanese cooperation 
remained the preferred choice. In contrast, German officials were reportedly extremely 
antagonistic in their attitude towards other nations’ navies, above all in their dealings with 
the Imperial Japanese Navy. That hostility led to one situation in 1911 that serves well to 
show how the Anglo-Japanese alliance remained relevant to both parties. 
During times of trouble in such remote locations, even when cooperation between different 
navies was conducted reluctantly, it was generally accepted that rank would be mutually 
respected, and the highest-ranking officer present would lead the multinational response. 
When Vice-Admiral Alfred Winsloe prepared to leave Hankou, which would involve his 
relinquishing command as the senior international naval officer present, the Japanese 
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ambassador in London lobbied the British government to instruct Winsloe to remain in 
place. Had he departed as planned then the next in line to take command was a German 
officer, a possibility that the Japanese found intolerable. After due consideration, the 
Admiralty ordered Winsloe to remain at Hankou a little longer in acquiescence to the 
Japanese request.9 That decision was aided by British suspicions that German officers had 
hidden agendas, given reports at the time that Germany was training Chinese soldiers. In 
such situations, both allies worked willingly together in China, although perhaps with a 
sense of resignation that it was due to a lack of viable alternatives rather than an ideal 
union. 
The First World War ultimately steered the uncertain alliance on its course towards 
complete collapse, starting with the very first month of the conflict. Japan’s government 
hesitated almost three weeks, after German troops entered Belgium triggering Britain’s 
entry into the European conflict, before finally declaring war. That delay caused significant 
friction with the British government, because it was perceived as Japan failing to honour the 
spirit of the alliance.10 In return, the British government formally notified Japan in 1914 that 
an agreement had been signed with the USA making it unlikely that Britain would join a 
conflict between the two Pacific powers.11 Nonetheless, the biggest influence upon Anglo-
Japanese relations as a result of the war was an indirect one, heavily linked to China.  
Expanding Japanese economic activity in China, particularly in the Yangtze valley, was 
already causing friction between the allies when war broke out in 1914.12 The British 
Empire’s dominance over trade with China had declined from a peak of 80% in the 1870s to 
just under 50% by 1913, but faced further fierce competition during the war years. 13 As 
Britain’s resources were increasingly focused on the war effort, Japanese businesses were 
free to step into the resulting trading void, accelerating the pace of the existing trend. This 
was part of a much wider picture in which British dominance of global merchandise exports 
was generally waning, with its market share almost cut by half between 1870 and 1929. 
While the USA played the primary role in that decline, the displacement of British trade by 
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Japanese businesses was particularly pronounced in China. Between 1872 and 1921, for 
example, Japan was the single largest source of foreign direct investment into Shanghai. 14  
In conjunction with that economic challenge, the war also increased the relative growth in 
Japan’s military and diplomatic hard power. In roughly twenty-five years, Japan had gone 
from having a navy barely worthy of note to creating a force capable of causing significant 
damage to the Royal Navy, and with it Britain’s position in East Asia.15 As a result, 
background suspicion started to solidify into official caution, with intelligence-sharing and 
joint-planning with Japan cut to a minimum by the end of the war.16 This was not purely a 
British attitude towards its Asian ally, with Japan also increasingly wary of its European 
counterpart and taking similar steps to limit its collaboration.17 
What was occurring during this period, however, was not just a one-way process of Britain 
becoming suspicious of their nominal ally. Britain’s temporary wartime alliance with Japan’s 
main regional rival, America, had highlighted the degree to which Anglo-American defence 
interests overlapped, and how well their forces could work together. Just as Japan had 
become a potential threat to Britain’s interests, it looked increasingly likely that Britain 
would side with America in a Pacific conflict. Indeed, Japanese suspicions about the latter 
scenario were quite close to the truth. Even before its official expiration in 1921, the 
Admiralty had already issued orders stating that in the event of war between America and 
Japan, the China Station was to ignore the alliance and prepare to assist America.18 There 
were factors at play in the final few years, particularly after David Beatty’s appointment as 
First Sea Lord, which pushed the relationship between Britain and Japan into rapid decline.19 
Japanese commentary on the Indian independence movement in 1919, for example, in 
response to Britain’s heavy-handed policies on the sub-continent was interpreted as an 
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effort to undermine the British Empire.20 The collapse, however, had been long in coming 
and was not just a result of Beatty triggering a sudden reassessment, within the Admiralty, 
of the potential threat posed by Japan. Entering the 1920s, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 
still in place, but the treaty was largely worthless and in practicality the two countries had 
long regarded each-other with suspicion as potential threats. 
Looking at East Asia in 1919, British officials would have seen a region dominated by recent 
wartime allies, but few of whom could be counted on as true friendly states. The marriage 
of convenience with Japan was approaching a potentially acrimonious divorce. America was 
returning to its previous international isolation, while simultaneously challenging Britain 
economically, militarily, and geo-politically worldwide. France, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal were seen as supportive powers, although they were no longer in a position 
materially to assist Britain in East Asia. Russia had new Soviet leadership and presented an 
apparently existential threat to the British Empire. Britain’s response to the heated 
environment in China, and the challenges posed by the leading Chinese factions, had to be 
weighed against that new geo-strategic background. 
The right warships in the right places? 
In 1904 the Commander-in-Chief of the China Station, Admiral Cyprian Bridge, wrote to the 
Admiralty arguing for a radical change to the structure and operational deployment of his 
force. Within his argument he stated that the China Station was actually split into two very 
different squadrons, one of gunboats and one true naval fleet. Bridge proposed retiring his 
gunboat force, given that he felt they were maintained for political purposes and had little 
military value.21 The request was denied by the Admiralty, but it does serve to highlight one 
of the long-standing unusual features of the China Station – it was not really a single 
command. While the precise dispositions had changed since Bridge’s time, particularly 
during the First World War interlude, entering the 1920s the situation was very similar to 
that in 1904.22 The China Station was still split between ocean-going vessels intended for 
battle at sea against other major powers, such as America or Japan, and a brown-water 
force of smaller warships for littoral operations.  
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Possessing a mixture of vessel types was not unusual in itself for a naval station, but the 
China Station’s size and split between fleet and patrol vessels does make it stand out, as the 
challenges it faced exceeded those at most other locations. The Africa and East Indies 
stations, for example, had both cruisers to protect trade routes and smaller sloops for 
counter-piracy and other naval policing work. In practice, however, the handful of warships 
posted to most naval stations around the world were only sufficient to deter lone mid-sized 
raiders, should war break out.23 In contrast, the China Station was the third largest global 
deployment of Royal Navy warships, even if it was still relatively lightweight when compared 
with the fleets in home waters and the Mediterranean.  
While the cruisers and submarines posted to China were nominally there to deter Japanese 
aggression, the force was still relatively small and exposed if truly intended to achieve that 
goal. The world’s third largest navy was based only a few days sailing away from Hong Kong. 
That position has previously been explained through exploring the expectation in Whitehall, 
prior to 1931, that Britain would potentially have had thirty to sixty days warning in which to 
prepare for war with Japan.24 Even three weeks would have provided sufficient time to 
despatch a task force from Malta, although war orders stated that the fleet would only 
initially sail as far as Singapore.25 Built around a squadron of Iron Duke class battleships at 
first, that relief force could potentially rendezvous with the China Station in the vicinity of 
Hong Kong within a week of leaving Singapore.26 The full battle fleet was expected to be 
able to join from home waters in the following two weeks, providing an overwhelming naval 
force at Hong Kong within a maximum of 54 days of being ordered to sail by the Admiralty.27 
Once the fleet controlled the South China Sea, securing British imperial territory, the Navy’s 
cruisers would begin a campaign of attrition, which it was hoped would slowly force Japan 
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to seek a settlement.28 In the following six weeks, two infantry divisions would also arrive 
ready for deployment in and around Hong Kong, assuming it had survived any initial 
Japanese assault.29  
Even in the early 1920s four to eight weeks represented a significant lag, during which time 
the China Station would have been exposed to attack from Japan. Most explanations so far 
have focused on the submarines present at Hong Kong, suggesting that they could, or were 
at least expected to be able to, delay any Japanese advance across East Asia during the 
critical first two months of a conflict.30 These fit with the plans for the station’s cruisers and 
light vessels to harry the Japanese advance, while falling back upon Singapore.31 Likewise, 
Joseph Moretz has discussed a theoretical study from 1921 looking at a Japanese assault on 
Hong Kong via landings in Mirs Bay, which suggested that the city might be able to hold out 
for a couple of months, although it was ultimately inconclusive over the final result.32 With 
such a delay, the balance of global naval power was still in Britain’s favour during the 
1920s.33 It has been proposed that the focus on enforcing global naval disarmament treaties 
was felt by Whitehall to keep a lid on Japanese naval development, to ensure a British naval 
task force to East Asia would be dominant for the foreseeable future.34 These points do 
provide a solid basis for understanding Britain’s grand strategy for dealing with Japan, but all 
assume either complacency or a cold detachment in the Admiralty’s leaving its third largest 
force, and associated ground forces, exposed to destruction before help could arrive. That 
risk was all the greater when considering that the Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron spent much 
of the year based not at Hong Kong, protected by shore batteries and submarines, but at 
undefended Weihai, some 400 miles closer to Japan.35 
To better understand the decisions behind that vulnerable position, it is crucial to consider 
that the Admiralty was operating under the assumption that Japan would not declare war 
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outright against Great Britain. As with America’s ‘Plan Red’ envisioning a theoretical future 
war with the British Empire, the Royal Navy also had to plan for every eventuality.36 Those 
scenarios included surprise attacks by Japan against Singapore, even if they were considered 
unlikely in the short-term.37 Believing such a direct attack was improbable was not 
unreasonable or unrealistic at the time, given that there were few British possessions in East 
Asia of sufficient potential strategic value to Japan, either economic or military, that would 
justify risking a major war. Instead, the Admiralty believed that the most likely cause of 
conflict would come either from Japan first clashing with America or through a Japanese 
campaign of expansion in China spiralling out of control.38 While events in 1941 saw the 
former scenario ultimately come to fruition, during the 1920s it was the latter that 
presented the greatest risk to Britain and largely dictated the Royal Navy’s strategy for the 
China Station. 
The Admiralty’s war orders issued in 1920 and updated in 1924 made clear that they did not 
expect or desire a war with Japan, but acknowledged that a Japanese territorial drive in 
northern China appeared increasingly likely. Such a campaign might then trigger a wider 
conflict and draw in the major powers.39 The belief that a campaign of imperial expansion 
was imminent stemmed back to Japan’s having issued the Twenty-One Demands to China in 
1915.40 That ultimatum sought Chinese acceptance of Japan’s acquisition of the former 
German concessions in Shandong, along with further extra-territorial rights that would 
effectively turn China into a Japanese protectorate.41 Coming without advance notice, taking 
the Foreign Office by surprise, and with serious implications for Britain’s position in China, 
the episode also played a part in the slow decline of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.42 No 
longer distracted by its peripheral role in the First World War, Japan was free to focus on an 
underlying desire to acquire territory and build its own empire. It was not certain that the 
resulting imperial drive would aim west into China, with an alternative maritime policy 
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considered, which would have primarily targeted the Dutch East Indies.43 Ultimately, 
however, Japanese expansionism came to focus upon the Asian mainland. 
During a series of Royal Navy War College lectures between 1924 and 1925, there were a 
number of presentations exploring the risk of a war with Japan and the power balance in 
East Asia. Listing the four possible causes of such a war, for example, Lieutenant 
Commander Arthur Armitage placed events in China as the most likely to occur. Exploring 
that risk in detail, Lieutenant Commander Ivan Franks produced a full complementary 
lecture discussing how events in China could trigger just such as war with Japan.44 In 
contrast, the three alternative scenarios that were seen as plausible were all ones in which 
Britain would have some influence over when and in what way it might become involved. 
The first of these was a Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, which was seen as a 
potentially fast-moving event, where Britain would most likely choose militarily to support 
the Netherlands. As Japan would have attacked a neutral power, Britain would have had 
some leeway to delay a declaration of war, allowing time to ready the fleet and potentially 
form a multinational coalition. Likewise, the other two cases that were explored revolved 
around escalating diplomatic crises caused by Japanese attempts to push for immigration 
rights in British colonies, or through interference in India. Both those proposals appear to 
have involved Britain instigating the conflict, primarily as a pre-emptive move to defend 
control over India.45  
It is unclear whether Whitehall felt that Japanese imperial expansion in northern China 
alone was sufficient to provoke a diplomatic crisis that would lead to a war directly with 
Britain, or whether it just opened the door to an environment where Britain might be drawn 
into a conflict. The latter seems more likely though, given that if Japan’s territorial appetites 
were being satiated in the north, it might deflect them away from Britain’s primary areas of 
interest in the Yangtze and south.46 Japanese expansion in northern China might also 
distract or apply pressure on the Soviet Union, which would also be of benefit to British 
foreign policy. What is clear, however, is the way in which the Admiralty intended to 
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respond in either event, in conjunction with the wider defence apparatus of the British 
Empire. The Royal Navy’s war orders proposed that the China Station should instigate a 
managed retreat of military and civilian personnel, and assets from northern China and the 
Yangtze. Should that process occur in the face of a direct war with Japan then the submarine 
flotilla was expected to play a crucial role in warding off an attack on Hong Kong and 
harrying Japanese advances. Emphasis was placed on the China Station’s warships following 
unusual patterns of behaviour, to avoid the British naval force being located and destroyed. 
Precise interpretation of that instruction was left to individual commanders, but it is likely 
that the Admiralty meant warships should attempt to plot routes unexpected by their 
adversary if hostilities were considered probable. The key protective element to the plans, 
however, was that the managed retreat would occur when a situation had developed in 
China that could lead to a war with Japan, and therefore before Britain was a formal 
participant in the hostilities.47 
With the naval antennae of the British Empire falling back on Hong Kong, the Commander-
in-Chief, China was ordered to assume additional control of the East Indies Station, and the 
Admiralty strongly suggested he should then concentrate his two squadrons at Singapore. 
From that position guarding the Strait of Malacca, the combined group of six to eight 
cruisers was considered sufficient to hold off any provisional IJN forays into the Indian 
Ocean, intercept all Japanese merchant vessels, and wait while the battle fleet steamed to 
their relief. As the Rear Admiral formerly commanding the East Indies Station was instructed 
to assume control of the naval forces defending Singapore, the strengthened China force 
may then have been expected to return to Hong Kong, once reinforced by the battle fleet. 
Crucially, the 1920 set of orders and all those issued throughout the rest of the decade only 
loosely referred to a war involving Japan in China, one which might not initially include 
Britain as a combatant.48 Those preparations for war might therefore occur while Britain 
was still at peace. In either event, the Admiralty did not believe that British possessions 
would be primary objectives in a Japanese campaign, allowing enough time for that 
managed retreat to occur. 
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Central to the Admiralty’s planning was an assumption that no other naval power would ally 
itself with Japan, allowing the Royal Navy to concentrate its force against a single, weaker 
opponent. In a 1923 revision to the war orders, for example, the Admiralty outlined that the 
three main possibilities where Japan might seek to form an alliance were Germany, Russia, 
and China, none of which posed a significant direct threat to the Royal Navy at that point.49 
Moreover, given that the Admiralty saw a Japanese invasion of China as the most likely 
trigger of British involvement in an East Asian conflict, it was probable that Britain could 
form a working alliance with some of the Chinese warlords.  
During his time as Commander-in-Chief of the China Station, Admiral Arthur Leveson 
emphasised to the Admiralty how important he felt it was that Britain should seek Chinese 
support. Leveson argued that Japan would find it difficult to seize Hong Kong quickly should 
Britain have either tacit or explicit support from China, presumably referring to the 
Guomindang given their control of Guangdong province.50 Nor did Leveson’s opinions come 
as the lone voice of a diligent but distant station commander. Rear Admiral Herbert 
Richmond as Commander-in-Chief of the neighbouring East Indies Station, repeated the 
proposals in the following year.51 Their ideas addressed one of the key concerns raised in 
the 1912 review of the plans to defend Hong Kong, which identified the greatest threat as 
one coming from a land-based attack from the direction of Guangzhou, a thrust that would 
render the harbour largely defenceless. The Committee for Imperial Defence had agreed 
with that earlier report, and predicted that 4,000 men could overcome the city from 
landward, but China was the only power in the position to arrange such an attack at short 
notice. 52 An amphibious assault against the island of Hong Kong itself would be at the mercy 
of Britain’s submarines, shore batteries, and by the 1920s potentially any military aircraft 
that might have been despatched to the colony. Preventing Japan, or indeed any other 
major power, from moving troops through Guangdong province was therefore seen as 
pivotal in securing Hong Kong. 
Two interesting points are raised by the tactical assumptions made by Leveson and 
Richmond for the potential defence of Hong Kong. Firstly, it seems strange that the Foreign 
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Office did not put greater effort into building a better relationship with the Chinese 
authorities in Guangzhou, considering that the Royal Navy recognised the strategic value of 
doing so. Secondly, the neglect of land-facing defences at Singapore in the 1930s appears 
even more complacent, when the not so dissimilar planning for Hong Kong in the 1920s had 
emphasised the vulnerability of naval harbours to an indirect attack. The latter is a little 
tangential to this study, and so should be left for future histories of Singapore, but the 
former is particularly pertinent.  
It appears that discussion of potentially allying with China in the event of a war with Japan 
did not, at least officially, go beyond the Admiralty. The most plausible explanation is that 
for much of the 1920s it was China, and increasingly the Guomindang, that the Foreign 
Office and Admiralty saw as the greatest threat to Britain’s position in Hong Kong. In June 
1925, for example, the Committee of Imperial Defence considered that growing anti-
imperial sentiment among Han Chinese populations presented a ‘menacing’ situation that 
threatened the security of both Hong Kong and Singapore.53 Shared aspects of identity, 
culture, and language meant that there was the potential for Guomindang anti-imperial 
rhetoric to spread unrest to two of Britain’s key imperial outposts. In contrast, while there 
was growing concern about Japan’s long-term ambitions, senior members of the Royal Navy 
repeatedly emphasised that they believed Britain’s relationship with Japan to be 
satisfactory.54 If the British authorities saw China as the greater threat for much of the 
1920s, it does raise the question about the extent to which the China Station was actually 
deployed to counter that threat, and not the longer-term theoretical one from Japan. 
China – Friend or Foe? 
Head-to-head the Chinese navy of the 1920s was no match for the Royal Navy, even if 
operating as a single body, which was far from likely given that the allegiance of individual 
warships was often unclear and did change between warlords. Chinese naval power in 1920 
was based around eight out-dated cruisers, mostly built on-order for the Qing regime, some 
of which had already been downgraded to armoured transport vessels. The Qing had 
ordered a range of newer vessels prior to the revolution from western powers, but those 
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warships were subsequently sold on to third parties after the revolution, while still under 
construction.55 The largest available in 1920 therefore, the Hai Chi, was twenty-two years 
old and over a thousand tonnes lighter than the smallest British cruisers in use after the First 
World War.56 To place China’s naval power in perspective, the single Kongo class 
battlecruiser spotted leading a Japanese squadron off Weihai and around the Yellow Sea in 
1924, could deliver a broadside greater than the entire Chinese Navy at the time.57 A 
pitched battle with one of the major powers’ navies would not have ended well for China. In 
turn, the Royal Navy had far more pressing concerns, both in East Asia and globally, than the 
relatively limited threat posed by a head-on confrontation with China. 
While they were incapable of fighting a decisive battle against a major power, the Chinese 
cruisers nonetheless posed a real threat to the Royal Navy’s gunboats and sloops, with 
whom they had frequent contact, and to Britain’s interests ashore. The Chinese Southern 
Navy, for example, attracted much attention in 1920 while based on the Pearl River, just a 
few hours journey from Hong Kong. The targeted intelligence reports being gathered by the 
Royal Navy at that point suggest a degree of concern about the warships, particularly the 
political leanings of their crews after they refused to sail and join the Northern Navy.58 That 
relatively small Chinese force was still sufficient to cause the Royal Navy a significant 
headache among the warren of waterways around Guangzhou, where the West River 
gunboats would be at risk of ambush. Those fears proved groundless in the end as over the 
following three years the Southern Navy’s warships spent much of their time in port with 
their crews ashore.59 After 1923 the Chinese factions made greater use of their naval 
resources, but by then the main warships had finally travelled up to join the North East 
Fleet, in and around the Yellow Sea, and so posed less of an imminent threat to British 
interests.  
Divided up between the different Chinese factions there were also three small destroyers, 
ten heavy gunboats, and at least twenty-three other fighting vessels of various types, which 
operated under different allegiances over the years.60 As with the cruisers, these posed no 
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real threat to the Royal Navy as a whole, but there were sufficient of these lesser naval 
vessels to overwhelm the China Station’s often isolated gunboats. With an influx of modern 
artillery into China after the First World War, Britain’s gunboats also reported a growing 
challenge of being fired upon from riverbanks and shorelines, with weapons increasingly 
capable of causing critical damage.61 In combination, this meant that the Royal Navy’s 
gunboat force faced the growing prospect of having its bluff called. Gunboats could be an 
effective tool for threatening to use force, but in isolation the same gunboats were a liability 
against organised opposition possessing relatively modern heavy weaponry both afloat and 
ashore. The Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron’s presence in East Asia was therefore not solely 
intended to deter Japan and protect sea lanes, but also provided supporting capacity to 
maintain British naval dominance over China. Without that squadron, both the China 
Station’s gunboats and Britain’s imperial interests in the region would have been left 
extremely vulnerable to the threat of attack. Questions would arise about whether the 
British Empire really remained the global superpower.  
The presence of large British warships presented a deterrent reminder that the Royal Navy 
could take significant punitive action against anyone who attacked British interests. While 
this did mean that the cruiser squadron was exposed to a potential surprise attack, the 
Admiralty did not believe Japan would consider launching one in the short-term. Nor was 
Britain really capable of developing an alternative strategy. In dealing with China the British 
government could, and in 1927 did, post additional infantry battalions as a show of strength, 
but without the mobility provided by the Navy those troops could only protect British 
interests at one or two major ports, such as Shanghai. The RAF could potentially provide a 
cheaper and agile deterrent, in a similar style to its previous employment in the Middle East, 
but again the RAF would still struggle to cover more than a few Treaty Ports.62 A sustained 
RAF deployment east of Singapore also brought with it other problems. Given the limited 
range of interwar military aircraft, an aerial deterrent would require a number of official 
military airfields, which when publicly announced would have been taken by Japan and 
America as a breach of the Washington Treaty.63 With Britain’s grand strategy predicated on 
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maintaining the limitations enclosed within that treaty, Whitehall was careful to avoid 
providing Britain’s rivals with an excuse to abandon the agreement.64 A naval solution was 
therefore the only one that could bridge the contrasting demands of providing effective 
strategies for countering the threats posed by both China and Japan. 
There were few alternatives for the structure of the naval force itself. Until the planned 
upgrades to Singapore were completed, there were no docks east of Suez large enough for 
the Royal Navy’s battlecruisers and only one capable of making basic repairs to some of its 
battleships.65 It was not operationally feasible, therefore, for a stronger battle fleet to be 
sustained in East Asia, even if the Admiralty were willing or able to consider amending its 
grand strategy. To do so would also have involved heightened financial costs. Estimates in 
1922 placed the premium of posting a battleship overseas, compared to a domestic base, at 
£11,000 per annum and that of a destroyer flotilla at £18,800.66 Roughly two-thirds of the 
supplementary expense was attributed to greater use of fuel because warships posted 
overseas were expected to spend an average of ten additional days at sea. The remainder 
largely came from transporting and storing armament and ammunition supplies.67 While 
only roughly a ten-percent increase in direct expenditure, when combined with increased 
wear on the vessels themselves moving a single battleship would realistically match the cost 
of constructing a brand-new gunboat every year.68  
Once Singapore’s facilities were fully upgraded the Admiralty did plan for the China Station 
to merge with the East Indies Station and become a ‘Future Peace Fleet’, built around a core 
of three battlecruisers, eleven cruisers, and two destroyer flotillas.69 Strengthened to that 
degree, Britain’s East Asian fleet would have been better suited to balance the opposing 
risks presented by China and Japan. The larger warships would be based safely beyond the 
range of a sudden strike from Japan at Singapore, at least in theory, while remaining close 
enough to quickly reach China’s littoral regions. As events played out the balance of naval 
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power swung further towards Japan before those facilities were complete. In 1923, 
however, the Royal Navy saw its solution as an acceptable, and crucially temporary, risk. 
Surplus to requirements: the China Station ashore 
Large docks for the repair of capital ships, such as those being developed at Singapore, were 
not the only harbour requirements that influenced the operational capabilities and strategic 
planning of the Royal Navy in East Asia. Equally, strategic planning over how to contain 
threats from Japan and China influenced the decisions made about the future of the full 
range of naval bases in the region, and not just the major ones. While the China Station was 
focused around three main harbours at Hong Kong, Singapore, and Weihai, the Royal Navy 
had built up a collection of facilities across a wide range of regional ports over the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. Shanghai, for example, hosted Royal Navy logistics facilities that 
were crucial for supporting the British naval deployment on the Yangtze, particularly in 
terms of fuel storage. Around 1890, there were further storage bases maintained by the 
Royal Navy at Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou, Zhenjiang, and Jiujiang (see Figure 3).70 The naval 
base at Weihai marked the final addition, with the first debate in the House of Commons 
over its acquisition occurring in March 1898. Initial proposals to construct a relatively 
substantial fortress at the harbour were quickly shelved due to budgetary constraints after 
the Boer War. An amended proposal was therefore tabled, for the construction of a largely 
undefended forward operating base, which was adopted as official policy in February 
1902.71 
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Figure 3: Official Royal Navy storage facilities 1900-1472 
 
 
The geographic spread of naval storage facilities used in the early years of the twentieth 
century provided the host of small warships used by the China Station with the ability to 
maintain operations around much of China’s coastline and its major waterways. Indeed, it 
was this global chain of coaling stations that had allowed the Royal Navy to project power 
into a far wider range of areas than most other major powers, including the USA.73 This was 
particularly important in China, given that gunboats were only capable of steaming for a 
maximum of roughly two weeks between re-coaling in harbour. Without the array of coaling 
posts, it would have been near impossible to patrol trade routes or apply coercive pressure 
effectively during times of crisis.74 The shift to oil-fuelled boilers prior to and during the First 
World War meant that by the 1920s the Navy was removing many of its smaller coastal 
storage facilities. Coaling points continued to be maintained on the Yangtze, however, as 
many of the gunboats still used coal to fuel their boilers either fully or partially. The 
declining residual demand for coaling meant that for the most part, the storage retained 
was generally supervised by the local Concession councils, rather than the Navy itself. Most 
noticeably, the naval base at Weihai was left shrunken in stature as a single oil tanker was 
moored in the harbour, replacing most of the coal stores and additional shore-based staff.75 
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While the general debate over moving to using fuel oil in warships during the early 
twentieth century was a complicated one, there were a couple of key points in the context 
of the China Station. Fuel oil has up to twice the energy density of coal, which either 
enabled additional space to be made available within vessels or alternatively it could extend 
their range, or in many cases a combination of the two.76 The higher energy density also 
meant that the bulk transportation of fuel between storage points was a far more efficient 
process.77 Despite testing different locally-mined sources of Chinese coal, British officers 
had struggled to find a reliable supply of the higher quality steam coal required for ship’s 
boilers. Welsh steam coal not only has an energy content over one-third higher than many 
regional sources, but it also produces far lower levels of ash, which reduced the 
requirement for boiler maintenance. Even blending different grades and using local coal for 
stoves only produced marginal savings, although the China Station did make greater use of 
medium-quality coal from Australia in this way.78 The Navy therefore relied upon colliers 
continually shipping bulk quantities all the way from Wales and Australia to a range of 
coaling points all around China.79  
In contrast, with a higher energy density and with sources far close to the Far East than 
Wales, less merchant shipping capacity would be required to deliver the same fuel energy. 
With the same British dominance of the global oil tanker fleet as there was with colliers at 
the start of the interwar period, the resources were already in place for the switch.80 As a 
result, in 1922 the Admiralty’s Navy Stores department proposed deploying oil-fuelled 
warships overseas and coal-fuelled ones at home ports where possible given the potential 
cost savings.81 The simpler process of piping fuel oil between ships also meant that fleet 
tankers could re-fuel warships on patrol in calmer conditions, something that was near-
impossible with bulk quantities of coal. A single fuel pump also removed the slow task of 
having seamen man-handling tonnes of coal into ship’s bunkers, which was particularly 
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burdensome for smaller warships and their crews. Indeed, as the chorus to a Royal Navy 
seaman’s song from before the period put it so eloquently: ‘Coaling, coaling, coaling – 
Always bloody well coaling’.82 Local labourers were sometimes used for the process, but this 
had become increasingly infrequent in the years before the First World War as cost-saving 
measures resulted in crews being seen as a ‘free’ alternative.83 As a result of these factors 
the switch away from coal could and did have a transformative effect on the way smaller 
warships operated, particularly for those used on the Chinese coast.  
By 1924, the China Station had six Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) oil tankers ranging in size from 
transporting 680 to 4,000 tonnes of fuel, including the Navy’s first ‘oiler’ RFA Kharki.84 
Rather than having a gunboat depart from the section of river or coastline it was patrolling 
to take on coal at a port, one of the tankers would be despatched to tour and refuel a 
number of warships in situ. Not only did this mean that ship-for-ship the China Station of 
the 1920s could be more productive, it also reduced the requirement for access to shore-
facilities. Provisions such as fresh food were less of a concern as they could normally be 
purchased at settlements along the coast and waterways, even during times of crisis, and so 
had a limited impact on the Navy’s storage requirements outside of major naval bases.85 
Ammunition had always been stored at a few guarded naval bases and was generally 
transported and passed on by other warships on the China Station. This resulted both from 
security concerns about ammunition presenting a tempting target for bandits and soldiers, 
and from the possibility of legal problems that might arise from merchant shipping carrying 
military cargoes.86 
Even in the context of Britain’s relationship with China, the gradual disappearance of shore-
storage leased by the Royal Navy from the Treaty Ports did not attract any real attention. 
Over the long-term, however, the shift did have significant implications that would influence 
the development of the Navy’s strategic planning. In particular, the value of Britain 
maintaining custody over Weihai declined as a result of the change in fuel. For a coal-fuelled 
Royal Navy to be capable of projecting power into the Yellow Sea, around northern China, 
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and towards Japan, maintaining a naval base at Weihai was beyond question. By 1920, most 
battleships had sufficient endurance to reach those regions from Hong Kong, particularly if 
they re-coaled at Shanghai. The cruisers and smaller vessels required as part of a balanced 
battle-fleet and to operate in the region on a day-to-day basis, however, would in some 
cases struggle to reach those distant expanses of water, let alone patrol them.  
The shift to fuel oil meant that by the early 1920s the number of China Station vessels that 
required coaling at Weihai had dropped to the flagship HMS Hawkins, the four Flower class 
sloops and potentially any gunboats sent north to the Hai River during times of crisis. Coal 
storage at Weihai did still retain some wider strategic significance, as a few of the capital 
ships that might be despatched to East Asia during a crisis were still partially coal-fuelled.87 
That residual value was set to disappear in the mid-1920s, with the planned retirement of 
the King George V class and the impending withdrawal of the Iron Duke class into reserve, 
the Royal Navy’s last remaining coal powered battleships.88 Closer to home, Hawkins and 
two of the Flower class sloops were also due for rotation back to home waters, to be 
replaced by newer oil-fuelled equivalents.  
In a curious twist, the withdrawal of the Iron Duke class battleships from the Mediterranean 
was in itself determined by events in East Asia. Prior to the completed upgrade of 
Singapore’s oil storage facilities, the Admiralty was forced to retain coal-fuelled warships as 
part of any battle fleet responding to a war with Japan, to ensure sufficient fuel supplies 
were readily available.89 Once those works were complete, only a sustained major conflict 
with Japan might force the Admiralty to deploy more coal-fuelled warships to the Far East. 
As a result, by the late 1920s just two of the China Station’s sloops were expected to require 
coal at Weihai, and even then it would only be in minimal quantities.  
The crisis that developed as a result of the Northern Expedition in 1926-27 did delay the 
Navy’s planned switch to a largely oil-fuelled China Station, but by mid-1928 those rotations 
had been completed.90 A brief exception to the expected requirements was during February 
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1929 when HMS Magnolia was temporarily held at Weihai, due to unrest at Yantai. With 
outside temperatures averaging -1°C, the stationary ship consumed roughly 50 tons of coal 
per week keeping men and machinery warm.91 While that elevated usage did foster the 
briefest possible stay at the base before returning to warmer climates, the total 
consumption was still relatively modest compared with the quantities previously required to 
re-coal major warships like HMS Hawkins.  
Without its prior role as a coaling point, Weihai’s value to both the Royal Navy and the 
British Empire as a whole was no longer clear. During a 1924 strategic review, for example, it 
was noted that while a northern Chinese base might help in a war against Japan, possession 
of Hong Kong was the only location truly critical for enabling offensive operations.92 As an 
operational base, Weihai’s main occupation by the 1920s came from hosting the annual 
fleet manoeuvres during the summer months when many of the China Station’s ocean-going 
warships would congregate in the harbour. As similar training activity was regularly 
conducted at Mirs Bay, near Hong Kong, there were alternative locations available.93  
The main reason Weihai remained the preferred option was because it enjoyed comfortably 
warm weather in the summer months, compared to hot and humid Hong Kong. As a result, 
the harbour was popular with the China Station’s officers and crew as a relaxing alternative 
to Shanghai.94 The area around the base had also become something of a holiday 
destination for the British colonial population in China, in addition to hosting boarding 
schools for their children.95 Indeed, as superfluous naval buildings, including those 
previously used in conjunction with coaling warships, were demolished during the 1920s 
they were quickly replaced with private shops and residences.96 As Leading Seaman ‘Bobby’ 
Roberts later recalled ‘I always found it a pleasure to spend a few days there. It had a lovely 
swimming beach, several shops and its own church.’97 Marine William Greenland likewise 
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noted that the base contained a number of ‘beautiful flower gardens’ and nicely decorated 
buildings.98 With a nine-hole golf course and bathing huts by Liugong Island’s beaches, 
Weihai was starting to resemble a holiday camp by 1930, rather than a naval base.99 
The declining strategic case for maintaining a British enclave in Northern China almost 
certainly played a role in the British establishment’s growing willingness to return Weihai to 
Chinese control after the First World War. As early as 1919, for example, proposals were 
tabled and broadly supported by British officials for China to resume complete control of all 
mainland areas including the town of Weihai itself, but with the lease covering Liugong 
Island and therefore the naval base extended.100 Protracted negotiations culminated 
without an agreement between Britain and China, however, with the fate of Liugong Island 
a red-line issue for both parties. The British government had also been pressing for China to 
refund various expenses incurred in ‘developing Weihaiwei’, although it was unsure how the 
Beiyang government might pay, even if they agreed to the demand.101 In contrast, 
complaints from the British business community in Weihai were largely dismissed or ignored 
by the Foreign Office. Consul A.P. Blunt, for example, acknowledged residents’ concerns in 
1923, but only provided vague assurances that compensation might be paid if serious 
personal financial losses could be shown to have been incurred as a direct result of the 
British government’s action.102 
While there were diplomatic imperatives behind Britain’s return to the negotiating table in 
July 1928, the lack of Royal Navy opposition helped smooth the way to an agreement. In the 
final treaty, for example, the Navy conceded that in the event of either Britain or China 
becoming involved in a war, all Royal Navy and Fleet Auxiliary vessels would vacate Weihai 
in accordance with international accords. Effectively this downgraded the Navy’s rights from 
the extra-territoriality of an imperial outpost to that of a tenant, although one that retained 
the right to freely conduct live-firing training exercises both afloat and on-shore.103 That 
move was extremely symbolic against the backdrop of the wider struggle over British extra-
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territorial rights in the country. Moreover, the Navy’s acquiescence was an 
acknowledgement that the naval base no longer played a part in the Royal Navy’s plans for a 
potential conflict with Japan.  
Without a role as a strategic fuelling point, leaving warships at Weihai amid wider hostilities 
in the region would have been a significant liability. After all, at that point the Admiralty 
believed war between China and Japan might produce scenarios where Britain was 
inexorably drawn into the hostilities. If the naval base had little value in such a war, then its 
immediate evacuation to try to avoid being drawn into the conflict was no real concession. 
This further supports the existing arguments by historians such as Jürgen Osterhammel that 
those locations where Britain initially surrendered its extra-territorial rights in the late 1920s 
were relatively insignificant to the Empire.104 Contrary to Edmund Fung’s argument, 
however, Weihai did still possess strategic value in the years between 1905 (when the 
enclave should have been returned to China when Russia lost Port Arthur) and the early 
1920s when coaling facilities were no longer a critical requirement for the Royal Navy.105 
The timing of the return was therefore not solely down to a change in imperial policy after 
the December Memorandum in 1927, but also due to the change in practical naval 
circumstances. 
The Hong Kong Question 
In contrast to Weihai, the maintenance of Hong Kong’s military facilities continued to serve 
a vital strategic purpose in Britain’s plans for a potential war with Japan. While the debate 
raged about prioritising units for the defence of Singapore, the importance of holding Hong 
Kong remained largely unchallenged within the Navy, as the only location from which 
offensive operations could be launched. The then Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, 
Rear-Admiral Richmond, summarised the position in a letter to the Admiralty in April 1925. 
Richmond stated that Japan’s capture of Hong Kong would effectively secure their 
dominance of East Asia, and it would prove ‘exhausting in the highest degree’ for Britain to 
re-capture the harbour.106 Indeed, Richmond went further to argue that if the USA remained 
neutral then Britain’s only hope for a favourable outcome involved preventing Japan from 
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securing a shift in the balance of power in East Asia through the seizure of either Hong Kong 
or Singapore.107 Singapore was vital to the defence of the Empire. 108 Hong Kong was the key 
that could unlock a potential victory. Richmond may have been a particularly vocal critic of 
naval policy in the period, but Christopher Bell has outlined how in the case of the 
Admiralty’s war planning for Japan, his arguments were favourably received in Whitehall 
and influenced the official strategy.109  
The strategic value to Hong Kong’s location did not necessarily come from enabling a 
submarine and cruiser blockade of the Japanese mainland, as has been proposed by Andrew 
Field, although that core element of the war plan would have been near impossible without 
the territory.110 The Admiralty’s economic assessment of Japanese import requirements 
centred on three core assumptions. Firstly, the British Empire controlled a number of key 
strategic raw materials that Japan required, particularly rubber, which could be limited and 
then cut off if relations broke down between the two powers. Secondly, in the event of 
hostilities Britain was unlikely to risk upsetting America by being heavy handed with neutral 
shipping crossing the Pacific, but a partial eastern blockade might limit Japan’s ability to 
source materials via the Americas. Lastly and crucially, the Yangtze basin provided 
significant quantities of raw materials vital for the Japanese economy. This included 
alternative sources for some of those resources that were otherwise imported from the 
British Empire.111 If Britain’s attrition strategy was to succeed, slowly pushing Japan towards 
either a rash and decisive naval engagement or the negotiating table, then the Yangtze 
would be pivotal. 
The Yangtze River basin in the 1920s, as it still does today, provided vast quantities of rice, 
iron ore, and other raw materials for the domestic Chinese and international markets. At the 
river’s mouth, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces also contained roughly half China’s 
manufacturing capacity, with GDP per capita levels at the time behind only Japan and 
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Taiwan in Asia, and were growing at roughly twelve percent per annum.112 Much of that 
trade flowed through Shanghai, which processed roughly half of all China’s foreign trade in 
the 1920s and was home to a similar proportion of China’s modern factories.113 Royal Navy 
estimates from 1930 suggest that the Central China region provided almost two thirds of 
Japan’s oilseed imports and roughly one-quarter of Japan’s iron ore and manganese supply 
(required for steel and aluminium alloys).114 The interlinked loss of trade routes with 
southern China, by blockade from Hong Kong, would further compound those losses, 
particularly for manganese shipments that were crucial for strategic heavy industrial 
production, such as warships, tanks, and aircraft. While the Korean peninsula and 
Manchuria provided alternative sources of some resources, the abundance of capacity and 
ease of transportation along the Yangtze made the region an obvious target for a wartime 
economic blockade. Britain’s strategic theory was that victory should be possible through 
blockading ‘the raw materials obtained from China, (upon which) Japan depends for her 
ability to carry on the war.’115 
The value of an economic blockade was disputed within the Navy of the time. Rear Admiral 
Richmond while commanding the East Indies Station, for example, argued that Japan could 
easily replicate sufficient trade routes to overcome a general British blockade. Richmond 
contended that the weak-link Pacific routes would prove impossible to cut unless America 
sided with Britain. There is certainly logic behind that assessment. The only resource whose 
loss could cripple Japan quickly in a war was oil, which the USA could and did provide.116 A 
distant blockade might slowly damage Japanese efforts to build large new warships, but it 
would do a better job of making America rich, rather than winning the war for Britain. As 
Admiral of the Fleet David Beatty mused in 1925, the American approach in the First World 
War of sitting on the side-lines while ‘plucking the Chestnuts from the fire’ had proven 
fruitful for them.117 It was therefore one that in all likelihood would be repeated if the 
opportunity arose. Richmond nonetheless made the case that the Royal Navy should adopt 
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the very same blockade approach, but with a reversed focus. His argument was based upon 
the assumption that any aggressive Japanese actions to increase influence in China, which 
might lead to a war with Britain, would also result in a military clash with Chinese forces. 
The primary location where that might occur was the Yangtze basin. In such a war, 
Richmond proposed aggressive naval attacks against Japanese supply lines, allowing the 
gradual destruction of the Japanese army ashore. That strategy would also comply with 
international law on submarine warfare, a prerequisite to American goodwill, when 
compared with the vague allusions to submarine attacks on merchant shipping around 
Japan itself.118 
Hong Kong is over 1,400 miles closer to the Yangtze River’s mouth than Singapore, a 
distance that would have made a British blockade of either type considerably more 
effective. The Royal Navy’s submarines would be able to spend longer on patrol, with supply 
and maintenance easier with the reduced distance. In addition, aggressive battlecruiser or 
cruiser raids, similar to those undertaken by the Kaiserliche Marine against Britain in the 
First World War, would be able to strike supply routes or exposed naval patrols before 
falling back to the relative safety of Hong Kong’s guns.119 The 1924 Royal Naval War College 
syllabus on Japan argued that a potential military blockade should focus on the trade routes 
with China, while all diplomatic efforts should focus on encouraging America to enforce a 
voluntary embargo.120 That strategy was only likely to succeed if the Royal Navy still had its 
key forward operating base on the Chinese coast. 
As a gateway to China, Hong Kong was also expected to play another crucial role. Admiral 
Richmond argued in 1925 that with British support, potentially including a quickly deployed 
expeditionary force, China could be encouraged to push Japan economically and militarily 
out of its footholds on the mainland.121 While Richmond’s generalised statements suggest 
he did not fully appreciate the fractious state of Britain’s relationship with the main Chinese 
factions in 1925, he was one of those who helped set the groundwork for later proposals. 
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Richmond had taken Leveson’s ideas and applied them in a broader sense to Britain’s grand 
strategy for East Asia, which then tentatively fed into official policy going into the 1930s.  
Christopher Bell’s discussion of Britain’s grand strategy highlighted the second part of that 
process, but it did not acknowledge the crucial role played by Admiral Leveson and the 
importance of the Yangtze basin. It is highly likely that Richmond’s ideas were actually just a 
restated, if refined, version of those submitted the previous year. As neighbouring station 
commanders, the two Admirals would have corresponded on such issues, but they also had 
a long history of sharing ideas. Having first worked together in 1909, they had not always 
seen eye-to-eye, most notably during the months Richmond served as Leveson’s deputy, 
when he was Director of the Operations Division in late 1914.122 Richmond’s brusque and 
arrogant manner clashed with the ‘considerate’ Leveson, who was a strict adherent to naval 
hierarchy and protocol. By the end of the First World War, however, an unlikely bond had 
developed, with the two regularly socialising and debating naval issues. Richmond’s 
comments about his friend, who he liked ‘immensely’, are particularly prescient; ‘He never 
writes down his opinions and in consequence never develops them.’123 When Leveson’s 
rudimentary suggestion was recorded as ‘controversial’ and then politely shelved by 
Director of Plans, Captain Dudley Pound, he would not appeal out of a belief in due process. 
Unafraid of confrontation and rocking the boat, Richmond took up the fight, re-drafted the 
proposals, and his determined lobbying the following year was more successful, for which 
he has been awarded the credit.124 Feeding into the debate over the legend or myth of 
Richmond’s stature as one of the great naval thinkers of his time, in this one example he 
was certainly a talented analyst, but one who matured the fruits of Leveson’s imagination. 
Discussion about China’s military capabilities throughout Britain’s war planning for East Asia 
is rather sporadic and says much about the attitudes of many individuals within the British 
establishment at the time. Flippant dismissals of Chinese military capabilities did occur on 
purely racial grounds. As the Director of Naval Intelligence Gerald Dickens later proposed in 
1935, the Royal Navy had been guilty of regarding Asian nations as ‘picturesque rather than 
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important’, with officers disbelieving that a ‘coloured’ nation could ever match a Western 
one.125 Those unprofessional assessments notwithstanding, the wider geo-strategic 
situation was a factor behind the intermittency of serious, objective top-level debate about 
the potential threat posed by China. China in the early twentieth century was certainly not a 
first-class world power, but it was nonetheless a large country that could wield significant 
military clout, or at least it could in theory. The bulk of China’s strength was on land, 
however, particularly when compared with those major powers with which the country 
interacted. While the Royal Navy focused on Japan, the British Army also had bigger 
concerns elsewhere, particularly the northern border of India and the threat posed by 
Soviet Russia through Afghanistan.126 When combined with the lack of a clear central 
authority in China after 1911 and the minimal amount of territory formally or informally 
held by Britain in the country, it was unlikely that China would or could directly threaten 
more than the furthest outposts of the Empire. 
The Cooperation Challenge 
While China and Japan did pose geo-strategic challenges for the British Empire after the First 
World War, particularly in balancing opposing requirements, the relationships were not 
always combative. Throughout the 1920s, both Asian nations also cooperated with the 
British authorities in the region, providing significant tangible assistance during particular 
events. Along with other powers with influence in East Asia, including America, France, and 
Italy, the varying degrees of assistance expected from temporary and ad hoc international 
arrangements influenced both the structure and operational behaviour of the China Station. 
Over the course of the decade it was increasingly the ability to establish a multilateral 
approach to threats that had a defining influence on the outcome of many potentially 
pivotal moments in Britain’s evolving relationship with China. 
Working with China to help support British interests was a difficult proposition in the 1920s, 
particularly as some of the most pressing concerns saw the two countries on opposite sides 
of the table. Trying to build common ground over extra-territoriality rights even with 
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individual local warlords, for example, was unlikely to yield any worthwhile results. Indeed, 
the lack of a central figure with meaningful power over the country as a whole negated the 
possibility of solid agreements upon which Britain could build elements of an effective 
collaborative defensive strategy. Even working with individual factions was problematic. The 
strongest faction with which Britain regularly interacted, the Guomindang, spent the first 
half of the decade vociferously and ideologically opposed to Britain having formal or 
informal imperial influence over parts of China. Moreover Britain was possibly the most 
unpopular foreign power in the eyes of the Chinese population, particularly in the two years 
after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925, during which British-led policemen shot dead 
roughly a dozen protestors in Shanghai.127 In spite of all the diplomatic difficulties, however, 
Royal Navy officers did still find grounds to build working relationships with local Chinese 
officials. 
Joint anti-piracy work was one such area where it was relatively easy to come to an 
understanding. While some of what Britain classed as piracy was in fact boycott picketing, 
which was often either tacitly or explicitly supported by the main factions, a good portion 
involved small bands who attacked all merchant shipping, regardless of the flag flown. 
Operations where Royal Navy warships transported Chinese troops to investigate and clear 
reported pirate ‘nests’ occurred throughout the decade. The scale, scope, and frequency of 
such raids, however, was not sufficient to materially impact upon the Royal Navy’s gunboat 
force in the region. With the exception of short periods when one or two gunboats were 
held unused in reserve, the Royal Navy was unable to reduce the number of gunboats or 
significantly lower the intensity at which they operated. The efforts made may have had 
some localised effect on shipping safety, but their real wider value was diplomatic rather 
than strategic. 
The deeper strategic collaboration proposed by Admirals Leveson and Richmond in 1924-25 
appears to have struggled to gain any tangible support during discussions within the 
Admiralty or Whitehall.128 This is probably a reflection of the diplomatic realities of Britain’s 
relationship with China in the mid-1920s, which would have made it all but impossible to 
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secure an agreement. Indeed, the Admiralty appears to have believed that there was a 
strong possibility that the reverse of the two Admirals’ plan might take place, with Japan 
securing Chinese support for a war against Britain. Suspicions about Japan’s efforts to 
seduce China with promises of returning Hong Kong certainly lingered on into the early 
1930s.129 It was only after 1927, when the fractious relationship between Britain and the 
Guomindang started to soften, that an agreement of any real significance could potentially 
have been brokered. With the communists purged from the Guomindang, Britain having 
made concessions to appease Chinese anti-imperial fervour, and softer rhetoric used by 
both sides, meaningful negotiations were a possibility. The rise of General Tanaka Giichi’s 
government in Japan that same year, advocating an aggressive foreign policy towards China, 
also meant that there was growing reason for the Guomindang to be interested in securing 
Britain’s good favour.130 
From being on the verge of war in 1927, Britain moved quickly to re-establish some modest 
means of collaborating with China, harking back to the approach used in the last years of 
the Qing dynasty. Between 1904 and the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, when the program was 
effectively suspended, Britain trained forty-six Chinese naval officers at the War Colleges in 
England.131 That process was resumed in late 1929, when twenty cadets made the journey 
to spend part of the following year on a gunnery training course aboard HMS Erebus, based 
out of Devonport.132 The sudden shift is all the more remarkable given that cadets from the 
Guomindang’s Whampoa Academy were suspected of organising many of the picket boats 
that had severely hampered British trade in Guangzhou in 1925.133  
In the early 1920s, Whampoa cadets either received training in Japan or based around 
Japanese principles, including a nationalistic interpretation of the Bushidō mentality.134 
Offering British military education therefore provided an opportunity to swing Chinese 
officers’ attitudes back towards European ideas, as well as build a sense of camaraderie. 
                                                          
129 Correspondence between Admiralty and Vice-Admiral Waistell, January 1931, TNA, ADM 116/3118. 
130 Thomas R.H. Havens, ‘Japan’s Enigmatic Election of 1928’, Modern Asian Studies 11/4 (1977), 545-551; Nish, 
‘An Overview’, 612-615. 
131 Appendix II to Captain Baillie-Grohman’s report on the Naval Mission to Nanjing, 31 August 1932, TNA, 
ADM 1/8756/133. 
132 Western Morning News, 11 December 1929, p.4. 
133 Vice-Admiral Everett to Admiralty, 21 August 1925, TNA, FO 371/10947. 
134 Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, p.167. 
Page | 69  
 
Indeed, shortly after the resumption of training Chinese officers in Britain, the Royal Navy 
also sent Captain Harold Baillie-Grohman to take a post as Head of Training with the Nanjing 
Government’s Navy. That naval mission was sent in response to a request by Admiral Chen 
Shaokuan, the Minster of the Navy, for Britain to assist with the development of a new 
Chinese navy.135 Tellingly, the briefing given to Baillie-Grohman by Admiral Howard Kelly at 
Hong Kong emphasised that his primary goal was to build friendly relationships with the 
Chinese officers, rather than to focus too heavily on actually training them.136 It was also 
around that point, at the end of the decade that the Royal Navy started actively working 
with the Guomindang against communist groups as well as pirate bands. HMS Aphis was 
involved in a series of events on the Middle Yangtze between Dongting Lake and Jiujiang, for 
example, from towing struggling transport vessels to bombarding communist troops in 
support of Guomindang ground forces.137 So long as the Guomindang was perceived to 
represent a clear and present threat to Britain’s interests then no accommodation could be 
reached. Once those short-term issues were resolved, however, then China became a 
potential part in the grand strategy to secure Britain’s interests in East Asia, against the 
spread of communism as well as Japan. 
During the years preceding 1927, in which Britain became the focus of anti-imperial 
sentiment in China, it was Japan that provided the assistance necessary to mitigate some of 
the new or growing risks. In contrast to cooperation with China, which was reluctantly 
desired but impractical, collaboration with Japan was often seen as disagreeable but the 
pragmatic choice. On a day-to-day basis, it was not unusual for the two nations’ navies to 
work together for anti-piracy work or in co-ordinating additional mutual security measures 
for international concessions at Treaty Ports. In November 1923, for example, HMS Cicala 
was despatched quickly to assist a Japanese merchant steamer near Guangzhou that had 
grounded while trying to escape a pirate attack.138 Similarly, a Japanese naval squadron 
proceeded to Xiamen in March 1924 during a period of anti-foreign unrest at the city. 
Admiral Leveson reported that he was grateful for the calming influence the force had upon 
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the area, while the Royal Navy was focused upon events around Guangzhou and Hong 
Kong.139 
Even in those early years, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance a recent memory, there were 
signs that the two navies did not necessarily see eye-to-eye. While visiting Yantai in 
September 1924 the captain of HMS Bluebell was forced, reluctantly, to place his ship in 
front of Japanese guns to act as an intermediary during a dispute. A Chinese merchant 
steamer had accidentally, it would seem, hit the bow of a Japanese submarine, causing 
minor damage.140 Such incidents involving submarines were not uncommon in Chinese 
waters, including the sinking of HMS Poseidon in 1931 with the loss of twenty-one lives.141 
Lieutenant Charles Drage of Bluebell describes how both the submarine and a nearby 
Japanese destroyer quickly aimed their main guns at the steamer and threatened to sink it, 
even though the vessel’s deck was crowded with civilians. Drage noted that the passengers 
included a number of white women, which may have precipitated the stern demand by 
Bluebell’s Commander Algernon Smithwick that the Japanese not use force. The steamer’s 
Norwegian captain reportedly later complained that the Japanese had also attempted to 
arrest him, until a British motor launch inspected the damaged submarine and proposed a 
compensation fee.142 While British service personnel were themselves not immune from 
heavy-handedness, the extreme reaction and particularly the threat to foreign civilians 
appears to have fuelled suspicions about the reliability of Japanese servicemen among 
Bluebell’s crew. Such sentiment was absent in Drage’s entries prior to the incident, but 
became a common feature in the following months. 
Similarly, in a slightly more light-hearted case from July the following year, Bluebell was at 
Fuzhou with the USS Sacramento trying to establish whether reports of rioting in the city 
were true. When the IJN Komahashi arrived, both Bluebell and Sacramento attempted to 
contact the new arrival, but to no avail. Drage recalled with amusement that both the 
British and American warships went so far as to light up the Komahashi with their ships’ 
searchlights, which still had no effect. While the incident was apparently taken in good 
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humour and there may have been reasons why Komahashi failed to respond to being hailed, 
the British officers regarded the move as having been a deliberate snub.143 
A normal encounter between British and Japanese servicemen in those earlier years, 
however, was perhaps one similar to a dinner hosted by Governor Reginald Stubbs at Hong 
Kong, honouring the visit of Vice-Admiral Seizō Kobayashi (Saito) in November 1923. The 
same Charles Drage noted that while pleasant, the evening was not particularly enjoyable 
and did not lead to any lasting friendships. There was no outright hostility, but nor was 
there much success in building a sense of camaraderie.144 Such feeling was not exclusive to 
the officer class, with Chief Petty Officer Douglas Poole leaving an uncharacteristically 
unemotional description in his journal, after attending the same official events.145 
Nonetheless, with significant military resources at their disposal and a growing willingness 
to employ them, Japan became a significant participant in talks about multi-national 
deployments to meet some of the challenges encountered in 1920s China. As a result, it was 
not just relatively small, reactive scenarios where cooperation was considered. During a 
Committee for Imperial Defence meeting in June 1925, for example, the service heads 
agreed that Britain was reliant upon multi-national forces, particularly involving Japan, to 
defend its interests adequately in Northern China.146 While it would take Britain five weeks 
to move an infantry brigade from India to Tanggu (Taku), even if one was available for re-
deployment, Japan had the men ready and could transport them in a fraction of that time. 
Similarly, that same month Foreign Minister Baron Kijūrō Shidehara informed his 
ambassador in London that the IJN was to push for greater naval cooperation with the Royal 
Navy, particularly on the River Yangtze, because of the wider benefits for Japan.147 Thanks 
to the Government Code and Cypher School intercepting and decrypting Japanese 
diplomatic messages, Whitehall was aware of that desire to work together in China, 
although it is unclear whether the intelligence was passed onto the China Station. 
The rising crisis in late 1926 going into 1927 presented a situation where deep strategic 
cooperation could prove particularly beneficial to both Britain and Japan, as the 
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Guomindang’s Northern Expedition seized control of city after city along the Yangtze. Even 
during the early stages, however, there were the first signs that what had been discussed in 
theory all the way to the highest levels was not so appealing to those decision makers in 
practicality.  
Throughout the second half of 1926, the Admiralty was supported by the British 
government in repeatedly strengthening the naval forces available to the Commander-in-
Chief of the China Station, irrespective of what other powers were doing. With the Shanghai 
Defence Force to follow from December 1926, Britain was committing significant quantities 
of men and materiel in an effort to shore-up its imperial prestige. Moreover, diplomatic 
realities meant that the kind of multinational response previously envisaged would prove 
extremely difficult to bring to fruition. America and Japan as the other major imperial 
powers operating in China were both reluctant to stand too closely alongside Britain, which 
had become the main focus of the Guomindang’s anti-imperial rhetoric and actions.148 The 
surprise with which the other powers greeted Austen Chamberlain’s new policy for China, 
announced with the December Memorandum, highlights the fact that during this phase 
Britain recognised its isolation and was following a unilateral approach. 
As the Northern Expedition neared the larger cities of the Lower Yangtze, in which Britain 
along with the other major powers had more invested, military rather than diplomatic 
concerns took priority. Proposals to form a multinational force therefore resurfaced, 
particularly those involving Japan. By April 1927 these ideas were being debated widely 
around the China Station, as recorded by Midshipman Leonard Sheppard in his official 
journal, while aboard HMS Despatch. The main plan under consideration involved 10,000 
British and Japanese troops forcibly occupying key sites along the Yangtze between Hankou 
and Shanghai. Sheppard summarised the ‘severe facts against this plan’ that he had 
perceived from discussions among his fellow officers. Firstly, a sustained deployment of 
thousands of British troops, in areas where there was no existing military infrastructure for 
stationing land forces, would come at an enormous financial cost. The potential benefits 
were not expected to justify that hefty bill. Secondly, such a provocative act was expected 
to undermine all the good work, as they saw it, that the Navy had done up to that point in 
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remaining neutral during China’s internal conflicts. Lastly, it was felt that pre-emptively 
occupying Chinese territory would play into the hands of Bolshevik propaganda, weakening 
rather than strengthening Britain’s position. Sheppard concluded that a firm but defensive 
military approach would be more advisable, with a focus on propaganda and diplomatic 
efforts to push China towards ‘sensible’ governance.149 
Curiously Sheppard made no mention of an issue highlighted by Foreign Office staff during 
this period, that of Japan’s response to the Nanjing Incident. While IJN warships were 
present during the events, they had operated separately from the Anglo-American naval 
force, and did not open fire upon the city. Given the location of the Japanese civilians in the 
city, the separate evacuation was fully understood by the Royal Navy. However, to avoid 
being caught by the Chinese backlash after the incident, Japan’s diplomats worked hard to 
draw a distinction between the different foreign powers. This included sending a letter to 
the Chinese press blaming Britain and America for what had occurred.150 While not 
necessarily inaccurate in its content, the spirit of that move was not in keeping with Britain’s 
expectations that the major powers would act in concert. It may be that junior officers in 
the Navy were not particularly aware of all the diplomatic complexities of the situation and 
the disputes involved. Alternatively, the letter may have been accepted by the Royal Navy as 
an illustration of how the IJN was increasingly operating by itself and was no longer seen as 
a team player among the major powers.151 
Irrespective of diplomatic disputes with Japan, the British establishment continued to 
consider further proposals for a joint force to secure their mutual interests. Perhaps 
highlighting the influence of the Tanaka government’s more aggressive foreign policy, the 
scale of the schemes suggested by the Japanese increased quite rapidly. In October 1927, 
for example, a plan was proposed for an Anglo-Japanese military occupation of all the major 
railways and ports in the lower Yangtze region. The argument made by Japan’s envoys was 
that by controlling the main transport hubs, it would be possible to force a peaceful 
settlement upon the two main Chinese factions. The proposal was supported by the 
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experience of the two Imperial Japanese Army regiments, totalling 8,000 men, which had 
been taking up positions along the Qingdao-Jinan railway since May, in the First Shandong 
Expedition.152 While that deployment ended in controversy and violence the following year, 
as the Northern Expedition continued its advance, the move appeared superficially to be a 
successful pseudo-peacekeeping effort in late 1927.153 
Some individuals within the Foreign Office were cautiously welcoming of the proposals, but 
they were summarily rejected by the British armed forces. The War Office appears to have 
voiced the strongest opinions, arguing that it would be unwise to have independent 
battalions spread across the region, as they might find themselves isolated and cut-off from 
support. Moreover, the British military attaché to the Foreign Office argued that in order to 
control all the main transport points across the lower Yangtze, which would be necessary for 
the plan to prove effective, it would require between three and six additional infantry 
divisions.154 Given that the Shanghai Defence Force only equated to roughly one division, 
the plan would require Britain to at least quadruple its core land forces in China. Even using 
skeleton divisional structures that would likely equate to a minimum of roughly 40,000 men. 
Finding sufficient manpower to achieve that during peacetime was nigh-on impossible, from 
both a political and practical standpoint. 
The Royal Navy was also hesitant about committing to such a plan. Policing the Yangtze and 
protecting the various treaty ports was already stretching the China Station’s resources, 
even with the reinforcements it had received. Indeed, the Admiralty had pushed the Prime 
Minister into ordering the return of 208 men from the 12th Royal Marine Battalion in July 
1927, roughly one-fifth of the unit’s manpower. A shortage of marines back in Britain was 
making it ‘very difficult to provide officers and men for necessary duties’.155 Ordering a 
British expeditionary force into Chinese sovereign territory to seize strategic locations, was a 
sufficiently aggressive move that it would likely provoke a Chinese military response. Should 
that happen, forts along the Yangtze were expected to start firing on British naval and 
civilian vessels. The Royal Navy would therefore have had to demolish a significant number 
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of fortifications, as a pre-emptive measure, which in itself would prove a challenging task. 
Such a sweep would probably also have proven ineffective, given the ease with which 
artillery batteries could be quickly entrenched at locations overlooking the river. As a result, 
Sir Miles Lampson reported to Whitehall that while he found aspects of the Japanese 
proposal attractive, it was militarily impractical. The British government would neither 
deploy sufficient resources to enact the plan nor authorise the use of sufficient ‘coercive 
force’ for it to prove effective. 156 
Discussion of such grand plans in the late 1920s does not disguise that in practice there was 
a growing belief within the British military and diplomatic corps that relations with Japan 
had reached a tipping point, between cooperation and confrontation. Colonel F.S.G. Piggott, 
commanding the nascent military intelligence establishment in East Asia, reported on this 
issue in February 1928. He stated that while Britain was sharing roughly eighty percent of 
the intelligence it obtained on the situation in China with their Japanese colleagues, the 
amount being shared in return was decreasing and perhaps only amounted to half. Piggott 
suggested that where Japan had a direct interest in securing British assistance, particularly 
involving naval issues, they were willing to share information and cooperate. When that was 
not the case, the opposite was felt to be true.157 It is difficult to assess how accurate 
Piggott’s statement was, but it nonetheless illustrates the breakdown in trust between the 
two powers in the late 1920s. 
This situation was not helped by some individual Royal Navy officers’ attitudes towards their 
Japanese counterparts and the difficulty of accommodating their very different naval 
culture. Upon arriving at Jiujiang in May 1927, for example, Commander Louis Hamilton of 
HMS Wild Swan messaged his international counterparts, introducing himself and taking 
command of defending the city’s international concession, as the senior naval officer 
present. He recorded angrily in his diary that the Japanese commander apparently ignored 
the message, forcing Hamilton to despatch one of his officers to investigate and ‘request’ a 
meeting. When the two men met the following day, Hamilton accepted that language was a 
challenge. However, his account also indicates that there was a mutual dislike on racial 
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grounds, which reinforced an apparent underlying dislike that Hamilton held for Japan.158 
This is a particularly curious scenario, as Hamilton was a long-term loyal follower of the then 
Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt, who was moderately pro-Japan by 
interwar Royal Navy standards and whose interactions contrasted with those of his 
understudy.159  
What stands out about the relationship between Britain and Japan in China, particularly in 
the impact it had upon military cooperation, is the relatively steady trend observable over 
the decade. While individual Royal Navy officers had different opinions and racial attitudes 
towards their Japanese counterparts, and willingness to work with them, at any one point in 
time the extent of assistance offered or requested by IJN commanders was broadly similar. 
This suggests the IJN tended to dictate what degree of collaboration generally occurred, a 
consequence of the comparatively rigid IJN command structure and the resulting uniformity 
of behaviour, in line with their orders from Tokyo.160 In contrast, the Royal Navy’s 
interactions with the warships of other major powers during times of crisis could prove 
unpredictable. 
Europe’s Retreat 
During the 1920s France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal all sent small flotillas of 
warships to China’s waterways and coastline. While the Royal Navy regularly socialised with 
the crews of those warships, particularly the Dutch, only the first two nations really had 
sufficient naval strength in the region to have any potential, tangible impact upon Britain’s 
strategy for East Asia.161 When in 1927 a multi-national force was amassed to defend 
Shanghai, for example, the second-tier participants only accounted for roughly one percent 
of all foreign military personnel ashore.162 Afloat the situation was much the same, with 
France, Italy and the Netherlands all making token displays of force, with lone warships 
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anchored on the Huangpu River at Shanghai (see Figure 4). The majority of international 
warships not from Britain or Japan that were sent to the city appear to have been moored 
out of sight downriver.163 As a result, the second-tier navies focused on planning a safe 
evacuation of their own civilians from the city, while passively acquiescing in the defence 
plans formulated by the major participants. Similarly, in June 1929 during the ceremonial 
second funeral of Doctor Sun Yat-sen, at the newly constructed mausoleum for him at 
Nanjing, only Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the US had warships available to attend as 
symbolic gestures of respect.164 While they infrequently provided some assistance with 
particular naval tasks, the Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese warships in East Asia had little 
impact on events in and around 1920s China. 
Figure 4: International warships anchored at Shanghai in April 1927165 
 
 
Neither France nor Italy deployed genuinely significant numbers of warships or troops to 
China during the 1920s, but they are worthy of some discussion in the impact they did have 
upon the course of events. Diplomatic ties between Britain, France, and Italy may have been 
strained at times during the 1920s, but on a day-to-day basis far from home their navies 
tended to socialise regularly, with the arrival of an Italian warship in particular often 
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heralding much merrymaking.166 Those bonds were reflected in their operational behaviour, 
with the three navies generally happy to co-operate. In dealing with the piracy threat 
around Daya Bay, for example, the French Navy agreed to adjust the routes taken by their 
warships as part of the Royal Navy’s visible-deterrent strategy. In addition, the French would 
join their British counterparts in conducting gunnery drills in the bay, in an effort to further 
enhance the impact of their passage upon the local pirate bands.167 While appreciated by 
the British, such collaboration had negligible practical impact upon their plans for East Asia. 
A few additional vessels assisting intermittently was welcome, but only supplemented 
existing approaches. Moreover, it appears that none of those few French warships actively 
assisted their British counterparts during the period, including during moments when they 
were present on the fringes of key clashes. The Doudart de la Grée, for example, was 
recorded as having been at Wanxian throughout the disastrous events in 1926, passively 
observing the entire incident.168 Even a British request for the French gunboat to move its 
moorings in order to ensure the French vessel’s own safety, was reportedly rejected. 
Likewise, at Hankou in May the following year, the local French commander chose not to co-
ordinate his defensive plans with the joint Anglo-American preparations, although the two 
groups did discuss their respective approaches.169 
The 1927 crisis provided a rare exceptional case, when additional French military resources 
were sent to China. As the Northern Expedition neared Shanghai, both France and Italy 
adopted a policy that was broadly similar to Britain’s in wanting to protect the extra-
territorial status enjoyed by the International Settlement and French Concession in the city. 
When summarising the positions taken by ‘Friendly Powers’, Major-General John Duncan 
took comfort from having those two nations, along with Spain, as willing participants in his 
planned defensive line.170 Their stances meant that Britain had symbolic allies and would 
not stand alone if the worst were to happen. A section of the defensive line around 
Shanghai’s International Settlement was nominally controlled by the Italian shore parties, 
for example, although in practice the district was actually guarded by Indian soldiers from 
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the British Army’s Twentieth Infantry Brigade.171 On paper 3,000 additional troops and eight 
cruisers from France did also provide something tangible, more than just words of 
support.172 In practice, however, those forces were focused solely on the French Concession 
and operated in a state of friendly isolation from the main Shanghai Defence Force, 
mirroring what was happening at Hankou.173 Even during times of crisis therefore, Britain’s 
European allies provided little in the way of real support that could assist with even 
temporary strategic deployments of its armed forces. 
The first signs of definitive collaboration only occurred with the French Navy after the 1927 
crisis and Japan’s new, increasingly aggressive foreign policy.174 The appointment of Admiral 
Stotz to France’s East Asia fleet in late 1927 led to proposals being made at a local level that 
would genuinely assist with Britain’s strategy for the region. Stotz and the senior officers 
sent with him all spoke English to a standard considerably above what was normal in the 
French Navy, and they had been reportedly chosen for the role based upon their 
comparatively anglophile views.175 The stronger bond between Stotz’s and Tyrwhitt’s, then 
later Vice-Admiral Arthur Waistell’s, senior officers appears to have stimulated greater 
discussion of how France might be able to assist Britain, perhaps unofficially. While none of 
the proposals gained sufficient support for a formalised agreement, informal 
understandings do appear to have been reached.  
In the event that Britain lost Hong Kong during the opening stages of a war with Japan, for 
example, there was a degree of willingness among France’s East Asian authorities to 
overlook the Royal Navy using Cam Ranh Bay, on the coast of modern-day Vietnam. Roughly 
half-way between Singapore and Hong Kong, Cam Ranh could offer the Royal Navy warships 
an intermediate location to re-fuel and re-organise, ready for a fight off the Chinese coast. 
There was some disagreement over the bay’s precise value among the British military 
officials who reported on the location, mainly over the lack of local supply sources, but 
overall there was general agreement that access to the bay would be strategically 
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beneficial.176 Ultimately, however, the lack of a signed treaty meant that the Royal Navy 
chose not to base their strategy on unreliable, regional good intentions. As a result, Admiral 
Kelly recommended in 1932 that official permission should be sought from the French 
government to use the bay as a staging point, although in such a format that France would 
be able to remain neutral.177 
The emergent special relationship 
If the informal, localised agreements made between the China Station and its European 
allies were felt to be too tentative to rely upon, and Japan was increasingly seen as a 
potential foe, there was still one further actor in the region from whom Britain might draw 
support. As with the China Station and Japan’s First Expeditionary Fleet, the USN Asiatic 
Fleet was tasked with projecting power across the Yellow, East China, and South China seas, 
and along China’s main rivers, but it also covered the Western Pacific. In particular, the 
Asiatic Fleet was required to protect America’s pseudo-imperial position in the Philippines. 
With a considerable expanse of water to operate across, eighteen modern destroyers were 
based out of Cavite Navy Yard near Manila, in addition to a dozen submarines, and an old 
cruiser.178 A sub-command existed for inland work in China, titled the Yangtze Patrol, which 
started the decade with eight ancient mostly ex-Spanish gunboats that dated from before 
the Boxer Rebellion.179 Further strengthened by the presence of a battalion from the US 
Marine Corps, the Asiatic Fleet had sufficient resources potentially to influence Britain’s 
strategic plans for the region. 
Based upon their respective governments’ policies throughout the decade, the USN’s Asiatic 
Fleet and the China Station should have found it difficult to collaborate effectively. The US 
was the only major power ‘genuinely admired by the urban elites of Republican China’, with 
a strong cultural presence in the country.180 In conjunction with the relative comfort derived 
from that admiration, the US government tended to limit the interventions made by its 
armed forces. While Washington insisted on its businesses retaining access to the Chinese 
market, along similar lines to Britain, influential State Department officials such as John 
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MacMurray urged restraint to avoid drawing the ire of China’s warring factions. Those 
officials’ arguments were aided by the reports submitted by America’s Minister to China, 
Jacob Schurman. Schurman felt the main protagonists in China cared more about being 
respected as a modern power than they genuinely believed the communist rhetoric they 
sometimes espoused.181 To some extent that hypothesis was proven correct in the case of 
the Guomindang, when the 1927 schism revealed the divisions between nationalists and 
those genuine communists. The heavy emphasis on restraint, to avoid stoking anti-American 
feelings among the Chinese population, was passed down along the chain of command, and 
sometimes featured heavily in local officials’ deliberations.182 
The contrasting approaches taken at the top level by Britain and America were at their most 
pronounced during times of crisis, particularly in the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident 
in 1925 and later when the Northern Expedition neared Shanghai in 1927. In both cases, 
Washington authorised landing sailors and marines as part of international efforts to protect 
their civilians and property in Shanghai, as well as other ports. There was considerable 
unease about the USN becoming caught up defending other nations’ interests, particularly 
when it was not as a result of a conscious decision by American officials. In June 1925, for 
example, Rear-Admiral Charles B. McVay Jnr. USN protested angrily to Rear-Admiral David 
Anderson RN that some British civilian officials were deliberately trying to exploit America’s 
relative neutrality. While he maintained a friendly relationship with Anderson, McVay 
subsequently reduced the size of the USN landing party in Shanghai.183 Similarly, in 1927 the 
US government pursued a comparatively cautious policy towards the defence of its interests 
in Shanghai, instructing its military forces there to maintain civil order but not to engage in 
hostilities against Chinese troops.184 
America’s policy for China may have been heavily influenced by top-down decision making 
during the 1920s, but implementation is always reliant upon personnel on the scene. While 
the interwar US Navy was generally an extremely formal organisation, with strict adherence 
to hierarchy and obeying orders, the Asiatic Fleet was not. In the Royal Navy, the China 
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Station was the second most senior overseas command after the Mediterranean and so 
high-ranking roles aboard the major vessels were relatively prestigious, if not always 
popular. In contrast, the Asiatic Fleet was low down the list of US Fleets and was not seen as 
somewhere an officer could make a career. Indeed, for some ordinary crewmen the Asiatic 
Fleet presented the opportunity to ‘hide’ from various troubles that might catch up with 
them elsewhere.185 By its very nature therefore, the Asiatic Fleet was somewhat maverick. 
On a day to day basis, the Asiatic Fleet’s destroyer and gunboat crews operated on the 
Chinese coast thousands of miles from home and frequently hundreds of miles or more 
from their nearest fellow USN warship. They would often be in close proximity, however, to 
Royal Navy warships that were equally isolated, that carried crews who spoke the same 
language and who had been comrades in arms just a few years beforehand. As a result the 
two navies’ crews regularly socialised together and to a greater degree than either did with 
other foreign powers in China, with the possible exception of the Dutch.186 Even in the 
major ports such as Shanghai where there were opportunities for other entertainment, the 
British organised Anglo-American boxing tournaments and USN warships invited their Royal 
Navy counterparts to watch the latest Hollywood films in make-shift mess-deck cinemas.187 
In October 1925 when HMS Magnolia was at Shantou, for example, the British crew spent 
most evenings attending informal cinema screenings held aboard the different US Navy 
vessels in the harbour.188  
When at liberty ashore, Anglo-American rivalry did sometimes reveal itself, and not just 
among the enlisted men. In one case two officers became embroiled in an unofficial boxing 
match in the street, after an exchange of bravado in a bar, much to the entertainment of 
the enlisted sailors present. The British officer was apparently very popular with his crew, 
after having won the impromptu bout.189 Arguments over girls were a relatively common 
cause of disagreements, along with British sailors resenting the fact that their American 
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counterparts were better paid and flaunted it when ashore.190 It was common, for example, 
for US sailors to privately hire Chinese labourers to perform their more burdensome tasks 
when in port.191 While British sailors did also sometimes out-source tasks, their disposable 
incomes were stretched thin in comparison, in part due to higher mess bills when serving in 
East Asia.192 Senior officers were generally relaxed about this fighting between their crews, 
particularly when compared with more serious developments with other nations. At least 
two clashes between American personnel and those from Japan in 1919 and then France in 
1925, for example, led to significant diplomatic incidents.193 In the former case, a 
disagreement between a few sailors in a Tianjin brothel escalated into a mass-fight between 
roughly thirty-five US marines and one hundred Japanese servicemen. All sporting and social 
events between American and Japanese personnel in the city were subsequently banned to 
prevent further clashes. Commonality of culture and language meant that it was easy for 
Anglo-American servicemen to insult each-other and start fights, but also for cooler heads 
to calm those involved and prevent things from spiralling out of control.  
Official, formal social events were different scenarios, and officers from both navies treated 
them extremely seriously. In one case, an American captain was forced to berate his sailors 
after they deliberately ate all the food at a dinner they were hosting for a Royal Navy 
warship, including the meals intended for their guests. A second event was held shortly 
afterwards, during which everyone involved was ordered to be on their best behaviour.194 
While a little day-to-day friendly rivalry was tolerated, or even seen as beneficial, it could 
not be allowed to cause a loss of face when senior officers were present. There was 
undoubtedly a rivalry between the two navies, but strong bonds of friendship were 
formed.195 
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In practice, therefore, Asiatic Fleet crews tended to collaborate enthusiastically with their 
British counterparts, an attitude that extended up the full length of the two respective 
regional commands. Admiral Joseph Strauss USN reported in 1921, for example, an 
agreement with his British and Japanese counterparts to divide patrolling sections of the 
Yangtze between the three forces, with the Royal Navy even sometimes referred to as ‘our 
strength on the River’.196 By 1924, Rear-Admiral Anderson gave a speech to the Shanghai 
Branch of the China Association, during which he commented on the heavy collaboration 
with the USN and that Rear-Admiral McVay was ‘always most willing to co-operate’.197 In 
return, McVay stated around the same time that the two navies operated alongside each 
other almost as if they were the same force.198 Often this came in the form of relatively 
simple acts. In the aftermath of the Wanxian Incident in 1926, for example, USS Stewart 
steamed up river and then transported wounded British servicemen quickly downriver for 
treatment, as the American vessel was considerably faster than the gunboats and 
steamships that were otherwise available.199 Likewise, the commanders of HMS Wivern and 
USS Paul Jones were both praised for conducting a rapid and largely peaceful joint 
evacuation of seventy-five British and American civilians at Zhenjiang on 26 March 1927, 
rather than attempting two separate efforts.200 
What that bond meant was that while officially American warships were only meant to 
protect their own civilians and interests, in practice they also extended their guardianship to 
British subjects and property, almost without question. In September 1926, for example, 
Commander Shaffer USN announced that his gunboat would protect the British community 
at Chongqing during unrest at the city, as the Royal Navy was busy responding to and 
dealing with the aftermath of the Wanxian Incident.201 Moreover, the Royal Navy knew that 
Shaffer had been authorised to extend that protection by Admiral Clarence Williams, 
commanding the USN Asiatic Fleet.202 As a result, such incidents meant that the Commander 
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in Chief of the China Station could feel confident that British interests would be protected at 
more Treaty Ports than the Royal Navy could guarantee on its own. 
Whereas Japanese warship captains rigidly adhered to the policies and approaches dictated 
by the IJN’s high command, the Asiatic Fleet’s officers operated in a relatively flexible 
system that enabled them to bend rules. With generally strong bonds of friendship, 
commonality of culture, and to some extent similar views about mutual Anglo-American 
priorities in East Asia, USN officers were also more motivated to work with the Royal Navy.  
The events involving Shanghai in 1927 are highly illustrative of how an unofficial, regional 
approach was adopted by the Asiatic Fleet, which influenced how Britain responded to the 
crisis. 
The seven USN warships and 1,200 marines stationed at Shanghai in early 1927 were 
officially under orders from Washington to protect only American lives and property.203 In 
the event of the Guomindang attempting to seize the International Settlement violently, 
those forces were expected to conduct a managed evacuation of the city. Indeed, the choice 
by President Calvin Coolidge only to deploy ships and marines was part of a wider public 
display that America was looking to avoid enflaming the situation and being drawn into a 
conflict.204 Whether deliberately or unintentionally, those orders were sufficiently vague to 
provide the American commanders on the scene with considerable room to act on their 
own discretion. 
William Braisted and Nicholas Clifford have already identified that Brigadier-General 
Smedley Butler of the US Marine Corps sought to exploit loopholes in the orders issued by 
Washington to take a stronger stance in the defensive plans for Shanghai.205 When the first 
Guomindang troops approached the city in late March, for example, Admiral Williams USN 
and Butler argued about the marines exceeding their instructions by taking up positions in 
the defensive perimeter and not limiting their activities to internal policing.206 While the 
marines maintained a public stance of neutrality, they were collaborating fairly heavily with 
the British behind the scenes. Indeed, on at least one occasion American marines were 
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ordered back to quieter locations by Williams after that collaboration became too obvious. 
Butler went far beyond just words, however, in the extent to which he exceeded 
Washington’s orders. 
In the days after the Nanjing Incident, the General Staff of Britain’s Shanghai Defence Force 
sought greater assurances about what assistance America might render. Under a heading of 
‘Very Secret’ an unnamed British colonel confirmed that the US ‘Commander’ had agreed to 
commit his forces as part of a contingency plan for the International Settlement. As Admiral 
Williams was repeatedly arguing with Admiral Tyrwhitt at this point, it seems highly 
probable that the mystery commander was Butler.207 In the event of a concerted attack by 
Guomindang forces, the US Marines would prepare themselves along the border between 
the Settlement and the French Concession. This would be done under the guise of their 
existing patrols within the interior of the settlement.208 Should the French lines look at risk 
of collapse, the marines would then march into the concession, evacuate all British and 
American civilians, and take up a defensive line along Avenue Joffre – now known as Huaihai 
Middle Road.209 As a wide boulevard offering a broad field of fire, it was hoped that Avenue 
Joffre would be sufficiently defendable to secure the Southern flank of the International 
Settlement. US servicemen would then have been fully committed to the fight for Shanghai, 
well beyond America’s official line of protecting its civilians in the city. 
The secrecy and deliberate anonymity of the document highlights the sensitivity 
surrounding the unofficial collaboration undertaken by the US Navy and Marine Corps. 
Major-General Duncan described the planned involvement of US marines in defending the 
French Concession, for example, as 'a purely unofficial understanding between General 
Butler and myself and a ruse on his part to over-ride his instructions.’210 The American 
consul in Shanghai had also apparently thrown his weight behind the secret agreement, 
adding to the impression of wider support among the local US representatives.211 Those re-
assurances and actions, taken at a local level, were sufficient for the British high command 
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to feel confident enough to plan for American marines to secure the southern boundary. As 
a result, within a week of that agreement with Butler the 12th Royal Marine Battalion was 
moved from acting as a reserve force within the International Settlement to guarding British 
businesses in Pudong, on the other side of the Huangpu River.212 
While Brigadier-General Butler showed a particularly strong desire to work closely with his 
British counterparts in Shanghai, there are also plenty of suggestions that even the allegedly 
Anglophobe Admiral Williams was guilty of privately exceeding his orders, or at least 
bending them. According to Major-General Duncan, Williams told him that in the event of 
Guomindang troops attacking Shanghai, he would 'take any action that I (i.e. Williams) 
considered necessary for the safety of Americans under the conditions then existing'.213 
That statement was interpreted by the British commander to mean that American forces 
would stay and fight, but could not be seen to place themselves in the front-line.  
A single comment from Williams could of course have been misconstrued by the British. 
There is evidence to suggest a deal was struck, however, committing both nations’ armed 
forces to defend each other’s interests at Shanghai. Williams had been faced with the 
challenge of defending St John’s University campus, an American run institution, situated 
over a mile beyond the boundaries of the International Settlement. William’s orders 
included protecting the campus, but doing so would have left American marines isolated 
and in the path of the advancing Chinese forces, in breach of those same instructions. A 
subsequent agreement to extend the British-led defensive line to include the university was 
inherently linked to US marines assisting British forces if they came under attack and were 
at risk of being over-run (see Figure 5). It was only on this basis that Duncan agreed to 
uphold the agreement after his arrival in Shanghai, despite the fact that it exceeded his 
instructions from Whitehall.214 Again, by itself the incident could simply have been a 
misunderstanding, but it adds to a pattern of incidents where Admiral Williams risked 
Washington’s ire by going beyond the letter of his orders. At the very least it shows that the 
protection afforded to the American staff at the university by British forces was not wholly 
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magnanimous.215 Co-operation and deal-brokering between Anglo-American forces in 
Shanghai was far more widespread and detailed than has previously been acknowledged, 
with numerous officers from both nations’ conducting their own diplomacy. 
Figure 5: Foreign defensive lines for the Shanghai International Settlement 1927216 
 
 
While Britain and America’s overall strategies for China may have differed in tone, there 
were sufficient practical overlaps for naval commanders to find common ground to work 
with. Against a background of heavy socialising, officers of the China Station and Asiatic 
Fleet saw each-other as comrades in arms, right up to the most senior positions of 
command. For all the diplomatic posturing over the official stances taken over China, and 
top-level antagonism between the two navies, events on the scene were quite different.217 
While there was a general understanding between the foreign powers that their gunboats 
would assist each-other, the Anglo-American bond came with an expectation of unfettered 
assistance. For Britain, the impact of that close relationship was similar to that of a force 
multiplier, enabling the China Station to achieve more comprehensive protective coverage 
across the Treaty Ports without an increase in its own vessels. 
                                                          
215 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp.202-204. 
216 Map of Shanghai, 1919, TNA, MR 1/758. 
217 Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars. 
Page | 89  
 
Summary - Intertwined tales 
The military situation in East Asia during the 1920s was based around a dynamic series of 
relationships, which changed over the years and not always along a linear progression. As a 
result, it would be incorrect to focus too heavily on a narrative of declining relations 
between Japan and its Anglo-American rivals. Assistance was sought and rendered in both 
directions between Britain and Japan throughout the decade, although it was increasingly 
tempered by mutual suspicion and conflicting priorities in China. Events on the mainland in 
East Asia, however, had far greater influence on the grand strategy between the major 
powers than just that of a playing field for the conflict of interests. 
The plan that was proposed repeatedly by the Royal Navy’s regional commanders that 
Whitehall should seek an understanding with China, or at least some of its leading warlords, 
as a means to counter Japanese aggression may never have come to pass. Events in China 
dictated that the British government was unable, or less willing, to pursue such an informal 
alliance. Based upon the various arguments made over the decade, however, the 
Admiralty’s belief that China would be on the same side as Britain in any conflict with Japan 
supported the decision to continue actively defending Hong Kong. The maintenance of 
significant naval forces around and at Hong Kong was as much to do with China as it was 
Japan, and with potential Chinese support its defence was far from ‘untenable’ during the 
1920s, even if it became so in later years.218 Gunboat flotillas and a single cruiser squadron 
were no real threat to the IJN, but they were sufficient to deter the threat of organised 
violence in China. Moreover, even after being reinforced by the battle fleet in the event of a 
war with Japan, Hong Kong was still primarily seen as a base that enabled offensive 
operations in and around China. Cutting the flow of raw materials and foodstuffs from 
Shanghai and the Yangtze was expected to prove a far more effective blockade strategy 
than attempting to impose a comprehensive cordon around the Japanese mainland itself. 
Britain’s relationship with China was also influenced at times by strategic developments 
between the major powers in East Asia. The declining value of Weihai as a refuelling base to 
enable naval operations in North East Asia, and its exposed position to a potential Japanese 
attack, played a role in the decision to return the territory to Chinese sovereignty. Equally 
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growing concern about Japan in the last years of the decade does seem to have played a 
part in fostering willingness on the part of the Royal Navy and British authorities in general 
to try to work with the Guomindang. In both cases, however, geo-strategic priorities were 
reliant upon changes in the local environment to enable those negotiations to take place. 
While the narrative of Britain’s interwar relationship with Japan broadly holds true in China, 
even if it was complicated by local events, the situation with the other major powers was 
more complicated and does not fit so easily with top-level developments. Informal 
arrangements between not only individual warships in isolated areas, but also all the way up 
the chain of command to the regional Admirals, often stood in contrast to official 
government policies. This was particularly true for USN vessels and marines, which at times 
committed themselves to actions well beyond their orders. Royal Navy commanders and 
those of France’s Marine Nationale also made similar decisions, acting in collaboration with 
their counterparts to help maintain western interests in East Asia. There were still some 
exceptions, notably Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt and Admiral Leveson, who were less enthusiastic 
about working so closely with perceived rivals. Anglo-American cooperation was widespread 
and generally acknowledged by the two navies as part of life on the peacetime front-line in 
China. Truly understanding the power dynamics at play in China during the 1920s requires 
an acknowledgment of that difference between what was said and agreed at a top-level, 
particularly when it was conducted thousands of miles away, and what actually occurred on 
the ground. 
Those informal agreements made at a local level sometimes had wide reaching 
repercussions. On a day-to-day basis it, in effect, increased the Royal Navy’s protective and 
patrol coverage on the Yangtze and around the Chinese coast. That additional support was 
particularly appreciated during anti-British protests and boycotts in the middle of the 
decade, when American neutrality meant USN warships were better received during unrest 
at ports than those flying the White Ensign. Without that support, the Admiralty would have 
had to consider diverting resources from elsewhere or demand additional funding from the 
Treasury. With the Navy’s budget already under significant pressure after the First World 
War, neither of those were popular prospects. Similarly, at times of crisis, US military 
resources helped Britain extend its reach a little further, enabling a task force to be 
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despatched to Wanxian in 1926 and freeing the 12th Royal Marine Battalion from guarding 
the International Settlement at Shanghai in 1927. 
The bonds of friendship and camaraderie formed between the officers and men of the China 
Station and Asiatic Fleet, during their service in and around China, also played an important 
role in further developing Britain’s grand strategy for a war with Japan. Behind all the 
strategic debates and calculations was an almost unwavering belief of a minimum of tacit 
support from America in the event of such a conflict.219 This fed into Britain’s war plans, 
with either ‘sympathetic’ or ‘benevolent’ neutrality expected, as a minimum, from the US 
armed forces.220 There remained an underlying assumption that a direct conflict with Japan 
was unlikely in the near future, but should the worst happen the Royal Navy felt that its 
blockade efforts would be supported by the US. Likewise, it seems likely that Britain 
anticipated that the Asiatic Fleet would extend its protection to British civilians around 
China, given the plans for Royal Navy gunboats to fall back rapidly on Hong Kong, based 
upon their pattern of doing so during smaller crises. 
The situation in East Asia in the 1920s involved a complicated web of relationships between 
the various countries with interests in the region. Japan’s growing power and its eventual 
shift towards an increasingly aggressive foreign policy after 1927 was a significant 
influencing factor in the Royal Navy’s strategy. Up until and including 1927, however, those 
factors were not the only, or indeed even the primary, influences on regional events. The 
instability in China was arguably the biggest influence upon Britain’s relationship with the 
other major powers. Concerns about Japanese intentions were over-ridden by operational 
priorities in China, and the desire to secure Chinese support against potential Japanese 
attack was hindered by the lack of a friendly regime with whom Britain could negotiate. 
Likewise, the other major powers’ navies, particularly those from America and France, 
operated at times in conflict with the official foreign policies of their governments as a result 
of what the local commanders saw as mutual interests in China. The Royal Navy’s presence 
in East Asia during the 1920s, as its title suggested, was focused on events in China. It was 
that country, and the events occurring within its borders, that the Admiralty felt would 
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decide the security of the British Empire. The Singapore strategy and a perceived direct 
threat from Japan only really started to take centre-stage at the very end of the decade, and 
even then the decisions made relied upon assumptions about the future of China. 
Ultimately, events in China also provided Britain’s far eastern fleet with most of its day-to-
day work, and as we shall soon explore those challenges also led to one of the largest-ever 
peacetime deployments of Royal Navy warships east of Suez. 
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Chapter Two: Adapting to a new China in a violent peace 
 
The complicated web of international relationships spun across 1920s East Asia was caught 
in a whirlwind of developments. In eight short years between 1911 and 1919 the British 
Empire and China in particular underwent a series of significant transformative events. 
Britain was one of the many countries deeply affected by the First World War. In China, the 
Xinhai Revolution had triggered a wave of subsequent changes in political environment. The 
influence those events had on Britain’s relationship with China was delayed to some extent, 
given pressing domestic and other international concerns. Nonetheless, they started to 
really make their mark as the world returned to relative peace in 1919. This chapter will 
explore what impact the revolutions in China and the First World War had upon Britain’s 
approach to one of the key powers in East Asia. This will enable an evaluation of what effect 
the new environment had upon the Royal Navy’s priorities for the region and conversely 
what role the navy had in Britain’s relationship with China during the 1920s. In addition, it 
will provide a better understanding of the relative influence of the First World War, upon 
regional events well away from the front lines in Europe and the Middle East. 
The direct impact of the First World War on the China Station was both modest and 
temporary. After Admiral Graf Spee’s cruiser squadron departed the region in 1914, on an 
eventful voyage culminating in its destruction at the Battle of the Falkland Islands, East Asia 
was left largely untouched by the naval war.1 As a result, vessels and crews were redeployed 
west to the conflict zones, with many of the China Station’s gunboats moored unmanned at 
Hong Kong and Shanghai. Shortly before the return to general peace in Europe, and the 
subsequent scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, that process was slowly reversed. 
By October 1919, most of the China Station’s peacetime complement had been restored, 
with the process completed in early 1920.2 Just as with the elimination of Russia’s Pacific 
Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05, the removal of Germany’s East Asia 
Squadron only re-ordered the local balance of power.3 It did not fundamentally change the 
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Royal Navy’s desire to project power into the region, particularly on China’s coast and 
waterways, where Britain’s gunboats resumed their peacetime imperial duties. 
Instead, the First World War had an indirect, but long-lasting, effect upon the China Station 
and the British Empire in East Asia. Financial cutbacks, greater political focus on domestic 
problems, and changes in attitude towards both the Empire and the use of military violence, 
all influenced the Royal Navy as a global entity. The relatively subtle, gradual changes to the 
China Station that resulted from those factors stood in stark contrast to what had been 
happening in China during that period. 
The Royal Navy’s return to meet a new China 
Entering the 1920s China was not a single unified country. In late 1911, the Qing regime 
finally succumbed to its long-term faults and weakness. A premature and relatively amateur 
attempt to provoke a revolution in Wuhan, sparked a series of events that soon shattered 
the illusion of Qing control over China.4 The Qing authorities’ failure to respond effectively 
to what was initially a localised crisis, ultimately led to it developing into a nationwide 
movement - the Xinhai Revolution, which destroyed the Qing regime’s frail domestic 
legitimacy.5 Subsequent attempts to form a Republic of China failed, due to the inability of a 
single leader to exercise sufficient economic, military, or political power over the whole 
country. As a result, effective domestic power within China transferred to a collection of 
regional warlords.6 No single warlord or faction was able to build the monopoly of violence 
or an effective enough bureaucracy necessary to maintain control over more than its 
immediate region. As a result, the various warlords fought a series of civil wars, over the 
course of the following two decades. Estimates suggest a cumulative total of up to 400 
individual conflicts fought during the full warlord era.7 
1920s China may have been highly fragmented politically, but as a whole its geographic area 
remained broadly in line with the boundaries that existed for the Qing and those eventually 
inherited by Mao’s Communist regime.8 China was still regarded as a single national entity 
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at the time by many international observers as well as by the more powerful warlords, who 
in some cases aspired to become the new sole ruler of the country.9 Indeed, as concepts of 
nationalism gained wider understanding and acceptance among the ordinary population, 
there was a contradictory shift. More of China’s 400 million inhabitants believed in and 
came to see the nation as a single political entity, even if in practice the country had moved 
further away from that reality. 
For the British diplomats and naval officers whose duties involved East Asia, contemporary 
reports show that there was a tendency to simplify the situation by focusing upon the two 
powerful northern (Beiyang) and southern (Guomindang) factions.10 That simplification was 
not unique to British officials. Indeed, many of the weaker warlords would at times 
nominally ally themselves with one of the two leading factions.11 There were specific 
circumstances when the British did consider the situation in greater detail. A 1927 RAF 
report, for example, on military aircraft in China examined seven main warlords’ forces: the 
three northern clique leaders, two sub-divisions of the Guomindang, the governor of 
Yunnan, and the ‘Dogmeat General’ - Zhang Zongchang.12 Despite acknowledging those 
divisions, however, the same British officials only officially recognised and negotiated with 
the representatives of the supposedly ruling Chinese Republic. That government apparatus 
was normally controlled by the leaders of the northern faction occupying Beijing.13 This 
complicated Britain’s relationship with China, as the northern leaders sometimes attempted 
to use international negotiations to their advantage in the domestic sparring. During 
negotiations between Chinese representatives and Britain’s Foreign Office about famine 
relief, for example, the northern-led Chinese proposals would have seen the southern 
warlords shouldering the burden of debt repayments to international creditors.14 In-fighting 
within the cliques further complicated the situation. There were four changes in president 
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and twelve different premiers of the Beijing authorities alone, during the period 1916-
1924.15  
To many a contemporary observer this collapse of central governance and the subsequent 
sustained period of violence, with no clear new leader or regime in sight, might have 
heralded the start of a more dangerous era for China. In reality, the assessment by the 
Foreign Office and Admiralty, as stated in the House of Lords by the Earl of Gosford, 
Archibald Acheson, in August 1925, was that little had changed. Acheson argued that under 
the Qing, day-to-day order had long been maintained by regional power brokers, and 
China’s core power structure was built around ‘the family, the village, and the province’.16 
This was perhaps a reasonable summary of the situation. Research by Wen-hui Tsai and 
James Sheridan has demonstrated that there was considerable continuity of ruling elites 
between the Qing and warlord eras with effective governance mainly taking place on a 
regional level.17 Indeed, in nine of the fifteen regions to declare independence in 1911 it was 
the existing elites that led the events, to secure or enhance their existing power.18  This 
continuity of local Chinese officials, along with a willingness in the British authorities to co-
operate with them, fed into a general maintenance of the status quo in and around the 
treaty ports immediately after the Xinhai Revolution.19 It was not until the early 1920s that 
that modus vivendi started to break down, changing the relationship between the two 
countries. 
Indeed, Britain’s stance towards China in the 1920s was not only based around the attitude 
that the Xinhai Revolution and subsequent warlord conflicts were part of a pattern of 
disorder and decentralised politics. British officials throughout the decade often considered 
China as being incapable of producing an effective national government, through a mixture 
of cultural, ideological, and racial arguments. The head of the British legation in Beijing Sir 
Miles Lampson, for example, informed Whitehall that negotiations over debt repayments in 
1928 were difficult as he felt that Chinese officials were ‘quite inexperienced and politically 
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incompetent'.20 This was something of a feature in Lampson’s memoranda, in which he 
reported that the decisions made by the leaders of the factions were often reckless, with 
apparent lack of thought of the potential consequences. Lampson felt that this was not 
because those individuals did not understand what the consequences were. Instead he 
argued that it was because all too frequently they acted in their own self-interest, with no 
sense of responsibility for the wider consequences. This fed through to the Foreign Office 
and therefore Whitehall’s understanding of each group’s goals, such as during Lampson’s 
assessment of Guomindang’s focus upon short term goals in its relationship with Japan. He 
felt this was extremely dangerous because if it became ‘a question of national honour with 
Japan - well God help the Chinese! And yet they are deliberately running that risk!'21  
Even with such dismissive views, Lampson and his Foreign Office colleagues were often at 
the softer end of the scale in their attitude towards Chinese officials and population. The 
‘Shanghailander’ community of foreign settlers in the Shanghai International Settlement, 
predominantly of British origin, provided far less favourable reports. This included 
arguments that under Chinese rule foreigners would be at risk of being decapitated or 
worse, and there was the potential for a new Boxer Rebellion.22 Robert Bickers and Nicholas 
Clifford in particular have explored how the Shanghailander’s fearful and aggressive rhetoric 
resulted from the community’s sense of racial superiority and inability to understand the 
changes in culture occurring in 1920s China.23 The relatively rapid emergence of mass 
nationalism in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution, did not fit with the established racial 
profile that British officials expected from Chinese people.24 Jürgen Osterhammel describes 
it as the point when ‘the Chinese had suddenly ceased being docile and deferential’, at least 
in the way they were seen by the British.25  
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The Xinhai Revolution was a primary driver of that political and social transformation, but 
the First World War had also had a significant impact upon China’s view of the world around 
it. Of particular importance to its relationship with the British Empire, were Japan’s Twenty-
One Demands and the 1919 peace treaties. The announcement on 18 January 1915 by the 
Japanese foreign ministry demanding that China effectively become a Japanese protectorate 
had two significant impacts upon the region. Somewhat unsurprisingly it caused widespread 
outrage among the Chinese population, when details were made public. Coming as a 
surprise with no forewarning, the initial move and later ultimatum also soured Britain’s 
relationship with its Asian ally. 26 Distracted by the on-going global conflict, the resulting 
surge in nationalist sentiment within China and how it might affect Britain’s imperial 
interests was not necessarily immediately clear, but was later revealed as a result of the 
1919 peace settlements. The decision taken at Versailles to award Germany’s former 
concessions in Shandong to Japan, rather than return them to Chinese sovereignty, sparked 
a wave of protests in what became known as the May Fourth Movement.27 While that 
movement was not necessarily fervently anti-foreign, there was considerable anger over 
Britain’s support of the move and failure to recognise China’s contribution to the war 
effort.28 140,000 Chinese labourers worked in Europe during the final year of the war, of 
whom 2,000 were buried in French graveyards.29 Claims that British influence brought 
investment and development sounded increasingly hollow against that burning sense of 
injustice and betrayal. 
It is also worth noting the significant scale and pace of change occurring in China at the 
time, which confused and confounded many British observers, and went far beyond the 
influence of conflict and revolution. When Commander Cedric Holland returned to East Asia 
in 1928, for example, he noted with near shock how in just fifteen years the local women 
had undergone a complete transformation. Gone were the squeezed, bound feet and 
subservient attitudes. Instead the ladies were freely socialising and dining at previously 
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male-only restaurants providing, as Holland noted with apparent pleasure, ‘most intelligent’ 
conversation.30 Whatever Holland precisely meant is open for debate, but the rapid social 
change he highlighted is very clear from his account. 
Against that backdrop, understanding in Whitehall of warlord China was formed around a 
picture of long-term weak leadership, inconsistent decisions, and chaotic developments.31 
As a result, Britain’s official stance was that peace and stability were unlikely to return to 
China in the foreseeable future, and so Britain should try to maintain a position of neutrality 
and non-intervention.32 Arthur Waldron has suggested that this ‘complacent’ non-committal 
strategy resulted from Britain, along with many of the other major powers, not fully 
appreciating how significant the changes in China would be for their East Asian policies.33 
British politicians were also heavily concerned with domestic issues during the 1920s, and so 
events in Asia were therefore of a lower priority.34 Bernard Porter goes so far as to argue 
that Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister from 1924 to 1929, was uninterested in the Empire as 
his government ‘had more important matters on their plates’, particularly the 1926 General 
Strike.35 In either case, the two causes were in many ways interlinked, and resulted in a 
political focus upon domestic rather than East Asian imperial issues. A key exception to 
Britain’s strategy of non-intervention, however, was that it should be maintained only as 
long as British interests were not directly threatened by the domestic sparring in China. 
There appears to have been a general consensus of support for taking that approach and it 
formed a core tenet of Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain’s statements to the House 
of Commons towards the latter part of the decade.36  
During the first half of the 1920s, China’s main regional warlords honoured the agreements 
made by the Qing with Britain, such as the extra-territorial privileges held by the 
International Settlements, helping to avoid a British or multi-national military response.37 In 
addition, the regions in which Great Britain had most interest, particularly the treaty ports 
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of Shanghai, Guangzhou (Canton), Nanjing and Tianjin (Tientsin), were less affected by 
actual fighting, prior to the start of the Northern Expedition. Nonetheless it was a new and 
different China that the Royal Navy encountered as it returned to East Asia. Distracted by 
domestic concerns and generally unaffected by the on-going civil conflict, the British 
government assumed a non-committal neutral posture in China prior to 1925. In essence, 
Britain’s politicians hoped that China would be reunified by a favourable regime, with whom 
it would be possible to work to protect and maintain the British Empire’s interests.38 
Britain’s changing interests in China 
The British Empire’s primary interest in 1920s China remained largely unchanged from the 
Opium Wars, when the country was forcibly opened to western trade, in the mid-nineteenth 
century. As a major trading nation, the British government sought to maintain and where 
possible expand the opportunities for trade in China whether proactively or following 
pressure from British companies. This trade was based around the cities along China’s coast 
and major rivers, particularly a few key centres such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. Between 
the late nineteenth century and the 1920s, railways and modern roads had spread across 
China, but the web remained very thin, with the 5,237 miles of railway track only roughly 
equal to Britain’s network in the 1850s.39 As a result, China was still very much a littoral 
mercantile economy, with its rivers, canals and coastline remaining the main arteries for 
trade.40 British businesses dominated international trade with China prior to the First World 
War, and were heavily engrained in that overall littoral economy. Long-term advantages in 
modern bulk transport shipping and trade finance, backed by the powerful Royal Navy, had 
allowed shipping firms such as Jardine Matheson and Co., to out-manoeuvre their rivals. 
Many British companies had also invested heavily in building local factories in many of the 
key cities, much of which was constructed prior to the Xinhai Revolution.41 Investment 
capital was largely concentrated in a few locations, with Shanghai alone accounting for 
roughly three-quarters of the £200 million in British investments in China in 1927. Events 
between 1919 and 1927 increased that concentration in Shanghai, but the city had long 
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been a focal point for foreign investment. There were, however, numerous factories, mines, 
and other business interests located in areas outside of the treaty ports.42  
The level of British interest in China had been slowly changing in the early twentieth 
century, however, both on land and afloat. In particular, the First World War interrupted the 
pattern of global trade and provided a boost to Japanese and American companies looking 
to export into China. Competition was therefore far higher going into the 1920s, although 
China remained a significant market for British manufacturers, accounting for over 3% of 
total exports.43 In return, the British Empire as a whole was by far China's largest trading 
partner, accounting for just under half of all Chinese international trade.44 Patterns of trade 
were also changing rapidly, with greater focus on consumer goods branding and business 
networks, particularly working with local firms. This brought into question the long-term 
value of defending the network of smaller treaty ports and industrial centres such as Jiujiang 
(Kiukiang).45 Indeed, as anti-imperialist sentiment grew in China over the 1920s, some 
British firms supported that growing detachment from formal concessions. British American 
Tobacco, for example, decided that formal protection risked harming their business 
operations and damaging their image among Chinese consumers. As Philip Pugh has put it, 
gunboats might open or keep open markets, but ‘Trade requires willing buyers and willing 
sellers.’46 As a result, British businesses preferred maintaining a low profile, to try to avoid 
becoming the focus of protests and boycotts.47  
Industrial and mercantile firms operating in China were not the only ones at stake from 
threats posed by the disorder in China. British financial institutions had significantly 
increased their exposure to the Chinese economy in the years prior to the First World War.48 
A high proportion of the railways in southern and eastern China, for example, were financed 
with long term loans by British bondholders, such as the section of the Jinghu Railway 
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between Shanghai and Nanjing, constructed in 1903.49 Britain’s exposure to these 
investments should not be overstated, however, as Ian Phimister has illustrated how the 
capital raised in some cases came from European investors, with the British financiers 
merely acting as intermediaries. It was not British money that was actually at stake when 
those assets were at risk. However, that was often of little consequence in practice, as the 
Foreign Office was generally only aware that the paper trail went through London and did 
not know who owned the investments.50  
As with global trade, the First World War had also interrupted global monetary flows and 
disrupted both Britain’s financial influence over China and its nominal exposure to the 
market. The Beijing government alone took out almost CH$1bn in foreign loans between 
1916 and 1926, mostly with Japanese banks.51 In addition, a considerable amount of 
borrowing had been undertaken by other warlords, with China’s total external debts rising 
as high as CH$2.2bn by 1925. As that debt and the interest payments required to service it 
soared, there was a growing risk that the loans would go into default. This was particularly 
true given the turmoil in the country, with the debtor governments, warlords, and 
companies unable to generate significant, stable incomes. A mass-default had the potential 
to cause a financial crisis in the City of London.  
The British government were aware, however, that there was some flexibility in the degree 
of instability that could be tolerated before such a scenario might come to fruition. Loans 
issued by British financiers were generally secured against either tangible assets, such as 
railways, or customs revenues.52 The over-riding concern for the British government was 
therefore to avoid a complete collapse of order in China that would result in both 
widespread loan defaults and loss of access to those securities. France was in a similar 
position, through a mixture of direct investment in the pre-war Chinese railway drive, and 
indirect ownership of British arranged loans.53 As a result, French financiers owned roughly 
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one-quarter of China’s secured foreign debt.54 This position was aided by British control of 
China’s Customs Service, enabling considerable influence over ensuring that Chinese 
government repayments continued, a key source of debt servicing for British financiers.55 
Likewise, a contemporary assessment by the China Association indicates that most 
corporate loans were also still being honoured, with over one quarter of all long-term British 
loans to Chinese railways, by value, having been repaid by the end of 1926.56 Admittedly, 
there was considerable variety between different regions, with some railways effectively 
bankrupt due to levies imposed by local warlords.57 However, the crucial point is that even 
with the regional conflicts, economic trouble, and general instability in China after 1911, 
most loans managed by British entities were slowly being repaid.  
In contrast to Britain and France, the Japanese government had guaranteed the largely 
unsecured ¥145 million ‘Nishihara’ loans, issued to the Beiyang faction, leaving Japan liable 
for the cost should the loans enter default.58 This meant that the Japanese government was 
exposed directly to that risk, which in effect tied Japan rigidly into taking a far more active 
role in Chinese affairs, even if later governments had switched to a dovish foreign policy. 
Moreover, Japanese financiers in general had greater exposure to unsecured debt provided 
to Chinese warlords and businesses. The nature of the finance deal was particularly 
significant in this case, as it meant that Japan had no financial reason for restraint when in 
1928 the Northern Expedition threatened the warlords and railways that the Japanese loans 
had financed.59 
Underneath all the monetary and business concerns was the human dimension. There were 
thousands of British civilians living and working in China, whose safety was a concern for the 
British authorities. Mirroring the location of business investment, the majority were resident 
in Shanghai’s International Settlement, although there were smaller communities at many 
other treaty ports. Shanghai’s British population had continued increasing slowly in the 
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1910s, partly driven by children being born to existing families. While those expatriates 
retained significant formal control over key institutions, their overall influence was waning, 
amid a rapidly changing city (see Figure 6).60 Shanghai’s other European populations were 
generally in decline after 1914. The German community had almost disappeared during the 
First World War and the numbers of both Italians and Portuguese were steadily dropping 
going into the 1920s.61 In contrast, the American presence had been progressively 
expanding, in conjunction with US business interests in the region. Likewise, a wave of 
Russian refugees fleeing the October Revolution had added to the evolving face of the city 
and disrupted established racial norms.62 Neither change was anywhere near as significant 
as Japan’s, however, which over a twenty-year period had gone from being a modest 
number of merchants to the largest foreign community in Shanghai. Britain still had a sizable 
civilian population in China that it sought to protect, but other countries had a growing and 
influence over local affairs. 
Figure 6: Foreign population of the Shanghai International Settlement 1915-2063 
 
Note: Does not include the French Concession. 
As a result, Whitehall’s key priority in protecting the range of British interests in China after 
the First World War was the maintenance of some semblance of law and order. There was 
less concern over who it was that provided the desired localised stability. Over the course of 
the 1920s, but particularly after the launch of the Northern Expedition, Britain had the most 
day-to-day contact with the Guomindang, which British officials often referred to as the 
‘southern faction’ due to its initial capital at Guangzhou. For the majority of the decade, 
                                                          
60 Bickers, ‘Shanghailanders’, 171-178. 
61 Shanghai Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1920, Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA), U1-1-985; Shanghai 
Municipal Gazette, 7 August 1924, SMA, U1-1-989. 
62 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Global Shanghai, 1850-2010: A History in Fragments, (London: Taylor & Francis, 
2008), pp.71-72. 
63 Shanghai Municipal Gazette, 18 November 1920, SMA, U1-1-985; Letter from the Canadian Trade 
Commissioner to the Shanghai Municipal Council, 20 August 1918, SMA, U1-2-551. 
Page | 105  
 
however, a mixture of the policy of neutrality and a distrust of the Guomindang’s links to 
Soviet Russia, limited Britain’s appetite to support any single ‘faction’. The British 
government favoured a unified China, but were content to wait and see who would emerge 
as the new leader, so long as there were no significant threats to Britain’s interests.64 Lord 
Curzon, as Foreign Secretary in 1924, even went so far as to criticise a memorandum from 
Lampson detailing events in the west and far south of China, because he felt that the power 
struggles in those regions had no direct impact upon the main areas of British interest.  
The Royal Navy’s growing piracy challenge 
While the Xinhai Revolution and subsequent breakdown in centralised control over China 
had not significantly altered the situation for Britain in relation to its main interests in the 
country, there were nonetheless new challenges for Whitehall. One area in particular that 
posed a growing indirect threat was that of piracy. The Foreign Office copied the diplomatic 
strategy it had used with the Qing, by pressuring the different warlords and factions to deal 
with the problem, including sometimes offering assistance. The Royal Navy occasionally 
provided logistical support to Guomindang forces, for example, when local officials were 
persuaded that it was also in their interests to deal with a particular pirate ‘nest’.65 This low-
level co-operation, however, did not have a significant bearing on the overall relationship 
between Britain and the Guomindang, or other warlords. Indeed, one of the first things 
agreed by Hong Kong Governor Reginald Stubbs and Guomindang Foreign Minister Chén 
Yŏurén (Eugene Chen) when discussing the issue in 1924 was that such co-operation would 
be ‘a strictly informal’ arrangement.66 Nor did it ultimately have a significant impact upon 
reducing the level of piracy in Chinese waters. With diplomatic efforts hampered and 
ineffective, the Admiralty was ordered to take responsibility for dealing with the threat 
posed to British shipping in the region. The changes that had occurred in China between 
1911 and 1919, particularly during the period when global attention was transfixed on the 
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First World War, had produced a new environment and set of challenges for the Royal Navy 
to deal with. 
While piracy and wider banditry has featured regularly in accounts of the period, there has 
been relatively little work done on what it actually entailed.67 Anti-piracy operations that 
went wrong in catastrophic style have seen considerable discussion, given the impact they 
had on anti-British sentiment in China. In particular, there were incidents on the boundary 
between piracy and diplomatic infringements on Britain’s extra-territorial rights, which 
involved local Chinese troops and led to major clashes. The Royal Navy’s bombardment of 
Wanxian in September 1926, for example, during a botched rescue of two hijacked British 
merchant vessels, has featured in most accounts of Britain’s relationship with 1920s China.68 
The day-to-day reality was somewhat less dramatic.  
With the widespread breakdown in law and order after the Xinhai Revolution and severe 
droughts negatively impacting the rural economies of large regions, groups of ‘pirates’ 
increasingly targeted merchant vessels on the Yangtze and Pearl rivers as well as routes 
around China’s coast.69 The pirates were a mixture of organised criminal gangs, smaller 
groups of local brigands, and in some cases simply communities of individuals driven to 
crime through economic necessity. This resulted in considerable variety in operating 
methods between the different groups, with some conducting largely amateur attacks, 
whereas other organised groups ran relatively sophisticated operations. Indeed, there is at 
least one account of pirates having paid informants in both the Guomindang’s army units 
and aboard the Royal Navy vessels tasked with defeating them. Prior to a planned raid near 
Guangzhou in June 1925, for example, General Leung had one of his subordinates arrested 
for passing on information about a raid to a pirate band. After a change of plans, the locally-
hired pilot of HMS Robin then warned the same group to prepare for the new alternative 
attack.70 The length of the maritime trade and transport routes, with numerous bays and 
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twists of river, made them difficult to police without a sizable force of patrol boats. As an 
example of what was available, for most of the 1920s the Royal Navy only had ten gunboats 
covering the 1,500 miles of the Yangtze regularly used by British shipping, as well as all its 
tributaries and interconnected lakes.71  
For British shipping companies, such as Jardines, the threat of piracy harming trade routes in 
China was not immediately a major concern given the size of their overall businesses. Losing 
a few insured cargoes to pirates would not significantly harm their profitability. However, 
repeated acts of piracy, increased costs from countermeasures and private guards, or a shift 
in trade to better-protected merchant fleets could all harm their competitiveness over the 
long term. For the British Empire, it was not just the profitability of such major firms at 
stake. The regularity with which incidents occurred around Daya (Bias) Bay posed a growing 
threat to Hong Kong’s position as a key trading hub, given it was only thirty-five nautical 
miles away. As with individual businesses, a few irregular incidents were an acceptable 
hazard, but a growing pattern of attacks was not. By the middle of 1924, for example, no 
more than three or four days generally passed between reports of incidents involving piracy, 
(or labelled as such), on the waterways and coast around Hong Kong.72 
In dealing with the threat, the volume of trade itself posed a challenge. Given the levels of 
manpower available to the China Station, it was impossible to simply provide military or 
police guards for all British vessels travelling along affected routes, although guards were 
used in some specific instances. Even during a particularly quiet month, for example, 
somewhere in the region of 100 different merchant ships passed through Nanjing, of which 
a quarter were British-flagged vessels.73 With a standard guard contingent of five seamen or 
marines per ship, roughly 120 personnel would have been required on a regular basis just 
for the Yangtze River.74 During a busier phase in the summer of 1928, for example, Rear-
Admiral Hugh Tweedie was forced to request additional manpower, with at least 150 men 
on guard duty – equivalent to the crew of a large destroyer.75  
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With ‘run and hide’ the long-established standard response by pirate groups when faced 
with professional fighters, such as the Royal Navy, it was rarely possible to tackle the 
problem on the water.76 As a result, raids against what were considered pirate ‘nests’ were 
launched by the Royal Navy, but the sheer scale of the problem and British government 
concerns that raiding would stir up anti-British feeling both limited the use of such 
operations.77 Rear-Admiral William Boyle later recalled that similar raids aimed at 
uncovering pirates living in normal villages were also unpopular with ordinary British 
seamen. Trying to unearth and punish criminals living amidst innocent families was not what 
those seamen had signed up for, and conducting such operations on a regular basis would 
therefore negatively impact upon morale.78 Indeed, those British crewmen found the 
normal punishment for piracy in China – public beheading – extremely distasteful and were 
sometimes ordered not to intervene when witnessing it being carried out.79 Problems with 
existing tactics, the terrain and the ability of suspects to move inland and hide, along with 
the lack of a central government that could be held responsible, meant that the Royal Navy 
had to develop new approaches to dealing with piracy.80 
One element of the piracy problem to develop in the period was relatively unusual, 
providing a new challenge to the British authorities. There was a steady growth in the 
number of cases where passengers were hijacking vessels mid-journey, leading to their 
valuable cargoes being offloaded at pre-arranged locations.81 These incidents generally took 
the same format: small groups of hijackers would buy tickets to travel as passengers on 
vessels, with a selection of small arms concealed on their person or in their luggage. After 
reaching a quieter point on the journey the infiltrators would reveal their weapons and seize 
control of the vessel, in some cases using violence against the crew in the process. During 
one such incident in November 1920, for example, ten passengers aboard the Chinese 
steamer Takhing revealed hidden revolvers shortly after the vessel had left Hong Kong and 
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seized control of the vessel. Three boats containing accomplices then joined the steamer, 
with the captain Cheung Fat forced to steer his ship in a failed attack on a second vessel, 
before taking it to Pakshawan Bay (Hebe Haven). The cargo of fourteen cases of sugar and a 
variety of ammunition crates were then offloaded, and the pirates departed.82 While in that 
case it resulted in a modest haul and no-one was killed, some attacks yielded goods worth 
tens of thousands of dollars and others in multiple deaths.83 In cases where there were no 
goods that could be readily removed, hostages were occasionally taken for ransom. Mr J. 
Rasmussen of the Asiatic Petroleum Company experienced just such a fate in November 
1921, although no details were made public of the ransom payment presumably made to 
secure his release.84 In a later example in 1928, bribes and ransoms made to secure the 
release of crewmembers from one merchant steamship added up to a total of $2,437 during 
a single journey, enough to pay for a couple of months’ worth of fuel oil for the ship.85 
Hijacking or ‘internal piracy’ as it was sometimes referred to, was not wholly new to the 
region, and had first been recorded off the Chinese coast in 1890, when the SS Namoa was 
seized in an incident that caused a significant stir at Hong Kong. It had remained a relatively 
rare form of piracy under the Qing, however, as foreign pressure applied to local Chinese 
authorities often resulted in them taking a particularly hard line in punishing those 
individuals suspected of committing such attacks. Hijacking only became a popular tactic 
among pirates once that risk was largely removed following the Xinhai Revolution. Its 
popularity had then soared during the First World War years, through on-going civil strife in 
China and a reduction in foreign gunboat patrols. By the time the China Station returned to 
normal duties towards the end of the decade, hijacking had become well established as a 
popular form of piracy.86 
As carrying passengers was an important source of income for ship-owners, they were 
reluctant to risk driving them away by adopting too stringent and potentially invasive 
security screening measures. Efforts were made to create ‘protected bridges’ to make it 
more difficult for pirates to seize control of vessels, but such efforts do not appear to have 
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proven particularly successful. Metal grilles placed over important windows and hatches, for 
example, were criticised as both ineffective and going against safety regulations.87 Despite 
pressure from the Foreign Office to deal with the problem, the Admiralty nominally 
considered it to be a matter for the civil authorities in the ports of departure. Pertinently, 
the instructions issued to the Commander in Chief of the China Station defined piracy as 
involving 'predatory and violent acts’, as opposed to general ‘robbery upon the coast’.88  
The Royal Navy’s desire to offload much of the piracy challenge on civil authorities quickly 
proved to be forlorn. Efforts made by city authorities were ineffectual with pirates 
continuing to seize vessels even after inspections at British administered ports. Indeed, the 
Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) were already struggling to deal with the widespread 
smuggling of weaponry by passengers in general. Just thirty-five people were caught by the 
SMP over the course of 1923, for example, although they were found to be carrying 135 
pistols and 10,000 rounds of ammunition between them. A key limitation was that the SMP 
only had authority to conduct searches when passengers came ashore. As a result, the 
Shanghai Municipal Gazette reported that weapons were quietly being offloaded to passing 
small local boats on the river, before ships docked and searches could take place.89 With 
punishments also as light as five days in jail, the risks to those discovered carrying weapons 
were minimal, with some even released without charge.90 While the police in other ports 
may have had greater success, preventing determined hijackers from successfully 
concealing the few handguns they might need for an attack was almost impossible. As a 
result, the Royal Navy was considered by many to be the only force capable of tackling the 
problem and so the China Station was left with its unwanted task. 
Foreign Office correspondence about the piracy problem on the River Yangtze provides an 
interesting insight into just how reluctant the Royal Navy was about being asked to tackle 
the problem. Rear-Admiral Crawford Maclachlan, as the senior naval officer on the Yangtze, 
was placed under considerable pressure from British consuls, both those of junior rank in 
upper-Yangtze treaty ports and those higher up the chain, such as Sir Ronald Macleay. 
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Maclachlan politely rebuffed each argument to assign more resources towards tackling the 
piracy issue, or to request additional men, apparently tendering little or no explanation for 
his decision.91 This caused Consul Lancelot Giles to apply pressure to individual gunboat 
officers. In one case, he successfully convinced Lieutenant Commander Tucker of HMS 
Woodlark to provide armed guards for the SS Changwo.92 Likewise Macleay also lobbied 
Admiral Arthur Leveson, in vain, to assign additional men to Maclachlan’s command, 
specifically for counter-piracy duties.93 
The Admiralty did make requests to the Treasury for funding to replace a few of the aging 
China gunboats, notably the pre-Boxer Rebellion Woodcock and Woodlark, to boost the 
resources available for anti-piracy work on the Yangtze in particular. Those older warships 
were due for replacement as they were 'in such a bad state that they are really useless for 
escort duty as they cannot keep pace even with the slowest river steamers.'94 As a result, 
they were wholly unsuitable for anti-piracy patrols along their stretches of the Upper 
Yangtze. In January 1925, for example, four gunboats and five motor boats were included on 
the Navy’s proposed new construction list, intended for the following year.95 Amid fierce 
battling in the British establishment over the financing of new warships during this period, 
however, the order for new gunboats was delayed and the motor boats rejected. It was only 
after the diplomatic situation in China had changed, and issues more pressing than piracy 
arose, that the replacements were finally authorised and the first two Tern and Peterel (sic) 
eventually launched in 1927.96 The earlier proposals therefore appear to have been included 
by the Admiralty more to assuage the Foreign Office, and as a secondary bargaining chip 
with the Treasury, than out of a genuine desire to improve their counter-piracy capabilities. 
Just as with two existing gunboats that remained idle at Malta, temporarily forgotten during 
discussions with the Foreign Office, the Admiralty was reluctant to divert resources to the 
task.97 
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The Royal Navy may have had plenty of previous experience in dealing with pirates that 
attacked from their own vessels, but there was little precedence for having to counter a 
threat such as hijacking.98 This became a prominent feature during the Navy’s official, and 
ultimately unsuccessful, argument that hijacking was an issue for the civil authorities.99 As a 
result, not only did the newly reformed, peacetime China Station have to prepare itself 
quickly for dealing with a surge in piracy, it had to develop an entirely new approach for 
doing so. On China’s rivers, pirates could offload their loot quickly to shore or ferry it away 
along tributaries, long before the Navy’s handful of slow-moving gunboats could reach the 
location. In some cases, a British gunboat arrived in time only to see pirate launches 
disappearing rapidly up shallow creeks, making pursuit even more challenging.100 In such 
cases, the gunboat would then usually just fire a few blank shells when passing the nearest 
village as a matter of prestige, to ensure ‘that none of this valuable asset is lost’.101 Likewise, 
the cruisers and sloops patrolling the coast were not designed or equipped for hostage 
situations. There were no helicopters or fast-boats with which to transfer marines quickly to 
the affected vessels. Indeed, in any case a Royal Navy response was almost wholly reliant 
upon their help being requested in the first place. This was rarely made in a timely manner, 
if at all, as pirates tended to occupy ships’ wireless rooms before mayday signals could be 
issued. Indeed, Commander Malcom Maxwell-Scott noted in his capacity as Senior Naval 
Officer on the West River in 1924 that most successful interventions occurred through his 
gunboats simply ‘bumping’ into the incidents.102 
Britain was not the only nation involved in anti-piracy operations on China’s waterways 
during the 1920s. Chinese gunboats themselves did attempt to tackle troublesome pirate 
groups, particularly those under Guomindang control based out of Guangzhou. This included 
engaging armed vessels around the Pearl River Delta, as well as raiding pirate camps ashore. 
In some pre-planned operations, British assistance was sought and provided, with Royal 
Navy gunboats either actively helping to engage the gangs or passively moored nearby as a 
background statement of force. One such raid highlights the complicated situations those 
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junior British officers could find themselves in, even with some form of official Chinese 
support.  
In the 1925 operation previously mentioned, which was compromised twice by pirate 
sympathisers, the British gunboats HMS Cicala and Robin were authorised to provide 
support after a request for their help from General Leung. The twice re-planned operation 
on 10 June led to the arrest of thirty individuals at the village of Songshi, of whom twenty-
eight were suspected of being pirates and later tried as such. The gunboats had played a 
modest role, helping to transport the Chinese troops, and firing two high explosive shells as 
a show of force.103 After that success, a second raid was arranged against the village of 
Wangtong the following day. Lieutenant Commander Victor Alleyne was in overall command 
aboard Cicala, but only the smaller Robin was able to navigate the shallow creek leading 
immediately up to the pirate group’s fortified encampment.  
Commanded by the twenty-eight-year-old Lieutenant Cyril Faure, Robin initially behaved in 
line with its orders, with its main gun and machineguns used to support the Chinese troops 
attacking the hill. When General Leung subsequently requested to go ashore, Faure 
provided him with a bodyguard of ten British sailors. Faure himself also then went ashore 
and participated in a flanking charge by those sailors to help successfully break the pirate 
defensive line. Up until that point, Robin’s comparatively light 6-pounder main gun had fired 
144 shells, but to almost no effect against the solid earth banks built around the camp. 
Having been invited to participate by Leung, Faure’s report of the incident suggests that he 
hoped that his bravery would be praised by senior figures.104 Instead, he received a rebuke 
from the Foreign Office, with his superior officer Commodore Anselan Stirling reminding him 
that British service personnel were forbidden from landing on Chinese soil.105 Praise from 
General Leung was sufficient to assuage Foreign Office concerns, and ultimately the 
Admiralty did issue a brief note of appreciation for both Alleyne and Faure’s conduct, two 
months later.106 It was a relatively minor infraction by an inexperienced officer, supported 
by a senior officer, but one that had significant repercussions for both Faure himself and 
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wider Anglo-Chinese relations. Faure responded extremely badly to the criticism directed at 
his actions and a month later played a pivotal role in the Shaji massacre, resulting in dozens 
of deaths, an incident that will be explored in chapter four.  
While the collaboration between General Leung and British forces in 1925 was apparently 
relatively successful at dealing with specific groups, such attempts had limited success 
overall. In particular, those efforts were often undermined by problems the Guomindang 
had in being able to pay their naval staff. As a result, their gunboats were often left for long 
periods sitting idle in port, and at other points the crews strayed towards the temptation to 
join forces with the pirates themselves.107 In one case on 19 June 1924, for example, some 
of the Kwang Tsi’s crew mutinied and rendezvoused with a pirate band, offloading the 
gunboats’ machine guns and ammunition.108 On balance therefore, collaboration with local 
Chinese authorities appears to have generally had a negligible impact upon the level of 
piracy. 
Alongside the sporadic work conducted with local Chinese forces, the Royal Navy also 
interacted with warships from numerous other naval powers operating in the region. The 
primary location where their work overlapped was on the Yangtze River, where ten 
Japanese, eight American, and five French gunboats were regularly on patrol. 109 During the 
1910s there had been a significant increase in the number of gunboats from other foreign 
nations on the Yangtze. For example, the USN ‘Yangtze Patrol’, officially reformed as a 
separate command in 1921, acquired two brand new gunboats in 1914 capable of traversing 
the Ichang rapids and gorges to reach the upper stretches of the river.110 Growing American 
naval influence was broadly beneficial in terms of British concerns about piracy on China’s 
waterways. Co-operation with the American gunboats was commonplace, given a shared 
language and similar concerns about the safe flow of trade.111 One British Acting-Consul, 
A.P. Blunt, went so far as to state that co-operation with the American naval forces was 
‘whole hearted’ and ‘went without question’.112 There were differences in diplomatic 
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approach to China, but day-to-day river policing was seen as mutually beneficial. Likewise, 
co-ordination of effort also occurred with the French navy, such as a scheme in 1926 for 
Royal Navy and Marine Nationale vessels to conduct gunnery drills regularly in Daya Bay, as 
a joint demonstration of force.113  
Cooperation with the Imperial Japanese Navy, even when dealing with the threat of piracy, 
was slightly more complicated. This thesis will go into greater detail about the relationship 
in chapter four, along with those with other powers, but specifically in terms of anti-piracy 
work there was some collaboration between the two navies. The gradual breakdown in 
Anglo-Japanese relations during and immediately after the First World War, leading 
ultimately to the non-renewal of the two nations’ alliance in 1921, meant that interactions 
were not as cooperative as they once had been.114 As the years went by, wider British geo-
strategic concerns about the possibility of a future war with Japan tended to surpass the 
possible anti-piracy benefits from formal co-operation with the second largest naval force 
on China’s waterways. In effect, growing support from the USN was counterbalanced by 
declining cooperation with the IJN. Overall, international assistance did little to help Britain 
with its conundrum over what to do with the surge in piracy, particularly around Hong Kong. 
The piracy problem in China was made all the more complicated by the emergence of anti-
British strikes and boycotts after the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. In theory, the boycott 
of British goods by the Chinese population in the aftermath of heavy-handed policing of a 
protest should have little in common with piracy. In practice, however, the two were 
interlinked in the minds of British officials and Royal Navy officers. Part of the reason for the 
blurred boundaries relates to incidents where boycott picketers detained, or attempted to 
detain, British shipping attempting to dock in ports like Guangzhou. Hong Kong’s Governor 
Cecil Clementi argued forcefully in a report to the Foreign Office in 1926, for example, that 
there should be no debate over the treatment of picketers as pirates. Clementi felt that they 
were ‘brigands’ who were also feared by the general Chinese population.115 It did not help 
that some pirate groups were reported to consist of former soldiers from Guomindang 
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forces, further obscuring the boundaries between officials and criminals.116 As a result, local 
British officials and officers were either unwilling or unable to recognise, or perhaps simply 
unaware, that there was a distinction between pirates and picketers. When preparing for 
anti-piracy patrols, Royal Navy officers were almost certainly influenced in these attitudes 
by discussing events with British expatriates living in the region and reading the newspapers 
they produced.117 Nicholas Clifford has argued that Shanghailanders saw all displays of anti-
British sentiment as threatening, with comparisons drawn to the violence of the Boxer 
Rebellion.118 With that mind-set, it is easy to see how the maritime enforcement of the 
boycotts by Chinese picketers was seen as dangerous and tantamount to piracy, with those 
views then filtering through to naval officers on the China Station. 
Of course, uncompromising attitudes labelling all protestors as pirates was not uniform. 
Many of the more internationally minded British businesses operating in China, including 
Jardines and the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, lobbying the British government 
for a policy of appeasing the Chinese protestors.119 This fits in with one of the divides in the 
International Settlement identified by Bickers, that the more international businesses were 
not representative of the attitudes of the Shanghai settler community.120 The degree of 
tension involved in the discussion of how to approach the boycotts was due to the impact 
on the businesses and communities involved as British exports to China plummeted. 
Edmund Fung gives the initial drop as being from £28.9 million in 1924 to £19.7 million in 
1925, with Goto-Shibata providing a differently-sourced figure of £12.1 million for 1925 
leading to a further drop to just £7.5 million by 1927.121 While the two figures are not 
directly comparable, they do provide an indication of the scale of impact the boycott was 
having.  
For the servicemen on board the navy vessels assigned to counter the piracy threat, the 
discussion as to whether picketers were pirates was perhaps an academic one. They were 
dealing with fast-moving situations where potentially armed men were boarding ships and 
their precise motives were difficult to establish in the heat of the moment. Indeed, British 
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servicemen who served in China later recounted the difficulty experienced in simply 
identifying who Chinese groups were, even when walking around Shanghai’s streets. Both 
ordinary civilians and pirates often wore elements of army or military-style clothing, and 
could be seen carrying weapons. In return soldiers’ uniforms were frequently in poor 
condition, sometimes supplemented by unofficial garments, and they could be found 
carrying a wide range of weaponry.122  
The discussion about picketers did feed into what pro-active steps might be taken and 
whether force could be used to prevent potential shipping seizures, rather than just respond 
to them.123 Against the highly charged backdrop, the Royal Navy had to balance the 
potential for heavy handedness, which would fuel support for anti-foreign groups and 
boycotts, with the belief that being a light touch would result in a drop in British prestige. 
For the naval officers involved, their training and experience in which indecisiveness was 
seen to risk life and ship, was a poor preparation for the diplomacy this work required. 
Commander Miles of HMS Hollyhock, for instance, was lobbied by Consul Cecil Kirke to take 
a strong stance to an affront to British prestige in Shantou (Swatow) in 1926 when a Chinese 
ship ignored demands not to use a pontoon belonging to a British company.124 Miles argued 
that any action he could take was legally dubious and could have made the situation worse, 
but Kirke vigorously protested about Miles’ inaction to the Foreign Office and Admiralty. 
Ultimately the Admiralty supported Miles’ caution, but this may have been an exception to 
the rule. While the Shantou incident was different to those involving piracy and hijacking, it 
displays some of the conflicting non-military priorities that had to be balanced by the 
officers making decisions in the field. In contrast, Admiral Sir Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair the 
Commander-in-Chief of the China Station (1925-26) proposed a direct military attack on 
Guangzhou in 1925 to break the boycott, which was ultimately rejected by Cabinet because 
Britain would clearly be seen as the aggressor.125 Sinclair’s suggestion may have been wholly 
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unsuitable for the tense situation in China after the May Thirtieth Incident, but it was much 
more in-line with the aggressive and assertive mind-set expected of a 1920s Royal Navy 
officer than Miles’ pragmatic approach.126 
The involvement of British service personnel in dealing with strikes, protests, and boycotts 
was not unique to China in this period. The Navy was deployed to a variety of locations 
worldwide including Mexico (1924) and Egypt (1926-27), as well as on mainland Britain 
during the General Strike (1926).127 What proved so challenging in China, however, was the 
variety of situations where a small force of one or two gunboats found itself involved in an 
unplanned flashpoint at a remote location. Those boats were primarily tasked with 
countering piracy, but then found themselves facing protestors and boycott pickets. By the 
end of 1925 British gunboats were also involved in direct clashes with Chinese troops, 
particularly after the May Thirtieth Incident triggered an escalation in anti-British feeling in 
China. Between July and October 1925 alone, there were at least three incidents involving 
the exchange of gunfire – at Shamian (Shameen) Island and Jiangmen, both near 
Guangzhou, and on the Yangtze between Chongqing and Chengdu.128 A reconciliation 
between Britain and the Guomindang going into early 1926, temporarily calmed the 
situation. Nonetheless, the events of 1925 highlighted the weakness of using a handful of 
gunboats to deal with unconventional threats, where there was no clear enemy to combat. 
Up until that point, the China Station had not had to, or been allowed to, call upon the 
significant global resources of the wider Royal Navy to assist with the piracy challenge. 
Within the following twelve to eighteen months, however, the events in China had a 
significant impact upon the entire Service. 
An exceptional deployment: the 1926 task force 
Anthony Clayton’s study of the British Empire in the interwar period has to a large extent 
framed the current understanding of the scale of the Royal Navy’s deployment to China in 
the latter part of the 1920s. Clayton states that for most of the 1920s, the Navy posted a 
large force to the China Station, which peaked in 1926-27 after the dispatch of a task force 
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to Shanghai, as the Northern Expedition neared the lower Yangtze.129 Osterhammel later 
relied upon that description when arguing that the extent of Britain’s military presence in 
1920s China highlights a feeling of weakness within the British establishment and that the 
final surge was a last attempt at using gunboat diplomacy in China.130 While not entirely 
inaccurate, the core understanding about the behaviour of the Royal Navy and the size of 
the force posted to China requires additional context. 
Between early 1920 and mid 1926 the number of vessels on the China Station remained 
almost entirely unchanged, with a squadron of five cruisers, four sloops, twelve submarines, 
sixteen gunboats, and various support craft.131 The cruisers and submarines were there 
largely in a deterrent capacity against a possible threat from Japan, while the sloops and 
gunboats were used on the Chinese coast and rivers in the anti-piracy work that has already 
been discussed.132 The cruisers did also make brief ‘flag waving’ port calls at the cities of the 
lower Yangtze, however, while travelling between the naval bases at Weihai and Hong 
Kong.133 During that period, the only notable change in deployment came from the 
attachment of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes in August 1925.134 This was despite calls from 
the Foreign Office in 1925 for the Navy to strengthen its anti-piracy gunboats patrols, which 
were summarily rejected by the Admiralty.135 The argument used in response - that there 
were no spare suitable vessels - was a little suspect, given that two gunboats were sat 
unused at Malta. That line was therefore probably just used as a pretext to avoid incurring 
the additional cost of re-commissioning gunboats, for what the Admiralty considered to be a 
non-core assignment. Nonetheless, the China Station was the Royal Navy’s third largest 
global commitment, after the vessels assigned to ‘home waters’ and the Mediterranean 
Fleet based at Malta.136  
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Figure 7: Royal Navy global deployment in November 1920137 
 
Note: Only includes those warships in active commission (i.e. not in reserve or at training schools). 
The China Station’s position as the third largest force had been unchanged since the early 
1880s, well before both the First World War and Xinhai Revolution.138 Indeed, after the 
disruption caused by wartime requirements, the Admiralty had largely restored its forces in 
East Asia back to the region’s previous complement. The only significant alteration that had 
occurred to the China Station between 1913 and 1920, excluding the war years themselves, 
was the replacement of three small pre-war submarines with a dozen newer, larger variants, 
purpose-built to serve as a deterrent against Japan. Of the surface vessels intended for local 
defence, a flotilla of Victorian torpedo boat destroyers had been replaced by wartime 
gunboats, better suited to navigating the rapids on the Middle-Yangtze. Given their broadly 
similar size and armament, however, that change did not represent a noteworthy shift in 
the Station’s strength.139 Likewise, the new cruisers were all powerful combat vessels, but 
few of those qualitative improvements were of much value in peacetime. Indeed, a lay 
person at the time would have struggled to recognise the difference, beyond more obvious 
visible changes such as funnel layouts. China’s civil wars after the Xinhai Revolution may 
have caused the Navy some concern, but there was no notable increase in the strength of 
surface vessels posted to the China Station. The overall focus for the post-war Admiralty 
was on returning to some form of pre-war normality, to a partial ‘Pax Britannica’, although 
one increasingly reliant upon American goodwill.140 
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The comparison used between the China Station in 1913 and 1920 also treats two 
submarine depot ships attached after the war as full warships, based upon the way they 
were actually employed during peacetime, particularly for anti-piracy and imperial policing 
work. If those vessels are assessed using their on-paper, supporting-role classification, then 
the Station’s surface warship tonnage was ten percent below its pre-war level in 1920. The 
latter approach is worth keeping in mind when evaluating the symbolic impact of the fleet, 
as submarine tenders were less visually imposing for reinforcing imperial prestige than fully 
armed warships. Both HMS Titania and HMS Ambrose, posted to the station until 1927-28, 
were originally designed as cargo ships, only to be hastily converted into depot ships in 
1914.141 They were functional vessels with only their white ensigns advertising that they 
were Royal Navy vessels and not merchant ships. 
Taken over an even longer timeframe, looking back to the Boxer Rebellion, there was still a 
strong degree of continuity. The China Station remained largely unchanged throughout the 
ten years prior to 1913, after the armada sent in response to the Boxer Rebellion had been 
recalled. Newer warships had replaced most of the original contingent from 1903, with a 
reduction in boiler room personnel and an increase in fighting attributes. HMS Hawkins as 
the flagship in 1920, for example, was faster and better equipped to respond quickly to 
crises around the command than its predecessors Minotaur and King Alfred. The greater use 
of machinery, however, meant that Hawkins had fewer crewmen available to put ashore 
when assisting in the policing of Britain’s imperial outposts. King Alfred had a crew of 
roughly 900 servicemen in 1910 and Minotaur 825 in 1914, whereas Hawkins set off for the 
China Station in 1919 with 732.142 That was particularly important when managing large 
protests or riots in Shanghai, or other Treaty Ports, because manpower was far more 
valuable than having slightly larger calibre main guns.  
Measuring the level of manpower precisely is a challenge, as replacement ships arriving on 
the Station were often short-handed and it could take months for them to reach full 
complement.143 As a result, submarines and gunboats were occasionally left on skeleton 
crews in harbour when undergoing repairs, with their sailors used to supplement those on 
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other warships.144 Nonetheless, after taking this into account the background number of 
service personnel permanently posted to East Asia remained relatively steady after the mid-
1890s, at between 4,250 and 4,750 men, excluding the war years, until the end of the 
1930s.145 On balance therefore, Britain maintained a remarkably similar peacetime naval 
presence off the Chinese coast in late 1925 to the one present in 1903. This is particularly 
significant given the major changes in the Royal Navy’s pattern of global deployment in the 
intervening years. Combined with the complete withdrawal of the neighbouring Pacific Fleet 
in 1912, the Royal Navy’s effective presence in early 1920s East Asia was actually relatively 
modest compared with pre-war standards.146 
The task force mentioned by Clayton and Osterhammel is therefore of far greater 
significance than is suggested by their accounts, as it marks an exceptional escalation in the 
deployment of naval force to China. At its peak in April 1927, Vice Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt 
had at his disposal thirteen cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers, four sloops, 
seventeen gunboats, and twelve submarines, in addition to a large collection of support 
vessels and hired armed merchantmen.147 The majority of the additional vessels were 
dispatched in the short period between September 1926 and February 1927, as the 
Guomindang’s Northern Expedition neared the lower Yangtze.148 In addition, a battalion of 
1,000 Royal Marines was formed and despatched from the UK in January, and placed under 
Tyrwhitt’s command upon its arrival at Shanghai. In total, the augmented force had roughly 
8,000 extra personnel and a total displacement of roughly 200,000 tons. As an indicator of 
what that actually meant in practice, that was over two and a half times its normal level and 
greater than most nations’ entire navies at the time, including those of the Soviet Union, 
Spain, and the Netherlands.149 The strengthened Royal Navy force in East Asia was over 
twice the strength of Japan’s First Expeditionary Fleet and three-times the US Navy’s Asiatic 
Fleet, even after they had also been reinforced, but over a significantly larger area.150 Along 
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with the naval force, the British Army assembled a Shanghai Defence Force, which peaked at 
17,000 men with a further 2-3,000 in Hong Kong. Likewise, the RAF made its first 
deployment of shore-based combat units to Asia, consisting of at least thirty combat aircraft 
split between Shanghai and Hong Kong. 151 
Taken in a global perspective the task force was a major deployment of the Royal Navy’s 
resources at that point in time, involving roughly one-third of the Navy’s cruisers in active 
service and over one-quarter of its fully crewed destroyers.152 This was in addition to the 
China Station’s normal contingent of roughly half of the Royal Navy’s total sloops and 
gunboats in active service. As a result of what was happening in East Asia, the remaining 
smaller warships around the world were also forced to abandon their existing duties, with 
seventeen sloops covering for missing cruisers around the Mediterranean and East Indies.153 
Of the eighteen cruisers not sent to China, three were being used for ‘instructional 
purposes’ leading destroyer flotillas, four were under-going repairs, and two were obsolete 
pre-war variants.154 Events in China were pushing the Navy to the limit, and left the 
Admiralty with minimal spare capacity in active service to react to any further adverse 
developments. 
Nicholas Clifford has previously highlighted the scale of the British Army deployment during 
these events, since it was larger than the 18,000 men sent to deal with the Boxer 
Rebellion.155 The scale of the overall force, however, was even more significant than his 
account suggests. The Admiralty had not deployed such a large portion of its total fleet to 
the east of the Suez Canal since the Boxer Rebellion.156 As a result, Lieutenant Commander 
Joseph Kenworthy MP questioned the First Lord of the Admiralty, William Bridgeman, in the 
House of Commons about whether it would be advisable to bring some vessels out of 
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reserve to strengthen those stations weakened by the commitment to China.157 Kenworthy 
was a curious character who has been described as ‘a man who was neither easy to work 
with nor necessarily very competent’ in his naval career and 'a solitary figure with a 
penchant for tilting at naval windmills' as a politician. 158 Nonetheless, in this case he aired a 
valid concern about the strain the Navy was being put under by events in China. A partial 
mobilisation of Britain’s naval reserves would have been an exceptional step in peacetime, 
particularly when not related to a threat posed by a major world power. Indeed, mobilising 
the Royal Navy’s reserves was not publically discussed when Britain was on the verge of war 
with Turkey during the Chanak Crisis, although the Mediterranean Fleet normally had 
greater resources at its disposal.159 Far from Chanak having produced a ‘reaction against an 
active foreign policy in general’, as argued by Kenneth Morgan, it had only changed the way 
the British government publically referred to its actions.160 In this spirit, Bridgeman’s 
response to Kenworthy’s enquiry was, unsurprisingly, an unequivocal statement that the 
major deployment to China was purely temporary.  
Bridgeman’s emphasis on the temporary nature of the strain upon the Navy was borne out 
by events. In August 1927, instructions were sent to China for preparations to be made for 
the gradual withdrawal of British forces, although none that would impede the defence of 
Shanghai.161 That came only three months after the full Shanghai Defence Force had arrived 
at the city.162 By November 1927 the China Station was back down to its normal 
complement of cruisers and one of the two aircraft carriers had returned to Britain for a 
refit. Half of the destroyers then followed shortly afterwards, departing East Asia in May 
1928.163 Similarly, the Shanghai Defence Force had halved by June 1928, with ten of the 
fourteen additional battalions present in mid-1927 withdrawn by January 1929.164 The 
period between late 1926 and mid 1927 therefore represents a clear, significant, and 
sudden escalation in the commitment of force to China, even if it was only a temporary one. 
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Had the deployment lasted longer, then further questions would almost certainly have been 
asked about whether the Royal Navy needed, at the very least, to mobilise sufficient 
reserves in order to bring its seven cruisers on reduced crews into active service.165  
That sudden increase in the size of the British military force available in and around China 
resulted from a relatively rapid change in environment during the preceding eighteen 
months. After the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and over the course of 1926, there was a 
shift from unconventional threats, in the form of piracy, banditry, strikes and boycotts, to 
direct threats against Britain’s core areas of interest in China, the treaty ports. In part, this 
resulted from the rising level of unrest and anti-British sentiment in cities along the Yangtze 
and particularly around Shanghai in late 1926 going into 1927. Existing tension in the city 
due to the Shanghai Municipal Police’s heavy-handed policing of the city’s Chinese 
residents, combined with poor rice harvests, built a background of growing tension. The 
situation in Shanghai then reached a full crisis point in early 1927 as the National 
Revolutionary Army of the Guomindang’s Northern Expedition approached.166 While the 
British Empire was not directly involved in China’s civil wars, the conflict nonetheless 
triggered the deployment of sufficient force to be able to dissuade armed groups from 
attacking foreign, and particularly British, persons and property in key cities, such as the 
treaty ports. 
Prior to 1926, when conflict between warlords had neared areas of British concern, it had 
been on a scale modest enough for existing resources based at Hong Kong to deal with. 
Changes in the warlord controlling Beijing and the area around it, for example, had led to 
one of Britain’s four army battalions permanently based in East Asia prior to 1927 being 
stationed at Tianjin.167 Deploying those 800 troops was largely symbolic, although it did 
unlock new options for the orderly evacuation or temporary defence of Britain’s diplomatic 
outpost in Beijing. Likewise within forty-eight hours of the May Thirtieth Incident, the 
cruisers Diomede, Despatch, and Carlisle were all ordered to steam at high speed from 
Weihai to Shanghai as a temporary reinforcement for the Yangtze gunboats.168 Over 1,000 
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additional sailors and marines did have practical value, but again the presence of three 
‘steel castles’ was seen as a powerful statement in itself. Both situations were felt to be too 
great for the ordinary patrols of smaller vessels to manage, but they did not require 
requests for additional resources from elsewhere in the Empire.  
The Royal Navy was aided in its defence of the largest treaty ports during times of crisis by 
civilian defence groups, such as the Shanghai Volunteer Corps (SVC), which was first formed 
in 1854. 169 Those units came under the nominal authority of the ports they were tasked 
with protecting and whose international residents volunteered for service. In practice, 
however, they were controlled to a large extent by the British government. Provided with 
weapons and leadership by the British Army, the eight main volunteer forces in Chinese 
cities added up to over 1,700 men in 1925, although the SVC accounted for the 
overwhelming majority.170 Likewise, roughly two-thirds of the volunteers were British or 
from the British Empire, but the SVC also had two dedicated American companies, one 
Portuguese, one Japanese, one Chinese, and a small Italian unit.171 Those militias had been 
formed with the intention of providing ‘military protection on the cheap’, to handle minor 
disturbances until the arrival of regular forces.172 In doing so, the volunteers generally 
operated within the boundaries of the treaty ports or the Shanghai International 
Settlement, but they were occasionally sent inland to guard nearby factories or power 
stations.173 Foreign civilians living in more remote locations, beyond the reach of those 
forces, were increasingly advised to move for their own safety, particularly after the May 
Thirtieth Incident.174 The ongoing civil war in China continued in close proximity to the 
international settlements, but foreign forces remained largely side-line observers.  
The Shanghai task force and Britain’s global struggle against communism 
The situation changed in 1926 as the civil unrest and disorder in the treaty ports combined 
with peasant uprisings around the Yangtze basin, along with the approaching Northern 
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Expedition. These factors were felt to be all the more critical because of the wave of anti-
British rhetoric that the British believed was being propagated by China’s communists and 
Soviet provocateurs, which surged after the May Thirtieth Incident.175 Such views were 
particularly pronounced among the British expatriate communities in China, but applied 
across wide swathes of the British establishment.176 Increasingly militant workers, 
demanding better deals from their foreign employers, fitted into that broader picture of a 
communist threat.177 While the general population in the Yangtze basin were supportive of 
what they understood communism to mean, the larger uprisings that occurred were 
generally connected to specific issues and not driven by ideology or thoughts of 
revolution.178 Nonetheless, it was the British establishment’s fear of a spreading communist 
threat, whether imagined or real, that influenced their decisions at key moments. 
What the British perceived as communist inspired civil threats to their interests in China 
combined with the fear of direct military action by the Guomindang’s armies. Prior to the 
breakdown between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party in late 1926 
through into 1927 the Northern Expedition was still partly led by the communists.179 While 
ultimately relatively short-lived, a Soviet brokered deal in 1923 had resulted in a United 
Front being formed between the Guomindang and the Communist Party of China, with the 
two nominally working together as a single force in the following years. Indeed, many of the 
National Revolutionary armies leading the Northern Expedition were armed with weaponry 
either gifted or sold by the Soviet Union.180 As a result, Britain felt that the Guomindang was 
'dominated by extremists working under Soviet influence'.181 
As the Northern Expedition approached the Yangtze’s major trading hubs, particularly 
Hankou and Nanjing, concern grew about what would happen when the fighting reached 
those cities and whether anti-British rhetoric would become more than just words. After the 
British had been forced to evacuate and abandon their concessions on the middle and upper 
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Yangtze, concern turned to panic as Guomindang forces neared Shanghai and its 
International Settlement. The Shanghai Municipal Police and Shanghai Volunteer Corps, and 
similar smaller civilian groups in other treaty ports, had provided an effective-enough 
defence for the foreign concessions when nearby fighting was between different warlords, 
such as during the 1924 Jiangsu-Zhejiang war.182 That fighting was not directed against 
foreign interests, and so the main risks came from potential collateral damage and 
lawlessness related to groups of disaffected defeated soldiers. In contrast, the threat posed 
by the National Revolutionary Army marching against those concessions, potentially linking 
up with agitators within the city, meant that the Royal Navy would have to be Britain’s 
primary deterrent.183 
A shift in the Royal Navy’s strategy for the Yangtze region, which will be explored in greater 
detail later in this thesis, did play a role in the decision to send the vast task force in 1927. In 
particular, the catastrophic failure of the Wanxian expedition in September 1926 brought 
about a series of events that led to a rapid re-assessment of Britain’s approach to inland 
treaty ports. The scale of the Navy’s response to the threat, however, was driven in part by 
the wider context of the communist influence in China fitting into part of what was seen as 
a global plot instigated by Soviet Russia against the British Empire. During a discussion of 
imperial defence issues in The Naval Review, for example, the clashes that had been seen in 
China were clearly linked into this wider battle against communism. Indeed, it was 
considered to be 'common knowledge that Russia is the instigator of the hostile attitude of 
China towards the powers, especially the British Empire'.184  
The British government’s concern about communist involvement in the events in China in 
1926-27 originated from the turmoil and bloodshed it had witnessed during the Soviet 
Revolution. At the height of its conventional power in the 1920s, having outlasted its main 
rivals in the First World War, the British Empire was comparatively relaxed about the threat 
of a major-power conflict. Brian Bond argues in his discussion of the ten-year rule, for 
example, that the British government genuinely believed, in the first half of the 1920s, that 
Britain would not be involved in a major war during the ten years after its first signing in 
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1919.185 The emergence of an ideology that could cause uprisings in its colonies and 
threatened to cause unrest at home therefore represented the most significant threat to 
the stability of the British Empire. In the eyes of its officials, communist-inspired uprisings 
heralded not only the prospect of weakened British power, but also widespread death and 
destruction. 
Communism was felt to be such a significant threat by Britain and the other remaining 
European colonial powers as to warrant the unprecedented regular exchange of information 
on potential communist agitators in Asia.186 As a result, China came to be seen as the front 
line in a war against Soviet influence. That belief was based upon some hard evidence, and 
plenty of questionable reports, that Soviet agents were promoting an anti-imperial line in 
China, in an attempt to push out the western powers from their lucrative and strategically 
valuable international settlements.187 Such sentiment appears to have increased over the 
early 1920s. Strikes by Chinese workers in Shanghai 1921-22, for example, were primarily 
blamed upon economic conditions, particularly the rising cost of rice.188 By the following 
year, however, Captain Superintendent McEuen of the Shanghai Municipal Police was 
retrospectively blaming ‘Bolshevik Propaganda’ as having been solely responsible for stirring 
up trouble.189 Indeed, by 1925 Admiral of the Fleet David Beatty proposed in a note to 
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey that 'the present state of affairs in China is the result of 
Bolshevist exploitation of … anti-foreign feeling.'190 
Events in China therefore added to the unrest in India, which the British establishment 
believed was being orchestrated by Soviet agents, and the loss of British influence over 
Persia, also as a result of moves by Russia. Officials in Whitehall wholly believed there to be 
an active, global Soviet plot to change the balance of world power. For some of Britain’s 
political elite there was a genuine fear that the Soviet Union was targeting the British 
Empire from ‘Dublin to Peking’, in an effort to undermine it. 191 The Under-Secretary of State 
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for Foreign Affairs Ronald McNeill went so far as to state to the House of Commons in 1925 
that he believed Russia was ‘doing their worst, or their best, to injure us so far as they 
can’.192   
The timing of the events on the Yangtze was also particularly significant, given that it 
mirrored the growing hostility between Britain and the Soviet Union, which culminated in 
the Arcos Affair in May 1927.193 The police raid on Arcos’ offices in Moorgate, based upon 
information that the premises contained stolen War Office files, ultimately led to a 
temporary severance of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.194 
The period between 1927 and 1929 was seen as a low point in Anglo-Soviet relations, 
producing heightened feelings among the British political class.195 Against the backdrop of 
those Anglo-Soviet clashes, the events in China were not just a concern for Great Britain in 
their impact upon trade, but as a part of a global ideological battle against communism. The 
effectiveness of Britain’s response to events in Shanghai and along the Yangtze, was 
therefore felt to have a much wider potential impact, upon the security of the British Empire 
as a whole. Sending such a large task force to China did not just send a statement to the 
Guomindang leadership about how serious Britain was in defending Shanghai. It was also a 
crude display of British imperial muscle in front of the global press as part of that wider 
propaganda war against the Soviet Union. 
While the Guomindang’s decision to purge its communist members in mid-1927 started to 
allay Britain’s fears that it was part of a wider Soviet plot, the Guomindang still officially 
maintained an anti-imperial stance.196 Even without the communists, Britain was not 
particularly keen about the Guomindang, but recognised that they were more aligned with 
western values and so regarded them as the lesser of two evils.197 A memorandum from one 
Foreign Office official in China, Mr Porter, to Whitehall in January 1928 stated that he saw 
the nationalist groups as being more co-operative and friendlier to deal with than other 
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options in China, even if they were not ideal allies.198 Likewise for the Guomindang, the shift 
to a friendlier attitude towards foreign powers in 1926-27, was the result of the pragmatic 
reasoning that they needed some level of support from the great powers to secure arms 
deals and financing. Sherman Lai argues that the disappearance of the derogatory term ‘ying 
fan’ from Chiang Kai-shek’s diary in September 1926, in reference to the British, marks the 
point where he switched to seeing Britain as potentially useful rather than as an enemy.199 
Such a subtle change would have been invisible to the wider world, but more tangible 
developments followed. The schism between nationalists and communists in 1927 was the 
most significant of those, removing the key barrier to the Guomindang and British being 
able to soften their rhetoric and shift towards a mutually beneficial relationship. Once that 
had occurred, and the immediate battle against communism was seen as having been won, 
the Royal Navy could start withdrawing warships from their temporary attachment to the 
China Station. 
This does not mean that the British government were entirely comfortable about the 
Guomindang, even without their prior communist links. As previously detailed, much of the 
1927 task force did disperse around the Empire by mid-1928, but the China Station retained 
part of its enhanced strength on a permanent basis. A full destroyer flotilla and two 
additional gunboats remained in East Asia until the new global conflict in 1939, 
strengthening the Navy’s capabilities in defending Britain’s interests in China.200 The scale of 
the task force, and the enhanced China Station did come at a cost, one that had a bearing 
on the long-term viability of the Empire.  
The Royal Navy’s previous strategy for China had generally been formed around the use of 
force to provide a short, sharp, and invariably violent response, such as in the aftermath of 
the Boxer Rebellion.201 That emphasis on avoiding long-term sustained commitments of 
force became all the more important in the years leading up to the First World War, but 
particularly after it. Britain’s politicians felt that cost of policing the empire was increasingly 
unsustainable, amid the apparent Soviet attempts to stir up hostility among the colonial 
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populations. Given the huge financial cost of the Great War, and Britain’s acquisition of 
mandates over large tracts of the Middle East, there was a growing reluctance to be drawn 
into further expensive military commitments.202  
Convoying measures brought in by the Navy on the Yangtze, to counter the piracy threat, 
were alone sufficient to raise questions about whether the cost was worth the results. By 
May 1928, for example, Rear-Admiral Tweedie noted that the additional fuel consumed 
convoying British merchant vessels on the Middle-Yangtze alone had reached £12,000 per 
annum.203 That growing background burden was nothing compared to the costs incurred, 
and potentially required, as a result of the 1926 task force. To bring a single cruiser out of 
reserve to replace one of the eight sent to China, for example, would have cost the navy 
roughly £100,000 per annum just to pay the crew’s wages, even before all the additional 
expenses associated with active service.204 To put that figure in context, Hong Kong 
contributed £250,000 per year towards the Royal Navy’s commitment to the China Station, 
only a fraction of the outlay of maintaining the existing squadron in the mid-1920s.205 As a 
result, the economic burden of maintaining the enlarged force, if Britain and therefore the 
Royal Navy were drawn fully into conflict with China, would soon outweigh the value of a 
peripheral area of informal empire. Not only that, but with Treasury restrictions on the 
naval budget, the Admiralty were aware that the burden of a sustained large commitment 
to China would require either the cancellation of new vessels or a significant increase in 
Hong Kong’s financial contributions. It was not only the economic burden of military action, 
however, that played upon the minds of the Admiralty and British government, when 
deciding upon how to handle the 1926 crisis in China. For politicians in particular, they had 
to consider domestic public opinion and changes in attitudes towards the use of military 
force, and the protection of civilian lives, trends with origins back beyond the First World 
War.206 
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The Royal Navy’s changing role in protecting British civilians 
It is worth emphasising at this point that the British government’s response to the 1926 
crisis was not made solely in order to intervene militarily on behalf of Britain’s foreign or 
economic policy in the region. One of the Royal Navy’s primary roles in its deployments to 
Chinese cities in the latter 1920s was the safe evacuation of civilians during moments of 
crisis, both from the British Empire and those belonging to other nations. Over the course of 
February 1929, for example, HMS Magnolia was stationed off Yantai (Chefoo) at the start of 
the month only then to shuttle to Weihai and back twice, in response to the situation 
escalating and then calming in different locations around Shandong Province.207 The log 
books from the earlier part of the decade, in contrast, show that even over the course of a 
number of years it was rare for those sloops to make so many visits to cities other than 
Shanghai and Hong Kong.208 While Magnolia was shuttling between Weihai and Yantai, HMS 
Foxglove was also stationed at Yantai, in the belief that its guns and men would offer 
suitable short-term protection to the 495 international civilians while preparations were 
made for a potential evacuation.209  
Such tasks were a relatively new role for the Royal Navy in China, which came about from 
two changes in circumstances. The first of those factors has already been discussed widely 
by historians of Britain’s relationship with China in the early twentieth century. Prior to 
1911, if a British civilian was not on official business in China, such as embassy staff, the 
British armed forces were unlikely to offer much protection outside of key locations. The 
safety of British civilians and officials was dependent upon the Foreign Office’s encouraging 
the Qing authorities to protect foreigners, often through the threat or use of violent 
reprisals.210 The murder of two British missionaries and their Chinese maid in 1902, for 
example, led to the Qing authorities arresting 300 people, executing ten and more dying in 
jail, after coming under pressure from the Foreign Office.211 State-level intimidation, 
coercion, and on-the-spot policing, using the background threat of violent reprisals by the 
Royal Navy, were central to how British gunboat diplomacy offered a degree of protection 
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to those of its civilians who ventured beyond the boundaries of the Empire.212 With the 
collapse of the Qing Empire and subsequent breakdown in central control in China after the 
Xinhai revolution there was no government to be held responsible for the protection of 
British civilians, and so that strategy was no longer possible. As a result, while the stated 
priorities for the armed forces still emphasised the protection of property at Shanghai and 
other major trading ports, there was also a growing emphasis on pro-actively protecting 
civilians.  
The switch to a pro-active approach was not simply due to the new inability to reactively 
threaten a Chinese government that was capable of extending effective protection over 
foreign civilians. A second factor was at play, with the British government feeling 
increasingly duty bound to prevent the death or serious injury of its subjects. General 
responsibility for safety outside the Empire remained with the individual, as illustrated by 
the Foreign Office instructions from early 1927 that all British civilians living upriver of 
Hankou should move immediately, as the Royal Navy was no longer going to maintain an 
active presence on the Upper Yangtze.213 The growing number of cases during the 1920s 
where civilians were evacuated from treaty ports ahead of potential trouble, however, 
indicates the steady and subtle underlying shift.  
The growing number of foreigners living in China with their families, rather than as small 
groups of merchants and missionaries, was almost certainly a significant factor in that 
process. The presence of women and children, who were seen as vulnerable and 
defenceless, catalysed the process leading towards the British government protecting its 
own expatriates.214 This was not unique to events in China. Harford Montgomery-Hyde 
describes how in 1922, the RAF made the world’s first ever airlift evacuation of civilians 
from Sulaimaniya in Mesopotamia, in the face of growing unrest among the local 
population.215 Merchant steamships were generally employed to conduct the practical 
process of transporting such groups in China, but the overall process was managed by the 
Royal Navy. In the immediate aftermath of the May Thirtieth and Shamian Island incidents 
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in 1925, for example, the Navy employed a P&O Steamship to move sixty women and 
children from Guangzhou to Hong Kong.216 
The task of potentially evacuating civilians from smaller coastal locations, as seen with 
Magnolia and Foxglove in northern China, was also not the only way in which the new 
official attitude towards the protection of civilians was evident. For those occasions when 
events took a dangerous turn, and might result in the use of force, the British establishment 
had put in place a series of rules of engagement. In the orders for ‘C’ company 12th Royal 
Marine Battalion, for example, upon their deployment to the Nanjing International 
Settlement in August 1927, clear emphasis was placed on negotiating an agreement for the 
resumption of trade first. If that was not possible then the protection of property followed, 
but if all else failed then the protection of ‘the lives of international persons’.217 Throughout 
these orders there was a recurrent emphasis upon trying to avoid enflaming the situation by 
exercising restraint and avoiding casualties, for both local and foreign civilians. This is 
highlighted by the paragraph outlining the rules of engagement:  
The use of firearms is justifiable and may be resorted to when it appears that loss of 
life or serious damage to property or to protect the troops should they be in danger 
of being overwhelmed. No more than the minimum amount of fire required to 
achieve this object is permissible nor can it be justified.218  
An explicit warning for the officers followed: they would be held personally accountable for 
any excessive violence committed by their men. The motivation behind the order was the 
desire to avoid escalating the situation through reports of British servicemen shooting 
unarmed civilians, rather than newfound unease with using violence against Chinese 
protestors. A later paragraph detailed, for example, that the use of rifle butts and bayonets 
was perfectly acceptable in dealing with groups of Chinese rioters, but only if they were felt 
to pose a risk. Over the preceding eighteen months the Royal Navy had been involved in a 
series of violent incidents where British servicemen had been involved in the deaths of 
Chinese civilians. Those in Whitehall were therefore worried about further tarnishing 
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Britain’s reputation, which might fuel further anti-British protests and violence, both in 
China and across the region. 
In the previous year, London had given clear guidance to the China Station that the Royal 
Navy would be given relatively free reign while operating around the coast and waterways 
of China. However, it stipulated that British personnel should avoid setting foot on Chinese 
soil where possible.219 That qualification came from a disagreement between Hong Kong 
Governor Clementi and London over the limited application of military force in China. In July 
1926, for example, Clementi and his local military chiefs made the decision to send a 
company of troops from the East Surrey regiment, a naval aircraft, and thirty policemen into 
Chinese territory to secure the release of Hong Kong police motorboat No.10 and its 
crew.220 Cantonese boycott picketers had seized the motorboat after it grounded on the 
Chinese shore on the night of the 20 July due to storms and flooding. Ultimately the incident 
passed peacefully when Mr Wood, a teacher taken on the expedition as a translator, 
persuaded the picketers to release the policemen, their boat, and their weapons. 
Nonetheless, sending troops ashore had risked a significant escalation, with the very real 
possibility it could have ended in bloodshed. 
As a result of the incident, an order was issued by the Admiralty to the China Station on 26 
September that no British military personnel or aircraft were to be sent into or over Chinese 
territory without express permission from London.221 Austen Chamberlain and Leo Amery 
stated that they were sympathetic to Clementi’s arguments and were willing to provide the 
caveat giving the Royal Navy freedom of operation when afloat on Chinese waterways. 
However, neither of them wanted to further inflame the situation given the protests and 
boycott that had developed in the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident. The subsequent 
flurry of correspondence between London and the British officials in China over the 26 
September order did not change Whitehall’s new, more pragmatic stance towards China, 
which was announced in greater detail shortly afterwards with the December 
Memorandum.222 The main purpose of that memorandum was to shift Britain’s relationship 
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with China and negotiate some moderate concessions, but it also involved clarification 
about how the British government felt the Royal Navy should approach events in China.223 
It would be tempting to assume that the August 1927 orders included greater emphasis 
upon avoiding casualties due to the violence involving British forces over the previous year. 
During earlier clashes in 1924 and 1925, however, there was a similar emphasis within the 
armed forces upon minimising any potential violent encounters. In July 1925, for example, 
Lieutenant Anthony Pugsley from HMS Widgeon led a shore party of four naval ratings in a 
bayonet charge to disperse a crowd of protestors outside the international area of 
Chongqing. As a result of that action, a Chinese civilian was stabbed in the stomach.224 While 
Pugsley ensured the civilian was treated by the ship’s medical officer and later released to a 
local hospital, and no-one died as a result of the incident, Pugsley’s name was notably 
absent from the official dispatches made to the Admiralty. This is despite a number of 
letters sent on behalf of British merchants from Chongqing praising his actions. From the 
various memoranda in the Admiralty file, it appears that it was felt within the Navy that 
Pugsley should have shown greater restraint in using force. The protestors were clearly 
angry, but they had only thrown stones at the British servicemen and so did not present a 
clear threat to property or life.225 Indeed, Pugsley later made no mention of the incident in 
his auto-biography, despite going into detail about numerous other, sometimes trivial, 
developments during his first year on the Upper Yangtze.226 
What made the new orders issued in late 1926 different to those that had gone before was 
the effort made to clarify the precise details of the rules of engagement.227 A spate of Royal 
Navy bombardments in 1926 against targets large and small, building up to the one at 
Wanxian in September, contributed to renewed anti-British outbursts and highlighted the 
problems inherent with the existing set of vague rules, which had been set in 1920.228 
Designed to cover a range of scenarios that might be encountered by the armed forces 
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around the world, the emphasis in 1920 had been upon the judgement of the individual 
officer in command. While some officers exercised caution, others acted disproportionately, 
although the actions in both cases could still be well within the bounds of the identical 
guidance they had received. As a result, frequent new orders and guidelines were issued to 
the China station from October 1926 into early 1927, culminating in a comparatively 
comprehensive set of instructions being issued by Cabinet in May 1927.229  
This is not to say that those rules established in 1920 remained identical throughout the 
period up until 1926. There was certainly discussion about revising particular aspects. One 
major amendment that would have clarified when violence was considered acceptable was 
dropped, however, as there was concern that the new definition might allow officers to 
simply act as they saw fit.230 Significant faults with the orders issued to the Navy’s officers, 
particularly the relatively inexperienced junior commanders of its China gunboats, had 
therefore already been identified as early as 1920. The Admiralty’s unwillingness to reduce 
the freedoms afforded to its regional commanders, and Foreign Office objections about 
recognising combatants in China as belligerents had meant that such efforts to improve 
significantly the instructions issued to gunboat commanders failed.231 
The presence of clearer guidance from Whitehall might not have been a guarantee of the 
proportionate use of force. Even with the sudden impetus in late 1926 to improve the rules 
of engagement, each round of instructions from Cabinet contained major revisions, 
intended to overcome areas where previous versions had been vague. The final May 1927 
orders, for example, included clauses intended to prevent a repeat of the Nanjing Incident, 
which had occurred only three weeks earlier.232 The events at Nanjing resulted in the deaths 
of up to 2,000 Chinese civilians through the combined fire of HMS Emerald, USS Noa, and 
USS William B. Preston.233 The incident arose after armies of the Guomindang’s Northern 
Expedition entered Nanjing, pushing out the troops from the incumbent warlord, and the 
city descended into disorder. The exact figure of civilian casualties remains a subject of 
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debate, which will be explored in more detail in the next chapter, but the higher figures 
were widely circulated at the time in the Chinese press and in Soviet propaganda.234 As a 
result, the incident marked another key moment in fuelling anti-foreign rhetoric among the 
Chinese population, highlighting how the major powers were struggling to adapt to the new 
dynamics in the country.235 That violence also catalysed further action in Whitehall, and the 
May 1927 rules explicitly stated that all civilian casualties should be strongly avoided, a 
considerably stronger statement than in all prior guidance.236 In relaying the rules, Vice 
Admiral Tyrwhitt added that if international civilians or military personnel were fired upon, 
the Navy should return fire with the minimum expenditure of ammunition and the vessels’ 
main guns could only be used when the target was clearly visible.237 
In terms of the December Memorandum’s impact upon the guidance to the Royal Navy on 
the use of force in China, it was less a sudden recognition of a new reality, than a sudden jolt 
into action. Throughout the early 1920s there was a slow progression towards emphasis in 
Whitehall that the minimum level of force possible should be used, and primarily in the 
defence of individuals rather than property. The rapid progress made in tightening the rules 
of engagement in 1926 and 1927, reflected a long-term failure among the British 
establishment to act upon well-established concerns. The shift towards a preference for less 
lethal strategies stretched back to the First World War and the influence that conflict had 
upon wider British attitudes towards casualties as a result of military action. This supports 
Edmund Fung’s argument that despite efforts to frame that declaration in December 1926 
as moralistic, it was instead driven by cold hard recognition of the new circumstances.238 
There was already a background degree of concern about the deaths of innocent civilians, 
but until that point there had been insufficient interest in ensuring the guidelines issued to 
gunboat commanders were up to the purpose. Moralistic or ethical concerns only went so 
far when dealing with threats to the British Empire from non-White populations, particularly 
those apparently in league with the Soviet Union. Moreover, what happened in December 
was only one step in a longer process that continued over much of 1927. Over the course of 
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that year, the wider legal setting changed from one in which individual commanders were 
afforded considerable, indeed excessive, personal freedom to conduct diplomacy, to one 
with much tighter control from the metropole. 
No matter how clear and strict a set of orders or instructions, the deployment of armed 
units into a threatening conflict zone almost invariably results in some form of violent 
clashes. That is particularly true when dealing with a heated environment, such as the one 
in 1920s China, where there was growing ideological opposition to the presence of foreign 
military forces. For example, when sent upriver to Chengdu with two merchant vessels in 
June 1925 to evacuate missionaries and foreign civilians, HMS Teal came under fire from 
Chinese soldiers on the river bank and returned fire in response.239 The Chinese troops 
appear to have believed the British ships were heading up river for hostile purposes. The 
vessels were not heading towards an official treaty port, nor had they declared their 
intentions to the local Chinese general.  
Incidents such as this were particularly common in early 1927, when the Northern 
Expedition reached the Yangtze. In April 1927 alone eleven reports were made of Royal 
Navy vessels on the river exchanging fire with organised units of Chinese soldiers.240 In one 
such example, HMS Magnolia came under rifle fire from Guomindang affiliated forces near 
Shanghai, in the early morning twilight, to which the British warship returned fire.241 Within 
ten minutes both sides ceased firing, however, after the sloop was identified as a British 
vessel and not one belonging to a rival Chinese force. More cautious orders for the naval 
personnel may have been intended to reduce the number and severity of flashpoints, but 
over the decade many areas of China were active warzones, where mistakes of identity 
could occur with subsequent events escalating very quickly. 
Changing approaches to imperial policing 
Some of the clashes involving the Royal Navy in China were a result of a subtler factor, the 
difficulty British officials had in coming to terms with the nascent sense of nationalism 
among the urban Chinese population. China’s long-held Tianxia concept of the world, where 
the imperial court was of primary importance and ‘barbarians’ were peripheral concerns, 
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was being replaced with one focused on becoming a respected and independent modern 
nation state.242 As a result, the deployment of international troops into Nanjing as the new 
capital of nationalist China, for example, was much more of an affront to the local 
population in 1927 than it had been a decade before.243 The British establishment, including 
the Admiralty and naval personnel, were all guilty of acting at times as they had been doing 
for many years previously, seemingly without realising that in the new environment those 
actions were almost certain to provoke a widespread hostile reaction. This is not to say that 
the acts themselves were not intended to provoke a reaction, but rather the potential for 
alternative, adverse reactions was not understood.  
In December 1926, for example, Rear Admiral John Cameron chose to inspect a parade of 
naval personnel on shore at Hankou, after weeks of Chinese protests against the foreign 
concessions in the city.244 Cameron acted in line with long-established practice on the China 
Station, although with less fanfare than similar parades at Hankou eighteen months earlier, 
after the May Thirtieth Incident, when HMS Despatch’s brass band went ashore to ‘create 
an impression’ among the Chinese protestors.245 The Navy had long believed such parades 
were an effective display of force, to intimidate and subdue the local population.246 
Whether they always had that result, or sometimes provoked greater bemusement at the 
spectacle is another question. Within days of Cameron’s parade in 1926, however, the 
situation in Hankou escalated from Magnolia posting twenty men as part of the force to 
guard the concession, to every man possible from all British warships in the port being sent 
ashore. The situation was sufficiently tense that the crew were ordered to sleep wearing full 
equipment at night, with half the crew always awake ashore. While it is difficult 
retrospectively to apply causality, the major protests that occurred so soon after the parade 
suggests it had the opposite effect to the one intended. Rather than intimidating the local 
population, the move fanned the flames of resentment. While new rules of engagement 
were intended to limit the possibility that the Navy might provoke protests through the use 
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of violence, the very act of deploying servicemen into the city had in itself came to be 
regarded as a hostile act.  
While the British establishment struggled to understand those local factors, the approach 
taken towards imperial policing was already changing. Some of this dated back to the 
aftermath of the unilateral action taken by Britain in the Second Boer War.247 Both the 
international and domestic reaction to the tragic events in southern Africa left a strong scar 
on British foreign policy. The reputation of Britain’s armed services had been damaged by 
the struggles against what was, at first, a largely amateur militia. The resulting heavy-
handed use of new ideas and tactics, particularly concentration camps for Boer civilians, also 
meant that the British Empire was pilloried in the international press. Contemporary events 
in China, specifically the Anglo-French looting and burning of the Summer Palace in Beijing, 
had added to that wave of criticism.248 An early sign of this less assertive attitude was seen 
in 1907 when Russian troops entered northern Persia, which in the nineteenth century 
would most likely have provoked a firm response. Instead, Britain opened negotiations over 
creating spheres of influence within the country.249 There remained a desire to defend the 
Empire, but the Victorian confidence that Britain reigned supreme had been shaken. 
The British Empire may have emerged from the First World War as a victor, but questions 
about how Britain approached sub-state threats around the world soon re-appeared. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than the indiscriminate use of aerial bombing as a method 
of imperial policing Somaliland in 1920 and then elsewhere in the Middle East. Those events 
highlighted the unpopularity of civilian casualties in the efforts to defend the empire, and 
often the counter-productivity of the tactic when trying to secure imperial stability.250 There 
were voices that spoke favourably about the use of repressive violence against civilian 
populations favourably. Anthony Clayton has argued that it proved particularly popular with 
the Colonial Office as a cheap method of imperial policing. Such attitudes tended to focus 
on the cost of maintaining the Empire, with military aircraft seen as the next step from the 
Maxim gun in enforcing Britain’s will around the world. Using aerial bombing and strafing, 
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for example, had helped reduce the British Army presence in Iraq from twenty-three to just 
two battalions, over a seven-year period. Clayton also makes it clear, however, that the 
events in the Middle East were an exception rather than the rule.251 The approach may have 
proven popular among some quarters in Whitehall, but the wider reception was less 
forgiving. Disquiet about the morality and ethics of such tactics affected the RAF pilots 
themselves, with many becoming increasingly unhappy with being ordered to attack 
civilians. Some even resigned over what they saw as a ‘cowardly’ approach.252 As a result 
there was a growing unwillingness to use significant levels of force unilaterally, to push 
British diplomatic ends, except where it was used to defend existing territory against a 
direct external attack.  
In relation to China by the 1920s, that slowly growing sense of caution contributed to Britain 
repeatedly attempting to secure an ‘Allied’ response, rather than act in isolation and 
therefore become the focus of criticism. In dealing with piracy in Chinese waters for 
example, Britain attempted to develop a united international response. That effort was 
undermined by the unwillingness of the USA to support any major action, which led to both 
Italy and France also abstaining, leaving only Japan willing to co-operate on major schemes, 
a country no longer considered to be a reliable ally.253 While there was some mutual co-
operation in practice, the absence of a unified front meant that the success of joint anti-
piracy operations was heavily limited. Likewise, when British forces were deployed to 
Shanghai in 1927, the Committee for Imperial Defence agreed that they would not object to 
Japan sending troops into the region around the city should it be considered necessary.254 
There were no doubt reservations about what exactly might occur if that were to happen. 
Given concerns about the risks and legality involved in sending British personnel outside of 
Shanghai’s boundaries, however, an unofficial and therefore deniable arrangement with 
Japan could prove acceptable.255 Not only would informal collaboration shelter the British 
Empire from domestic and international criticism, but it would also avoid paying the full cost 
involved. 
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The shifting attitude within the British government away from the callous Victorian attitude 
towards killing colonial civilians was only ever a slow and gradual process. Moreover, it was 
one driven more by a desire to avoid negative headlines, than by a sudden change in heart 
over the morality, although that was a contributing factor. As a result, while there was a 
greater preference for multilateral approaches that avoided innocent deaths going into the 
1920s, this did not stop British officials and officers from ordering violent actions to 
suppress and subjugate populations around the world, including China. 
Summary 
Upon its return to peacetime duties in East Asia in 1919, the Royal Navy was operating in a 
new era, one no longer defined by British Imperial dominance, but one scarred by the First 
World War. Amid massive post-war cutbacks across the Service as a whole, however, the 
China Station was restored in large part back to the state it had been throughout most of 
the fifteen years before 1914. That continuity is really quite surprising, given the changes 
that had occurred over the 1910s. The world order had changed. The USA was increasingly 
influential, Germany and Austria defeated, France exhausted, Russia in a state of 
revolutionary flux, and Japan taking an independent path in shaping developments across 
Asia. With it the entire global balance of naval power had shifted, away from Europe and 
towards the Pacific, and yet the Admiralty attempted to continue as if it was business as 
usual. The China Station had never just been about those major power struggles, and within 
its remit was the protection of British trade and interests in China. With the Xinhai 
Revolution having transformed the political situation in the country, and challenges such as 
piracy growing in complexity and scale, the Admiralty’s stance is all the more remarkable. 
In this regards, existing imperial history accounts require amending, given that for the first 
half of the 1920s the Royal Navy’s presence on the Chinese coast was actually quite modest, 
particularly when compared with the tasks it faced. A score of smaller warships patrolling 
thousands of miles of coastline and waterways were a drop in the ocean, against the threat 
of piracy. Moreover, it was a vast task that the Navy itself wished to avoid, as pirate tactics 
increasingly focused upon hijackings and riverine small boat attacks, neither of which could 
be countered effectively by a light spread of relatively slow gunboats. In itself, this is a 
relatively small change to how we see Britain’s presence around China in this period. 
However, it does emphasise the near futility of a task that the China Station had only 
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accepted with great reluctance. Where this has a significant impact upon our understanding, 
is in what followed in the second half of the decade. 
The scale of the large increase in the fleet deployed to China, quite suddenly in late 1926, is 
of far greater importance than generally acknowledged. Putting the Navy on the verge of 
mobilising its reserves showed just how seriously the Admiralty and British government 
were about defending core locations, such as Shanghai. The December Memorandum of 
1926 might have shown a new willingness of the British Government to return some 
secondary imperial assets, but core ports like Shanghai were non-negotiable.256 In this 
regards, it is key to note that many of the additional warships were only deployed to China 
after the December Memorandum had been announced. Moreover, that task force was 
globally significant in its size, despite being almost entirely absent from the naval 
historiography of the period. As has been identified with other topics, the whims of key 
early naval historians, such as Arthur Marder and Stephen Roskill, have had a huge influence 
upon what we have since remembered and studied when looking at the interwar period.257  
With communist links to the Guomindang and its National Revolutionary Army, and the 
belief within the British establishment that unrest in China was part of a wider Soviet plot, 
Britain’s response was aimed at a far wider audience. While much of the force was 
despatched slightly before overall Anglo-Soviet relations hit a nadir at the start of April 
1927, with the Arcos Affair, events in China have to be taken against that wider background. 
Sending a naval force vastly in excess of even that sent by the Imperial Japanese Navy, and 
of greater power than the entire Soviet Navy, was a global statement and a reminder of 
British power. The Shanghai Defence Force was formed primarily as a means of imperial 
enforcement, as highlighted by previous historians. However, the Royal Navy’s vast task 
force was also sent to ensure that the British Empire was not defeated in what it considered 
to be a form of proxy war against the Soviet Union. 
Before, during, and after the Royal Navy’s surge of warships to China there were further 
changes in the wider world that affected the way they approached their task, beyond the 
nature of the tasks and the resources available. The rules of engagement issued to Royal 
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Navy officers also changed over the period. This occurred most notably in the period 
between the Wanxian Incident and late 1927, where some of the catastrophic clashes in 
China highlighted how weak and badly worded some of the instructions were. Those events 
did not start that process, however, with changes to and debate over the Admiralty’s 
instructions dating back to 1920, which introduced many core tenets about avoiding civilian 
casualties. There was some appreciation that vague guidance could have deadly results, but 
insufficient willingness to push through major amendments that might avoid such 
calamitous mistakes. This came against a background where there was growing concern 
about negative perceptions of Britain’s imperial policing, particularly when it resulted in 
civilian casualties. While updating the rules of engagement was a task largely set aside for 
another day, however, far more visible and controversial efforts were adopted that went in 
the opposite direction. Aerial imperial policing was an approach only tested to a significant 
degree in the Middle East, to displace British Army battalions with cheaper RAF squadrons, 
but the Admiralty did turn to new technology as a means of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which it maintained the outposts of the British Empire in East Asia. 
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Chapter Three: Technological development and imperial policing 
One of the principal purposes of naval warfare is to establish a maritime 
superiority so decisive that military force can be brought into play in the 
form of descents upon the enemy's coasts.1 
Between 1812 and the 1890s Britain’s global naval supremacy had enabled regular, if 
piecemeal, additions of territory to the British Empire. The amphibious landings and 
gunboat diplomacy used to build and defend the Empire relied upon Britain having the 
capability to safely shift its modest military resources between regions by sea.2 During the 
First Opium War, for example, Britain’s ability to ship its military forces between Guangzhou 
and Tianjin was a key factor in neutralising the Qing armies’ numerical superiority. Without 
an established railway or paved road network in China, the only quick and effective means 
of transporting troops and equipment was by water.3 Britain’s superior mobility was only 
possible because the Royal Navy, along with ships from the East India Company, achieved 
complete naval superiority in China’s littoral regions.4 The outdated coastal vessels available 
to the Qing could not compete with the Royal Navy’s warships – some of the most advanced 
in the world at the time. For the remainder of the nineteenth century, that on-going 
disparity in capabilities helped the Royal Navy keep the China Station’s running costs below 
the perceived rewards derived from Britain’s informal empire in China. Technology played 
an integral role in shaping the Royal Navy’s, and as a consequence the British Empire’s, 
relationship with China. 
By the 1920s, further enlarging the British Empire was no longer a priority in Whitehall. The 
Victorian strategy of using amphibious operations as part of a policy of gunboat diplomacy, 
however, remained key to maintaining the existing imperial system. Relatively few warships 
and men could be used to secure large areas, so long as it was possible to concentrate 
rapidly a force of sufficient strength at key locations during time of crisis. Financial 
restrictions after the First World War required the military and naval cost of Empire to be 
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kept to a minimum. Excluding the hefty burden of First World War pensions, roughly thirty 
percent of naval expenditure by the early 1920s went towards paying ships’ crews, with 
provisions and clothing accounting for a further ten percent.5 In contrast, total pay and 
victualling costs had only come to twenty five percent of the pre-war 1914 budget. This was 
despite the Navy having undergone an overall reduction in service personnel by roughly a 
third, from 146,000 to just under 100,000. A key factor in that shift had been the significant 
increases in naval pay during the war, to better match those available in the British Army 
and partially compensate for wartime inflation.6 As a result, the Royal Navy’s operating 
costs (excluding pensions) had increased from £46 million in 1913/14 to £55 million in 
1922/23, while the overall naval vote was almost back down to the same nominal level as 
before the war.7 There were attempts to save money by reducing the number of civilians 
employed by the Royal Navy, but it was recognised that this would only yield marginal 
gains.8 If the imperial system was to remain financially viable it was ever more crucial to 
minimise the number of service personnel required to police and defend the British Empire.  
The China Station had been fortunate that its manpower had remained broadly unaffected 
by the cutbacks, from its pre-war complement.9 That left roughly 4,400 servicemen afloat on 
the Station, with hundreds more working in the shore facilities at Singapore, Hong Kong, 
and Weihai. Precise numbers fluctuated a little as warships were not always fully manned in 
peacetime, and some of the smaller gunboats were placed in reserve with skeleton crews 
for short periods. Against the background of overall cuts, however, maintaining the force on 
the Chinese coast cost the Admiralty, on balance, a greater proportion of the Navy’s budget 
than it had done before the cuts. Efforts were made throughout the 1920s to raise locally 
financed Royal Navy Reserve units around the world to ease the burden of local defence 
duties. This included the China Station, although it was not until 1933 that such a force was 
formed at Hong Kong.10 Locally hired Chinese crewmen were also employed as cooks, 
                                                          
5 Report on the reduction of naval expenditure by the sub-committee of staffs from the Admiralty, Air Ministry 
and War Office, January 20 1923, TNA, CAB 24/160/72, pp.4-12. 
6 Correspondence between Admiralty and Cabinet about the Navy Estimates 1925-1926, 1925, TNA, ADM 
116/2300. 
7 Report on the reduction of naval expenditure, TNA, CAB 24/160/72, p.5; Ferris, ‘Treasury Control’, 880. 
8 Cabinet Committee on Reduction of National Expenditure, January 1923, TNA, CAB 24/160/72; Navy 
Estimates for 1920-21, 1920, TNA, T 1/12533/16620. 
9 Navy List, March 1913, NLS, p.270; Navy List, December 1920, NLS, p.714. 
10 Spence, Colonial naval culture, pp.18-21. 
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stewards, and for loading coal or other supplies, as a cheaper way of counteracting chronic 
understaffing, particularly on the lightly-manned Upper Yangtze gunboats. While many of 
those seamen built bonds of friendship and loyalty with their foreign shipmates, during 
times of crisis they stayed ashore, however, fearing that their families would be threatened 
if they were seen to be helping the British.11 Adopting new technology could provide a 
qualitative increase in the Royal Navy’s capabilities, potentially easing the demand for 
manpower, to limit the cost of maintaining Britain’s ‘imperial gendarmerie’. The use of new 
‘mechanical devices’ for that purpose was even explicitly recommended at Cabinet level, 
during the formation of the Ten Year Rule in 1919.12 
Advanced technology was expected to enhance far more than just the Royal Navy’s capacity 
to engage potential opponents, particularly in a peacetime imperial environment. The 
benefits sought can be separated into three broad areas; maintaining prestige, 
understanding events, and responding to crises. For the first of these, new equipment was 
often used to reinforce global perceptions of Britain’s power. Imperial prestige had long 
served an important role in convincing both foreign governments and overseas populations 
that the British Empire could be a dangerous opponent or a valuable ally. In essence, the use 
of technology exemplified the ‘stick and carrot’ metaphor. The ‘stick’ - an underlying threat 
that the British Empire could wield unparalleled force - was used as a deterrent to try and 
avoid costly deployments of manpower. In contrast, the ‘carrot’ was the possibility that 
Britain might share some of its technology and expertise with those considered to be 
friends. In the early 1920s, for example, Britain provided both France and Greece with 
technical assistance to aid their efforts in naval aviation, as recent and potentially future 
allies.13 The carrot also tended to come with an unwritten understanding, particularly where 
the technology gulf was significant, that the recipient would put British armaments 
manufacturers at the front of the queue for contracts.14 
In the second case, the British Empire’s ability to understand global geopolitical 
developments relied upon the timely collation of information and its subsequent 
                                                          
11 Rear-Admiral Cameron to Admiral Sinclair, 26 July 1926, TNA, ADM 116/2509. 
12 Ferris, ‘Treasury Control’, 871. 
13 Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945, (London: Jane, 1979), p.63. 
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Failure, (London: Routledge, 2012), pp.65-101. 
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dissemination to the relevant offices of government. For East Asia in the interwar period, 
and China in particular, the Foreign Office and Royal Navy formed the two key branches of 
Britain’s intelligence gathering and official communications apparatus. The speed at which 
that information could be gathered and passed on affected both the nature and uniformity 
of Britain’s policies and responses to crises. This could be in relation to either extremely 
localised events, such as piracy in Daya Bay, or the overall relationship between Britain and 
China. Moreover, using new technology could increase the coverage of events around East 
Asia, without significant increases in manpower and therefore cost. 
Finally, Britain’s responses to both on-going threats and extraordinary crises, such as the 
one seen in 1927, were influenced by the resources at the Royal Navy’s disposal. Evolutions 
in fighting equipment, particularly the adoption of ‘quick-fire’ and automatic guns in the 
1880s and 1890s, had previously altered how Britain dealt with sub-state violence as the 
Empire expanded.15 The first generation of British quick-fire naval guns, for example, could 
deliver roughly ten times as many shells per minute as those they replaced.16 Such 
weaponry had been instrumental in enabling Britain to subjugate large populations using 
only modest military forces. The First World War produced another similar step-shift in 
capability, catalysing the development of new platforms for bringing the Navy’s manpower 
and weaponry into, or evacuating personnel out of, a conflict zone. Using naval aircraft or 
larger, faster ships, for example, provided the potential to transform the way in which the 
Royal Navy could respond to adverse scenarios. This did not necessarily involve acts of 
violence, but had the potential to influence how evacuations of civilians were conducted. As 
the area that saw the most regular and active operational employment by the Royal Navy 
during the 1920s, China would be a peacetime testing ground for those evolving new 
technologies.17 
Maintaining imperial prestige: 
Exploiting the latest technologies in order to intimidate and impress around the world, 
formed an integral part of the British Empire’s strategy to emphasise its superiority. In 
                                                          
15 Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), pp.47-48. 
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particular, flag-waving tours by British warships were not just an opportunity for socialising 
with other nation’s dignitaries and obtaining information. Those port visits were intended to 
emphasise the power of the Royal Navy and wider British Empire, with displays of Britain’s 
newest technologies often deliberately included in the carefully choreographed pomp and 
ceremony.18 The Special Service Squadron’s 1923-24 ‘Empire Cruise’, for example, was led 
by the pride of the British fleet and largest warship in the world at the time – HMS Hood. 
During port calls, Hood’s powerful searchlights were frequently used to illuminate distant 
objects, given the reportedly striking effect they had upon local dignitaries.19 The visually 
dramatic party-trick also came with the unsubtle message that anywhere the ship could 
illuminate, it could also bombard, by day or night.20  
In effect this approach of applying technology imitated the way sport had previously been 
used as a subtle element of Britain’s gunboat diplomacy. Daniel Spence argues, for example, 
that rugby and cricket matches were invariably staged by British gunboats during port calls 
in the late nineteenth century to emphasise British mariners’ physical prowess. Even cricket 
matches were apparently understood by foreign officials to carry the message that it was 
better to accept cricket balls than cannon balls.21 The changing focus from physical to 
technical superiority had come as a result of the mechanisation of violence in the late 
nineteenth century. While the Special Service Squadron only briefly met with the China 
Station at Singapore, technology was still used on a day-to-day basis to reinforce British 
imperial prestige in the East Asia. 
Immediately prior to the First World War simple displays of moderately advanced vessels 
were generally considered sufficient to emphasise Britain’s power. The number of ports that 
could be visited was normally seen as the critical measure, rather than the scale of the 
impression made at each location. The officer commanding Britain’s gunboats stationed on 
the upper Yangtze in 1907, Lieutenant Commander George Todd, argued in just such a way 
when requesting additional gunboats for his force.  
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This would enable the Flag to be shown at many places it has, as yet, not been 
seen and would doubtless tend to increase the respect of the Chinese for us as 
a Nation, and impress upon them the preponderating nature of our interest 
both political and commercial in this part of China.22 
When that same year one junior officer experimented with using displays of fireworks to 
amplify the impact caused by his gunboat arriving at Chinese cities, it was politely suggested 
to him by his senior colleagues that such behaviour was unbefitting of a Royal Navy warship. 
The White Ensign alone was felt to be sufficient in earning the respect of local populations. 
Indeed, a rumour was circulating the China Station at the time that one group of pirates had 
immediately jumped overboard, into the night, when calmly informed by a Chinese 
crewmember that they had mistakenly boarded a British gunboat. The British crew were 
said to have slept soundly below deck, shielded by an invisible imperial aura. 23 Such stories, 
whether true or not, appear to have reinforced a belief among the British that the Chinese 
population were in absolute awe of the Royal Navy.  
Relying on simple numerical displays of strength faced numerous problems by the 1920s. 
The Fisher reforms and subsequent destruction of the German East Asia Squadron had led 
to a smaller surface force being based on the China Station in 1920 than that in 1907.24 
While probably better suited to policing and patrol duties, many of the warships posted to 
China post-war were also less prestigious vessels. The 10,000 tonne armoured cruisers 
Monmouth and Hampshire had been replaced by 4,000 tonne light cruisers. Four slow and 
lightly armed sloops and additional gunboats supplanted a destroyer flotilla. The latter 
change even led to unsuccessful calls in the Commons by Lieutenant Commander Joseph 
Kenworthy MP for a destroyer flotilla to be returned to China. Kenworthy’s argument was 
that ‘sloops cannot show the flag with dignity in peace nor with effect in war’.25 While the 
pre-war destroyers were quite small by later standards, displacing less than 1,000 tonnes, 
they were warships designed for operating at sea with the battle fleet and reflected that in 
their appearance. In contrast, few people who have seen HMS President moored on the 
                                                          
22 Letter from Lieutenant-Commander G.J. Todd to Vice Admiral Moore, 17 July 1907, TNA, ADM 125/127. 
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Thames, the lone survivor from the Flower-class sloop family, have ever realised that it was 
once a warship, since its deck-guns were removed.26 The Flower-class had been hastily 
constructed in wartime as minesweepers and later to escort convoys, and so they looked 
and performed like small merchantmen rather than world-class warships.  
Among the various strategic reasons for the switch, the Admiralty was partially driven by 
two relatively simple practical considerations. The mainstay W and V class destroyers were 
notoriously uncomfortable for their crews and lacked refrigerators, whereas on the Flower 
class sloops food had to be carried on the open deck between the kitchen and mess.27 It is 
perhaps unsurprising therefore that with the return to peace, the former were stationed in 
Europe and the latter in warmer climates. Overall, most of the new vessels posted to the 
China Station after the First World War were suited to specific military tasks; only a few had 
the right attributes to make a powerful impression on those who saw them. 
In contrast Britain’s main rivals in the region were increasing and strengthening their 
regional fleets. Japan started the decade with an order for five modern gunboats, which by 
late 1923 had doubled its permanent China river force.28 With the expansion and 
modernisation of the IJN’s main fleet during the First World War, many pre-war destroyers 
were deployed on patrol duties around China, although on paper they were based in 
Japan.29 Those destroyers were obsolete for fleet duties and had been re-rated as second or 
third class, with most due for scrapping, but they made adequate gunboat substitutes to 
increase the visibility of Japan’s growing maritime power. Likewise, while HMS Hood and its 
compatriots did not venture beyond Singapore, the IJN sent touring squadrons around East 
Asia, including battlecruisers twice the size of the China Station’s flagship HMS Hawkins.30 
Japan was waving the flag as Victorian Britain had often done, and could do so with far 
greater ease given the comparatively short distance from its main naval yards.  
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Even more crucially than the IJN’s rising sun, the USN’s Asiatic Fleet received eighteen brand 
new destroyers between 1918 and 1922, which had a sufficiently shallow draught to 
navigate as far upriver as Hankou.31 Those destroyers were larger, faster, and more heavily 
armed than any of the smaller warships Britain or Japan had stationed off the Chinese coast. 
That increase also resulted in the Asiatic Fleet receiving a full Admiral on a permanent 
attachment from September 1919, senior to Vice Admiral Alexander Duff who was 
commanding the China Station at the time. Previously the Royal Navy’s regional commander 
had always been senior to his USN counterpart. The balance was only restored in July 1921 
when Duff was promoted to full Admiral, with his replacement the following year also newly 
appointed as a full Admiral - Arthur Leveson. Royal Navy officers were a little dismissive of 
the disparity, however, as often the American ‘Admiral’ only possessed a temporary rank. 
Admirals Edwin Anderson, Clarence Williams, and Mark Bristol, for example, all reverted to 
being Rear-Admirals upon leaving the Asiatic Fleet.32 Nonetheless, the Chinese civilian 
officials they encountered were unlikely to be aware of that subtle distinction. 
The USN was also making frequent requests in Washington for modern gunboats to 
strengthen its Yangtze Patrol, in order to raise America’s profile and influence in China. After 
much lobbying, an order for six new mid-sized vessels was finally approved in 1924.33 Delays 
in securing funding and then during construction at Shanghai, however, meant that the first 
of those new American gunboats was not launched until 1927. The one area where the USN 
Asiatic Fleet did not experience an upgrade, was with its core flagship, which was first the 
pre-war cruiser USS Huron (launched 1904), which was replaced in December 1926 by the 
equally outdated USS Pittsburgh (launched 1903). In contrast, the British flagship was first 
HMS Hawkins (launched 1917) and then HMS Kent (launched 1926), both of which were on 
their inaugural commissioned voyages. As the China Station was also formed around the 
Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron, it remained the most powerful naval force based in the 
immediate locality. The growing strength of both America and Japan’s deployments on the 
Chinese coast, however, meant that Britain’s margin of superiority was slim and increasingly 
difficult to demonstrate to civilian observers. 
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Along with the shifting balance of international power in Chinese waters, Britain’s gunboat 
force was being affected by changes within China itself. After the collapse of the Qing rule, 
the fighting between rival warlords had resulted in a rapid modernisation in the land-based 
military equipment used in China. This was part of a long term trend, as European and 
American technological supremacy in that area had been waning since the 1870s and 1880s, 
relative to China, but that process accelerated in the years after the Xinhai Revolution.34 By 
May 1924, for example, even a relatively small band of 300 bandits operating near 
Guangzhou was recorded as being armed with four field guns and thirty Thompson sub-
machine guns.35 The ‘Tommy Gun’ had only become available for sale in 1921 and was a far 
superior squad-level weapon than the heavy Lewis machine-guns and bolt-action Lee-
Enfield rifles carried by British service personnel at that time.36 Where the Royal Navy could 
keep their distance, particularly while sailing along the lower Yangtze, the greater range and 
accuracy of the British weaponry was an advantage. Along narrower waterways or ashore 
that was not the case. While the average Chinese soldier or bandit was still likely to be less 
well armed than the British sailors and marines they might encounter, that advantage could 
no longer be taken for granted.  
Steel plating, splinter mattresses, and sandbags were often used as relatively effective 
supplementary counter-measures against small-arms fire, with the river itself aiding defence 
by keeping snipers at a distance from the warships.37 Caught by surprise and unprepared, 
HMS Robin reported in October 1920 that only minor damage was sustained and no injuries 
suffered when it was suddenly machine-gunned in the Pearl River delta.38 The distance from 
shore alone had helped avoid a more serious incident for the slow-moving gunboat. 
Likewise, the better-prepared gunboat HMS Gnat counted over 100 rifle rounds fired at it 
near Chongqing in March 1926, of which seventeen hit the vessel, but only three risked 
causing injury.39  
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The counter-measures taken could do little against heavy weapons though, and a well-
aimed artillery shell fired at relatively close range would cause significant damage.40 On 29 
May 1924, for example, HMS Tarantula came across two merchant vessels near Guangzhou 
that had been badly damaged by artillery shells fired from shore, with numerous casualties 
reported on both vessels.41 With next to no armour plating on most of the Royal Navy’s 
gunboats, they were little better suited to facing such an attack than those civilian steamers. 
Indeed, the smaller gunboats like HMS Robin at just 85 tonnes and 108 foot long would be 
at risk of suffering critical damage and numerous casualties if hit by an accurate artillery 
shell.42 HMS Bee had a lucky escape from such a scenario on 8 September 1926, when fired 
upon by two field guns, leading to one shell inflicting substantial, but largely superficial, 
damage to its steel hull (see Figure 8).43 Britain’s gunboats still held an advantage given their 
firepower, but they were no longer able to cruise the river almost immune from harm, as 
they had done in prior decades. Even then, in the Victorian era it was not unusual for a few 
gunboats to carry the same weight of firepower as a small army, but by the 1920s that was 
no longer the case.44  
Figure 8: Damage to HMS Bee 8 September 192645 
 
Fortunately for Britain, the Royal Navy’s perceived power protected it from serious, 
organised attacks for most of the decade. Between 1923 and 1925, for example, the 
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quarterly reports sent to the Admiralty from the China Station often noted that no shots had 
been fired near or at British warships. This was despite regular reports of other vessels using 
the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers having been hit by both small arms and artillery.46 In one 
incident in early 1923 the Chinese cruiser Chao Ho, after threatening to bombard ‘enemy 
forces’ in Shantou, was dissuaded from doing so by the arrival of the smaller HMS 
Magnolia.47 The British warship may have posed a limited direct threat by itself, but a fight 
with the Royal Navy was almost certain to lead to the later destruction of the Chao Ho. It 
was not until May 2 1927, therefore, that heavy weapons were first used against Royal Navy 
vessels, when the destroyer HMS Wanderer came under rifle and artillery fire from 
Guomindang troops near Jiangyin.48 Wanderer’s subsequent, immediate heavy counter-
bombardment was intended to remind the Chinese troops of the Royal Navy’s superior 
firepower. Lieutenant Commander Louis Hamilton nonetheless felt that his ship had been 
lucky to escape with only one wounded sailor, with some shells only narrowly missing the 
ship’s superstructure. As China’s soldiers and bandits were increasingly capable of and 
willing to challenge British warships in this way, the invisible protection provided by the 
Royal Navy’s waning prestige was of even greater importance. 
The rapid modernisation in East Asia’s weapons pool after the First World War was not 
purely a hindrance to the Royal Navy. In 1921 for example, the SVC was loaned a range of 
surplus wartime weaponry by the British Government, including four 4.5” howitzers, 900 
rifles, and twenty-four machine guns.49 Likewise, the American and Italian governments 
made similar, if much smaller, donations towards the SVC companies manned by their 
citizens.50 Shanghai Municipal’s Council then purchased a further 400 brand new rifles, 
along with revolvers, steel helmets, and grenades. The Council also funded the construction 
of ten locally-designed armoured cars over the decade, with seven in service by early 
1925.51 Prior to these purchases the SVC had generally relied on obsolete British Army 
weaponry donated as it was phased out of use, with infrequent small supplementary 
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purchases funded by the SMC.52 The Corps of 1918 had therefore been armed with a motley 
collection of weapons, some of which dated back to well before the Boxer Uprising, and 
with most in a poor state of repair.53 Alongside an enthusiastic but largely amateur 
approach, the pre-1919 SVC was little more than a very basic part-time militia. 
The mass influx of up to date, if slightly worn, equipment therefore provided a step change 
in capability. In addition, the attachment of experienced British Army Warrant Officers and 
many volunteers who had served during the war, contributed to a growing professionalism 
within the Corps. As concern grew about the situation in China, so did the strength of the 
SVC as foreign residents were encouraged to play a role in the defence of the International 
Settlement. Between 1920 and 1927, for example, the number of volunteers increased from 
1,345 to 1,887. With better equipment being procured and experienced wartime officers 
replacing those previously appointed as social favours by the Commandant, morale 
improved significantly.54 As a result, attendance also increased from an ‘active’ participation 
rate of 73% in 1920 to 86% the following year, peaking at 88% in 1924.55 By 1927, 
favourable comparisons were even being drawn between the SVC and Territorial Army 
battalions back in Britain.56 The SVC’s Light Horse Company, drawn from the city’s richer 
residents, proved to be the exception and retained their nickname as the ‘Tight Horse’ due 
to their drinking prowess rather than military abilities.57 Overall, however, the SVC was 
becoming increasingly capable of dealing with all but the most extreme crises that might 
affect Shanghai from 1920 onwards, largely relieving the Navy of one task drawing on its 
manpower.  
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Figure 9: Shanghai Volunteer Corps membership 1920-2758 
 
While there were such practical benefits, overall the flow of modern weaponry into China 
was eroding the perceived strength and novelty value of the Royal Navy’s river force. As a 
result, the British Empire was left with two options if it was to preserve its superpower 
image in the region. The first option was to strengthen the China Station. With the Treasury 
looking to cut rather than increase the Admiralty’s funding, such a choice would have 
required redeploying resources from elsewhere. Such shifts in vessels would either result in 
the abandonment of another post or greater force dispersal, which would go against the 
core element of Britain’s post-Fisher naval grand strategy. Neither was acceptable to the 
Admiralty. Alternatively, the Royal Navy could make a qualitative improvement to its China 
force. 
Hermes the trickster 
Commissioned in 1924, Hermes was the world’s first purpose-built aircraft carrier and with a 
complement of relatively new aircraft (Fairey IIID and Fairey Flycatcher), for a very brief 
period it represented the cutting edge in the rapidly evolving field of naval aviation.59 The 
posting of Hermes to Asia in August 1925 was therefore highly symbolic, having only 
recently completed its sea-trials in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Not only was the 
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deployment itself a statement, but on 1 November 1925 three of Hermes’ aircraft formed a 
ceremonial escort for the ship delivering Hong Kong’s new Governor, Cecil Clementi.60 The 
parade was an attempt to impress both the population of Hong Kong and the warships from 
China, France, Japan, and the USA that were docked in the harbour. The spectacle’s impact 
was undermined, however, when one of the aircraft was caught in turbulence and crashed 
into the harbour. As a result, the local English-language newspaper, the China Mail, 
reported the accident as front-page news, relegating coverage of Governor Clementi’s 
welcome to page seven.61 Nonetheless, the intention had been to exploit the aircraft 
carrier’s novelty in order to advertise British power in the region. 
Hermes’ first tour on the China Station was characterised by daily exercise and training 
flights over and around Hong Kong, up the Pearl River to Guangzhou, or across to Macau. 
During those six months there were only two recorded instances where the ship was used in 
an active military role. Even those were far from dramatic. In the first, an armed guard was 
simply sent by motor launch to inspect a Chinese steamer.62 In the second, two aircraft were 
despatched in vain to find a Dutch cargo vessel, which was suspected of transporting 
weapons to the Guomindang in contravention of an international arms embargo.63 The little 
real drama from the first visit came from formation flying displays, generally watched by 
crowds of onlookers, some of which were reported by the local press.64 Articles in the same 
newspapers a few weeks later suggest that the novelty soon wore off, especially as the 
regular early morning practice flights over the city were less appreciated by the local 
population.65 In contrast, after returning to the China Station in late 1926 Hermes was 
involved in monthly anti-piracy operations in Daya Bay, spending far less time in Hong Kong 
harbour.66 Even then Hermes’ role was as much symbolic as military; during an anti-piracy 
raid on villages in Daya Bay in March 1927, for example, aircraft were flown overhead in 
part ‘to add to the impression of power’.67 
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The sedate nature of Hermes’ first visit to Hong Kong in late 1925 was aided by the military 
aircraft in China at that point not yet posing a significant threat to Britain’s interests. Only 
the strongest factions had been able to finance the purchase of aircraft in any quantity, and 
even then most descended rapidly into a poor state of repair, due to a lack of fully trained 
mechanics.68 In July 1925, for example, Consul-General Jamieson had reported to Palairet 
that most of the Guomindang’s aircraft were not in a sufficient state of repair to even reach 
Hong Kong from Guangzhou, a distance of just over 100 miles.69 While the direct threat was 
limited, the contrasting absence of British airpower in East Asia was increasingly felt to be 
undermining Britain’s image as a superpower. This was particularly true of the British 
colonial communities in the region, with the China Mail strongly advocating the need for 
military aircraft, arguing that they were vital in the competition between major powers for 
prestige in East Asia.70 Up until this point the only real display of British military aviation in 
East Asia had involved the outdated seaplane tender HMS Pegasus visiting Hong Kong in 
November 1924, as part of global tour taking aerial photographs of strategically important 
harbours.71  
Hermes’ deployment came at a point when military aviation in China was developing 
rapidly. Immediately after the First World War Britain had largely dominated the flow of 
aircraft into China. Sales of some of Britain’s roughly 10,000 surplus wartime aircraft were 
made as part of a wider effort to recoup at least part of the estimated £1 billion of military 
equipment no longer required in peacetime.72 Dominating the global surplus military aircraft 
market enabled the British government to influence the number and quality of aircraft sold 
on to many second-tier powers. To some extent this had ensured that most aircraft in China 
in 1920 were already outdated compared with those used by the major powers’ air forces. 
That situation did not last long. After signing the multinational treaty embargoing armament 
sales to China in mid-1919, Britain lost its tentative power of influence. While British arms 
manufacturers found ways to break the embargo, the French arms industry in particular 
                                                          
68 Chan, Arming the Chinese¸pp.117-121. 
69 Jamieson to Palairet, 14 July 1925, TNA, FO 371/10947.  
70 E.g. China Mail, 21 August 1925, p.1; China Mail, 2 November 1925, p.1. 
71 Monthly reports from Admiral Leveson to Admiralty, 1924, TNA, ADM 116/2262; G.L.D. Alderson, History of 
RAF Kai Tak, (Hong Kong: Royal Air Force, 1972), pp.11-12; Cliff Dunnaway, Wings Over Hong Kong: An Aviation 
History 1891-1998, (Hong Kong: Pacific Century Publishers, 1999), pp.12-65. 
72 Chan, Arming the Chinese, p.118; Higham, Armed Forces in Peacetime, p.19. 
Page | 162  
 
exploited the absence of support in Whitehall for aircraft sales to China. Such was the shift 
to France that by 1923 one of Zhang Zuolin’s trusted commanders, Colonel Wei, had been 
sent to establish an office in Paris purely for ordering new military equipment.73 As a result, 
by early 1924 Britain had little influence over the flow of what were often brand new 
military aircraft being sold to China’s warlords.  
Concern about the prestige risk presented by growing interest in aerial power in China was 
exacerbated in mid-1925 when the Soviet Union sent five of its latest aircraft on a 
diplomatic tour from Moscow to Guangzhou. While technical faults forced two of the five to 
abandon the tour, the three that completed the journey were reportedly a big hit with 
Guomindang officials and the local population. Indeed, Hong Kong’s two main English 
language newspapers, the China Mail and Hong Kong Telegraph, both featured articles in 
the following weeks arguing that the tour had been a victory for Soviet prestige and 
influence in the region.74 This was not the first time another power had completed such a 
tour. The previous year a flight of four US Army Air Service aircraft visited Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, and Canton as part of their world record, world tour.75 The Americans were received 
warmly at Hong Kong, although it set a stark contrast to the single RAF seaplane that was 
competing against them for the record. The British competitor arrived three weeks overdue 
and later crashed off the Japanese coast.76 While the previous incident was considered bad 
luck, beaten by an admired friend, there were considerably stronger feelings about the 
Bolshevik foe having pulled off a propaganda coup in such a sensitive location for Britain. 
Along with the anti-British boycott, launched after the May Thirtieth Incident, these events 
around Hong Kong were combining to make the British Empire look weak. As a result, 
Cabinet were convinced that an effective way to remind the Guomindang and the people of 
Guangzhou of Britain’s power would be to use military aircraft.77  
The role of military aircraft in China was not intended to be based around their combat 
effectiveness, but rather the psychological impact of their use. Hermes’ normal contingent 
of fifteen Fairey IIID and Fairey Flycatchers only provided a theoretical maximum cumulative 
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bombload of 1,200lbs (544kg) per sortie, which was relatively trifling compared to the 
ordinary naval firepower available on China’s main waterways. During the Nanjing Incident 
in 1927, for example, HMS Emerald alone fired roughly 600kg of ordnance within the first 
minute.78 Likewise, a few weeks later HMS Wanderer discharged almost 2,000kg of shells at 
a group of Chinese soldiers near Jiangjiu, during a relatively short engagement.79 With 
ranges of between fifteen to twenty kilometres, the main naval guns could also adequately 
cover the majority of territory immediately surrounding the treaty ports, although with 
questionable accuracy in areas of rough terrain.  
Aircraft did provide the new possibility of punitive raids far inland, but there are no records 
that such a mission was actively considered. In the event of accidents or aircraft being 
downed by enemy fire, the RAF pilots might have been left far from help or rescue, 
particularly given the rules against ground forces being sent into Chinese territory. In 
authorising the deployment, the Cabinet instead intended Hermes to operate in a colonial 
policing role similar to the RAF’s activities in the Middle East, trying to use the fear 
generated by the novelty of military aircraft to intimidate and emphasise British 
superiority.80 Likewise, the presence would have the contrasting effect on the British 
colonial community in China, by reassuring them that Britain would do what was considered 
necessary to protect them. 
It is unlikely that using military aircraft was a particularly effective means of impressing the 
Chinese audience, or even had potential to achieve the desired results in boosting British 
prestige. During the early years of military aviation in China, between 1917 and 1923, 
aircraft did reportedly instil fear and respect among civilians and troops alike. By the time 
Hermes arrived in the region, however, aircraft had become a common feature in the 
skylines over eastern China. Most warlords and factions possessed their own embryotic air 
forces and regularly employed them in dropping leaflets, reconnoitring enemy positions, 
and bombing targets. The arrival of British aircraft therefore only added to a general 
normalisation of the Chinese population to the presence of military aircraft. Not only that, 
but after the initial employment of aircraft the morale impact of bombing and strafing 
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attacks tended to decline rapidly, a fact evident from the experience of air policing 
elsewhere in the Empire.81  
While ostensibly Hermes’ tour may have been intended to boost British prestige in China, 
the Admiralty had an additional, nominally secret motive. During the tour, Fleet Air Arm and 
RAF personnel carried by Hermes spent a significant amount of time ashore while in Hong 
Kong, establishing military facilities at Kai Tak (Kai Teck) airstrip, Kowloon.82 Founded only 
the previous year, Kai Tak was a quiet airstrip on newly reclaimed land in Kowloon Bay, 
suitable for both land-based aircraft and seaplanes.83 The initially basic facilities established 
there were gradually expanded with Kai Tak later becoming an official RAF airfield, although 
it also remained Hong Kong’s main international airport right through until its closure in 
1998.84 Under the terms of the Washington Treaty, Britain had agreed to maintain the 
‘status quo’ in regards to its military facilities at Hong Kong, theoretically but not explicitly 
banning the creation of a military airfield.85 The clause was one that the Admiralty had been 
very reluctant to agree to, regarding it as a dangerous concession, but one they had agreed 
to in order to secure the overall treaty.86 Britain had not been willing to sacrifice existing 
naval bases during negotiations, but suspending upgrades to Hong Kong and Weihai were 
considered acceptable losses to secure Japan’s agreement not to seek a harbour south of 
Taiwan (Formosa).87 At the time of Hermes’ tour in 1925 the British government still wanted 
to avoid being seen to break the treaty, as it would have provided Japan and the USA with 
cause to revoke it, potentially threatening Britain’s global defence strategy.88 
Adapting the facilities at Kowloon’s civilian airstrip under the guise that it was a ‘temporary 
landing ground’ for Hermes’ aircraft may not have been within the spirit of the Washington 
Treaty, but in Britain’s view it was not a clear violation.89 In 1923, for example, the Admiralty 
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advised its senior commanders that storing military aircraft supplies at Hong Kong would 
not contravene the Washington Treaty, so long as the equipment was transported by an 
aircraft carrier.90 As aircraft-carrier landings were still extremely hazardous, both on deck 
and using floats, it was not an outrageous argument by Britain that such land-based facilities 
would be installed on a temporary basis for pilot safety. Hezlet argues that one in four 
carrier landings in the early 1920s resulted in damage to the aircraft, with one in twelve 
leading to the aircraft being written-off.91 Certainly during his time as Executive Officer 
aboard HMS Hermes during 1926, Commander Reginald Ramsbotham remembered aircraft 
regularly being written off from rough landings, although most aircrew escaped with minor 
injuries.92 Such attrition rates were unsustainable and difficult to justify in peacetime. While 
an airstrip was indeed safer for the pilots it also removed the need for the Fairey IIIDs to use 
floats and allowed them to carry more fuel, both of which increased the aircraft’s potential 
range.93  
Despite the safety argument, the discussion around the 1923 War Orders provided by the 
Admiralty suggests that the decision to establish ground-based facilities was actually, 
primarily intended to strengthen Hong Kong against a potential Japanese attack. A military 
airfield would also have additional value in strengthening Britain’s position in relation to 
China. Should war with either of the two Asian powers have appeared likely, RAF squadrons 
could be quickly despatched to Hong Kong with the required front-line stores, facilities, and 
equipment ready for their arrival. Upon departure from Malta, Hermes had picked up 
sixteen spare aircraft and as many RAF supplies as the ship could carry, which were 
unloaded soon after arrival in Hong Kong.94 When Hermes later went to make its departure 
from the China Station, its commander Captain Cecil Talbot recorded: 'We have left a few 
aircraft, and most of the RAF personnel, at Hong Kong.'95 As a result, a study in early 1928 
stated that in the event of war, Kai Tak was sufficiently prepared as a semi-military airfield 
that it could support three squadrons (c.50-70 aircraft) at short notice.96 As the aircraft 
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already available in the region aboard HMS Hermes provided Britain with sufficient air 
power to deter attacks from the Guomindang, the scale of the preparations further suggests 
that Kai Tak’s development was quietly directed against the perceived threat from Japan.  
By 1927, Britain stretched the terms of the Washington Treaty further by permanently 
stationing one flight of six fighter aircraft at Hong Kong’s airfield. As the aircraft were 
transported to China by an aircraft carrier and on detachment from the Fleet Air Arm, they 
were publicly presented as a temporary defensive measure related to events in China.97 This 
was officially discussed and authorised by the Chiefs of Staff, who were recorded as stating: 
‘We have never admitted that the use of (Kai Tak) is prohibited in so far as operations 
against the Chinese are concerned, by the Washington Agreement’.98 A further disclaimer 
was made that the military aircraft sent to Shanghai were also not seen as restricted by the 
treaty, under Britain’s interpretation, given that the city was neither official British territory 
nor a military base. 
The first RAF flight appointed to the Far East then took yet another step in bending the 
terms of the Washington Treaty. While permanently based at Singapore, the four 
Supermarine Southampton flying boats did spend time working out of Hong Kong. As the 
flying boats did not require the use of Kai Tak’s runway, they enabled the continued 
pretence that the airfield was only a civilian enterprise. It was only finally in January 1930 
that the RAF officially put in place a command structure recognising the existence of a Far 
East Command, including a presence in Hong Kong.99 Curiously, after a decade of trying to 
avoid breaking the Washington Treaty, the creation of the Far East Command occurred 
three weeks before the opening of the London Naval Conference, and six years before the 
expiration of the original agreement. It seems likely that by that point Britain was 
sufficiently confident that restrictions on base enhancements in the region would be 
rescinded. Signed in April, amid a range of negotiated compromises, the Admiralty got their 
way and the limitations on air power at Hong Kong were lifted.100 
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Throughout the process of developing Kai Tak as a military airfield at Hong Kong, the 
Admiralty does not appear to have formally consulted Cabinet. As an operational matter, 
which the Admiralty argued did not breach Britain’s international treaty commitments, 
there was no requirement to seek political approval. In the June 1925 correspondence with 
Cabinet about Hermes’ deployment, the Navy referred to using an improvised landing 
ground at Happy Valley racecourse in Hong Kong to land its Fairey Flycatcher fighters, with 
no mention of Kai Tak.101 When Hermes departed Portsmouth on 17 June, however, it was 
already loaded with additional aircraft equipment to be delivered to Kai Tak.102 The 
omission is therefore highly suggestive that the Admiralty used the situation in China to 
quietly facilitate the controversial development.  
This hypothesis is supported by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Trenchard when he 
proposed exactly the same plan during a Cabinet discussion in November 1926, after 
Hermes had already returned from delivering its first load of aircraft equipment to Hong 
Kong. Trenchard apparently had no knowledge of what had already happened at Kai Tak, 
and was advised by Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain that such a move would put 
the Washington Treaty at risk. 103 Likewise, at the end of Hermes’ first deployment, the 
Colonial Office lobbied the Navy to remove the equipment from Kai Tak, when it became 
clear it would be left behind when the warship was due to depart China. Talbot’s diary 
indicates that an initial response from an unnamed individual at the Admiralty agreed with 
the Colonial Office that the Washington Treaty was risk, but all opposition was dropped 
quite suddenly after senior command became involved.104 Alternatively, it is plausible that 
successive British governments avoided officially recognising the plans, to help maintain the 
pretence that the Navy was only temporarily using what was otherwise a civilian airfield. In 
either case, the choice of Hermes to conduct the subterfuge, named after the trickster god 
of Greek mythology, seems particularly appropriate. 
Such hidden motives raise the question whether the Royal Navy by the 1920s really believed 
that displays of naval technology were effective at boosting British Imperial prestige. 
Certainly, image appears to have been an important factor under consideration. During 
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Seaman Albert Heron’s time aboard HMS Carlisle from 1919 to 1921 for example, ‘much, 
much more attention’ was paid to the cruiser’s appearance than was normal on other 
stations, in order to make a strong impression when visiting Chinese ports.105 A similar 
account from Seaman Thomas Wallace, stationed in China aboard HMS Vengeance between 
1907 and 1908, indicates that this was a long term trait of the China Station.106 Indeed, 
warships on the China Station were painted white, in contrast to the standard grey used 
worldwide by the Royal Navy. That distinctive colour scheme ensured that the vessels stood 
out from their peers, which is clear from contemporary photographs.107 The disappearance 
by the 1920s of outright statements in official naval communications emphasising the need 
for flag waving, however, would suggest that imperial prestige carried less weight after the 
First World War than it had done previously. Indeed, even in debate at the House of 
Commons there were only infrequent references to flying the flag in China in the early 
1920s, such as Gershom Stewart MP suggesting it would help at the smaller concessions to 
‘reassure those of our people there’.108 Was Hermes’ deployment to China in 1925 therefore 
actually more to do with preparing the facilities at Kai Tak rather than impressing the 
Chinese population?  
The lack of even a brief visit to Shanghai or Guangzhou by the carrier on its first tour, 
obvious choices if the intention was to spread word of British aerial prowess in China, 
supports the idea that Hermes’ deployment was not primarily to boost imperial prestige. 
Likewise, during its time in Hong Kong only four official receptions for foreign naval officers 
were held, two from the USN and two from the French Navy.109 Hermes’ captain was not 
going to great lengths to show-off his new ship, particularly when compared with its time in 
the Mediterranean on route to China. The vague statement made to the House of Commons 
by Bridgeman is not particularly convincing either, referring to Hermes being sent for 
‘training and exercising the Fleet Air Arm’ and possibly assisting in defending British 
interests in China.110 Training could easily be done in the Mediterranean at a lower cost than 
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making the trip to Hong Kong, and the quiet stationing of Hermes in Hong Kong harbour for 
almost the entire tour did little to support the second stated aim. Hong Kong was rocked 
during that period by major strikes after the May Thirtieth Incident, but the city had 
survived previous strikes and the main anti-British protests, and resulting violence, occurred 
at Shanghai and Guangzhou.111 Investigating the impact of the local climate on flying 
conditions or testing the suitability of landing sites might have supported a deployment to 
China, but neither factor was mentioned in the correspondence. It seems likely, therefore, 
that the while strengthening imperial prestige was a factor in and provided the opportunity 
for Hermes’ first deployment, the primary motive behind the Admiralty’s decision was the 
establishment of military airfield facilities at Hong Kong. 
With the Royal Navy’s standing in East Asia under pressure from the growing power of both 
its international rivals and by China itself, in addition to the Admiralty’s diminishing interest 
in overtly displaying its power, the China Station was in a precarious situation. For most of 
the 1920s, however, even if the superpower image of the Royal Navy was waning, the 
service was still regarded with wariness and respect by China’s leaders and population. No 
warlord or faction officially challenged Britain militarily during the 1920s, although during 
the 1927 crisis there was some willingness by the Guomindang to allow minor clashes 
between its troops and British warships, even if only through passive acquiescence. For the 
most part, however, the Royal Navy’s experience was that seen during the Nanjing Incident 
when all of HMS Emerald’s officers reported that neither southern nor northern troops 
deliberately fired at the ship.112 The only casualty aboard Emerald, Able Seaman John Knox, 
was hit in the head by a stray bullet when fighting first erupted between the rival Chinese 
troops, and before Captain England ordered his men down from exposed positions. It is 
therefore difficult to attribute the growing number of incidents where naval vessels were 
fired upon by Chinese troops to a shift in respect afforded to the Royal Navy, or diminishing 
fears of potential retribution, particularly as the USN was exposed to the same trend.113 The 
increase in violence was instead a result of the growing sense of nationalism in China, and 
crucially - the greater availability of modern weaponry. 
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This is supported by the ground-level interactions involving British servicemen in China. 
Seaman Arthur Gaskin remembered that during the troubles at Hankou in January 1927, 
Chinese protestors generally preferred toying with British sailors and marines by trying to 
knock their steel helmets off using bamboo poles.114 His opinion was that while Chinese 
protestors were boisterous and occasionally mischievous, they did not look to start fights 
with groups of foreign servicemen. Gaskin did note, that lone foreigners were at greater risk 
of beatings during tense protests, recounting how a Royal Marine patrol rescued a badly 
injured German doctor who had tried pushing through the crowd. The local American 
newspaper, the Hankow Herald, provides a slightly more dramatic account of the bamboo 
pole swinging antics, stating that two sailors were deliberately knocked unconscious during 
the course of events.115 However, the weight of first-hand accounts tend to agree with 
Gaskin’s core views on interactions with Chinese civilians. Both Lieutenant Ian Wight and 
Private Ernest Whitney, for example, felt the Chinese were generally friendly with or at least 
respectful of British servicemen, when they were posted to Shanghai and Guangzhou 
respectively in 1927.116 
So overall, while new technology was used at times in an attempt to reinforce British 
prestige in East Asia, those efforts had become a secondary aim targeted at re-assuring the 
British colonial population in the region. The Admiralty does indeed appear to have placed 
less value on waving the flag, in line with the general post-Fisher shift in strategy away from 
gunboat diplomacy. Crucially, however, any decline in the Royal Navy’s perceived power in 
China did not significantly alter the events on the ground. Chinese troops and bandits were 
increasingly capable of engaging foreign forces, but even the worst clashes did not show any 
serious intent to challenge Britain militarily. The Royal Navy’s use of technology was 
overwhelmingly focused upon the practical requirements of defending the British Empire, 
rather than reinforcing how it was seen by the Chinese. 
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Understanding China 
Communications technology played a key role in influencing how the British Empire was 
organised and controlled, particularly in relation to the Royal Navy. As late as the mid-
nineteenth century the reliance on ship-borne mail as the main long-distance means of 
conveying information and ideas had resulted in significant discretionary power being 
placed with local officials and commanders. 117 For Britain’s outposts in East Asia that 
situation only started to change after the first telegraph cable was laid to Hong Kong in June 
1871, transforming London’s ability to understand what was going on in the region.118 
Andrew Lambert argues that in the following two decades the British government started to 
exploit this comparatively rapid form of communication as a means of actively influencing 
events as they happened, at the furthest reaches of the British Empire.119 Sending messages 
around the world with those early cables may still have taken hours, and often required re-
sending as a result of being garbled by poor quality transmission, but that was a huge leap 
forward from postal communication.120 For the most part, however, the interpretation of 
events and subsequent formation and implementation of policy, was still left to the China 
Station’s Commander in Chief, in conjunction with his Foreign Office counterparts in Hong 
Kong and Beijing. Likewise, communication at the base of the Navy’s command chain 
remained reliant on intermittent letters between ship and shore. It could therefore take 
weeks for orders to be distributed to all China Station vessels, or longer when the 
Commander in Chief was out on tour with his squadron. This could lead to policy being 
further diluted, as decision-making authority passed by default to officers lower down the 
scale. 
Correspondence between Vice Admiral Arthur Moore, commanding the China Station in 
1907, and the Admiralty provides a peacetime example of how communication prior to the 
First World impacted on policy. On 28 July 1906 Lieutenant Commander George Todd, 
commanding the gunboats on the upper Yangtze, held a banquet at Leshan (Kiating) on his 
own initiative to promote better relations with the local Chinese officials. Using his own 
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money, Todd had spent thirteen dollars and two cents on ‘wines and liqueres’ (sic), five 
dollars and sixty-two cents on food, and fifty cents on cigarettes. 121 While not an 
exceptional amount, if such banquets were held regularly the cost would soon add-up for 
such junior officers. It was not until 12 January 1907 that Vice Admiral Moore, Commander 
in Chief of the China Station, received and was subsequently able to forward the report and 
associated expense request for the feast to the Admiralty.122 A further two months lapsed 
before the Admiralty’s answer was dispatched in March, stating that such banquets were 
not official Navy policy and so the cost would have to be met by the officers involved.123 
Moore responded with a passionate letter in April arguing that promoting warm relations 
with Chinese officials could provide Britain with ‘a great deal of advantage’. In addition, 
Moore made particular reference to growing competition from other nations for trade in 
China while justifying the expense.124 Perhaps feeling that he had overstepped his authority, 
Moore retracted his letter a week later with a statement that the order had been 
distributed to his officers that no official banquets or gifts were to be exchanged with 
Chinese officials.125  
Making the assumption that there was a comparable further delay in Moore’s order 
reaching the upper Yangtze, it had taken the Navy almost a year to clarify what authority 
junior officers had in exercising soft power in China. By that point, Todd had already been 
notified of his next command and his imminent departure from the Yangtze. The process 
could have been expedited during a crisis, by using dedicated despatch vessels for example, 
but this example illustrates how Whitehall only had a distant and delayed ability to influence 
events on the ground. 
Slow communications could have far greater consequences than matters of soft diplomacy, 
with junior officers sometimes facing the burden of decisions that could significantly impact 
upon Britain’s relationship with China. This was true of the Navy worldwide, but was 
particularly pronounced in a command like the China Station where smaller warships often 
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operated in comparatively remote locations.126 In early 1907, for example, when a British 
steamer was seized by the Guangzhou authorities in relation to the death of a Chinese 
passenger, a young Lieutenant Commander in charge of the gunboats on the West River 
ordered twenty-seven-year-old Lieutenant, Gerald Dickens, to take his destroyer HMS Hart 
and recover the vessel.127 His orders were to negotiate a peaceful release with the Chinese 
government officials, but if necessary to use force. Looking back on the events, Dickens later 
wrote in his memoirs that he felt it was amazing that such responsibility was left to junior 
officers who were not required, or indeed able, to get authorisation from the Commodore 
at Hong Kong, but that the situation was quite normal before wireless sets became 
commonly available. In this case, Dickens convinced the Chinese officials that it would be 
better for everyone if the gunboats detaining the steamer were withdrawn, but the peaceful 
outcome relied heavily upon the amicable relationship between him and his Chinese 
counterpart.  
Had the Chinese authorities refused Dickens’ proposal, a small flotilla of British destroyers 
was being prepared nearby to engage the three Chinese gunboats and ‘cut-out’ the 
steamer, much in the style of what was attempted during the 1926 Wanxian Incident. A 
potential battle between the two nations’ warships, and the diplomatic crisis that it would 
have produced, was only avoided through a negotiation conducted on the British side by an 
officer with just one year’s experience in sole command. Effective wireless equipment 
therefore offered the opportunity to accelerate the flow of information and orders along 
the chain of command, putting many decisions of similar importance in the hands of senior 
officers.  
Wireless sets were first introduced by the Royal Navy around 1900, but it was not until 
shortly before the First World War that new advances really made them into effective 
tools.128 Those sets available in 1904, for example, were capable of transmitting merely fifty 
miles in daytime, which was of limited value across the expanses of the China Station.129 
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Even as wireless technology improved, the limited funding available to purchase sets and 
difficulties in finding sufficient space to house the equipment on smaller vessels meant that 
it was only during the First World War that most naval vessels had radios installed.130 As an 
outlying outpost that was not integral to the Royal Navy’s grand strategy, the China Station 
was a low priority for receiving those sets that were available. Indeed, in 1913 both Vice 
Admiral Martyn Jerram and Captain Frederick Powlett had bemoaned in letters to the 
Admiralty how the Royal Navy’s effectiveness on the Chinese coast was hampered by delays 
in issuing wireless sets.131 The planned issuing of wireless sets however, which the two 
officers were attempting to expedite, was subsequently cancelled due to the outbreak of 
war in Europe. Wireless sets therefore only appeared on the China Station in any numbers 
when relatively new, wartime-built vessels were sent out to East Asia in 1919. Crucially, 
most river gunboats still had to wait for older sets to be cascaded down to them, a process 
completed in 1924.132 
One early incident in China where the value of wireless sets can be clearly seen, was during 
warlord fighting around Beijing in late 1923. The telegraph lines out of Beijing had been 
severed during the violence, removing the normal means of communication with the 
outside world used by the various international consulates within the city. As a result, the 
wireless link between the British consulate and a Royal Navy warship at Tianjin became the 
sole quick and effective means Britain had for communicating with the legation. While the 
situation in Beijing was felt to be sufficiently calm not to require a Royal Navy taskforce to 
be based at Tianjin, it was still tense enough to require a rapid means of requesting help 
should the situation take a turn for the worse. After hearing of the Great Kanto earthquake 
in Japan and the devastation it had caused, Admiral Leveson sent as many vessels to assist 
as possible, with two cruisers, a sloop, and two support vessels despatched immediately, all 
laden with supplies and medical personnel.133 Leveson also wanted the sloop HMS Foxglove 
to join the humanitarian mission, but it was delayed while waiting for HMS Bluebell to take 
over its duties maintaining a link in the radio chain to the diplomatic mission in Beijing. 
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Without the newly installed radio sets on the China Station’s sloops, Leveson would have 
had no choice but to hold one of his valuable cruisers off the northern Chinese coast, 
reducing his force’s ability to provide assistance in Japan. Had there been no wireless sets 
available on the China Station at all, as was the situation just ten years beforehand, then 
given the violence around Beijing it is unlikely Leveson would have felt comfortable 
despatching any significant vessels to assist in Japan. Radio enabled the China Station to 
monitor events around China, without having to post forces sufficient to deal with possible, 
but not necessarily probable, adverse scenarios. 
Sometimes the influence wireless had on the China Station’s force disposition was less 
obvious. Prior to the First World War, for example, one light cruiser and two sloops were 
normally based on the Yangtze in order to afford rapid support the resident gunboats.134 
When tracing through the ship’s logs for the cruisers on the China Station in the early 1920s, 
it is evident that visits to the Yangtze had become relatively rare, consisting of infrequent 
stops at Shanghai, Nanjing, and occasionally Hankou. The cruisers spent most of their time 
docked or training at Hong Kong or Weihai, or making diplomatic tours of the wider region, 
as can be seen with the example of HMS Carlisle below (see Figure 10). At times of crisis, 
however, the cruisers could still be summoned by radio. During an attack by Wu Peifu’s 
troops near Qinhuangdao in late October 1924, for example, the cruisers HMS Despatch and 
HMS Durban along with the sloop HMS Foxglove were assembled from around the region 
with additional marines from HMS Hawkins and HMS Diomede. The force was issued with 
orders to land at the city if required to maintain order.135 As it became clear that the fighting 
would not affect the city, the naval force was soon reduced and normality was resumed by 
17 December, with the cruisers docked back at their berths in Hong Kong and Weihai.136 
                                                          
134 Memorandum from Vice-Admiral Jerram to Admiralty, 23 September 1913, TNA, ADM 1/8376/109. 
135 Report from Admiral Leveson to Admiralty, 10 November 1924, TNA, ADM 116/2262. 
136 Report from Admiral Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair to Admiralty, 17 December 1924, TNA, ADM 116/2262. 
Page | 176  
 
Figure 10: Movements of the cruiser HMS Carlisle 1920-23137 
 
As conflicts came and went around China during the decade, the Royal Navy’s wireless links 
became increasingly important for the wider British establishment. The Foreign Office’s 
Consul at Chongqing, R.S. Pratt, reported in January 1927 that he was almost wholly reliant 
upon the news stream from the Navy’s gunboats on the upper Yangtze.138 With the 
telegraph network frequently disrupted through changes in frontier, the normal alternative 
was to wait for mail and newspaper deliveries by ship. Postal services could take weeks to 
travel that far up-river and bundles were occasionally lost.139 Reliability of ground 
communication was not just a practical issue. Even when the cables were operational, cases 
were seen at Hankou where press telegrams had been altered either before or during 
transmission.140 Instead the Navy’s wireless transmissions kept the vessels, and the ports 
they were posted to, updated with the latest news. During January 1927, for example, 
Midshipman Philip Burnett recorded day by day the forces being despatched to China, while 
stationed aboard HMS Emerald at Nanjing.141 Burnett was even able to note the exact units 
being assembled in Britain within days of those units receiving their orders, such as the 12th 
Royal Marine Battalion. The enthusiasm with which Burnett recorded the news provides 
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some indication of the morale boost provided from hearing so quickly that reinforcements 
were on their way. 
The greater flow of naval messages around the Station did not always have a positive impact 
upon the recipients. While at Weihai, Lieutenant William Andrewes serving as Torpedo 
Officer aboard HMS Ambrose noted a growing sense of unease and concern in June 1925 
after the May Thirtieth Incident, as the ship recorded messages about clashes around China. 
This came to a climax on 24 June after overhearing reports from Guangzhou about the 
shootings on Shamian Island the preceding day. Andrewes wrote that he was very unsettled 
by reports of foreign women and children being hastily evacuated from Guangzhou and so 
spent his free time that evening at Weihai’s club reading newspaper reports about the 
situation in China. Perhaps a statement about the questionable accuracy of the North China 
Herald in particular, Andrewes returned to his quarters that evening feeling no more certain 
or comfortable about what was behind the events.142  
The desire to gain insights into both what was happening around China, and the causes 
behind those events, was even greater on an institutional level than the personal curiosities 
of Lieutenant Andrewes, Midshipman Burnett, or their colleagues. The Navy had long made 
use of human intelligence to achieve those aims, but the arrival of radios provided the first 
opportunity to exploit signals intelligence. Adopting a policy of actively intercepting foreign 
warships’ transmissions provided a new external source of information. While primarily 
intended to improve Britain’s knowledge of other countries’ naval codes and radio 
techniques, particularly Japan’s, the messages also included valuable news and indications 
of the policy plans of other powers.143 Instructions from an American Admiral to the 
warships of the Asiatic Fleet, in the aftermath of two USN destroyers being hit by artillery 
fire on the Yangtze, for example, were intercepted and then circulated by the Royal Navy 
ships at Hong Kong on April 26 1927. The result was that when HMS Wanderer sailed upriver 
a few days later, it was fully prepared for a fight, allowing it to respond immediately when 
similarly fired upon by Guomindang troops near Jiangyin.144  
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Gathering secret intelligence from wireless signals extended an existing policy of 
intercepting and decrypting telegrams. British ownership of the main long-distance 
telegraph cables had long provided secret insights into other nations’ plans.145 Nor was it 
just naval communications that the Royal Navy targeted, as diplomatic communications 
were generally poorly encrypted in the early interwar period. As a result, they became a 
popular target for intelligence services the world over, including Britain’s.146 In contrast to 
telegraph intercepts, however, wireless intercepts came with a reliability problem, as some 
transmissions were only partially intercepted or were difficult to decipher. This appears to 
have been a particular problem with Chinese communications, given British naval 
telegraphers’ inexperience in dealing with Chinese codes and transmission techniques. In 
one such example, two-thirds of a message from Guomindang officials in Nanjing to the 
Yunnan Provisional government detailing the movements of the 38th Army was either 
missed or unreadable.147 The delays involved in sending complicated signals back to the 
Government Code and Cypher School, and deciphered copies back to the China Station, also 
reduced the tactical value of time-sensitive intelligence.148 Despite those limitations, radio 
intercepts did provide a valuable new supply of snippets of information to better inform 
decisions made by the Royal Navy. 
While success in intercepting Chinese messages was decidedly mixed, Britain had less 
trouble with Japanese transmissions. In part this was due to the weakness of Japanese 
diplomatic encryption, linked with a habit of repeating messages to all of its consuls in China 
and many overseas embassies. For example, in the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident 
in 1925 the Japanese Foreign Minister sent instructions to all his consuls in China updating 
them on Japan’s official stance towards relations with Britain. While the original 
transmissions were missed by the Royal Navy, the British authorities were able to intercept 
and decrypt the message when it was forwarded to the Japanese ambassador in London. As 
a result, the British government were aware that the Japanese government believed its own 
citizens in China were trying to stoke anti-British sentiment, but did not approve of that 
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behaviour.149 Such reports added weight to the pre-1927 assessment that the Japanese 
government would not seek a war with Britain, but there was a growing risk the two powers 
could be driven to war due to Japan’s aggressive commercial expansion in China.150 This was 
not helped by a relatively rapid shift in Royal Navy officers’ attitudes towards Japan and the 
Japanese in the mid-1920s, from patronising and dismissive, based on a background of racial 
prejudice, to outright distrustful.151 
Wireless equipment also sometimes resulted in unexpected developments, which included 
the creation of a new role for the L-class submarine flotilla. In the years after their first 
deployment to China in 1920, those submarines had generally been employed on regular 
training exercises. Their primary purpose as a deterrent targeted towards Japan, came with 
few peacetime responsibilities. The Navy generally avoided leaving the submarines in 
China’s mercantile ports, as the boats themselves had too few crew to provide effective 
shore parties, except when deployed en masse as a flotilla. Submarines were also extremely 
vulnerable to being sunk through collisions with merchant vessels. One unfortunate 
submarine suffered that fate in June 1931, when HMS Poseidon was accidentally rammed 
and sunk by the Chinese merchant ship SS Yuta off Weihai.152 The occasional exceptions to 
that mundane, if dangerous, routine usually resulted from the vessel’s possession of a 
wireless set.  
The radio sets aboard the L-class submarines had a potential range of up to 1,000 miles, 
although in practice reliability was poor when used over such long distances.153 That 
enabled a submarine stationed at Qinhuangdao for much of 1924, for example, to act as a 
link in a wireless chain used for monitoring unrest in the region, in a similar fashion to the 
previously mentioned case involving HMS Foxglove.154 With twelve submarines available on 
the station, one could be regularly spared for relay duties without having a noticeable 
impact on the flotilla’s day-to-day operations. The Royal Navy’s efforts to maintain order at 
the various treaty ports in 1927, however, provided an additional new opportunity for 
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meaningful peacetime employment of the submarines. The months of crisis placed high 
demands on the China Station’s surface vessels, with the force spread thinly around China’s 
many ports that contained British civilians. As a result, the warships were largely unavailable 
for sustained anti-piracy operations. With piracy still plaguing areas such as Daya Bay, the 
Navy remained under significant pressure to deal with the threat to British shipping. The 
Admiralty’s defence for its approach towards Daya Bay in particular, was the argument that 
at least three vessels would be required to patrol that expanse of water alone and such a 
deployment was unlikely to prove effective enough to justify the cost.155 
On 28 October 1927 Commodore John Pearson, the Senior Naval Officer at Hong Kong, 
outlined a new plan to solve the problem, although the core proposal was most likely drawn 
up by Commander Allan Poland of the submarine tender HMS Ambrose.156 Citing ad-hoc 
deployments dating back to 1923, Pearson instigated the maintenance of permanent 
submarine patrols around Daya Bay at night searching for suspect vessels. If a ship failed to 
respond to hailing and the firing of a blank shell, the submarine could radio for assistance, 
while remaining at a safe distance to avoid potentially being rammed and sunk. Should the 
ship attempt to flee, the submarine was to use its deck gun to target the engine room and 
prevent an escape. Surface vessels would therefore remain on-watch at Hong Kong and 
Guangzhou, for example, but when requested could attempt to seize pirated vessels only a 
few hours sailing away. The submarine commanders also felt that such a role would provide 
valuable training and experience for their crews, given the similarities between the work 
and wartime commerce raiding.157 
While the strategy was generally sound, things did not always go so smoothly in practice, as 
submarine L4 and its commander Lieutenant Frederick Halahan discovered on 20 October 
1927. After challenging the SS Irene, the pirates that were in control of the vessel decided to 
take pot-shots at the submarine with their small-arms. Halahan promptly returned fire with 
the submarine’s 4” deck gun, which killed most of the pirates, but also set fire to the Irene. 
While the Irene’s 234 crew and passengers were freed, the ship and most of its cargo 
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ultimately sank.158 Submarines were certainly not ideally suited to stopping pirated vessels 
peacefully, but they nonetheless supplemented the China Station’s other means of 
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. Wireless technology therefore enabled the Navy 
to become more efficient in covering the expansive waters around China’s coastline. 
Numerous, cheap to maintain, small, lightly crewed vessels and aircraft equipped with 
radios could act as the Navy’s eyes and ears, not just in wartime, but also during peace.159 
The handful of larger vessels available would then be free to respond only when they were 
really needed. 
Improvements in the speed news travelled between naval posts could and did help improve 
the accuracy of knowledge the Navy possessed about events in China. However, there was 
no organised system for gathering and assessing intelligence reports, and then 
disseminating guidance around the China Station. Whereas the Foreign Office compiled a 
single document containing summaries of the intelligence updates sent in by its consuls on a 
range of pertinent diplomatic topics, submitted on a quarterly basis, the Admiralty only 
received intermittent reports subject to individual officers’ judgement.160 The Foreign Office 
quarterly reports do not appear to have been shared with the Admiralty on an official basis, 
although some informal exchanges of information between officials working in China seems 
probable. Technology had advanced, but the process used to report developments and keep 
ship’s officers informed remained largely unchanged from the age of sail.161 That absence of 
a coordinated understanding of the situation in China was to be exposed by the escalating 
events of late 1926. 
While there was a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) presence in China, its regional officers 
were forbidden from sharing their reports with even senior British officials in East Asia.162 As 
a result, SIS was blamed by the armed forces for the lack of forewarning about how tense 
the situation had become in China during 1926, leading to an order from Cabinet in January 
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1927 forcing greater disclosure. With SIS’s Asian operations later described as the 
‘Cinderella Branch’ of the Service - largely forgotten and starved of resources - it is unlikely 
that SIS had much information to disclose in any event.163 Britain’s failure to foresee the 
crisis of 1927 cannot be solely attributed to SIS’s failings and was certainly a result of the 
wider, disorganised nature of Britain’s military intelligence gathering apparatus in East Asia. 
Indeed, a number of contemporary decisions indicate that the armed forces were starting to 
recognise that there were significant deficiencies in their own organisations.  
In early 1927, there was a tense exchange of messages between the War Office and Major-
General John Duncan, commanding the Shanghai Defence Force. The orders and demands 
from Whitehall show a profound nervousness that Britain did not know the strength or 
intentions of the different Chinese armies.164 As a result, on 23 April the War Office issued 
orders for the creation of a temporary Shanghai Intelligence Bureau, to gather information 
in support of the Shanghai Defence Force.165 A further order was issued the following month 
that the new Bureau should become a permanent establishment, gathering military 
intelligence from Northern China to Malaya in co-ordination with the existing military 
attaches in Beijing and Tokyo.166 In the subsequent months both the Admiralty and Air 
Ministry followed suit in making their own changes. For the Royal Navy, this involved clearly 
assigning an officer aboard every China Station vessel to intelligence duties, required to 
report regularly to regional staff officers based at Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore, who 
would in turn pass on vital information to a senior officer on the Commander in Chief’s 
staff.167 It was only through the combination of both structural and technological changes 
that the Royal Navy was able to improve the consistency and accuracy of understanding 
what was occurring in China, across the China Station and along the command chain. 
By 1930, the China Station was regularly using signals intelligence, rapidly passing news 
from ship to ship over long distances, and had in place an organised structure to exploit that 
wealth of information to try to form a single, unified approach to dealing with China. While 
individual ship’s commanders retained considerable leeway to act on their own initiative, 
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this represented a significant shift towards a centralised command system. Counter 
intuitively, however, the changes strengthened rather than weakened the position of the 
Commander in Chief. While Whitehall could issue tighter instructions and orders to guide 
developments, implementation of policy remained at the Admiral’s discretion, which he was 
able to enforce over his officers with greater control. For all the changes though, ultimately 
the strength of the system was still dictated by officers’ behaviour, influenced by their 
training, personalities, and experience. Those individual decisions were to play significant 
roles in some of the pivotal crisis moments during the decade. 
Responding to crises 
More efficient news gathering and transmitting capabilities had led to changes in how the 
Royal Navy’s vessels were distributed across the China Station, which in turn influenced how 
the Navy responded to threats around the region. New technology also had a deeper impact 
in changing the way in which the Royal Navy went about its work. In dealing with piracy, for 
example, wireless technology allowed the substitution of submarines for surface vessels on 
patrol duties, but also provided options for a very different underlying approach to the 
problem.  
Before radios became readily available in East Asia, the Royal Navy was generally unable to 
respond to acts of piracy until well after the event. As a result, valuable goods were 
frequently stolen and in some cases the entire ship’s cargo was lost. The only proactive 
steps the Navy could take involved maintaining a deterrent, in the form of naval patrols or 
stationing armed guards on vulnerable merchant steamers. Both options required 
significant amounts of manpower, which came at a cost. Indeed, with only fifty-three crew 
aboard each fully manned Insect class gunboat, and as few as twenty-five on others, the 
Navy did not have enough spare men to provide regular armed guards along river routes.168 
Even the Navy’s preferred option of making the police in the main ports inspect passengers’ 
luggage was manpower intensive and crucially it proved largely ineffective. In 1929, for 
example, the Shanghai Municipal Police checked for weapons the passengers of ninety two 
ships set to depart the Bund, at the request of their captains, but only found one group of 
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suspected pirates from all those efforts.169 With many hundreds of ships passing through 
the main ports every month, inspections were disruptive, expensive, and produced very 
limited results.  
The ability for merchant vessels to radio for assistance in the event of emergency provided 
the possibility for naval vessels to catch pirates in the act, while still able to perform other 
day-to-day duties. Even where the attacked merchant vessel did not have a radio, passing 
ships or patrolling warships could request assistance on the victim’s behalf and then 
coordinate a search for the perpetrators. In essence, the merchant vessels became 
additional eyes and ears for the Navy, in return for the protection the Navy provided. 
At 05.25 on 16 November 1926 the sloop HMS Bluebell radioed Hong Kong reporting that it 
had spotted a ship on fire in Daya Bay.170 After reaching and boarding the affected ship, the 
Butterfield and Swire’s steamer SS Sunning, Bluebell confirmed by radio at 09.18 that the 
vessel had been attacked by pirates. Within seven minutes the flagship HMS Hawkins 
ordered HMS Hermes to send out aircraft to search for the pirates, as well as passengers 
who were believed to have been taken hostage in the ship’s lifeboats. As a result, two 
aircraft were underway just over half an hour after confirmation was received. The cruisers 
Despatch and Vindictive were ordered to sail for the bay as soon as possible. Hawkins also 
radioed other merchant vessels in the area both as a warning and to request their assistance 
in searching for the lifeboats. Through the combined efforts, by 15.32 a Norwegian 
merchant vessel and one of the Hermes’ aircraft had separately radioed in that they had 
located the missing lifeboats.  
That night Admiral Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair radioed further, very precise, orders to Captain 
Ronald Howard of HMS Vindictive on exactly what action Howard was allowed to take 
regarding reports that two female passengers had been taken hostage ashore.171 Sinclair 
made it clear that landing parties could only be sent ashore if the reports were first 
confirmed, with advance warning provided to the local Chinese authorities. Indeed, Sinclair 
ordered Vindictive to use its three spotting aircraft to conduct the primary search for the 
missing women on shore, as it should avoid any accidental clashes with Chinese troops. In 
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either event firing was explicitly forbidden, unless British servicemen first came under fire. 
Fortunately, it was established by the following noon that all but one of the Sunning’s 
passengers and crew were safe, with the exception believed to have drowned trying to 
escape the attack. Eighteen pirates were arrested during the recovery operation and some 
of the looted goods were recovered. The case highlights how radio equipment allowed a 
quick response to a piracy attack, along with the better co-ordination of the responding 
ships to secure a comparatively peaceful and diplomatic incident free resolution. 
The China Station’s commander’s ability to guide events from a distance was only of real 
significance though, given a similar improvement in his ability rapidly to despatch 
reinforcements to those areas where he felt the situation to be critical. Hermes’ deployment 
was extremely valuable in that sense, because the high-speed and large capacity of aircraft 
carriers made them ideal for rapidly moving troops and supplies in response to crises.172 
Apart from the handful of cruisers, most warships posted to the China Station were only 
capable of transporting one or two dozen servicemen in addition to their small crews. The 
sloop HMS Bluebell, for example, was only felt safe to carry thirty-four marines for a short 
journey between Hong Kong and Guangzhou, in addition to its normal crew of seventy-
seven.173 Under normal circumstances, warships smaller than a cruiser were not regularly 
posted a marine detachment of their own. This was a problem during a crisis as Royal 
Marines or British Army troops were preferable for shore work, compared with ordinary 
seamen, given their training and equipment. The ‘small’ carrier Hermes, in contrast, could 
accommodate hundreds of additional service personnel and their equipment, if required. 
For the anti-piracy raid at Daya Bay on 31 August 1927, for example, Hermes and the cruiser 
Danae transported almost all of the 476 servicemen landed, with only the destroyer Sirdar 
and sloop Foxglove assisting.174 There was also a ‘substantial’ reserve force held back 
aboard the vessels, in case the landing force got into trouble, making a sizable total force 
transported by the four vessels. Indeed, based upon a 1938 assessment by the Navy, 
Hermes alone was capable of transporting the entire force while remaining fully functional 
as an aircraft carrier.175 
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Civilian steamers were generally used to transport personnel between distant ports, such as 
when the Shanghai Defence Force was deployed from the United Kingdom in early 1927.176 
With many weeks required for those long distances journeys the slower, but more efficient, 
pace of commercial vessels was not considered to be a major disadvantage. The steamships 
also normally afforded greater comfort for the transported servicemen, particularly the 
officers who enjoyed the luxury of first class booths.177 The Atlantic Transport Line 
steamship Minnesota, for example, was used to transport the 12th Royal Marine Battalion to 
Shanghai, but only had a maximum speed of fourteen knots.178 In contrast, Hermes was 
equipped with the latest oil-fuelled boilers and could sustain twenty-five knots, over long 
distances if required, with fewer maintenance concerns compared with older coal-fuelled 
vessels.179 The Admiralty also considered using the larger carrier, HMS Furious, which could 
transport troops from Portsmouth to Shanghai an estimated twelve days sooner than 
Minnesota.180 Carriers were the first choice when time was considered critical; the higher 
expense in fuel and wear could be justified, and comfort was not a consideration.181 One of 
the most impressive examples was in 1929 when HMS Courageous transported a full 
infantry battalion of 734 servicemen over 1,000 nautical miles from Malta to Haifa in just 48 
hours, averaging twenty one knots.182 For movement around China’s coastline, Hermes 
therefore gave the Royal Navy a rapid ‘heavy lift’ capability, which would have been entirely 
impossible just two decades earlier. 
After transporting a force, and once the shore parties had alighted into small boats to head 
ashore, Hermes was also capable of returning to its primary role as an aircraft carrier. During 
the 31 August 1927 raid, for example, Hermes provided aerial cover for much of the mission. 
The value of an aerial overflight was highlighted during the short period when aircraft 
temporarily based at Kai Tak took over from Hermes’. At 11.45am, shortly after arriving on 
the scene, the aircraft’s observers spotted a column of Chinese troops approaching the 
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shore party. The regular updates subsequently provided through messages dropped directly 
to the shore party and radioed to Danae enabled Captain Lachlan MacKinnon to move his 
force away from the approaching Chinese troops and avoid a potential clash.183 Despite 200 
Chinese troops coming within 100 metres of the landing force at one point, Captain 
MacKinnon later reported that he only knew about their presence due to the aerial 
reports.184 Photographs taken from the aircraft illustrate this point, with rows of houses and 
trees clearly restricting the ground observers’ field of vision.185 
Being able to provide an aerial scouting force was even more valuable to the Royal Navy by 
the 1920s, given the greater availability of modern weaponry in China. It was increasingly 
probable that Britain’s shore parties might encounter armed groups of soldiers or bandits, 
who could bring to bear a comparable or superior level of firepower. Of primary concern to 
naval officers was therefore the greater possibility of suffering casualties during any landing 
operation. At a senior level, however, there was also concern about what impact sustained 
firefights with Chinese troops would have on Britain’s relationship with China. If a shore 
party came under heavy fire it would almost certainly call on naval fire support to provide a 
covering bombardment, to facilitate their evacuation, as happened during the Nanjing 
Incident. Firing large calibre naval guns brought with it the almost certain likelihood of 
numerous Chinese fatalities. If those killed were from the groups firing upon British 
servicemen then the incident, while hardly positive, could be defended under the 
contemporary understanding of rules of engagement. The situation was not that simple 
though, as most naval guns in use by Britain’s gunboats, sloops, and destroyers were not 
designed for shore bombardments. Moreover, the targets involved were often centred in 
locations inhabited by civilians or in close proximity to civilian areas, making accuracy a 
paramount requirement. 
Naval gunfire at Wanxian and Nanjing 
Two of the most dramatic and significant single moments involving the Royal Navy in China 
during the 1920s involved naval gunfire, both of which highlight the issues of accuracy. The 
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casualties resulting from the shore bombardments during the botched cutting out 
expedition to Wanxian in 1926 and then the use of naval gunfire support at Nanjing in 1927 
played a significant role in fanning the flames of anti-imperial fervour in China. Simple 
technical considerations played an important, but previously unreported role in the tragic 
outcomes of both events.  
The 6” ‘quick-fire’ guns on most of the British gunboats, 12-pounder guns on the Acacia 
class sloops, and the different variations of main guns on Britain’s cruisers were all naval 
guns. They were designed for hitting other vessels on a relatively flat trajectory, over a 
medium range, which would also be at sea level. When firing at ground-based opponents at 
short range, often behind the riverine levees bordering China’s rivers, shells would almost 
certainly over-shoot the target due to the very precise angle required on such a shallow 
trajectory. A change in elevation of just one degree for a 6” gun, for example, would lead to 
the shell landing a further 1,000 yards away.186 The cruisers had some basic systems to 
calculate accurate gun-laying angles at sea, but even with those tables aiming was still 
largely reliant on manual estimation.187 On the gunboats, accuracy was entirely down to the 
abilities of the gun commander and his crew, and their state of mind during the action. 
Many gunnery officers only had basic experience and training in shore bombarding, making 
precise shooting at ground targets very unlikely.188  This was a factor in the cause of civilian 
casualties both at Nanjing and Wanxian, where over the course of events naval guns were 
fired at combatants located on a hillock and city wall respectively. None of the following 
points are intended to deny or distract from the fact that British warships did fire upon the 
two cities, and in doing so caused many innocent civilian casualties. The aim is to provide an 
objective assessment of factors that influenced the outcome, and tender potential 
explanations for the discrepancies in existing accounts about the numbers of those killed. 
At Wanxian in August 1926, Royal Navy boarding parties aboard the armed merchant vessel 
Kiawo triggered a firefight with Chinese troops, while attempting to ‘cut out’ two British 
merchant steamers being detained by the city authorities. When the Kiawo came under fire, 
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the supporting gunboat HMS Widgeon engaged Chinese troops on and near the city wall. 
Approximately twenty minutes into the fight HMS Cockchafer then began firing at the 
military headquarters of General Yang Sen, sited on a hill within the city.189 At Nanjing in 
March 1927, a bombardment was made in response to a request for fire support from a 
shore-party of twelve American marines. The group had been cornered on ‘Socony’ Hill by 
rioting Chinese troops, while attempting to evacuate ninety American civilians.190 Bordered 
on its western edge by the city wall, Socony Hill is a relatively small and steep sided hillock 
near the north-western corner of the old Nanjing city walls, approximately thirty metres 
above river-level at its peak. The cruiser HMS Emerald, and destroyers USS William B 
Preston and USS Noa replied to the request with a few heavy opening salvoes of shrapnel 
shells, followed by a slow series of high explosive shells as the shore party was 
withdrawn.191 The American destroyers also opened fire at shore-targets with machine 
guns.192  
In both Wanxian and Nanjing, trying to hit precise targets on shore using the warships’ main 
guns meant that the angle required had to be accurate to within a few minutes, rather than 
degrees. In cases with such fine margins of error, gunnery officers were reluctant to risk 
firing short and potentially hitting their colleagues, and so guns were more likely to be 
aimed high.193 Cases involving over-shooting during shore bombardments, were not unique 
to events in China. It had been a significant concern during the Gallipoli campaign in 1916, 
had occurred during contemporary training exercises, and was later seen during Second 
World War amphibious operations.194  
Manual inaccuracy appears to have been a significant factor at Wanxian, particularly after 
the British gunboats came under fire. Rear Admiral Hugh Tweedie later attributed at least 
some of the civilian casualties to Widgeon’s gun crews being unable accurately to hit the 
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Chinese troops and field guns positioned in front of and on top of the high city wall. Tweedie 
indicated that a significant amount of ammunition was fired over the top into populated 
areas beyond.195 An anonymous eyewitness report postulated that Widgeon fired a few 
hundred two pound (0.9kg) high-explosive ‘pom-pom’ shells.196 While there are grounds to 
doubt the accuracy of other sections within that account, that particular detail does tally 
with clues in other descriptions. This includes a report by Consul A.P. Blunt from October 
1926, by which point he had been able to explore the city, detailing that large quantities of 
smaller calibre shells had hit buildings on the slope immediately behind the wall. In Blunt’s 
opinion most of the damage caused there had been a result of secondary fires, although he 
made no mention of how many deaths were related to that damage.197 Along with these 
lighter shells, an unquantified amount of machinegun fire was also directed at the city wall, 
with bullets sent over the target just as deadly to bystanders as shells. 
What Tweedie did not mention was the lack of shielding or temporary protection around 
Cockchafer’s 6” main gun. The absence of even basic defensive preparations led to the 
warship’s captain Lieutenant Commander Leon Acheson and many of the gun-crew being 
wounded during the incident. With the men left dangerously exposed and suffering 
casualties, aboard a moving vessel, it seems certain that Cockchafer’s attempted 
bombardment of Yang Sen’s headquarters was largely inaccurate, with shells landing in the 
densely populated surrounding area.198 Again this is supported by Blunt’s account, which 
noted that most of the damage caused by the British bombardment had been up on the hill 
- Cockchafer’s target area.199 While it is more difficult to corroborate the anonymous 
witness’ figure for Cockchafer, they suggested that somewhere between twenty-four and 
thirty-six of the larger shells were fired into the city.200 It is unclear why Acheson was unable 
or unwilling to prepare his vessel during the days while he was waiting for Kiawo and 
Widgeon to arrive in support. Acheson’s motivation for attempting to shell the headquarters 
of the general with whom he had only recently had a ferocious argument, is a little easier to 
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deduce. While the limitations of the weapons in use did therefore play a role in the damage 
done to Wanxian, a wider range of factors contributed to the scale of the destruction. 
In contrast to Wanxian, reports from naval personnel and British, American, and French 
civilian observers all agree that the naval gunfire at Nanjing was generally well-aimed. 201 
Monsignor Roger Caplain, of the Postes Chinoises, began his observation after the first salvo:  
The shot was admirably set upon the hill, where the residences of the 
Standard Oil Company… were located, about 300 metres south-south-west of 
our residence. I later learned that the shrapnel shot had been executed by 
Lieutenant O’Connor of HMS Emerald and as a (former) artilleryman, I would 
like to congratulate him.202  
The British gun-crews aboard the stationary Emerald were in comparative safety and 
conducted most of the firing at a steady and relatively slow pace of one round per 
minute.203 Contemporary photographs support reports from the time that the hill and 
immediate vicinity was sparsely populated wasteland, limiting the likelihood of collateral 
damage from accurately directed fire.204 Nonetheless, given the precise accuracy required 
to hit the apex of Socony Hill, it is probable that at least a few shells over-shot the target. As 
thirty-six of the seventy-six shells fired by Emerald at Nanjing were shrapnel, with timed 
fuses that detonated before they could significantly over-shoot the target, the precise 
number of shells detonating in areas well beyond the target was very low.205 Based upon 
the information available, the bombardment at Nanjing appears to have been conducted as 
accurately as possible, within the restrictions of using largely manually-aimed, high-velocity 
naval guns. Those technical limitations, however, meant that a small number of British shells 
almost certainly did miss their intended target, potentially by quite some distance. 
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Accusations made at the time and since that the Royal Navy deliberately bombarded civilian 
areas as a punitive measure are therefore at least partially true.206 In both cases the decision 
to fire was made with the knowledge that any bombardment, with the naval guns available, 
was going to be at least moderately inaccurate and so shells would hit unintended, possibly 
populated, districts. Captain England’s own testimony about the Nanjing Incident is telling in 
this regard, when he stated that three hours before the actual request was made, he had 
already decided that in the event of Socony Hill being rushed, he would order the 
bombardment of the area directly behind the hill in support.207 While that target involved 
an unpopulated mixture of woodland and open waste ground, England would have known 
the limitations of his main guns, given the challenging trajectory required.208 As a result, he 
would have also known the likelihood of missing that area and therefore the potential for 
civilian deaths, whether or not he intended them. Indeed, with both the British and 
American consulate buildings located near Socony Hill, England will also have been aware of 
the potential for ‘friendly-fire’ casualties.  
A similar account for Wanxian is provided by Lieutenant Anthony Pugsley, who was aboard 
Widgeon, in which he later argued that the gunboats had only deliberately targeted military 
objectives. The reliability of Pugsley’s account is open to question, however, as it does 
contain some rather obvious attempts to deflect blame, resulting from an apparent sense of 
guilt.209 It is true that inaccurate gunnery contributed to the high civilian death count at 
Wanxian, something acknowledged by the Navy at the time.210 Given the scale of damage 
caused though, it is also fair to say that accuracy was not the primary, or even a significant, 
factor that led to civilian areas of the city being bombarded. The events at the two cities 
were therefore slightly different. England’s fervent desire to attack the city punitively on 25 
March strongly suggests that he was entirely comfortable with Chinese civilian casualties. 
Nonetheless, regardless of those feelings, when he actually gave the order to fire on 24 
March, he focused on an area of open ground. Widgeon’s firing at Chinese troops on the city 
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walls may fall in a similar category, but Cockchafer’s bombardment of Yang Sen’s 
Headquarters was of dubious military value and very probably intended for purely punitive 
purposes. 
Even with the likelihood that some British shells were over-shot at Nanjing, a small detail in 
Captain England’s official report also raises questions about the resulting number of 
casualties. When outlining the targeting of Emerald’s earlier salvoes, England noted that 
they were aimed at the area of open ground slightly to the rear-left of Socony Hill, from the 
ship’s perspective (see Figure 11). This appears to have been the direction from which the 
Chinese individuals participating in the events were approaching the house. Given that 
Emerald was moored by the Butterfield and Swires’ hulk at Hsiakwan, the resulting line of 
fire made it far less likely that over-shot shells would land in densely populated areas of the 
city.211  
Figure 11: Map of Socony Hill and the surrounding area in 1927212 
 
In the northern half of Nanjing the two main populated areas were around the river 
shoreline outside the city walls, and then a strip running from the Fung (Chung) Gate past 
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the British and US consulates, to the small Sanpailou railway station. Neither of these 
districts was within Emerald’s field of fire. Instead the area directly beyond Emerald’s target 
was largely open, apart from Nanjing’s fledgling agricultural college (now the Nanjing 
University of Finance and Economics), a small temple, and a few bungalows among the 
wooded hillocks that formed the city’s European residential quarter. This was not specific to 
the western section of the city, with large areas within the old walls formed of little more 
than sparsely populated wasteland in this period.213 To have reached a densely populated 
city district, the shells would have had to over-shoot by roughly three miles, a total of five 
miles from Emerald (see Figure 12). That was quite a distance given the increase in 
trajectory required, even when allowing for the difficulty in aiming at a hilltop. On flat 
ground, for example, that would have involved a change in gun elevation from 2.5 degrees 
to 13.5 degrees. It is therefore extremely unlikely that any over-shot shells, from Emerald, 
hit a densely populated area of the city. 
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Figure 12: Map of Nanjing in 1924214 
 
Assessing potential civilian casualties purely through using maps of the area only provides a 
very rough indicator and one that should not be used alone, as the maps generally show 
blocks of buildings and obviously do not illustrate population movements. Eye-witness 
testimonies provide some supporting evidence, to help us understand what was actually 
happening in northern Nanjing on the day. Consul-General Giles, for example, mentions in 
his account that most of the Chinese civilians that he saw in the northern part of the city 
were located around the Fung and Jiang gates – well away from the target area. While he 
mentions numerous soldiers and a police officer near the British consulate, his account 
outlines that no shells landed in the immediate vicinity.215 That was also the same area as 
where Roger Caplain was located, whose account makes no mention of shells landing in his 
immediate vicinity.216 Likewise, Lieutenant Oliver-Bellasis who was in Socony House stated 
that 'The shells burst either in open country or against the walls and hills’, although he did 
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acknowledge seeing one Chinese house hit.217 Such written accounts have previously been 
open to question, given that the individuals concerned were not immune to bias. In 
conjunction with both maps and photographs of the target area, however, it appears likely 
that such statements contained a strong degree of truth, even if their subsequent assertions 
of minimal civilian casualties are more dubious. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
unpopulated nature of the target area and its hinterland formed part of Captain England’s 
calculations. Indeed, he only mentioned the precise area the shelling was aimed at in 
passing, as part of the paperwork accounting for the expenditure of ammunition. His 
decision was not made, therefore, to avoid killing or wounding innocent bystanders. 
Nonetheless, that decision significantly reduced the number of shells fired by Emerald that 
could plausibly have landed in areas containing significant numbers of civilians, which would 
have been required for the scale of casualties listed in some historical accounts.  
With friendly forces under fire in both cases and the warships’ commanders therefore 
bound to provide covering fire, accusations of punitive bombardments appear academic in 
terms of the actual incidents. The weaponry available was, unfortunately, incapable of 
providing sufficiently accurate fire-support for civilian casualties to have been realistically 
entirely avoided. This was particularly true of Nanjing, although it was a lesser contributory 
factor at Wanxian. Midshipman Burnett noted that the Royal Navy landing party he was 
with, helping evacuate those trapped on Socony Hill, were themselves almost hit by one 
shrapnel shell burst, when one of the warships fired approximately 100 metres short of the 
target.218 The group quickly fired two ‘Very light’ green flares as a warning for the warship to 
change its aim. Indeed, it is also worth noting, that even if an entirely accurate 
bombardment of the target area had been possible, it would still have resulted in civilian 
casualties, as some civilians were reported to have been present with the Chinese troops 
and looters on Socony Hill.219  
A limitation of this assessment is that it does not examine the accuracy of the USN warships 
in detail. The American bombardment will have involved many of the same issues, and the 
first-hand reports suggest it was no less accurate than the British shelling, but the two US 
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destroyers also machine-gunned targets ashore, which adds further complication. Consul-
General Giles’ account of where crowds had formed, for example, indicates that if such 
machinegun fire was directed around the hulks at Hsiakwan then there would have been 
numerous civilians in the line of fire.220  
There is also evidence that suggests not all the civilian casualties that occurred due to 
shelling that day, were necessarily a result of Anglo-American actions. Gunboats operating 
under Guomindang authority bombarded various locations on 24 March, during fighting 
between the troops from the different factions.221 Reports of Northern Expeditionary 
shelling are supported by photographs of Pukow, located on the opposite bank of the 
Yangtze to the area targeted by Emerald, which show fierce fires on both 24 and 25 March. 
The North China Herald also quoted eyewitnesses who stated that artillery belonging to 
southern forces was placed on Shizishan ‘Lion’ hill near the Fung Gate, and opened fire 
across the river at Pukow.222 Burnett and England’s accounts, however, state that those 
guns were only put into position on the 26th, indicating that the Herald’s sources were 
mistaken in their recollection.223 Fleeing northern troops did set fires and destroyed 
buildings in the area during their retreat, so some of the damage resulted from that 
scorched earth activity.224 What is particularly pertinent is that no account suggests that any 
foreign warship fired upon Pukow and so any shelling there was entirely the result of 
fighting between the two Chinese forces. 
Together, all these various factors explain why there are such widely differing numbers 
quoted for how many civilians perished at Nanjing, ranging from as low as 3, up to 2,000.225 
It is entirely plausible that fifteen was a British assessment based purely upon those civilians 
killed on Socony Hill, with the higher figure including casualties from over-shot Anglo-
American shells, firing by Guomindang forces, and general violence in the city. By focusing 
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upon the gunfire itself in detail, using a broad selection of alternative sources and not just 
general descriptions of the incidents, it is possible to say with reasonable confidence that 
the number of civilian casualties caused by British shelling at Nanjing was towards the lower 
end of the scale. In contrast, the inaccurate gunfire that occurred at Wanxian strongly 
supports those historians who argue that official British estimates of only 200 troops and 
eighty civilians killed were extremely conservative.226 However, technical factors were not 
the only contributory factor in those deaths at Wanxian. Lieutenant Commander Leon 
Acheson’s decision to direct Cockchafer’s fire directly into populated areas, based upon 
Rear-Admiral Cameron’s threat, and Acheson’s failure to prepare any form of protective 
shielding for his gun-crews, were both significant to the end result. As will be further 
explored in the next chapter, Acheson was not solely responsible for what happened at 
Wanxian in 1926, but he did play a pivotal role in the deadly outcome. 
To some extent the precise numbers of those killed in both cases were tragic but minor 
details in the bigger picture. It was the very act of bombarding the cities itself that enflamed 
passionate anti-imperial responses. Reports of mass casualties only adding fuel to the 
fire.227 Nonetheless, whatever the exact figures attributable to the Royal Navy in those two 
cases, some of the problem of overshooting into civilian areas was avoidable with a 
relatively simple change in equipment. Arriving in the aftermath of the Wanxian Incident, 
the new Senior Naval Officer on the Yangtze – Rear-Admiral Tweedie – reported to the 
Admiralty that the gunboats’ high velocity naval guns should be replaced with howitzers as 
soon as possible.228 Ultimately, it was not until HMS Falcon and HMS Sandpiper were 
launched in 1932 and 1933 respectively, replacing two older gunboats, that 3.7” howitzers 
finally appeared on the China Station.229 With a high arc of fire and low muzzle velocity, 
howitzers were better suited to landing shells in a tighter spread at short range, reducing 
the risk of causing collateral damage, and improving the chance of hitting the intended 
target. This would have significantly lowered the precision required from the gunnery 
officers in aiming their guns, while still being able to put shells into the right area. In doing 
so, the use of howitzers would therefore have also reduced the likelihood and magnitude of 
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civilian casualties. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps had already had its field guns replaced 
with howitzers, in 1921, for that very reason.230 Likewise, China’s own warlord navies had 
long understood this issue, and most Chinese river gunboats launched after 1912 were 
equipped with howitzers.231 It is unlikely that the presence of howitzers aboard the Royal 
Navy’s gunboats would have significantly altered the general course of events at either 
Wanxian or Nanjing. The use of naval guns was a factor, however, in causing additional and 
avoidable civilian casualties. 
Both events came against a backdrop where civilian deaths caused by British commanded 
personnel, whether civilian or military, were increasingly the cause of strikes or boycotts of 
British goods. The better use of technology, such as howitzers in place of naval guns, or 
aircraft in place of shore parties, could reduce the possibility of creating significant headline 
incidents that would affect Britain’s overall position in China. With growing nationalist 
sentiment in China, such incidents were no longer isolated to just the area they occurred in 
and could spark regional or nationwide reactions. This applied even to relatively small 
events, outside of major cities, which did not involve civilian casualties. For example, 
Commander Hamilton’s use of HMS Wanderer’s main guns against Guomindang troops near 
Jiangyin, in May 1927, prompted protests and warnings from Chiang Kai Shek himself to 
Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt.232 Previously warships on the Yangtze would normally only 
respond with small arms or medium calibre weapons to such firing, but Wanderer had 
expended seventy-eight 4.7” shells during its short engagement, which even Hamilton later 
conceded was excessive. Reports that the Chinese had fired first with a field gun appear to 
have provided sufficient balance to the argument for the Guomindang not to publicise the 
incident. Two weeks after the incident, however, Tyrwhitt told Hamilton in private that he 
wanted no further such incidents while he was working with the Foreign Office to decide a 
new policy towards the Guomindang. 
Controlling the violence 
While the technical specifications of Emerald’s guns played a negative role in the violence at 
Nanjing, another technology had a more positive impact: the availability of radio 
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equipment. The Anglo-American naval force present at the city was able to contact their 
respective commanders at Shanghai and receive a response within hours. The cautious joint 
reply by Admiral Williams USN, Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt RN, and Rear-Admiral Jirō Araki IJN, 
was instrumental in Rear-Admiral Henry Hough USN and Captain England’s decisions to 
negotiate with Guomindang representatives on the second day. As with the earlier Sunning 
incident, the senior commanders were able to provide guidance during the crisis, rather 
than just issuing new advice after the event. It was during that second phase, after the 
events at Socony Hill, when England began advocating, ardently, his own plan of 
immediately returning to using force by punitively bombarding the city.233  
At this point, it is worth briefly mentioning Japan’s involvement in the course of events. The 
Japanese naval force at Nanjing had adopted a cautious approach from the outset, as the 
Japanese consulate was situated deep within the old city. As a result, there was no realistic 
possibility of Japanese landing parties securing a safe evacuation if they used force. The 
Japanese consulate was also located well beyond the effective range of the IJN destroyers’ 
main guns, and so fire-support could only be provided through a request to HMS Emerald, 
with an inevitable loss of face.234 In contrast, the Anglo-American community was largely 
based in the northern part of Nanjing, nearest the Yangtze and the main railway station on 
the line to Shanghai. That section of the city was readily accessible to small boats using the 
Qinhuai River and city moat. While it is now hidden behind high-rise buildings, the city wall 
by Socony Hill was visible from the warships on the Yangtze. Admiral Araki’s involvement in 
the joint reply was therefore for diplomatic rather than practical purposes.  
Given that the British establishment largely accepted the subsequent argument made to 
justify the initial Nanjing bombardment as a defensive measure, it is curious that Tyrwhitt 
later claimed in private correspondence that he came close to replacing HMS Emerald’s 
commander during the radio exchange.235 Tyrwhitt stated that he felt Captain England was 
far too eager to resume bombarding Nanjing, which Tyrwhitt believed could lead to outright 
war in China, although it is difficult independently to confirm or counter Tyrwhitt’s claims.236 
Certainly a second bombardment would have been difficult to justify as defensive, coming 
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after most British civilians and servicemen had been evacuated from the city. Tyrwhitt’s 
official report only explicitly criticised Emerald’s Royal Marine Captain Heathcote for having 
failed in his duty. Heathcote had left unarmed marines at the consulate on their own 
devices, with no organised plan for their defence, evacuation, or how he would return to 
them if required. Moreover, he was not present at the consulate during the events that 
followed.237 The Nanjing Incident did lead to a form of punishment for Captain England 
though, who was removed from commanding HMS Emerald one month later and placed in a 
semi-administrative role.238 In the intervening weeks, the Admiralty had received and 
relayed a flurry of messages in support of England and his actions.239 What was tantamount 
to a demotion stands out against a backdrop of such international praise. It is entirely 
plausible, therefore, that Tyrwhitt did indeed consider ordering the replacement of Captain 
England by radio from Shanghai. Just a decade earlier it would have been impossible for 
Tyrwhitt to have even considered such an extreme measure when not actually on the scene 
at Nanjing.  
New technology made it possible for the Commander in Chief to use at different occasions, 
aircraft and radio messages, as part of efforts to avoid or subdue potential diplomatic 
incidents. If those attempts proved ineffective, he could rapidly assemble a force to provide 
a powerful localised deterrent. While this helped improve the effectiveness of the Royal 
Navy’s counter-piracy work, ultimately when crises occurred there was little the available 
technology could do to limit the damage done by using high-velocity naval guns against 
targets in urban environments. Against the backdrop of the Northern Expedition and anti-
British sentiment in China, 1926-1927, it was not technology that decided events. In 
practice, it was the willingness of the officers involved to use violence, their understanding 
of what gunboat diplomacy involved, and often their mistakes that dictated the course of 
events. This was all regardless of whether or not those officers’ actions were in line with the 
Commander-in-Chief’s or indeed Whitehall’s wishes. 
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Summary 
By the 1920s the Royal Navy’s use of new technology in ‘waving the flag’, as a means of 
boosting imperial prestige, does indeed appear to have waned on the China Station. Efforts 
to uphold the image of the Navy still regularly influenced officers’ behaviour, and ordinary 
actions such as painting the warships in their bright white Far Eastern colours were 
maintained. Below the surface, however, the situation had changed and residual references 
to ‘waving the flag’ appear to have generally been intended for British metropolitan and 
particularly British colonial audiences. There is little evidence that technological change was 
behind this shift in approach, nor that the growing visible power and prestige of America 
and Japan produced a notable overt change in the Royal Navy’s behaviour. The China 
Station continued to rely on small gunboats and unimpressive sloops, the despatch of an 
aircraft carrier had ulterior motives, and the Special Service Squadron only paused at 
Singapore. Overall, therefore, technology was primarily employed by the Admiralty where it 
served a practical purpose for the policing and defence of the British Empire. Intangible aims 
such as imperial prestige were secondary concerns. 
Technological change, however, did have the potential to alter significantly the way in which 
the Royal Navy approached the challenges it faced, in its dealings with warlord China. By the 
end of the decade many new pieces of equipment were being used to great effect in 
improving Britain’s understanding of what was occurring, and the way in which the China 
Station responded to adverse situations. Progress towards fully exploiting new technologies, 
however, was neither smooth nor was it systematic. While wireless communication helped 
prevent a second bombardment of Nanjing in May 1927, for example, its limitations had 
contributed to the failings that lead to the tragedy at Wanxian the previous year. So overall 
what impact did new technology really have on how the China Station operated across the 
1920s as a whole and was that impact extraordinary compared to previous decades? 
Probably the most significant changes were the improvements in efficiency across the China 
Station, which were heavily linked to the Navy’s evolving command structure. By the mid-
1920s the Commander in Chief was able to draw on up-to-date reports, in some cases only 
minutes old, to issue timely orders to either pro-actively or re-actively influence the course 
of events. Increasing centralisation of command fundamentally changed the way that the 
Navy operated in the region. Foremost, it allowed the force to become more flexible in its 
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approach. Rather than warships being posted to pre-defined areas and then acting 
independently, their actions could be co-ordinated. Forces could be dispersed to cover the 
widest area possible in supressing piracy or concentrated at times on a crisis point. 
Moreover, senior officers were able to order changes with increasing rapidity as wireless 
sets became more available, and more powerful. With the exception of the upper Yangtze, 
this meant that isolated smaller warships could, at least theoretically, be reinforced quickly 
by the Station’s larger warships or ad hoc forces when required.  
The knowledge that potentially hundreds of naval personnel, backed by large calibre guns, 
were only a radio message away was vital in maintaining Britain’s position as China’s armies 
and bandit gangs obtained modern weaponry. Indeed the withdrawal of gunboats from the 
upper Yangtze was not just because of the collapse in trade for British merchants operating 
deep inland during 1926.240 The small upper Yangtze gunboats could not be reinforced in 
emergency, given the shallowness of the river between Chongqing and Hankou, and 
crucially they were no longer powerful enough to operate alone.241 Taking into account the 
force available to the China Station, the greater flexibility afforded by wireless 
communication had managed to prolong the Navy’s operations along the most peripheral 
stretches of China’s waterways. Without that improvement, the Royal Navy would almost 
certainly have had to withdraw protection from many treaty ports, years before Austen 
Chamberlain’s diplomatic announcement in December 1926. 
Greater centralisation of command also reduced the heavy burden placed upon the junior 
officers commanding the gunboats and sloops, which were involved in the majority of 
interactions with the Chinese population and officials. By 1927, for example, the 
Commodore commanding the Pearl River Delta gunboats was able to take remote command 
of his whole force when responding to piracy incidents, with minute-by-minute updates 
from individual ships.242 The limitations of the quite basic wireless sets in use across much of 
the Station did limit the extent to which there was a real change though, as seen during the 
Wanxian Incident when vital messages were unable to get through.  
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Successful centralisation and coordination was also limited by individual behaviour. Some 
captains were unenthusiastic about relinquishing their freedom of command and others 
were quite willing to exploit the unclear post-wireless command structure to pursue 
individual strategies. In one such example, while posted as Commander of HMS Wild Swan 
at Jiujiang Louis Hamilton sent two platoons of armed seamen on a march into the city, 
despite knowing it went against the wishes of his immediate superior Rear-Admiral John 
Cameron. Hamilton proudly noted that he carefully timed and worded his wireless 
transmissions to avoid being countermanded and to establish pre-emptively a defence that 
he merely intended to exercise his men and so Chinese complaints were ‘frivolous’.243 
Possessing the technical ability to communicate a centralised strategy in meeting challenges 
in China was not enough in itself to encourage greater adherence to that plan by individual 
officers. The training, career experiences, and attitudes of the service personnel on the 
China Station were more significant than technology in defining the course of events at key 
moments throughout the decade. 
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Chapter Four: Changing attitudes, ideas, and approaches 
 
Technology was an important factor influencing the way events evolved on the China 
Station during the 1920s, but the decisions made by individuals on the scene were often 
extremely significant in defining the outcomes. Despite being a uniform force in theory, with 
men from very similar backgrounds and life experiences, the Royal Navy’s officers could 
make notably different decisions and were given significant freedom to be able to do so. 
Variations in behaviour displayed by the Royal Navy’s officers and ordinary servicemen in 
China therefore need to be assessed. During some of the key crisis moments, for example, 
there was considerable variety in the way the commanders and crews of individual ships 
reacted to flashpoints. Royal Navy officers in the early twentieth century may have come 
from the same mould, as Mary Jones has argued, but they were still individuals who 
possessed their own unique set of ideas and attitudes.1 These differences extended along 
the full line of naval command into senior command, with Captain Francis De Winton 
recording shortly after the 1927 Nanjing Incident that 'Admiral Boyle wished to do some 
bombarding… and I believe the CinC had to restrain him.'2 This chapter will explore both the 
mind-sets of the naval personnel involved in some of those key moments and the extent to 
which differences in attitudes was a factor in the outcomes. The overall intention being to 
evaluate the extent to which the Navy was actually a uniform entity in East Asia and how 
the Royal Navy’s approaches towards meeting its aims in the region changed over the 
decade. As part of that examination, it will be considered how far naval staff were willing 
and able to adapt, developing and using alternative ways of going about their role defending 
Britain’s interests across the region in the new interwar environment. 
The different mentalities displayed by Royal Navy officers had an impact not only on the 
outcome of individual events, but also on the formation and implementation of the Navy’s 
broader strategies and as a result on Britain’s foreign policy. While improvements in 
communications technology enabled greater centralisation of command structure, the 
Admiralty still allowed its commanders considerable freedom to act on their own initiative. 
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As a result, officers on the China Station were allowed to, and often did, deviate from their 
Admiralty script, based upon their own views of how Britain should deal with the challenges 
faced in the region. An influencing factor within that process was a web of personal 
allegiance within the command structure, which at times influenced the behaviour of 
individual officers and vessels. For most of the decade the China Station maintained a 
relatively stable collection of vessels and commanders. This provided senior officers with 
many months or even years to develop a reasonably homogenous understanding of how to 
respond to developments among their subordinates. During 1927, however, there was a 
sudden influx of warships from all around the world, with new vessels attached on an ad 
hoc basis to the China Station’s various sub-commands. It therefore provides an 
unparalleled opportunity to explore whether the Navy possessed different regional 
identities. Ego and strong personalities may have been significant factors in disagreements 
between officers over the best course of action to pursue. Likewise, nervousness and 
tension caused by the strain of the seriousness of the events unfolding undoubtedly also 
played a part in causing disagreements, but there were far deeper issues at play. It is 
important to understand therefore, whether subtle background differences in professional 
cultures across the Navy’s different stations strengthened, or indeed weakened, the 
officers’ adherence to their viewpoints.  
The term ‘gunboat diplomacy’ is often used to describe the Navy’s main strategy in China 
prior to the December Memorandum in 1926, when Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain 
announced a new policy for China. While the exact definition of gunboat diplomacy 
continues to feature in theoretical discussions, there is general agreement about a number 
of its features as a strategy. At core it is ‘the demonstration, threat, or use of limited naval 
force for political objectives’, heavily linked to shows of force, but including the possibility of 
violence in an effort to coerce an opponent.3 James Cable’s four categories are often used 
as a broader definition, covering the range of approaches from ‘expressive’ behaviour 
conveying intangible, emotional messages, to ‘definitive’ actions intended at achieving a fait 
accompli.4 In practice the tactics involved ranged from peacetime pageantry involving 
marching, music, and dinners, to the violent destruction of strategic fortifications by naval 
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guns or shore parties. This did not and does not necessarily require the involvement of 
actual gunboats, although during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the strategy 
generally relied upon littoral warships of one sort or another. A number of key 
characteristics are common to all scenarios: the threat or use of force should be limited, the 
action should be aimed at coercing the adversary to submit, and it generally involves the 
opponent having to accept the long-term consequences of that submission.  
Within that debate there has been discussion of what gunboat diplomacy in the 1920s 
entailed at a strategic level, but there has been little consideration of what the Navy’s 
mainstream officers interpreted it to mean in practice and in theatre. As it was those 
operational officers who implemented the strategy, their attitudes are core to 
understanding how gunboat diplomacy impacted on Britain’s relationship with China, on a 
day-to-day basis. A top-level definition is of great value in understanding what Whitehall 
and the Admiralty intended Britain’s strategy in China to be. Exploring what ground-level 
officers believed the strategy to involve, however, is vital in explaining how events panned 
out in reality. The difference between the two interpretations in turn provides an insight 
into how effectively the command structure of the Royal Navy operated in the period. By 
defining what individual warship commanders saw gunboat diplomacy to mean, it will also 
be possible to better understand when exactly the approach went out of general use on the 
China Station and whether that transition happened in conjunction with the change in 
diplomatic approach in December 1926. Rather than a top-down shift in strategy, from 
gunboat diplomacy enforcing extra-territorial privileges to a more balanced relationship 
between Britain and China, it will be shown that developments on the periphery of Empire 
were well in advance of Austen Chamberlain’s announcement. Moreover, failures to 
effectively control individual officers and to prepare a wave of new arrivals for service on 
China’s rivers from mid-1926 meant that events on the scene did not always conform to 
either the local or official strategies.  
Within the existing historiography there are many debates about the existence of anti-
intellectualist attitudes and behaviour among the early twentieth century Royal Navy officer 
class, something that will also be discussed during this chapter.5 Anti-intellectualism can be 
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defined as a formative culture focusing on intangible personal attributes and social factors, 
at the expense of formal training and expertise in job-specific tasks. Indeed, anti-
intellectualism is associated with the creation of a nepotistic system wherein those 
individuals whose abilities are purely meritocratic are discriminated against. That could take 
relatively subtle in-direct forms, such as the promotion of officers who kept their vessels 
particularly ‘ship-shape’, i.e. clean and practised in general drill, over those who were better 
at the core technical requirements involved in sailing and fighting.6 It is important to note, 
that there is a difference between anti-intellectualism and a negative attitude towards 
advanced technology, as the two are not synonymous. A common attitude within the Navy 
of focusing upon the ‘Nelson Spirit’ over formal training and education, with daring 
gentlemen inspired by a cult of Nelsonian heroism, did not preclude those same officers 
valuing the use of new technology and equipment.7 Admiral Hugh Tweedie is a particularly 
good example of this, having expressed a strong belief that spirit was more important than 
technical knowledge for senior command, while also being a proponent for using the latest 
equipment.8 How officers were trained to go about their roles and what equipment they 
used while doing their work were two separate if closely related issues. During this chapter 
it will be the former factor that will be discussed; the aptitudes and prior preparation of the 
officers deployed on the China Station, along with their attitudes towards new ideas of how 
they should go about their work. 
Late-Victorian gunboat diplomacy in East Asia 
Between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the Carnarvon Commission in 1887, a core 
facet of the Royal Navy’s global strategy was the use of gunboats in enforcing Britain’s will. 
With near-complete naval supremacy at sea after Trafalgar, the Navy was able to focus on 
projecting its power into littoral regions of the world, a key factor in the expansion of both 
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the formal and informal elements of the British Empire. Trade agreements, port access, and 
diplomatic approaches could all be influenced by the timely arrival of the White Ensign, and 
with it the regular implicit threat and occasional actual use of violence. Small steam-
powered warships, particularly those broadly classed as gunboats, were pivotal in enabling 
that strategy by extending the Navy’s reach far inland along navigable waterways. With 
those same waterways acting as the main arteries of transport and commerce across much 
of the world, Britain’s ability to exert some degree of control over them was a significant 
strategic advantage. 
The Carnarvon Commission heralded the end of that Victorian approach, when it reported 
that the maritime arteries of the British Empire were increasingly exposed to new threats 
due to changes in the strategic environment.9 Rather than focusing on ports, harbours, and 
convoys, the Navy felt it needed to defend the new electric telegraph networks and utilise 
the rapid communication available to deploy fast cruisers in search of reported commerce 
raiders. In effect, rather than trying to maintain a passive background global deterrent, the 
Navy wished to switch to an approach of rapid, concentrated reactive force. As a result of 
that shift in strategic focus, along with the first signs of an emergent naval arms race, the 
number of gunboats and sloops maintained by the Royal Navy started to be reduced. That 
process accelerated during the 1890s with the development of ‘destroyers’ as a new class of 
warship intended for the Navy’s patrol and other day-to-day duties. While destroyers were 
normally no larger than the gunboats they effectively replaced, in those early years, they 
were fast and seaworthy enough to operate with the fleet.10 One of the few exceptions to 
the rule of gunboat decline was the China Station, however, which retained both its gunboat 
force and the increasingly outdated approach of gunboat diplomacy. 
The China Station’s unique position in retaining a sizable gunboat force came from a mixture 
of geo-strategic circumstances and naval practicality. For coastal areas, destroyers could 
conduct many of the peace-time tasks previously done by gunboats, while also capable of 
operating with the fleet in wartime. That process of displacement occurred on the China 
Station, as it did elsewhere, with a flotilla of destroyers tasked with coastal patrols in the 
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late 1890s.11 In contrast, riverine environments had slightly different requirements. Vessels 
needed propulsion equipment suited to overcoming river-rapids along with high levels of 
manoeuvrability, which gunboats possessed, rather than the combination of speed and sea-
worthiness inherent in destroyer designs. Early destroyers could and did travel along the 
lower sections of major rivers, but venturing along smaller tributaries or far up-river was ill-
advised. Indeed, even for purpose-built gunboats the Yangtze gorges were extremely 
challenging, and featured many near-misses, ships sunk, and the occasional stranding upon 
a rock (see Figure 13).12 Within the formal British Empire, particularly along the Nile in Egypt 
and Sudan, the gradual introduction of armoured cars and automatic weaponry also meant 
there were alternative options for deploying significant firepower. As the only significant 
series of inland waterways globally in which the Royal Navy still sought to project power on 
a regular basis by the turn of the century, China’s rivers continued to house British gunboats 
in peacetime.  
Figure 13: Merchant vessels and the Upper Yangtze rapids in 192813 
 
For the most part, gunboat diplomacy in East Asia during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries involved little more than ‘waving the flag’. In other words, warships 
making regular patrols around the littoral regions of China and visiting the various treaty 
and open ports. At its most basic, it was believed that displaying the Union Flag and White 
Ensign atop a comparatively modern warship in a wide range of ports would increase the 
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prominence of and respect for the British Empire. When China experienced periods of 
unrest, the implicit threat of force provided by the presence of a British gunboat was also 
generally sufficient to instil a wariness in the Chinese population and ensure British interests 
were left alone. When protests against foreign interference in China did occasionally turn 
violent, lethal military force was often readily employed.14 The magnitude of violence during 
the Boxer Rebellion, however, stands out as exceptional for the China Station between its 
formal separation as an independent command in 1865 and the start of the First World War. 
The events of 1900-01 therefore do not represent the on-going day-to-day reality of 
gunboat diplomacy. Captain Gerald Dickens noted that during his first spell in China 1903-
05, for example: ‘The people were friendly (although no doubt they had inward reservations 
about foreign devils generally) and such local bandits as existed kept out of our way’.15  
When straying from their usual patrol grounds, or visiting a new port, officers might 
occasionally dine at banquets with local Chinese officials to extend courtesies and build 
working relationships.16 Otherwise, for the men employed in operating the gunboat patrols, 
life generally constituted long, uncomfortable days afloat aboard the cramped gunboats, in 
between weeks ashore boxing and playing games of cricket, football, golf, rugby, and tennis. 
Indeed, sport was a defining feature of the China Station’s brand of gunboat diplomacy. In 
part this was to emphasise the physical prowess of Britain’s service personnel, but it was 
also simply conducted to pass the time in remote ports.17 Of course, playing sport was not 
unique to the Royal Navy, with their American counterparts also keen sportsmen, but the 
British made it a public display of competitive fighting spirit to a much greater degree than 
other nations.  
Sport was a subtler means of expressing power than many other options, such as parades or 
marching bands, which was useful during tense moments. In the aftermath of the May 
Thirtieth Incident at Shanghai, for example, on 5 June 1925 roughly 200 Royal Marines were 
landed ashore in the International Settlement in response to protests. The following day, 
the Royal Navy held a series of impromptu football matches between ship’s crews in the 
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city.18 Likewise, in March 1927 HMS Cockchafer’s commander deliberately sent his men 
ashore to play sports at Ichang, only a few days after his gunboat had been at action 
stations prepared for violence in the city.19 In both cases, the servicemen were quietly 
reinforcing Britain’s extra-territorial rights, but not in such a brazen way that might provoke 
a resurgence in hostility. This was not just done in response to Chinese protests that were 
directed against the British. In June 1920, for example, Captain Arthur Walker of HMS 
Colombo landed the ship’s company to march around Hankou the day after general protests 
in the city. The reason he gave to his sailors was that it would make a statement of British 
power, and ‘boost the morale of the (British) public’.20 For the most part, however, sport 
was normally used just as a means of keeping crews fit, entertained, and busy in a 
constructive way. Even with regular sporting events, crews still got into trouble by drinking, 
fighting, and following other pursuits in port, so that the Navy surgeons were kept busy.21  
The quiet reality of gunboat diplomacy led many in the Navy to question the value of 
continuing the strategy. Admiral Cyprian Bridge, the commander in chief of the China 
Station between 1901 and 1904, dismissed the gunboat half of his force as being ‘political 
and not naval’ and even requested permission to retire the vessels.22 Bridge argued that the 
response to the Boxer Rebellion had shown to the Chinese that Britain was not to be 
challenged, and any future crisis could just as well be met by larger vessels from Hong Kong.  
Admiral Dudley Pound was also later to note that service on smaller vessels in East Asia was 
particularly unpopular with married men, who struggled to persuade their wives to move 
temporarily to Hong Kong, let alone the smaller ports.23 This appears to have resulted from 
a combination of the cost involved in moving between ports and poor expectations of the 
sanitary and social conditions in most treaty ports. Edward Barraclough recorded that 
during his time as a Lieutenant Commander on the China Station it was common for 
servicemen to go for two or three years without seeing their wives. Indeed, he was lucky 
that his wife decided to stay in Hong Kong, but they still went eleven months at one point 
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without meeting. Even the major ocean-going warships would only spend a few months of 
the year at Hong Kong, with Yangtze gunboat crews having to suffice with shorter periods at 
Shanghai. While officers had some influence over where they were sent, a shortage of fully-
paid deployments meant few took the risk of questioning an appointment.24 Barraclough did 
also note, however, that some officers enjoyed the freedom and behaved very badly as 
husbands during their East Asian commissions, although he believed only a few marriages 
collapsed as a result.25  
As a result of the combination of those factors, staffing the gunboat patrols generally fell 
upon young, junior officers, providing them with an opportunity to gain experience in 
command.26 Despite that selling point, those junior officers who had better connections 
often sought out postings aboard the major warships on the station, or even at the shore 
facilities, which gave them more frequent opportunities to catch the attention of their 
superiors. This could even extend to civilian roles, such as filling in as a temporary private 
secretary to Hong Kong’s governor, if the officer had sufficient influence.27 While gunboat 
commanders were afforded unusually high levels of independence for junior officers in the 
1920s Navy, being posted to lead just twenty-four men aboard HMS Woodlark or Woodcock 
on the upper Yangtze in particular was not interpreted as a positive career development. In 
multiple letters to his mother, Commander Paul Berryman complained about being posted 
to command Britain’s presence on the upper river, stating in one 'I am not looking forward 
to my 2 (sic) years out here at all'.28 Indeed, tracing the careers of those officers who 
commanded Yangtze gunboats during the 1920s reveals that very few achieved promotion 
to captain major warships or secured senior roles within the Admiralty later in their careers. 
A cursory investigation suggests that a similar situation existed in the decade or two leading 
up to 1914, although some officers who commanded the early destroyers operating on the 
lower Yangtze and around the Pearl River Delta did reach senior command, most notably 
Roger Keyes and Gerald Dickens.29 Joseph Moretz perhaps offers an explanation for this 
variation, highlighting how many junior officers gained practical command experience 
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during the First World War.30 Against that background, it may be that the experience on 
offer when serving on China’s rivers in the 1920s was less valuable for career development 
than it had been in previous years.  
Of course, with so many officers passing through the command there were exceptions. 
Antony Pugsley later referred to his time as a Lieutenant aboard the small gunboat HMS 
Widgeon as ‘a vivid and enthralling experience’, as an early step in his relatively successful 
career in the Navy, later retiring as a Rear Admiral. 31 Moreover, with the Royal Navy heavily 
over-staffed in the aftermath of the First World War, a posting of any sort was better than 
being left in reserve.32 Gunboat service might not have been many officers’ preferred 
choice, but it still gave them a chance of developing a career in the Navy. Of the three 
officers commanding Widgeon during Pugsley’s time aboard, however, two quit the Service 
shortly after their China tour, with the third injured during the Wanxian Incident and forced 
to retire. 
Late-Victorian gunboat commanders appear to have understood their role, in implementing 
gunboat diplomacy, as needing to display diligently the dignity demanded of a Royal Navy 
officer and therefore a gentleman. They were expected to be firm with local Chinese 
officials, but had confidence that aggression was not generally required, nor desirable, in 
obtaining a resolution in Britain’s favour.33 Causing skirmishes over minor disputes was seen 
as beneath the dignity of an officer belonging to the world’s most powerful navy. Captain 
Dickens recounted, that in negotiating the release of an impounded British steamer in 1907, 
he knew that significant reinforcements were on the way and that his Chinese counterpart 
was also interested in finding a relatively quick and peaceful resolution.34 Dickens believed 
that had he been direct and aggressive, demanding the steamer’s immediate release, then 
the Chinese official would have felt pressured to respond with a similar tone. Dickens’ 
thought process was framed by an unfettered belief in the supremacy of the Royal Navy and 
that if he chose to fight then there would be only one victor. Even during a heated protest at 
Hankou in January 1911, when underlying anti-foreign sentiment erupting to the surface, 
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the initial attempt by the British commander was to try to calm the situation and withdraw 
his sailors to the riverside. After some of the seamen were knocked down by protestors, 
however, there was no hesitation in opening fire to re-assert control, killing thirty to forty 
Chinese civilians in the process.35 Employing lethal force was not a concern in itself, but a 
Royal Navy officer was not expected to require using violence against what was regarded by 
the Service as a markedly inferior opponent.  
The mind-set focused upon maintaining a dignified approach extended well beyond just the 
use of violence. Indeed, one enthusiastic gunboat commander who had taken to firing off 
rockets and fireworks to impress the local population in a friendly, almost celebratory 
manner was quietly scolded by his colleagues for acting in a manner unbecoming of the 
Royal Navy.36 Late-Victorian gunboat diplomacy at its most basic, however, was the 
maintenance of an underlying threat of violence, but with the officers involved generally 
behaving as diplomats, seeking to avoid actually using force. In any event, the day-to-day 
reality for Royal Navy servicemen was a monotonous one. The China Station’s gunboat 
flotilla was not somewhere a junior officer could secure advancement, but if a flashpoint 
was mishandled it would certainly impede their careers. That situation and relationship was 
maintained until the start of the First World War, when the demand for experienced naval 
personnel led to the temporary suspension of most gunboat operations in China. During the 
war gunboats did re-appear in service around the Mediterranean and Mesopotamia. The 
majority of the new Insect-class vessels, constructed for those duties, were then sent to 
China with the return to peace in Europe and formed the backbone of the Yangtze force.37 
The failed attempt at returning to pre-war ways 
In contrast to the decades before the First World War, the 1920s China Station was 
increasingly a hotbed of action for the Royal Navy. Nowhere else during the period was 
there such an active deployment as along China’s coastline and rivers. While day-to-day life 
on the Station retained its pre-war simplicity, with much time still spent re-painting the 
gunboats and playing sport, there was a new unpredictable air of danger.38 The breakdown 
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in order resulting from the Xinhai Revolution, an influx of modern weaponry, and the 
growth in nationalist, anti-imperialist ideologies all removed the relative safety that Royal 
Navy warships had previously enjoyed. The first signs of this were apparent between the 
break-down in order in 1911 and 1914, but the Navy had been increasingly distracted at 
that point by the European march to war.39 For a generation of officers who had 
experienced during the First World War the first major naval engagements since Nelson, 
1920s China presented the possibility of a little more action. There were occasional crises in 
the Middle East and elsewhere around the Empire, but no other region presented such a 
likelihood of being able to make a name for themselves as the China Station.40 Service 
aboard remote China gunboats might not have been a sought-after posting, but a rare 
chance of independent command did appeal to some officers.41 If an officer was likely to be 
placed in charge of a small warship, a location where they had a few opportunities to raise 
their profile through action was better than being side-lined on quieter assignments 
elsewhere. 
Entering the 1920s there was a greater risk that gunboats might become involved in 
firefights when sailing along China’s waterways, either with bandits or through cases of 
mistaken identity with warlord forces. For the first few years of the decade, however, 
violent incidents involving Royal Navy warships remained almost as rare as before the First 
World War. The pirates and bandits operating on or by the waterways were generally 
sensible enough not to start a fight with a well-armed warship.42 In return, the instructions 
issued by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief of the China Station emphasised that 
pre-war spirit of aloofness. The Admiral was told to impress upon his officers that they 
should be respectful of the Chinese population, as causing offence by heavy handedness 
was expected to weaken China’s respect for the British Empire, rather than enhance it.43 
The potential threat nonetheless required the Royal Navy to divert more time and resources 
to policing the waterways, responding to acts of piracy, and deterring warlord armies from 
fighting in the Treaty Ports. 
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The accounts by Royal Navy personnel on service in China gradually changed in tone as a 
result of conducting more frequent, higher-risk tasks. Whereas those who served before the 
Xinhai Revolution referred to gunboat duty as having been a generally quiet assignment, 
those in the early 1920s indicate some degree of excitement from the disruptions to an 
otherwise sedate deployment. The then Lieutenant Commander Reginald Ramsbotham later 
recalled that China was a lively location, as 'we were always shooting off to a place where 
the Consuls wanted a bit of pressure put on.'44 Pressure did not always equate to violence, 
however, with HMS Bluebell using a night-time display of its searchlights, Very lights, and a 
rocket to allude to its power during one such trip to Wenzhou in June 1924.45 So busy were 
the Yangtze gunboats that in 1923 Admiral Arthur Leveson felt it necessary to take men off 
the cruiser Carlisle and supply ship Titania to re-commission the gunboat Cricket, which was 
being held in reserve at Shanghai.46 
Growing pressure on the gunboats to tackle the piracy problem also saw the first 
retrenchment in the China Station’s presence in China during this early period, although 
mainly around the Pearl River basin. Upon resuming full peacetime operations in late 1918 
into early 1919, British gunboats returned to making journeys to a wide range of ports 
around Guangdong and even far into Guangxi province. Within eighteen months, however, 
their deployment shifted to concentrate upon a much smaller number of waterways, 
primarily the West River downstream of Wuzhou, around Guangzhou. There are no 
suggestions in the China Station’s correspondence that this was originally meant to be a 
permanent change. However, given Britain’s weakening position in China and its volatile 
relationship with the Guomindang, the ruling force in Guangdong, the Royal Navy rarely 
ventured back upriver after 1922. This change can be seen particularly clearly in the 
movements of HMS Moorhen, which visited cities far inland at Baituzhen, Chongzuo, 
Liuzhou, and Napozhen between January 1919 and June 1921.47 In contrast, from July 1921 
onwards Moorhen’s activities were largely restricted to the area around Guangzhou. It only 
made one solitary journey beyond Wuzhou, to Nanning, in the following two and a half 
                                                          
44 Unpublished memoirs of Captain Ramsbotham. 
45 Diary of Commander C.H. Drage, Vol. 4 (1923-1926). 
46 Admiral Leveson to Admiralty, 11 October 1923, TNA, ADM 1/8665/142. 
47 Ship’s log books of HMS Moorhen May 1919, TNA, ADM 53/49912-49938 and ADM 53/80939-80955. 
Page | 218  
 
years (see Figure 14).48 This trend was particularly pronounced in Moorhen’s case, but can 
be seen with the other Royal Navy gunboats assigned to patrol the Pearl River basin. 
Figure 14: Patrols by HMS Moorhen 1919-2449 
 
For ordinary seamen the tasks associated with the Navy’s counter-piracy policing work seem 
to have proven quite enjoyable. HMS Carlisle’s regular night patrols of Daya Bay provided 
some low-risk action, with the warship stalking suspect Chinese junks in the dark, then 
boarding and searching them when they could not get away. In one case the crew was 
entertained when they discovered some known gangsters hiding in coffins, with Carlisle 
radioing the Hong Kong police to take charge of the suspects.50 Guard duty aboard 
merchant steamers also provided freedom from normal duties and the opportunity to 
socialise with the passengers. 
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Anti-piracy work, however, was less popular with the officers, with many treating it with the 
same distain that Admiral Bridge had regarded the responsibilities of his gunboat force 
almost twenty years earlier. Admiral Leveson complained in 1924, for example, that there 
was little his gunboats could do to prevent acts of piracy and he felt pressure should be 
placed on searching passengers in harbour instead.51 Instead, many officers felt that the 
Royal Navy should be focusing on seeking out and destroying pirate ‘nests’ and vessels, with 
hijacking a matter for the civil authorities. Changes in the understanding of what the duties 
were, or at least should be, for the China gunboats started to become particularly obvious in 
late 1923, going into 1924.  
After protection money was demanded from the British-flagged steamer San Ming on the 
West River in January 1924, HMS Robin sought out a suspected pirate vessel and opened 
fire upon it with the gunboat’s main 6” gun, after the junk failed to stop. Five suspected 
pirates were killed in the process, after a shell hit the ship’s boiler causing a large explosion. 
A total of seventeen high explosive shells were fired during the mid-afternoon chase.52 Both 
Robin’s Lieutenant Commander Lionel Tudway and the Senior Naval Officer on the West 
River, Commander Malcolm Maxwell-Scott, argued that it was only through such firm 
actions that pirates would be dissuaded from attempting to attack or extort money from 
British merchant vessels.53 Strong anti-piracy patrols were not in themselves unique to 
gunboat diplomacy as a strategy, but the consideration and use of raiding shore parties 
made the approach different from ordinary counter piracy work. Through those raids, 
Britain was attempting to make the statement that it would ignore Chinese sovereignty to 
protect its interests and force local officials to do more, even if there was no effective 
nationwide government to take notice. Whether the tactics worked was another matter, as 
Tudway himself discovered four months later after he was shot through the thigh, when 
Robin was targeted by gunmen on the same stretch of river.54 
It was shortly after those reports, during the summer of 1924, that the situation started to 
really change for the China Station. The Jiangsu-Zhejiang conflict and Second Zhili-Fengtian 
War both brought greater risk of Britain being caught up in the fighting between warlord 
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armies, which coincided with a surge in pirate attacks across the south of China.55 As an 
indication of the threat posed by the fighting, in September 1924 an 8,000 strong army led 
by General Lu Yongxiang retreated on Shanghai and attempted to seek refuge in the 
International Settlement, with their weapons. As the SVC only maintained on-paper strength 
of 1,695 men, a further 1,800 sailors and marines were landed from the warships in 
harbour. In addition, the SMP and Fire Brigade were mobilised as a further impromptu 
defensive group. On paper that formed a total make-shift force of roughly 5,500 armed or 
semi-armed men, although in practice only a lower number could be relied upon. SVC 
records highlight that many volunteers were either not always present in Shanghai or were 
reluctant participants, with even the annual ceremonial parade struggling to reach 1,000 
attendees.56 Nonetheless, the scale of that mobilisation was unprecedented in the history of 
Shanghai’s International Settlement, although it would soon be overtaken.  
The growing combined threat from conflict and piracy precipitated a subtle change in the 
Royal Navy’s gunboat strategy, with hawks like the commander of HMS Robin coming to the 
fore. Even as late as the previous year British gunboats had generally ignored the occasional 
shots aimed at them when sailing along the West River.57 In contrast, 1924 saw a number of 
the China Station’s gunboats using their main guns in shore bombardments against reported 
pirate groups, although this generally occurred when they were working in combination 
with forces commanded by local Chinese generals and admirals.58 Cases of mistaken identity 
also crept in, with Yunnanese troops targeting Robin as it sailed along the West River in 
June, resulting in the British gunboat returning fire with its machine guns.59 Gunboat 
diplomacy was no longer a passive day-to-day deterrent reinforced by odd moments of 
severe violence, and the first signs of its ultimate crisis were emerging. 
The impact of the May Thirtieth Incident 
The mid-1920s saw a return to an earlier incarnation and probably the purest form of 
gunboat diplomacy, in response to Britain’s deteriorating position in China. The main 
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catalyst for that decline was the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925, when British-led police shot 
and killed twelve protestors. With nascent concepts of nationalism in China stiffened by 
anti-foreign rhetoric in the aftermath of that incident, politicised groups were increasingly 
willing to challenge the representatives of British imperialism.60 Even more significantly, the 
growing sense of commonality between cities and regions, fostered by rising nationalist 
sentiment, meant that potential clashes were now unlikely to pass as localised affairs. In the 
aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident and subsequent clashes, anti-British protests and 
boycotts spread quickly across many other Treaty Ports.61 Indeed, there were even small 
anti-imperial protests as far away as Sydney in Australia, organised in solidarity by a few 
unions.62 News travelled much faster than it had done previously and could create storms 
far and wide. 
The growing contagion effect was significant for the Royal Navy, as previously the restricted 
application of force by gunboats could be used in a quasi-surgical manner to deal with issues 
at specific locations. In such situations, the Navy could easily achieve a localised monopoly 
of violence. If protests and clashes could spread nationwide as a result, however, the limited 
resources available on the China Station could never maintain that largely illusory threat of 
overwhelming force. Indeed, a June 1925 situation report to the Committee for Imperial 
Defence stated explicitly: ‘…it is unlikely that we shall be able to strengthen our naval forces 
commensurate with possible developments.’63 That challenge particularly applied to the 
riverine ports, inaccessible by the China Station’s larger warships, where at times the Navy 
might only be able to deploy a single gunboat or armed merchantman carrying a handful of 
marines. 
The change in environment did not initially produce a fundamental re-assessment of which 
tactics should be used by Britain’s warships in China. Nor were any efforts made to transfer 
the Navy’s two remaining spare gunboats at Malta, which could have provided a modest 
boost to the China Station’s littoral capabilities. Curiously, the Admiralty failed even to 
acknowledge their existence during discussions with the Foreign Office, who were pressing 
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strongly for a strengthening of Britain’s riverine forces in China.64 This failure reflects the 
long-standing reluctance among senior officers to put their energy into what they saw as a 
peripheral imperial policing task. Indeed, the contrasting redeployment of the aircraft 
carrier HMS Hermes to Hong Kong in August suggests that the Navy’s priorities lay with the 
major coastal ports.65 Overall, there remained a belief that a few displays Royal Navy 
firepower would be sufficient to remind the Chinese that Britain was the superpower. 
Indeed, it appears that the growing anti-foreign sentiment only furthered the existing trend 
towards a gradual hardening of gunboat tactics, with hawkish British commanders 
increasingly free to use their guns.  
On June 23, for example, HMS Cicala put a landing party ashore on Shamian Island in 
Guangzhou, taking the lead in defending foreign possessions in the city, during anti-foreign 
protests resulting from the May Thirtieth Incident.66 The island was separated by a 100 foot 
wide canal, but was connected to the shore by two small bridges. There are conflicting 
accounts about what happened as the Chinese protestors reached the western crossing, 
shots were reportedly fired, which triggered a subsequent exchange of gunfire. Sir James 
Jamieson, the British Consul General, later claimed that he had seen Whampoa Academy 
cadets open fire first, but even if true the response was disproportionate.67 That is not 
certain, however, as Chinese eye witnesses swore that gunfire first erupted from Shamian 
Island itself, i.e. the foreign forces.68 In the violence that ensued, over fifty Chinese 
protestors and one French marine died, with many more injured.69 Only after twenty 
minutes did Lieutenant Commander Victor Alleyne order the international forces to cease 
fire. Highlighting the intensity of the event, the unfortunate Petty Officer signalling the 
order with his whistle was shot through both hands.70 The incident became known as the 
‘Shaji Masssacre’. 
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The British Lieutenant in charge of the Lewis machinegun party that caused many of the 
casualties, Cyril Faure, appears to have been instrumental in the scale of the violence. Faure 
is reported to have reacted very badly in the weeks before the incident to criticism from the 
Foreign Office, for breaking the prohibition on landing British personnel on Chinese soil 
during a joint Anglo-Chinese anti-piracy raid near Jiangmen (Kongmoon) the previous 
month. While Faure also received praise, including from General Leung who commanded 
the raid, his behaviour changed markedly as a result. He started getting a reputation for 
being drunk and disorderly on duty, with some incidents sufficiently bad to be recorded in 
his personnel file. This was in stark contrast to reports from previous years, when he was 
described as an intelligent and diligent young officer. There is no clear evidence that alcohol 
played a part in his actions at Shamian, but in the immediate aftermath his immediate 
superior Commander Maxwell-Scott recorded that Faure had become ‘liable to get excited’ 
and that a ‘grievance seems to be affecting his balance’.71 In contrast, every report about 
Alleyne, who had overall command at Guangzhou, indicates he was a tactful and 
trustworthy officer, who was skilled at calming tense situations.72 
Despite subsequently being rotated into alternative roles, drunkenness affected Faure’s 
actions so heavily by 1928 that he was suspended from duty, and forced to retire, with 
Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt simply writing ‘Not recommended’ on his file.73 The following 
year a businessman who met Faure described him as being clearly very intelligent, but 
prone to drunkenness, inclined to blame his failures on others, and held grudges against 
those he believed to have undermined him, particularly the Foreign Office.74 Curiously, in 
1934 the by then retired Faure was cautiously used by SIS’s Hong Kong branch, although his 
employment was soon terminated with the assessment; 'One does not expect SIS agents to 
be saints, but… Lt Cdr Faure is well below the line which must be drawn'.75 That Faure and 
his men opened fire at Shamian was a reflection of the Navy’s increasingly aggressive 
stance, and Alleyne would probably have reacted the same way. Alleyne had after all issued 
                                                          
71 Personnel file of Lieutenant Cyril Faure, TNA, ADM 196/122/80; Personnel file of Lieutenant Cyril Faure, TNA, 
ADM 196/146/649. 
72 Reports about Alleyne by Commodores Bowden-Smith, Grace, and Stirling, 1922-1925, TNA, ADM 
196/144/50. 
73 Personnel file of Lieutenant Cyril Faure, TNA, ADM 196/122/80; Personnel file of Lieutenant Cyril Faure, TNA, 
ADM 196/146/649. 
74 Character reference about Cyril Faure by G.S. Moss, 31 December 1929, TNA, WO 106/5270. 
75 Letter from MI2 General Staff officer at Hong Kong, 13 September 1934, TNA, WO 106/5270. 
Page | 224  
 
the overall order for armed men to be sent ashore, despite his reputation for calming 
situations. In this sense, Harumi Goto-Shibata’s description of an ‘atmosphere of fear’ 
among the foreign force is at least partly accurate.76 It seems probable that the high number 
of casualties those British sailors caused, however, may have been a tragic consequence of 
the rapid and sad decline in Faure’s mental health.  
Writing in The Naval Review after his retirement, Faure offered what reads as a short, half-
hearted effort to restore his reputation, which does little to change this assessment of his 
actions. In doing so, he blamed the Chinese authorities in Guangzhou, the armed volunteers 
under his supervision, and the Foreign Office for denying him an inquiry that he felt would 
have vindicated his actions. Given the brevity of his argument, supported by very limited 
evidence, and some rather grandiose claims made later in the article about his connections 
among China’s elites, Faure does not make a particularly convincing case.77 Indeed, the 
vague allusions to a conspiracy, his avoidance of taking any personal responsibility, attacks 
on Foreign Office Consul O’Malley’s intelligence, and hints at delusions of grandeur, the 
account tends to add credence to suggestions that Faure was a young man who had come 
off the rails. 
Official guidelines, such as those Faure fell foul of, were in place to limit what the Navy’s 
warship commanders were allowed to do in response to violence in China. In that case, 
British service personnel were not meant to be landed on Chinese soil, without prior express 
permission from Chinese officials.78 It seems that the Foreign Office felt that General Leung 
was insufficiently senior to authorise the incursion, and Faure had exceeded his own orders 
by setting men ashore, rather than simply providing naval support for the Chinese troops. 
Even at the Treaty Ports, written restrictions were imposed on when sailors or marines 
could be landed at times of crisis.79 For the Royal Navy, gunboat diplomacy had rarely been 
about placing boots on the ground and so those limitations meant little in practice.  
Difficulties in defining what forms of intervention were considered acceptable, and 
advisable, extended up the full line of command. In August 1925, for example, Vice Admiral 
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Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair - the new Commander in Chief of the China Station – proposed a 
plan to the Admiralty to bombard the Taku Forts near Tianjin and the Whampoa Military 
Academy near Guangzhou. He felt that such strong displays in two pivotal locations would 
break the anti-British boycott.80 In London, the Director of Naval Operations, Captain 
Ambrose Peck, suggested aircraft from Hermes could bombard the picket lines near 
Guangzhou instead, but he questioned whether such forceful action would be sensible given 
the reported conditions in China.81 While ultimately Whitehall sided with Peck’s caution and 
did not authorise Sinclair’s plans, the exchange does highlight the aggressive spirit 
developing at the head of the China Station. Sinclair sensibly chose to act in line with the 
guidance from London, in contrast to Faure’s unfortunate decision that went beyond what 
he was authorised to do. For the command as a whole, however, emphasis was shifting 
from ‘observe and coerce’ to ‘intervene and punish’. The Navy’s culture towards command 
at the time also meant that most day-to-day decisions were left to Vice Admiral Sinclair, as 
he was the man on the spot, although he should do so ‘in communication with the 
diplomatic and consular authorities.’82 
It is important to note that despite the shifting mentality, the majority of cases in late 1925 
where gunboats were sent to ports experiencing strikes, protests, or boycotts, continued to 
pass relatively peacefully. In his final report as the Senior Naval Officer on the Yangtze in 
October, Rear Admiral David Anderson commended numerous officers who had responded 
to such situations in a calm and restrained manner. HMS Gnat, for example, had shore 
parties ashore at Jiujiang for three weeks, during a two-and-a-half-month spell at the port, 
without a single clash occurring. Likewise, Bluebell and Foxglove both quietly avoided 
provoking violent clashes at Shantou in August, despite breaking a ferryman strike by 
providing cross-river transportation.83 Bluebell also sent a shore party into Nanjing during 
fighting between Chinese armies there in October 1925, but sufficient restraint and good 
sense was shown that the local population reportedly gave them a friendly send-off when 
they departed in December.84 Whether or not that report is true, the only physical damage 
done by British action during the course of that potential crisis came from the flooding of 
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the officers’ bathroom aboard HMS Concord, due to the speed at which it steamed to 
Bluebell’s assistance. In contrast, Lieutenant Anthony Pugsley of HMS Widgeon was 
deliberately omitted from Anderson’s report, despite being soundly praised by the local 
British officials at Chongqing. Anderson was displeased that Pugsley’s uncompromising 
approach had come close to sparking a riot.85 Certainly it was not an episode that Pugsley 
wished to mention in his memoirs, although he did discuss the difficulty involved with 
balancing the use of force during such incidents.86  
The command culture of the China Station remained that of the Victorian navy, with 
commanders allowed considerable independence in deciding how to interpret and go about 
fulfilling their orders. Indeed, between mid-1925 and late-1926 the China Station was under 
the command of Vice-Admiral Sinclair, whose distant style of leadership meant that his 
thoughts on which tactics should be used remained a ‘mystery’ to his subordinates.87 
Indeed, Sinclair replaced Rear-Admiral Allan Everett who had relinquished command in April 
1925 due to ill health having suffered a mental breakdown during his short tenure in 
charge.88 In the absence of clear instructions over that two-year combined period, individual 
commanders were almost entirely left to follow their own instincts. That freedom, 
combined with the heated atmosphere in China and the growing bellicose spirit around the 
China Station, and Sinclair’s own aggressive proposals, soon contributed to the set of 
developments that in part led to the final crisis of gunboat diplomacy. 
A double crisis – gunboat diplomacy living up to its reputation 
While the crisis that ultimately brought about a fundamental change in Britain’s approach in 
China did not occur until late 1926, as the Northern Expedition neared the Yangtze, the 
tactical crisis of how the Royal Navy should conduct gunboat diplomacy began much earlier 
that year. Even during the tense times of 1925, most violent incidents involving the Royal 
Navy had tended to be reactive situations, or with some degree of official Chinese 
acquiescence. In particular, when gunboats or marines opened fire as a result of events 
ashore spiralling out of control. The Navy often played a role in the developing course of 
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those events and threats of violence were not uncommon, but there was far more bluster 
than bite.  
In June 1924, for example, Lieutenant Commander Ivan Whitehorn of HMS Cockchafer took 
a retaliatory attitude to the killing of an American businessman, Edwin Hawley, after the 
latter had been in an argument with port workers in Wanxian.89 Amid threats by Whitehorn 
to bombard the port, the local Chinese commander General Lu ordered the execution of 
two men accused of committing the murder. During the entire incident only a single blank 
shell was fired in order to disperse a crowd before the landing of a small shore party to 
recover Hawley’s body. At no point during the events did Cockchafer perform a main gun 
drill, which was normal practice when there was a possibility they might be used. Likewise, 
after initially being put on alert for the five hours of the evening of Hawley’s killing, 
Cockchafer’s crew returned to ordinary cleaning duties the following morning.90 Neither of 
those individual factors is conclusive, but when combined with the thin precedence for 
bombarding a city over an incident involving a non-British national, it seems likely that the 
threat was just a bluff, but we will never know for certain. Even then, there was pressure on 
the Navy from the Foreign Office for Whitehorn to face a court martial, on the grounds of 
grossly exceeding his orders. As no live shells were fired, and amid positive statements from 
the American community, no proceedings were opened into the incident. Over the following 
year, Whitehorn’s perceived ‘gamble’ with his career and the Foreign Office’s attitude 
became major talking points among the Yangtze gunboat officers.91  
The events that unfolded two years later at Wanxian, in September 1926, provide an 
example of how much the interpretation of how to conduct gunboat diplomacy had shifted 
over the course of the 1920s. In the summer months of 1926, General Yang Sen - the 
warlord Governor of Sichuan Province - and his army around Wanxian were increasingly 
under pressure from forces participating in the Northern Expedition, during their push 
towards the Yangtze. Faced with that threat, Yang Sen’s men started to challenge the 
neutrality of foreign shipping by demanding that merchant vessels transport units along the 
river. British merchantmen had previously provided such transport in return for lucrative 
                                                          
89 Braisted, Diplomats in Blue, pp.82-84. 
90 Ship’s log of HMS Cockchafer June 1924, TNA, ADM 53/73583. 
91 Pugsley and Macintyre, Destroyer Man, p.13. 
Page | 228  
 
fees, despite strict instructions from the Foreign Office not to do so. This precipitated a crisis 
in September, when Chinese troops aboard the Butterfield & Swires steamer Wanliu 
demanded transport, only to be removed with the assistance of HMS Cockchafer. While this 
was happening, Cockchafer’s wake led to a number of Chinese junks being swamped with 
some of their occupants drowning. In the events that followed, Chinese troops were 
ordered to seize control of two other British merchantmen, Wantung and Wanhsien, by 
General Yang Sen.92 During similar circumstances in 1907, the Royal Navy assembled a 
response force, but the officers on the scene focused on negotiating a peaceful release of 
the steamers, which they duly achieved.93 At Wanxian nineteen years later, however, both 
the approach taken and the end result were wildly different. 
While Consul General A.P. Blunt started to negotiate for the release of the steamers, the 
Royal Navy assembled a ‘cutting-out’ party at Hankou, intended to sail to Wanxian and seize 
back the two vessels.94 Within four days of the seizure of the vessels, and twenty-four hours 
after receiving the first official report from his subordinates on the scene, Rear Admiral John 
Cameron dispatched the armed merchantman Kiawo. Captained by Commander Frederick 
Darley, the Kiawo contained 120 sailors and marines.95 In the words of his fictional 
counterpart, Jack Aubrey, it appears Cameron felt that there was ‘not a moment to be lost’. 
Deriving its name from the process of severing a stationary vessel’s anchor or mooring lines, 
the ‘cutting-out’ of large ships was an approach usually reserved for wartime. The confusion 
of boarding vessels held by an opposing armed force, particularly when done without the 
element of surprise, was a process almost certain to result in casualties. Given that Cameron 
knew Chinese troops were occupying the two merchantmen, and so a direct clash was likely, 
his decision stands out when compared with the China Station’s normal reliance upon 
coercive threats. Cameron later reported that he had given instructions that the Chinese 
forces should be notified that if the British warships were fired upon from the city itself 
Darley was authorised to reply with the gunboats’ 6” main guns. That direct threat never 
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reached General Yang Sen, but the associated order did reach Darley and the other gunboat 
commanders, with tragic consequences.96  
Cameron’s fateful decision was not made with a measured understanding of what it would 
mean for gunboat diplomacy in China. Indeed, his decision was made with limited 
knowledge of what had actually occurred, since the report he received from Lieutenant 
Commander Leon Acheson aboard Cockchafer was highly exaggerated.97 What Cameron did 
not know was that Commander Acheson and General Yang Sen did not get along well, and 
their attempts at negotiation amounted to little more than exchanging personal insults.98 
Yang Sen reportedly had a strong personality and Acheson’s personal record suggests that 
while a popular sportsman among his fellow officers, he was ‘inclined to be obstinate… 
(and) wanting in tact’.99 Acheson had also been the officer in command of Cockchafer when 
it had assisted the Wanliu and in so doing had drowned some of Yang Sen’s men at the start 
of the incident. Subsequent negotiations led by Commander Paul Berryman of the newly 
arrived HMS Widgeon were then hampered by the profound negativity resulting from the 
early exchanges, and occurred only after Darley and Kiawo had already been ordered up 
river.100 Berryman had only taken up his role as Senior Naval Officer on the Upper Yangtze in 
mid-August, and his negotiations were further hampered by his lack of knowledge about 
what was occurring, given how fresh he was to the region.101 The events that unfolded as a 
result of Cameron’s misinformed decision, would force a change in the Royal Navy’s tactics 
in China.  
The attempted cutting-out on the 5th September was a catastrophic failure. Commander 
Darley and six other Royal Navy personnel died while attempting to board the two vessels. A 
further thirteen sailors and three of the hostages were wounded during the course of 
events.102 Darley’s plan had been based on a complacent, and possibly racially framed, 
assumption that Chinese troops would naturally lay down their arms when surprised by the 
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sudden appearance of British sailors.103 Indeed, Darley and his boarding party were only 
armed with wooden entrenching tool handles (see Figure 15) when they first leapt aboard 
the SS Wanhsien, such was their belief that they would be largely unopposed.104 This was 
reinforced by an apparently successful ruse by the Chinese troops, with some pretending to 
eat dinner complacently at a table on Wanhsien’s deck before the attack. In reality, those 
troops were well aware that Kiawo was approaching and were prepared for a fight. After 
failing to seize back the steamers, and coming under fire from the defenders, the British 
gunboats returned fire towards the city, and as has previously been discussed, many shells 
landed in populated areas. At least 280 and potentially up to several thousand Chinese were 
killed, either directly or in the subsequent fires, with similarly variable estimates of the 
proportions of military and civilians among the dead.105 
Figure 15: Officers of the ‘cutting-out’ group taken on the morning of 5 September106 
 
The casualties at Wanxian alone were sufficient to precipitate a diplomatic crisis that fed 
into worsening Anglo-Chinese relations. For the Royal Navy, however, the events also 
represented a fundamental tactical and strategic failure. Cameron had deployed a force far 
stronger than those generally available to respond to such crises, and yet the Royal Navy 
had been made to appear both weak and brutal at the same time, despite efforts to portray 
the expedition as heroic in the British press.107 The failed attempts at issuing direct threats 
of retribution if the vessels were not released were always tangential to the primary orders 
for the Kiawo expeditionary force to seize them back. Crucially, Darley’s instructions were 
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not based upon co-ordinating the Navy’s actions with the local consul’s efforts to force Yang 
Sen into yielding to British demands. Indeed, Kiawo only possessed a short-range wireless 
set, intended to notify Cockchafer and Widgeon, ahead of its imminent arrival and the 
impending raid.108 How the slow-moving Kiawo was meant to achieve tactical surprise was 
left unanswered. While his account does contain some very questionable assertions, 
Lieutenant Pugsley later claimed that Widgeon, so presumably Commander Berryman, had 
even radioed Darley at the last minute, ‘pleading’ with him to change his plan as the Chinese 
knew of Kiawo’s approach.109 In all, the rash and rushed plan was both a tactical and 
strategic mess. Poorly co-ordinated threats, followed by a naïve attempt at using force, 
showed neither a considered attempt at gunboat diplomacy nor military sense. As a result, 
what occurred at Wanxian revealed Britain’s gunboat bluff and with it dented perceptions of 
the Royal Navy’s power among China’s regional leaders and population.  
Curiously, the whole incident went against Admiralty instructions in early 1926, restricting 
the use of gunboats on the Upper Yangtze.110 By this point the Admiralty had already 
decided, in conjunction with the civil authorities, to withdraw protection from those British 
civilians and vessels that chose to operate in that peripheral region. The Admiralty 
subsequently provided retrospective approval of Cameron’s decision, which had been 
approved by Vice Admiral Sinclair. The incident does, however, serve to highlight that the 
China Station’s officers were taking a firm interpretation of what their responsibilities 
entailed. Leon Acheson’s behaviour certainly adds credence to the reports highlighted by 
Nicholas Clifford that some naval officers were ‘spoiling for a fight’.111 While it might be 
assumed, given Cameron’s pattern of strong action, that he may have been a cause of the 
hardening in gunboat behaviour, as shall be explored shortly he was actually considered to 
be too cautious by some of his subordinates.112  
A disjointed strategic and tactical shift 
The final months of 1926, after the Wanxian Incident, saw a fundamental change in the 
Navy’s strategy towards and tactics in dealing with China. The strategic shift was closely 
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aligned with the diplomatic stance taken by the Foreign Office, discussed in the first chapter 
of this thesis, culminating with Austen Chamberlain’s December Memorandum. Official 
policy changed to a withdrawal of resources from a wide range of Treaty Ports to focus upon 
the determined defence of key harbours and waterways, such as Shanghai and the Lower 
Yangtze. The Admiralty’s proposed strategy in light of the new circumstances involved the 
use of warships to evacuate foreign civilians from secondary Treaty Ports when required, 
and to secure those of primary importance. Previously, there had been a large grey area 
between formal British imperial possessions and what were seen as China’s sovereign rights. 
After the shift in late 1926, however, a dividing line had been drawn – Whitehall had 
effectively told the Navy that they should consider some Treaty Ports as core to the British 
Empire and defend them accordingly. 
The message sent to the warship commanders by the strategic shift was reinforced with the 
rapid redeployment, in September, of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and the Third 
Destroyer Flotilla, both from the Mediterranean.113 That posting was largely a response to 
the broader environment, given the strength of anti-British rhetoric from the Guomindang 
in mid-1926 and the launch of the Northern Expedition. Nonetheless, while it may have 
been intended to show Britain’s resolve to the Chinese and British expatriate communities, 
it had an impact upon Royal Navy personnel as well. 
A subtle example of how this influenced the Navy’s tactics can be seen during trouble at 
Hankou, soon after the Third Destroyer Flotilla arrived on the China Station. In response to 
anti-foreign protests after the city was seized by the Guomindang, the senior naval 
commander at Hankou ordered the landing of shore parties, in much the same way that the 
Royal Navy had behaved in years before. Unlike previous incidents, however, the decision 
was made to send ashore a 2-pounder quick-fire ‘Pom-Pom’ anti-aircraft gun.114 That 
weapon could fire approximately three high explosive shells per second at a distance of up 
to a kilometre, and was a significant jump from the normal rifles and machineguns issued to 
shore parties. Prior to 1926, there appear to be no recorded instances of the Navy landing 
heavy weaponry since the Boxer Rebellion, nor had they requested the assistance of the 
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treaty port volunteer corps gun batteries. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps, for example, had 
four 4.5” howitzers and a battery of 2.75” mountain guns, although the latter were 
antiquated and largely for show.115  
Even in itself, having a heavy weapon ashore was a significant and explicit threat, greater in 
intensity than the implicit one posed by a gunboat mid-channel. Weighing 527lb (239kg), 
landing a Pom-Pom was not something ordered on a whim and doing so showed that the 
shore party would not surrender their position lightly. Even mounted on a wheeled carriage, 
a large team was required to move the weapon around.116 As a result, it tied the shore party 
into making a determined defence to avoid potentially losing a valuable piece of equipment. 
Using land-based heavy weapons in this way went against the very essence of gunboat 
diplomacy, stretching the idea that it should involve a limited application of force. By 
defending a fixed location there was no end-goal of trying to coerce a change in behaviour 
by the Chinese forces.117 
It is worth noting that the landing of the Pom-Pom occurred prior to the December 
Memorandum, signifying that gunboat diplomacy was already being abandoned prior to the 
official change in Britain’s foreign policy towards China. This is an important distinction, as it 
would indicate that there was a grass-roots recognition within the Navy that gunboat tactics 
were no longer effective. The existing discussion about the decision in effect to abandon 
Hankou in January 1927 focuses heavily on the changing diplomatic situation and how that 
led to the decision not to defend the concession. Edmund Fung and Jürgen Osterhammel, 
for example, both argue that the realisation after Wanxian that gunboat diplomacy was 
failing, led to a shift in foreign policy to managed imperial retreat.118 That would also 
suggest that the aggressive approach taken in early 1927 was the Royal Navy’s final gunboat 
hurrah, before being restrained by diplomatic pressure. The decision not to defend Hankou, 
however, was as much a military one as a matter of foreign policy. 
In the first week of January, Britain had just three vessels stationed at Hankou – the newly 
arrived destroyer Woolston, the sloop Magnolia, and Cameron’s flagship gunboat HMS 
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Bee.119 Together with an additional detachment of marines, that only provided a force of 
roughly 300 service personnel. With southern forces assembling at Jiujiang and other treaty 
ports, the Yangtze gunboat force was stretched thin. On paper, the Hankou Volunteer Corps 
(HVC) could provide a supplementary force of 130 individuals armed with a selection of 
small-arms, passed on from their larger Shanghai counterpart’s armoury.120 However, as 
many of the foreign population had already departed, the HVC was only useful for 
supervising the gates to the concession. Similarly, the local municipal police consisted 
largely of Sikhs from India, who were demoralized, not particularly committed to the British 
Empire, and therefore unwilling to defend the concession.121 As it was mid-winter, water 
levels on the middle and upper Yangtze were also low and dropping fast, making it difficult 
to move Woolston or arrange for any additional major warships to reinforce Hankou from 
Shanghai. While over the course of January it was subsequently discovered water levels 
were sufficient to send more destroyers up to Hankou, at the critical moment no 
reinforcements could be expected.122  
In contrast to the small British outpost, there was a substantial Chinese force marching on 
Hankou. Cameron notified Tyrwhitt on 14 January that a Chinese army numbering roughly 
12,000 men was in position around the city, with further divisions nearby around Hubei 
province. An earlier report, later dismissed as inaccurate and speculative, had suggested 
that up to 47,000 troops were descending on Hankou.123 In addition, there was the local 
Chinese population, many of whom were involved in protests and riots against continued 
foreign possession of the concessions. Even allowing for the possibility that the lower figure 
might also have been inflated, and the potential for military assistance from other foreign 
powers in the port, the Hankou defence force was heavily outnumbered. Indeed, every 
available man was landed on 3 January just to deal with civilian protests.124  
A subsequent assessment by Admiral Tyrwhitt suggested that an additional 1,000 men, 
presumably referring to the 12th Royal Marine Battalion, would have evened the odds in the 
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short-term. With the Chinese army possessing a range of artillery, however, Tyrwhitt 
doubted whether any defence of the concession could be sustained for any period of 
time.125 The shifting balance of military technology in China had evened the odds markedly 
from earlier decades, placing the Royal Navy in a situation where for once it was outgunned. 
There were also unconfirmed reports that Guomindang aircraft had been seen bombing 
targets around the city, adding a further potential complication to the defence.126 Quite 
simply, holding the Hankou concession in January 1927 with the resources at Cameron’s 
disposal would have been virtually impossible.  
Cameron also had to keep in mind the wider situation of the middle and upper Yangtze 
region while deciding how to behave at Hankou. There were still hundreds of British civilians 
at Yangtze treaty ports up-river of Hankou, who needed to be evacuated.127 Sichuan was 
calmer than it had been immediately after the Wanxian Incident, but Britain was still highly 
unpopular. All pretence of maintaining Britain’s image on the upper Yangtze had gone in the 
aftermath of that calamitous episode. The Navy’s gunboats were forced to send small boats 
and the ships’ boys into even remote river ports to obtain supplies, due to widespread 
unwillingness to do business with British officials.128 In particular, it was nearly impossible to 
obtain locally sourced coal to help fuel the gunboats, which were undertaking heavy duties 
and so consuming greater quantities than usual. Indeed, the Navy’s usual local coal 
merchant in Wanxian was arrested in late 1926 for supplying the armed steamer Kiawo.129 
This problem also applied at Hankou, but was less acute as some foreign merchant vessels 
were still venturing that far up river.  
A violent clash at Hankou would therefore not only have been futile, but it could have 
endangered both the upper Yangtze gunboat force and the civilians they were attempting to 
evacuate. Only a reckless and bloodthirsty commander would have chosen to defend 
aggressively the Hankou concession in those circumstances. The decision to back down at 
the city does not therefore mark the end of gunboat diplomacy, which had actually occurred 
months earlier. Instead it reinforced Wanxian’s lesson. Royal Navy gunboats were unable to 
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match the challenge posed by large numbers of well-armed Chinese troops if those soldiers 
were no longer sufficiently in awe of British prestige and thus afraid of potential retribution.  
The gunboat retreat 
1927 would pan out as a year in which violent clashes between the Royal Navy and different 
Chinese groups occurred with a regularity and volume unlike any other part of the decade. 
The Northern Expedition moving along the Yangtze River and contemporary anti-foreign 
protests triggered a crisis situation for the British establishment, in its attempts to maintain 
many aspects of its informal imperial influence. The actions of the Royal Navy during this 
period have generally been assessed as a whole, analysing their cumulative impact. This was 
a year unlike most others for the China Station, however, and so to understand fully the 
Navy’s actions, it is vital to consider the unusual nature of the force posted to the region at 
that time. The China Station in the last months of 1926 was reinforced by the arrival of a 
destroyer flotilla and the return of HMS Hermes and its aircraft. That increased the number 
of surface fighting vessels from twenty-five to thirty-five, and with it the total manpower on 
the station by roughly half. By April 1927, the number of surface warships in the region had 
reached fifty-six, bringing with them an additional 8,000 naval personnel.130  
The wave of vessels was in itself a reflection that the Royal Navy was attempting a different 
approach to dealing with the immediate challenges posed by the situation in China. The 
scale of that task force, as assessed in the first chapter, has been poorly understood in 
existing histories. Something not considered so far, which was caused by that sudden influx, 
is that the many additional warships brought with them a wave of new officers, many of 
whom had never served on the China Station prior to that point. As a result, few really 
understood the environment they found themselves in. In the case of HMS Emerald, for 
example, the first detailed official briefing the officers and crew received on the situation in 
China came almost three months after the warship had joined the command.131 That 
presentation was made by Captain Hugh England, commanding Emerald, who had little 
additional knowledge than his crew. After a quick meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, 
shortly after arriving in China, England had few chances to discuss events with other fellow 
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commanders, as only HMS Caradoc stopped at Nanjing during the intervening weeks.132 His 
primary source of information was therefore from civilians living in Nanjing, particularly the 
British members of the Nanjing Club.133 It seems very unlikely that England had a rounded 
understanding of either Britain’s overall position in China or the evolving strategy for the 
Royal Navy to deal with the challenges it faced. 
There was also considerable variety among the new crews in their loyalty to their new 
senior commanding officers. While Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt was generally highly respected, 
given his reputation as a hero of the First World War, his deputy Rear Admiral Cameron 
commanding the crucial Yangtze River region, was not seen in the same light. Cameron had 
captained the cruiser HMS Phaeton at the Battle of Jutland, among other warships, but the 
appointment to the Yangtze in 1925 was his first operational experience of senior 
command. As a result, Commander Louis Hamilton noted proudly in his journal that he and 
other officers deliberately undermined Cameron’s authority and considered him to be an 
‘old woman’ who was too willing to ‘turn the other cheek to these Bolshevik swine’.134 Given 
Cameron’s relatively strong instructions and behaviour prior to and during the Wanxian 
Incident, Hamilton’s statement may be more a reflection of his own attitudes and 
inexperience of the situation than a fair assessment of his new commanding officer. It is also 
possible that Wanxian’s political and diplomatic repercussions took their toll on Cameron, 
leading to a comparatively cautious outlook. Regardless of the accuracy of Hamilton’s 
statement, such views existed and influenced the behaviour of the officers newly assigned 
to Cameron’s force. At the height of the crisis in the first half of 1927, it would prove to be 
those fresh officers like Hamilton, particularly those under Cameron’s command, who 
became heavily involved in some of the most violent and controversial incidents. 
During the first two months of 1927, Cameron was tasked with leading the evacuation of 
the cities along the Upper Yangtze, further calming the situation at Hankou, and protecting 
Britain’s interests on the middle and lower stretches of the river. The first of those tasks, 
conducted for the most part by his existing cadre of junior officers aboard their gunboats, 
proved successful and largely peaceful. 380 British and 200 non-British foreign civilians were 
                                                          
132 Movements of HM Ships on the Yangtze, March and April 1927, TNA, ADM 116/2510. 
133 Midshipman P.W. Burnett’s log book. 
134 Journal of Commander Hamilton, 1927-1928. 
Page | 238  
 
safely escorted out of Chongqing, Wanxian, and the surrounding areas in the first two 
months of the year, leaving only 48 remaining, many of whom were missionaries.135 The 
gunboat commanders involved appear to have focused on their task, with little regard for 
previous concerns about maintaining Britain’s image or punishing Chinese transgressions. 
After Navy stores were stolen by picketers while being loaded aboard HMS Mantis at 
Chongqing, for example, an unarmed party of British marines was sent to try and retrieve 
the items, but they were beaten and forced to retire to the gunboat. An official protest was 
made and an apology was received from General Liu Hsiang, in command of Sichuan, but 
Mantis left the port without the stores and no-one was punished for their loss.136 Likewise, 
the crew of Cockchafer at Yichang were free to play sport ashore within a month of arriving, 
much in the style of earlier years, but only after calmly riding-out the initial hostility to their 
arrival.137 It is worth noting that the temperamental Acheson had already departed in late 
1926 to recuperate from wounds sustained at Wanxian, and then commanded a destroyer 
in home waters.138 There was no risk that he might spark another clash in China. 
There certainly remained some superficial similarities between the Royal Navy’s tactics for 
evacuating the upper Yangtze ports and how they had conducted their gunboat duties in 
previous years. This included issuing threats to bombard towns. During one incident at 
Chengling in January 1927, for example, Lieutenant Commander Douglas Garvey aboard 
HMS Woodcock did threaten to bombard the town. The message was conveyed in response 
to Commissioner Tung threatening to fire upon British vessels in the port and Chinese 
troops subsequently moved a field gun onto a hill overlooking the river. Garvey argued that 
as Tung represented the Guomindang his threat bordered on a declaration of war against 
Britain, and if Woodcock were fired upon a state of war would exist.139 Formalising the 
conversation led to a quick clarification by Tung that his threat was only aimed at British 
merchant vessels who he had not authorised to leave port. Ultimately, Tung reluctantly 
agreed that the port’s foreign community could be evacuated aboard those steamers under 
the supervision of Woodcock. When looking in detail at the incident, however, there are 
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some clear differences in Garvey’s tactics compared to those previously employed by the 
Royal Navy.  
Commander Garvey appears to have been deadly serious in his threat to bombard 
Chengling, having kept his men at actions stations by their guns throughout the drama.140 
During the full course of events, however, the gunboat remained mid-river and no parties of 
armed sailors were sent ashore or to the British merchant vessels. Moreover, even when 
picketers sank a junk in front of the British vessels and attempted to sink further boats, to 
prevent the steamers from departing, Garvey simply ordered a Jardines’ tug moved to 
ensure there was a clear path. While he felt that Tung was bluffing, Garvey did not risk 
testing that theory. The local Consul, Grant Jones, subsequently argued to Britain’s Minister 
to China, Miles Lampson, that a bloodbath would have been better than a surrender that 
had harmed Britain’s image in the region. Garvey simply reported in return that his primary 
duty was to ensure the safety of the civilians under his care.141 Such statements are notable 
in their absence from earlier accounts. Prioritising the evacuation in that way was different 
to what was expected, both tactically and emotionally, under a policy of gunboat diplomacy. 
While the strong defence of British possessions afloat on China’s waterways did show a 
technical use of extra-territorial rights, in practice the Royal Navy had always considered the 
decks of British flagged vessels as British soil, wherever in the world they might be.142 
Hankou may have been the core location that defined Britain’s position on the upper 
Yangtze in early 1927, but it did not become the boundary between retreat and defence 
after the decision to withdraw from the concession in January. Gunboats were still 
supervising the official evacuation of the ports upriver, including Chongqing, Wanxian, 
Changsha, Yichang, and Chengling. Nonetheless, on 9 January 1927, just a few days after the 
Hankou concessions had been effectively abandoned, the decision was made to also 
completely evacuate Jiujiang, a day’s sailing downriver of Hankou.143 The 5,000 Chinese 
troops that had taken up position in and around Jiujiang presented a threat that the Royal 
Navy’s Yangtze flotilla was equally as incapable of countering as that posed by the 12,000 at 
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Hankou.144 Against such numbers the joint parade by the entire international naval force at 
Jiujiang two months earlier, of just 125 sailors from Britain, America, France, and Japan 
appeared an ineffective and token gesture – a transparent pretence of strength and unity.145 
Anti-British rioting within the town on 7 January, in response to reports from Hankou, had 
led to valuables and foreign civilians being clustered at protected properties near the 
waterfront. 146 The final decision to evacuate, however, was made in light of the presence of 
so many well-armed troops in and around the city. As a result of those evacuations, the 
confluence of the Gan and Yangtze rivers became the temporary boundary (Point 3 in Figure 
16). Britain had lost official direct access to the markets of Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei 
provinces, along with the western part of Jiangxi after the evacuation of Jiujiang. 
Figure 16: Map showing the extent of official Royal Navy protection on the Yangtze147 
 
Correspondence between Cameron, Tyrwhitt, and the Admiralty in January and February 
outlines how the Royal Navy planned to continue defending the concessions downriver of 
the Gan River boundary. Tyrwhitt went into considerable detail about the forces available 
for defending Britain’s interests along the lower Yangtze and how far he could rely upon 
American and Japanese troops to provide support if violence ensued.148 His official 
assessment sent to the Admiralty in late January also suggested that Britain should seek 
                                                          
144 Admiral Tyrwhitt to Admiralty, 22 January 1927, TNA, ADM 116/2509. 
145 Acting-Consul Ogden to Sir Ronald Macleay, 4 November 1926, TNA, ADM 116/2509. 
146 Diary of Arthur Ransome, January – February 1927, Brotherton Library, BC MS 20c Ransome/1/A/9/3/3. 
147 Produced by the author. 
148 Assorted correspondence between Tyrwhitt and the Admiralty, early 1927, TNA, ADM 116/2509. 
Page | 241  
 
quietly to undermine the Chinese authorities at Hankou, rather than seize the concession 
back through violence. If the Guomindang were seen to have failed at Hankou, then Britain 
could make the case that its supervision of the Treaty Ports was vital for the success of 
China’s economic hubs. Britain might then have its extra-territorial rights in Hankou 
restored and regain complete access to the upper Yangtze basin. The memorandum did 
note, however, that if Hankou under Chinese control proved a success, then Tyrwhitt 
believed Britain would certainly lose all its possessions in China, including Hong Kong.149 
While it was a pivotal moment, the withdrawal of military guarantees over British 
concessions at Hankou and neighbouring ports was not seen as a permanent move by the 
Royal Navy when the decision was made. 
The end result of the events on the upper Yangtze between the Wanxian Incident and 
February 1927 was that Britain accepted the loss of some peripheral brown-water Treaty 
Port concessions, in an effort to defend those of greater value. Contrary to previous 
interpretations, that process was not one of calculated surrender, nor was it one forced by 
‘vigorous popular reactions that could no longer be suppressed’. 150 The mass protests were 
a significant factor in triggering the initial defensive preparations and some nominally 
temporary evacuations. However, at both Hankou and Jiujiang in particular, but at many 
other ports along the Upper Yangtze including Wanxian, Britain had simply been militarily 
outmatched. The China Station’s commanders were both unwilling and unable 
simultaneously to counter large armies at multiple locations, which were unified at least to 
some extent under Guomindang direction. Had a clash occurred between the Royal Navy 
and the Chinese armies, the British force would have been outnumbered and almost 
certainly alone, with only one Japanese and one Italian gunboat left above Hankou able to 
offer potential assistance.151 These factors were made all the worse by the influx of modern 
weaponry.  
By the end of the decade, when faced with a communist army 10,000 strong at Changsha in 
July 1930, the Navy acknowledged that any possible attempt at gunboat bluster would have 
failed. Even before taking changed diplomatic priorities into account, they were heavily 
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outnumbered and many of the Chinese troops were armed with the ‘latest’ machine guns 
and field artillery. 152 Nonetheless, the evacuations in 1926 and early 1927 did not involve 
complete abandonment. British gunboats, merchantmen, and civilians were all still present 
at locations along stretches of the upper and middle Yangtze, just in lower numbers.  
The lower Yangtze and other treaty ports around China remained tense during this period, 
but relatively calm, with protests and boycotts inspired by Wanxian and the unequal treaties 
in general. Those protests combined with press reports of atrocities in other ports, and 
concern at what many British expatriates felt was a significant loss of British prestige at 
Hankou, together created an air of fear among the British expatriate communities, 
particularly at Shanghai.153 In public, the Municipal Council issued a proclamation in January 
aimed at the Chinese population, stating that the SMC was happy to work with whoever 
controlled the Shanghai region and talk of a possible war was premature.154 In private, all 
talk was about the very real prospect of war coming to Shanghai. Tyrwhitt reported to the 
Admiralty on 12 January that in addition to the reinforcements he had already received, he 
needed at least an Army division to secure Shanghai. A worst-case scenario involving the 
evacuation of Shanghai had been discussed, but Tyrwhitt felt that not only would such an 
event be catastrophic for Britain’s reputation, it would be virtually impossible to conduct 
safely. As a result, the formation of a Shanghai Defence Force was approved by Cabinet the 
following week, along with the immediate despatch of the First Cruiser Squadron from 
Malta and the hastily formed 12th Royal Marine Battalion from Britain.155 The influx of new 
service personnel that started in late 1926 became a flood. 
Sailing to War 
Plans to defend robustly those treaty ports still considered as core to the Empire were not 
unique to officers on the China Station, with the new policy extending all the way to 
Whitehall. The First Cruiser Squadron, for example, was authorised by the Admiralty to send 
its midshipmen and section leaders ashore at Malta so they could train with the Army prior 
to departure. During the journey the warship commanders were further instructed to 
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conduct practice firing and prepare for landing shore parties.156 Similarly, having newly 
arrived at Nanjing from the East Indies Station HMS Emerald practised landing its full crew, 
less those required to maintain the ship itself, in preparation for a future defence of the 
concession.157 A bombardment range was also set up at Mirs Bay, so the new vessels could 
gain experience in firing at land-based targets.158 All this preparatory activity may simply 
have been for the defence of Shanghai, except that most of the new warships were 
subsequently spread around the treaty ports, highlighting that they were intended for a 
wider range of locations. Having steamed at high speed around the world, while training to 
fight, the new forces were prepared for action. With the Northern Expedition nearing the 
middle and lower Yangtze, and the existing China Station forces spread thin, the stage was 
set for the crisis to erupt into war. 
The China Station may have moved on from an approach of gunboat diplomacy, to focus on 
trying to maintain the status quo, but the newly arriving crews from other stations did not 
know or understand that a shift had occurred. Moreover, some of the new crews arrived in 
a state of excitement and enthusiasm at the prospect of action. Perhaps a portent of things 
to come, HMS Emerald was just such a ship. Captain England continued to order frequent 
landing drills throughout February and early March, in between social events ashore in the 
Nanjing concession. This included testing alternative approaches for preparing landings to 
improve the speed with which Emerald could respond in emergencies. The ‘platoons’ of 
sailors and marines intended for shore parties were split into two, for example, with 
alternate half-units always dressed in full kit ready for action. Emerald was also regularly 
sending armed teams to intervene in disagreements involving British steamers at Nanjing, 
although in most cases the situation had been settled before they arrived.159 By mid-March, 
a platoon of twelve sailors or marines armed with Lewis machine guns were a regular 
feature on Emerald’s main deck, sheltering behind improvised redoubts made of sandbags 
and sheets of armour plating.160 While individually none of those actions was particularly 
unusual, cumulatively they indicate the elevated enthusiasm of one newly arrived crew. It 
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also highlights that Captain England did not approach his role with the same focus on calm 
stabilisation that had become apparent among Rear Admiral Cameron’s existing cadre of 
officers in the aftermath of the Wanxian Incident. 
As armies of the Northern Expedition neared Nanjing in late March, it was the enthusiastic 
England with Emerald that was on the front line, at a point on the Yangtze where Britain still 
intended to set a boundary behind which it would maintain its extra-territorial possessions. 
In the events that unfolded, Emerald bombarded part of the city with its main guns, during 
an effort to exfiltrate British and American shore parties and civilians. Even after the initial 
crisis had subsided, Captain England pressed the following day for permission to punitively 
bombard the city.161 Indeed, he argued so strongly that Admiral Tyrwhitt removed England 
from his command and placed him in an administrative role the following month as 
punishment, and Tyrwhitt himself was not shy of using violence.162 Indeed, only a few weeks 
later Tyrwhitt was reportedly visibly disappointed when his flagship HMS Hawkins was not 
fired upon near Shanghai, as he was eager to see some action.163 The overly aggressive 
stance taken by Emerald throughout the situation can therefore be partly attributed to the 
warship being a new arrival and an excessively enthusiastic desire to repeat the famous 
successes of the Boxer Rebellion. That previous crisis had, after all, provided the former 
Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe and Admiral Roger Keyes the fame that helped launch their 
careers.164  
It is worth noting that had it been a resident China Station cruiser posted to Nanjing the end 
result may have appeared broadly similar to outside observers. With a request from allied 
forces ashore for an immediate supporting bombardment, it seems unlikely that any Royal 
Navy officer would have declined to assist their American friends. Indeed, two weeks later 
HMS Carlisle risked fresh clashes when ordered to prevent Guomindang forces from 
removing British-owned railway rolling stock from Nanjing by taking it across the river to 
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Pukow.165 Where a different course of action probably would have occurred was on the 
second day of the incident, which saw Captain England threaten and vehemently demand 
permission to conduct a punitive bombardment of Nanjing. While that was broadly in-
keeping with what would be expected from a warship conducting gunboat diplomacy, 
threatening or using a short violence outburst to force a change in behaviour, it was wholly 
at odds with Rear Admiral Cameron’s orders and policy for the Yangtze region. Admiral 
Tyrwhitt also explained at the time that his decision not to approve Captain England’s 
request was ultimately because he felt it would have served no practical purpose. Again, this 
is not to say Tyrwhitt was against the use of violence, indeed his biographer noted that 
during this period he was strongly in favour of war with China, wanting to defeat the 
Guomindang rather than coerce them.166 What it does show, is that neither of the two 
senior commanders on the China Station appears to have held the intangible longer-term 
focus of gunboat diplomacy in particularly high regards. While contemporary observers and 
later historians have debated the first bombardment and its deadly collateral damage, those 
in the Navy at the time took note of Captain England’s re-assignment a month after the 
incident.167 
In isolation, what happened at Nanjing only provides a modest case showing the difference 
between the mentalities of the newly arrived officers and those already on the station, and 
how that influenced the tactics they looked to adopt. When combined with other such 
cases, however, a clear pattern develops. Rear Admiral William Boyle and his First Cruiser 
Squadron, which arrived at Hong Kong shortly after Emerald, certainly had a reputation for 
wanting to take an aggressive line with China.168 Tyrwhitt’s reluctance to share centre-stage 
at Shanghai with another British flag officer, however, kept Boyle around Hong Kong and 
firmly on London’s leash.169 In contrast, the newly arriving destroyers were quickly spread 
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around the station. Commander Hamilton recorded in his diary that when dining aboard 
HMS Frobisher, after arriving at Hong Kong, he was just as keen to fight as Boyle, who he 
described as having a ‘great blood lust on’. While Boyle was not his direct superior it seems 
that the discussion defined Hamilton’s approach to China, with Commodore John Pearson at 
Hong Kong unable to provide specific orders about what the destroyers were actually meant 
to do.170 While apparently somewhat calmer, Commander de Winton later recalled in a 
similar manner how he took his ship up the Yangtze without really knowing what the 
situation was.171 Enthusiastic, relatively junior officers were therefore being fed into the 
Yangtze with most of their guidance coming from the war-mongering Boyle, who had no 
recent experience in China. 
When sailing up the Yangtze, the new officers did not appear to act in a way that was far 
removed from the approach taken by existing China Station commanders, but nonetheless 
there was still a difference. As might be expected in the situation, the new warships would 
immediately go to action stations upon sighting Chinese troops, their main guns ready to 
fire.172 A standing order, radioed around the station after the Nanjing Incident, stated that 
warships could open fire at shore targets if fired upon first.173 The new arrivals appear to 
have interpreted that as ‘should open fire’. HMS Emerald’s semi-official published account 
of its voyage summarised the results of that confusion as events 'developed into rather a 
farce, as even if a little sniping took place at ships the full main armament was brought to 
bear'.174 HMS Wanderer under Commander Hamilton, for example, engaged Chinese troops 
with all the guns at his disposal after coming under relatively light, if accurate, fire near 
Jiangsu on 2 May 1927. Even Hamilton realised afterwards that the expenditure of 
ammunition, particularly the use of seventy-six shells from Wanderer’s main 4.7” gun, was 
excessive and they had been too enthusiastic. What really marks the incident out, however, 
was that Hamilton turned Wanderer around and made further passes of that stretch of river 
to repeatedly bombard and attempt to destroy the Chinese troops’ field gun.175 Similarly, 
HMS Veteran expended roughly eighty shells to flatten a field gun at Kueishing Fort near 
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Zhenjiang in early April on its first run up the Yangtze.176 Veteran’s Lieutenant Commander 
Henry Clanchy also ordered his ship to turn around and return past the fort to continue the 
bombardment, even though it having suffered no more than a few bullet scratches to its 
paintwork during the whole affair.177 Both commanders had quickly expended one-sixth of 
their warship’s total store of shells, and a much higher proportion of their high explosive 
ones, during a single engagement against targets of negligible military value.178 
In contrast, the China Station resident HMS Magnolia had been fired upon on the same 
stretch of river in mid-April. Magnolia’s Commander Harold Hadley, however, chose to 
make a brief reply with one Pom-Pom and its Lewis guns, and ordered a cease fire within 
ten minutes, once the ship moved beyond the range of the Chinese troops.179  Similarly, the 
gunboat HMS Mantis came under fire near Nanjing in April, but only replied with its 
machine guns.180 Further afield around the Pearl River Delta, dealing with groups of bandits, 
gunboat commanders repeatedly reported landing and talking to villagers in response to 
incidents of firing at passing British ships. Lieutenant Commander Thompson on HMS Robin, 
for example, stated that he saw little value in firing as it would punish innocent civilians and 
the real offenders would almost certainly escape unharmed.181 While the Navy’s existing 
commanders were taking a pragmatic, defensive approach to dealing with gunfire from 
Chinese troops or bandits, the new arrivals were looking to make a statement and utilised 
traditional, aggressive Victorian gunboat tactics. 
In light of the enthusiasm with which the newly arrived warships had been engaging shore 
targets, Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt even felt it necessary to relay a series of instructions across 
his command restricting his commanding officers’ actions. On 18 May, orders were radioed 
out across the station that the expenditure of ammunition should be kept to a minimum, 
not only to limit the political impact, but also for reasons of economy. Moreover, Tyrwhitt 
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expressly forbade the use of the warships’ main guns unless there was a clear target, 
presenting a threat to life, and where firing would prove effective.182 
While such orders did instil some restraint on the new arrivals, they were surprisingly 
resistant to softening their stance as they got to understand the situation in China better. 
When posted to the recently evacuated Jiujiang in mid-May, for example, Commander 
Hamilton was told by the local Acting-Consul Ogden that surrendering the concession had 
changed little in practice. While many civilians had been evacuated, and the police and 
other civil authorities were now under Chinese control, business largely continued as 
before. Ogden had even been able to get his Chinese counterpart Chen to agree to pay rent 
to the British consulate for using the municipal buildings. Despite that apparently favourable 
modus vivendi, Hamilton wrote in his journal that 'I shall not have the slightest hesitation in 
opening fire if they give me the opportunity'.  
In any event, Hamilton did not sit and wait for the opportunity, and within days of arriving at 
Jiujiang he sent two dozen sailors marching through the old concession in an attempt to 
annoy Chen and provoke a response. When visited shortly afterwards by the Commander-
in-Chief, Hamilton felt that Tyrwhitt had been amused by the exercise, although he was 
subsequently taken aside by his superior and instructed to avoid creating an incident. The 
two officers knew and liked each-other, from when Hamilton had served under Tyrwhitt 
during his time commanding the Harwich Force in and immediately after the First World 
War. Indeed, Tyrwhitt recorded that he had ‘a very high opinion of this officer', after that 
commission and almost certainly played an important role in Hamilton’s early career 
development.183 As a result, Hamilton does appear to have respected the instructions to 
behave himself, although only temporarily.184 
This appears to have been one of a few reported cases where Tyrwhitt initially gave the 
impression he supported such rash actions, only subsequently to request that his 
subordinates follow his official policy of restraint. Indeed, Tyrwhitt appears to have been 
conflicted between a personal desire for action and his professional sense of duty as 
Commander-in-Chief to act in Britain’s best interests. On returning to Shanghai for example, 
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after meeting Hamilton and telling him to avoid creating incidents, Tyrwhitt was openly 
disappointed that his flagship had not been given an opportunity to fire.185 This behaviour 
may have contributed to the aggressiveness of some newly arrived officers, who did not 
have time to get to understand Tyrwhitt’s habits and that not all he said should have been 
taken as actual guidance on how to behave. 
Those developments are in contrast to earlier events, with the actions of a single gunboat 
commander illustrating the issue rather well. Commander Edward Jukes-Hughes was one of 
the first naval officers re-assigned to the China Station towards the end of the First World 
War, as the gunboats started to be re-commissioned. Within weeks of having taken 
command of HMS Widgeon on the upper Yangtze, the gunboat came under heavy rifle fire 
on 7 December 1917 after leaving the Yellow Flower Gorge near Chongqing. A later count 
revealed that at least a dozen bullets had hit the vessel, with one entering the officers’ 
wardroom. Jukes-Hughes ordered his men to reply with the 6-pounder main gun, and again 
the following day with both the main gun and maxim machine-guns, in order to silence their 
assailants. He recorded in his journal that at least some of the attackers had been killed. In 
contrast, when Widgeon came under fire on 2 July 1920 near Zhangzhou, Jukes-Hughes 
recorded that he first ordered the firing of a blank shell, followed by a live shell aimed into 
the middle of an empty field. Subsequent communication then revealed a case of mistaken 
identity, with apologies offered, and the incident passed without injury.  
There was clearly some excessive enthusiasm during the former incident, but after Jukes-
Hughes gained a better understanding of China he adopted the nuanced approach required 
with gunboat diplomacy. Admittedly the second event came almost three years later, but 
after those initial violent events, Jukes-Hughes’ journal suggests he gained a taste for acting 
as a diplomat when dealing with potential flashpoints during the intervening period. This is 
supported by his personnel files, which are full of praise for his calm and tactful behaviour, 
both when commanding Widgeon and then after his promotion to Senior Naval Officer on 
the Upper-Yangtze. Indeed, Rear-Admiral George Borrett recorded that Jukes-Hughes’ 
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actions ‘materially increased the prestige of the British flag through the province of 
Szechuan', benefitting from having built up an ‘extensive knowledge of China’.186 
The wave of new Royal Navy commanders arriving in 1927 showed no such interest in 
diplomacy or getting to know the country. They arrived with and continued to maintain a 
desire for action, and a strong willingness to take offence for perceived slights on behalf of 
the Navy and British Empire as a whole. That mindset went against one of the core tenets of 
gunboat diplomacy – the limited application of force. Curiously, while the newly arriving 
naval officers during this period tended to push an aggressive line, those of the 12th Royal 
Marine Battalion did not. Having arrived on 28 February, the marines initially took charge of 
defending Shanghai’s International Settlement, before slowly being replaced as British Army 
units trickled into the city. Throughout the Battalion’s China war diary, the commanding 
officer Lieutenant Colonel Robert Carpenter repeatedly noted that given the exposed 
position of his men, they should focus on defusing situations and avoiding confrontation.187 
This appears to have been largely a result of the precarious situations the Royal Marines 
were often placed in.  
Shortly after arriving in Shanghai, Colonel Carpenter proposed that those of his men 
intended to defend British possessions in Pudong, which was in the Chinese part of the city, 
should be based in ships on the Bund on the International side of the Huangpu River. That 
decision was based solely on the recognition that putting a small force of marines into 
Chinese territory, in the midst of large numbers of Chinese troops, would present a 
significant risk of clashes and damage to British property.188 In an even more pronounced 
case, in September, one company of marines was posted to defend British factories on the 
outskirts of Nanjing. It was hoped that those marines would provide sufficient protection for 
British businesses to be able to retrieve valuable machinery. The expeditionary force quickly 
converted a factory into an improvised fort, and confidently reported that they could 
defend it against any mob. Nonetheless, there was an underlying warning both in the orders 
issued to that company and the reports from it, that 10,000 Chinese troops were still 
positioned around Nanjing. With it came a reminder that the marines could only call upon 
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reinforcements from a single cruiser and were therefore badly outnumbered if the worst 
were to happen. As a result, the force was instructed to maintain a cordial relationship with 
the local Chinese commander and to avoid provoking protests.189 
The discipline shown by the 12th RMB in strictly following Carpenter’s orders is all the more 
unusual as it had been formed as an ad hoc unit. Newly formed from a combination of 
companies out of the Royal Marine depots at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, the 
battalion had arrived at Hong Kong only six weeks after the order had been issued for its 
formation. Carpenter had been given little time to prepare his unit for the tasks they would 
face. That challenge might have been avoided had the proposals of a 1924 Admiralty 
committee on the ‘Functions and Training of the Royal Marines’ been enacted.  
The ‘Madden Report’ as it was known, after its Chairman Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles 
Madden, tendered a definition of the Marines’ future role and made a series of 
recommendations as to how the force should be modernised. Adjutant-General Alexander 
Hutchison stated that their primary function was as a 'Landing force to preserve order, or to 
deal promptly with trouble in out of way places'.190 In effect, Hutchison was arguing that the 
Marines were there to support the Navy’s peacetime role as Britain’s imperial gendarmerie. 
While acknowledging the financial challenges facing the Admiralty, the report proposed 
withdrawing the small marine contingents aboard cruisers and light warships, and the 
formation of four 1,600-man formations and a central reserve. Three of those units would 
be placed at Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Hong Kong, from where they could quickly deploy to 
most of the likely trouble-spots around the Empire. While this required 1,900 extra Marines, 
it was expected that savings would be made by using civilians to take on some existing 
depot tasks, and the British Army garrisons at those three hubs could be reduced.191 The 
proposal had been rejected by First Sea Lord Earl Beatty, however, due to significant initial 
costs. 
Had the plan been enacted, the China Station would have had a force at its disposal ready 
for rapid deployment in response to potential threats. Kenneth Clifford has previously 
suggested that the essence of the proposals was still put into place, given the quick 
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formation and deployment of the battalion to Shanghai in 1927.192 Given Admiral Tyrwhitt’s 
statements about defending Hankou in January if he had 1,600 marines at his disposal, 
however, the six weeks it took for the force to arrive from Britain was very significant.193 
Without speculating on what the end result might have been, a marine battalion at Hong 
Kong would have been close enough to reach Hankou within a few days, with the orders 
issued by the Commander-in-Chief, not through Whitehall. It does highlight the limitation of 
Clifford’s argument, as the deployment was hardly that of the rapid reaction force 
envisaged in the Madden Report. Perhaps in defence of Beatty’s decision, having five 
detachments of eighty to one hundred marines aboard each of the China Station’s cruisers 
and smaller numbers on the sloops, may have been better suited to day-to-day 
requirements. With the exception of the 1926-27 crisis, having those smaller contingents 
spread around the region allowed the Navy to reassure treaty port communities at short 
notice during times of trouble. 
The Royal Marines by nature have always been separate from their parent service. When 
looking just at the Royal Navy itself, there was a clear divide in mentality and tactical 
approach between those officers who served on and those who were attached to the China 
Station, throughout the core crisis period between late 1926 and mid-1927. Within the 
localised context, it was the arriving group of naval officers who were behaving in the 
unusual manner, but taking the Royal Navy as a whole it was the China Station acting 
differently. The warships arriving in China came from all around the Empire; Emerald and 
Enterprise from the East Indies Station, the First Cruiser Squadron and Third Destroyer 
Flotilla from the Mediterranean Fleet, the Eighth Destroyer Flotilla from the Atlantic Fleet, 
and Argus from the Home Fleet. Sailing to the sound of the guns, those warships all came 
with a basic belief that aggressive gunboat tactics were effective in dealing with China and 
the officers were generally excited at the prospect of action. In August 1927 for example, 
Rear Admiral Hugh Tweedie was disappointed at being chosen to replace Cameron as 
commander of the Yangtze gunboats, believing himself to be the only senior officer who 
was not keen on getting involved in the trouble there. Indeed, Tweedie lamented that prior 
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to receiving the order sending him to China, he had been looking forward to a European 
posting that would allow him to spend more time with his wife.194 
The China Station differed from the rest of the Royal Navy because of its experiences during 
1925 and 1926. The Wanxian Incident in particular demonstrated that amid growing 
nationalist sentiment in China, localised clusters of the populace could no longer be coerced 
by the appearance of a British gunboat. Violent British actions were increasingly seen as 
having been made against the Chinese nation and not just against regional populations 
within China. This added to the existing subtle, but deep-set, institutional reluctance within 
the China Station towards gunboat diplomacy as a strategy. Not only were gunboat tactics 
proving to be increasingly ineffective, but their demise offered the opportunity to remove 
the drain of mundane operations aboard cramped vessels that took men and resources 
away from what were seen as the ‘real’ duties of the Royal Navy. 
A sudden influx in contrast to ordinary fleet rotation 
Over the course of a warship’s posting to any single station, its crew never remained the 
same for the whole commission. At regular points a portion, or indeed the entire 
complement, would be ‘paid off’ and sent back to the UK, either to rest at their home naval 
base or to leave the Service. In 1924, for example, both Magnolia and Hollyhock paid off 
their full crews at Hong Kong, taking aboard new replacements.195 For reasons of practicality 
and continuity, however, this process was usually an on-going one, with small groups of 
officers and men replaced when they were due for rotation or retirement. The China 
Station’s cruisers were treated slightly differently, with the vessels sent back to Britain when 
a replacement cruiser arrived, such as the switch of Cairo with Diomede in 1922.196  
While replacement crews certainly did produce some changes in approach, for the most 
part newly arrived officers opted on the side of caution. There appear to be three likely 
reasons why this was the case, in contrast to the more disruptive impact from the influx of 
new personnel in 1927. Firstly, numbers were clearly a factor as prior to 1927, particularly 
during quieter months, it was entirely feasible for the one or two new commanders to 
actually call upon the Commander-in-Chief or the Rear Admiral commanding the Yangtze 
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gunboats. In doing so, there was time for the senior officer to provide a detailed briefing on 
the assigned role as well as the general situation in China. No such luxury was available in 
late 1926 or 1927. Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt was not only busy travelling between locations 
trying to manage the crisis, but with thirty-six new warships arriving along with further 
replacement commanders it was impractical to give them the same preparatory briefings. 
Indeed, Commander Hamilton’s experience in Hong Kong, with Commodore Pearson lacking 
a detailed understanding of Tyrwhitt’s plans, highlights that the China Station’s command, 
control, and communication structure was struggling.197 
The second factor is the rank and general experience of the newly arriving officers and 
where they were being posted. During the comparatively peaceful early 1920s, the majority 
of replacements were for the gunboats and sloops, which involved junior officers being 
given their first full command afloat. Given their inexperience of sole command, 
unfamiliarity with their new environment, and since they were aboard quite modest 
warships, they were less apt to make rash decisions that could significantly harm their 
career development. In contrast, many of the destroyer commanders arriving in 1927 were 
on their second commands and the cruiser captains were seasoned officers. Captain 
England, for example, was forty-three in 1927, had been given his first command - the small 
destroyer HMS Fawn - back in 1909, and had been decorated for bravery during the First 
World War.198 With years of experience, those officers were not just practised in dealing 
with the demands inherent with command, but they were also expected to provide decisive 
leadership. 
Finally, it was made clear from the beginning that the surge of warships heading to China 
were not intended to stay there permanently. The orders sent to the vessels despatched 
emphasised it was a short-term attachment to the China Station.199 Likewise, the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, Viscount Bridgeman, publically stated in the House of Commons that the 
expeditionary force deployed to East Asia was a temporary measure.200 As a result, there 
were limited consequences for those officers on attachment, compared with those 
permanently based in the region. A river gunboat commander, for example, may have had 
                                                          
197 Journal of Commander Hamilton, 1927-1928. 
198 Service record of Hugh England, TNA, ADM 196/49/69. 
199 Admiral Tyrwhitt to Admiralty, 17 July 1927, TNA, ADM 116/2510. 
200 Hansard, 2 March 1927, v.203, cc. 358-9. 
Page | 255  
 
to continue working with his Chinese counterparts for years to come after a clash. In 
contrast, it was unlikely many of the newly arrived commanders would have to worry about 
such interactions, even if in practice it was later decided that one of the two destroyer 
flotillas should be permanently attached to the China Station.201 Awareness of potential 
consequences did not always mean officers behaved diplomatically, as was clearly the case 
with Lieutenant Commander Acheson during the events preceding the Wanxian Incident.202 
The frequency with which the temporarily attached ships become involved in clashes, 
however, and the volume of ammunition consumed in dealing with them, are clear 
indicators that newly arrived commanders were not worried about the long-term impact on 
their personal standing in China. 
New approaches and the Nelson Spirit 
Considering the historiographical debate about whether or not there remained an anti-
intellectual atmosphere within the 1920s Royal Navy, a look at grass-roots level yields some 
interesting results. To begin with, across all the accounts from both permanent and 
temporary members of the China Station, there are no records that suggest ordinary officers 
were dismissive of new technology in any way. This runs in contrast to the arguments by 
Arthur Marder and Jon Sumida that many officers were reluctant to adopt new equipment 
that mechanised existing processes.203 Those arguments were largely made in reference to 
the battle-fleet and wartime tactics, however, where the proposed equipment was more 
complicated and the consequences potentially far greater. In contrast, on the China Station 
the benefits of using new wireless sets, for example, were fairly obvious to all concerned. 
Indeed, by late 1927 Vice Admiral Tyrwhitt was putting pressure on merchant vessels to 
purchase and install radios, to aid the Royal Navy in its anti-piracy work.204 Likewise, the 
range of new operational uses for aircraft from the carrier HMS Hermes found between its 
first and second deployments to Hong Kong from display flights to scouting patrols ahead of 
the anti-piracy raids in Mirs Bay showed not just an acceptance of new technology but an 
enthusiasm for employing it.205 Together this adds a little nuance to existing debates, by 
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highlighting that the grand theoretical arguments about operations involving fleet vessels 
only illustrate what was happening within one, admittedly very important, segment of the 
Navy. While previous reforms had much diminished its brown-water forces, the 1920s Royal 
Navy was still far more than just a battle-fleet. 
Exploring the changing tactical approaches taken by the China Station towards the 
challenges it faced produces a slightly different picture to that involving technology. In 
particular, the phase between the Wanxian Incident and late 1927 provides a range of cases 
where officers deliberately resisted moving away from long-established policies. Hamilton’s 
efforts to provoke a clash at Jiujiang, for example, went completely against the new tactics 
proposed by Cameron and harked back to an earlier Victorian understanding of gunboat 
diplomacy. Outlining what he felt the situation to be in his journal, Hamilton argued that the 
Royal Navy was only on the Yangtze due to trade, and if the Chinese could not be trusted to 
ensure law and order, then Britain should do so by employing garrisons and gunboats. 
Moreover, Hamilton felt that any withdrawal would see British steamers have to fall back, 
which would severely damage British Imperial prestige.206 While particularly vocal in his 
beliefs, Hamilton was not alone in holding that view, with many officers struggling to 
countenance alternative strategies or tactics for dealing with the situation in China, no 
matter how effective or not they might be.  
Behind the conservatism displayed by many Royal Navy officers in China, their core mind-set 
appears to be tied in with a belief in the value of a Nelson Spirit, with attitude more 
important than tactics. This is hardly surprising when considering the early training those 
officers would have received as cadets or at the staff colleges. Harry Dickinson, for example, 
argues that the historical knowledge of many junior officers prior to the First World War 
amounted to ‘little more than tales of heroic action and daring deed’.207 There were some 
efforts at reforming the system during and after the war, but the focus remained on spirit 
over technical training.208 Beyond Jutland and submarine warfare, the Cambridge University 
Course for Naval Officers in 1922, for example, was heavily based around lectures exhorting 
the bravery displayed in the time of Nelson. In the amphibious warfare section there was 
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not even a single mention of what had occurred at Gallipoli or Zeebrugge, just a few years 
beforehand, with the main focus on Wolfe’s exploits at Quebec in 1759.209 So pronounced 
was the focus upon the exploits of famous admirals, when it came to leadership training 
that many cadets and junior officers regarded the training with a high degree of cynicism.210 
Commander Darley’s attempted cutting out of the two merchant steamers at Wanxian, 
against overwhelming odds, was a product of that unbalanced approach to education. 
Darley and his force went into action with the unwavering belief that their bravery and 
Nelson Spirit would leave Chinese troops in awe, recognising the inherent superiority of the 
Royal Navy, and throw down their arms.211 As retold in HMS Despatch’s account of the 
preparations: ‘It was thought that… the men on board the 'Wanhsien' on seeing an armed 
party suddenly draw up alongside would down arms.’212 In reality, Chinese troops were 
increasingly armed with weapons capable of matching those used by the Navy, and they 
were also willing actually to use them.213 Lieutenant K.R. Buckley’s submission to the Naval 
Review in 1930, reporting the Third Destroyer Flotilla’s experiences while in China, 
demonstrates how the new arrivals failed to appreciate fully the significance of Wanxian. 
The report summarised the lesson from the incident as ‘Their (the gunboats) bluff was called 
at Wanhsien and it was seen that, with the modern weapons of war now in China, 
something bigger was needed to provide security for treaty ports.’214 Upgrading the naval 
deterrent from a gunboat to a destroyer at some middle Yangtze ports did provide an 
additional eighty sailors and two more main guns, but that changed the balance little if they 
were pitted against thousands of relatively well-armed Chinese troops ashore.  
It was not therefore so much a case of anti-intellectual attitudes directly holding back the 
adoption of new tactics to deal with the evolving challenges faced in China, but rather a 
long-term consequence of the inadequacies of the Royal Navy’s system for educating its 
young officers. There was an enthusiasm for exploring new ways of using technology and for 
improving the way in which the Navy went about its precise tasks. When it came to dealing 
with the changing environment in which they operated, however, many officers displayed 
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the hallmarks of anti-intellectualist behaviour through their weak training in objectively 
assessing the situation. Other factors were at play, however, with racial attitudes common 
within the Navy towards the Chinese just as significant as reluctance to change. Echoing the 
words of Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Gerald Dickens in 1935, the Royal 
Navy’s patronising and prejudiced attitude towards Asian peoples was just as problematic in 
its dealings with China as it would become with Japan.215 Regarding Chinese troops as 
naturally inferior contributed to significant underestimations about the increasingly tenuous 
position Britain was in, and was the underlying reason why new tactics, such as those 
developed by Rear Admiral Cameron in late 1926, were necessary. 
Summary 
Over the course of the 1920s there were a number of gradual developments in the 
approach taken by the Royal Navy towards China, and the impact those changes had upon 
the course of events. Most notably, there was a slow and steady shift towards using greater 
levels of violence in providing forceful responses to threats, whether ashore or afloat. Much 
of that trend was catalysed by growing nationalist sentiment in China and with it the 
contagion impact of localised events spreading rapidly across discontiguous regions. 
Fundamentally, the Navy was struggling to cope with the new environment in China, where 
it was dealing with numerous, increasingly well-armed groups operating in isolation, but 
linked by a common sense of identity. This process ultimately culminated in the violent 
events at Wanxian in September 1926, which represented the real end of the Royal Navy’s 
purposeful use of gunboat diplomacy in China. From that point onwards, the Navy’s 
behaviour in China became less about trying forcefully to coerce the local population into 
accepting a form of British imperial presence ashore, and more about simply defending a 
reduced number of core ports. As events developed, it proved an impossible task to protect 
much more than Shanghai and Hong Kong, although the Navy continued to operate far 
inland up the Yangtze and West rivers. Just as the final line was drawn by the British 
commanders in the region, with plans to offer a sustained defence of Shanghai’s 
International Settlement, the diplomatic situation moved on and war was avoided. Britain 
formally agreed to a new post-imperial relationship with China, and the Guomindang 
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dropped its anti-foreign rhetoric to focus on its new struggle with the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
The cases after the Wanxian Incident where British warships employed gunboat tactics 
generally came as a result of the diverse force assembled during the crisis triggered by the 
Northern Expedition. Newly arrived officers did not generally receive sufficient guidance 
necessary to fully understand the situation in China and tended to act in a particularly 
aggressive manner. The nature of that unprepared naval relief force is something that has 
not previously been explored in the existing historiography, with general assumptions that 
the Royal Navy operated as one. In reality, a significant range of attitudes and approaches 
were taken by the different officers, with the China Station possessing a distinct personality. 
The China Station warships not only appeared visibly different, with their bright white 
painted hulls, but the unusual circumstances in East Asia produced a specific mind-set, when 
compared to the rest of the Navy’s global operations. This is potentially of significance when 
examining the Navy’s operations elsewhere around the British Empire during the period, 
where local forces may have been affected by the arrival of new warships, which would 
require further research beyond this thesis. 
On the peacetime frontline of the British Empire, the Royal Navy’s officers did display some 
of the traits discussed during existing debates about an anti-intellectualist attitude existing 
within the Service during the early twentieth century. This was significant in the way the 
newly arrived officers in 1927 behaved, given an unwillingness among some officers to 
adapt to the new environment and find a solution that met Britain’s interests in the region. 
In particular, this proved problematic when combined with those exhibiting a strong focus 
on the ‘Nelson Spirit’, putting greater emphasis on their aggressive spirit and taking direct 
action, than developing more effective tactics. There was still a strong desire to make use of 
new technologies to improve the effectiveness with which the Navy could conduct its 
required duties. This stands in contrast to some of the debates within the battle fleet of the 
Navy during this period, where officers resisted mechanising certain fighting functions. 
Reluctance to adopt new ideas among ordinary officers was certainly not the same as a 
reluctance to use new equipment.  
The changing tactical approaches taken by the Royal Navy in China had a significant bearing 
upon the ways events developed, even if they evolved quite slowly over much of the 
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decade. While the Wanxian Incident represented a significant turning point, the roots of the 
crisis went back much further. Of all the challenges, however, that faced the China Station in 
its efforts to support Britain’s presence in East Asia it was one completely unrelated to 
tactical or even strategic thought that proved the most influential. Ultimately, the lack of 
respect shown towards the Chinese, and the resulting failure to appreciate their greater 
military capabilities, undermined Britain’s ability to control a measured withdrawal of 
informal empire. The same racially charged attitude of complacency existed towards the 
Japanese and would prove particularly costly in later years. The Royal Navy in the 1920s still 
had to balance the requirements between presenting a deterrent towards Japan, while 
facing against the threats posed by the situation in China. It is important therefore to go 
beyond considering the Navy’s operations on the Chinese coast, and how technology and 
tactics influenced the approach taken, to consider events against the wider context of the 
naval situation in East Asia. 
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Conclusion 
Returning to its peacetime work after the First World War, the Royal Navy’s China Station 
found itself on a new frontline as the British Empire struggled to adapt to a changed world 
environment, born out of years of conflict, revolution, and turmoil. The decade of ‘violent 
peace’ that followed saw fundamental shifts in both Britain’s relationship with China and 
the Royal Navy’s strategic position in East Asia. A core theme revealed by this thesis has 
been the extent to which those naval and imperial developments were interrelated. 
Localised issues involving the defence of Britain’s outposts of informal empire were 
inherently interlinked with matters of grand defence strategy. The work done by the China 
Station had a central role in both the maintenance of the Empire and in Britain’s strategic 
planning, although not always in ways that were valued or appreciated by the Royal Navy at 
the time. Developments in naval technology and tactics could and did play important parts 
in the evolving relationship between the two countries, and not just through moments of 
violence. In return, fluctuations in Britain’s imperial position in China had a significant 
influence over the strategies developed in Whitehall to counter the threats posed by both 
the global spread of communism and Japan’s growing military might. Bringing together 
those two strands, this thesis shows just how important events in East Asia were during the 
period. In particular, it highlights the often overlooked 1927 Shanghai Crisis, which triggered 
one of the Royal Navy’s most significant peacetime deployments of naval power in its 
history. Britain’s naval history of the interwar period is not just one of a battle-fleet 
preparing for a possible future decisive major engagement. The mainstream Royal Navy 
maintained an active operational deployment on the Chinese coast throughout the 1920s, 
fighting what amounted to an on-going low intensity conflict. 
A vital new angle that this thesis adds to our understanding of Britain’s imperial relationship 
with China comes from breaking down the image of the Royal Navy as a wall of blue 
uniforms, wholly committed to imperialist ideals. A complex array of issues lay behind many 
of the key moments that influenced the fortunes of the British Empire in East Asia, with 
human and technical factors as important as ideology and instructions from the metropole. 
Just as Robert Bickers’ detailed analysis of Richard Tinkler’s experiences with the SMP 
yielded new insights into the realities of life on the periphery of Empire, this study adds 
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similar colour to our understanding of the Navy’s role in those developments.1 By revealing 
the lives and experiences of Britain’s gunboat crews, this thesis highlights the limited 
influence that senior diplomats, politicians, and military commanders had upon events. 
Junior officers were often placed in positions with an unduly weighty responsibility for the 
implementation of foreign policy. Individual abilities, training, aptitude, and attitudes 
towards their work were all just as significant as official policy. Some were consummate 
professionals, whereas others let egos, career aspirations, and racial prejudices cloud their 
judgement. The personality traits of key individuals played defining roles in each of the most 
contentious violent clashes involving the Royal Navy. 
At the height of the 1927 crisis, one event in particular demonstrates how the approach 
taken by this thesis in combining naval and imperial aspects improves our understanding of 
a pivotal period in Anglo-Chinese relations. At thirty-seven past three on 24 March 1927 the 
city of Nanjing reverberated as HMS Emerald and two USN destroyers hurled a salvo of 
shells at the city’s northernmost extremities. The significance of the decisions made by 
Emerald’s Captain Hugh England, both immediately before and after that critical moment, 
have either been over or under-stated by imperial and naval historians ever since. That 
cacophonous cannonade crowned an incident that suitably illustrates a period of 
momentous changes and challenges for the Royal Navy and British Empire as a whole. 
Emerald was part of a vast peacetime armada, led by officers with minimal knowledge of 
local circumstances who therefore adopted out-dated tactics, which had already been 
proven ineffective in a rapidly modernising China. Throughout the Nanjing Incident, 
diplomats and indeed diplomacy were side-lined as the two groups of armed individuals 
were caught in a maelstrom that led to a violent clash with lasting repercussions for the 
nations they represented. Imperial dominance was on the wane, and the Navy’s furthest 
outposts were already being proactively and reactively withdrawn. As a result, the parade of 
naval strength that Emerald was a part of failed to mask that Chinese troops had already 
called Britain’s gunboat bluff on the upper Yangtze. Emerald and its American counterparts 
may have brought Nanjing to a standstill, allowing most remaining Anglo-American 
                                                          
1 Bickers, Empire Made Me. 
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personnel to be evacuated, but the violence only added momentum to the wave of change 
swamping Britain’s extra-territorial outposts.  
The Royal Navy as an organisation provided the bulk of the ordinary, everyday contact 
between the British establishment and China’s officials and population. While technology 
was improving the ability of the Service to control those interactions, this thesis shows that 
events such as those at Nanjing were often dictated by decisions made by relatively junior 
officers. Independent command was much rarer in the 1920s Royal Navy that it had been in 
previous decades, but we should not over-state the level of top-down control it was possible 
for senior command to exert in practice. The stories of those individuals who manned the 
China Station therefore take on a far greater significance in the broader debates of Britain’s 
position in the interwar world. Sometimes those who made the ‘great man’ decisions that 
changed the path of events were actually the ordinary individuals on the scene, who have 
until now remained nameless and forgotten.  
The Royal Navy and Imperial Policing 
The China Station’s anti-piracy work and implementation of gunboat diplomacy have been 
key features in accounts of the period. What this study highlights is the degree of continuity 
between how the Royal Navy approached those interrelated roles, but not always in the 
ways that it has often been assumed. For both duties, the China Station had always been 
reliant upon bluff and the ability of young gunboats commanders to realise that the Navy’s 
work in those areas could only succeed if threats of violence were sparingly implemented. 
Examining the mechanics of those duties in detail, this thesis shows how reluctant the 
Admiralty was about deploying resources towards tasks it saw as peripheral to the safety of 
the British Empire. As a result, the China Station was re-instated with a relatively modest 
gunboat force in 1919, little different in strength to that in place either side of the Boxer 
Rebellion twenty years earlier. China was changing rapidly in ideas, technology, and 
international outlook, but the China Station’s resources remained much the same. The 
Admiralty was committed to the defence of the Empire, but there was an institutional 
reluctance towards supporting peripheral informal aspects, long established by the 1920s 
and which pre-dated the corresponding changes in public and diplomatic stances. 
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By understanding and acknowledging that continuity and those attitudes, it allows us to 
better grasp the great significance of the task force sent out to China in 1927. This thesis 
demonstrates that not only was it the largest peacetime deployment of Royal Navy warships 
east of Suez between 1919 and 1939, but that it also brought Britain close to partial 
mobilisation. At no other point during the interwar period did that occur, even during the 
Chanak and Abyssinian crises. As a result, the thesis highlights that Shanghai 1927 is the 
often-forgotten crisis - a pivotal moment that played a huge role in defining the path of East 
Asian geo-politics in the following decade.  
Fully appreciating the scale of escalation in the military approach taken in late 1926 is vital 
for two reasons. Firstly, it was not just a last roll of the dice for the British Empire. As an 
extraordinary display of hard power in peacetime, it strongly suggests that the British 
government was extremely concerned about the wider significance of what was happening 
in China. In particular, the relationship between events in China and the global struggle 
against communism. The question in the minds of British officials was what impact it would 
have on the safety of the entire British Empire if an anti-imperialist group, supported by 
Soviet Russia, were seen to succeed in forcing major concessions out of Whitehall. The 
timing of the task force’s full deployment, with many vessels despatched after the 
diplomatic agreements conceding extra-territorial rights on the Upper and Middle Yangtze, 
highlights that a line had been drawn, beyond which there was a genuine risk of war. 
Moreover, it represented a significant statement by the British government in re-affirming 
that the British Empire was still the global superpower, as no other power in 1927 had the 
military resources to sustain a similar deployment. Whether the Shanghai response 
represented a peak moment for British naval power projection or came in the years after 
the zenith had already been passed is perhaps a rather academic and moot point. It does, 
however, represent a far more pivotal moment than any one of the new warships launched 
by Japan or America in the period, which have frequently been used as a crude yardstick to 
measure naval power. Of far greater practical significance for the years to follow, the 
Shanghai deployment was Britain’s last serious and confident attempt at demonstrating 
global naval supremacy, before unilateral efforts made way for an increasingly multilateral 
approach towards global crises. 
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Secondly, the task force highlights just how exposed Britain’s position in East Asia had been 
during the early 1920s. The defence of Britain’s informal imperial interests in China had 
been conducted very efficiently, but it frequently left warships and their crews extremely 
isolated and vulnerable. As surplus wartime military equipment flooded into the region, the 
relatively safety of life aboard gunboats in mid-river was taken away. When faced by those 
new threats, the gunboat crews knew that rescue forces and reinforcements would take 
considerable time to arrive. That background knowledge influenced their decisions in such 
hazardous circumstances, although not always with the same end result. This is particularly 
important to consider when exploring the Royal Navy’s imperial policing work. Individual 
officers still had an unbridled confidence in Britain’s overall naval power. However, when 
judging their actions we should keep in mind just how dangerous the situations were that 
they were placed in and the impact that may have had upon their behaviour. 
The extent to which the China Station’s crews were exposed to danger during the 1920s 
relates to another important finding of this thesis – the earlier date for the collapse of 
gunboat diplomacy in China. Following a decade of traumatic changes around the world in 
the 1910s, the 1920s Royal Navy faced numerous significant regional challenges in its role as 
Britain’s ‘imperial gendarmerie’. As a result of the new questions being asked of the Navy in 
East Asia, China became the focus of a sustained active deployment unseen elsewhere in 
the world during that decade. This began with the task of reining in the flourishing levels of 
piracy, which had become a significant hazard for trade passing along China’s waterways 
and coast. Not only was the scale of piracy in Chinese waters a challenge, but this thesis has 
shown how the nature of the threat was itself relatively new and why that is so significant.  
In particular, hostage-taking and hijacking had emerged as the predominant modus 
operandi among the pirate bands. Those types of attack were, and still are, difficult to 
prevent, detect, or respond to. The British gunboats available were also simply not designed 
or equipped for dealing with such low-level threats. Not only did ‘internal piracy’ represent 
a new challenge, but this thesis has shown that there was also considerable reluctance 
within the Royal Navy to be drawn into what many officers considered to be an issue for the 
local civilian port authorities. Responsibility nonetheless fell upon the China Station. That 
institutional disinterest in countering modern piracy combined with post-war financial 
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restrictions to result in only a small pool of pre-existing resources being assigned to dealing 
with the problem, further limiting the effectiveness of the Royal Navy’s response.  
Indeed, the China Station was the Admiralty’s third largest global deployment after the First 
World War, but the resources available were quite modest when compared with what they 
were expected to achieve. By exploring their day-to-day duties, such as counter-piracy 
patrols, this thesis highlights how a remarkable amount of the Royal Navy’s active 
operational work in peacetime was done by a surprisingly small segment of the Service. 
Moreover, as gunboat service was generally not valued as a career path, this adds to our 
understanding of the culture of the interwar Royal Navy. Opportunities to gain significant 
independent command experience and familiarity with combat pressures, were overlooked 
in favour of training with the battle fleet. When compared to those well-studied capital 
ships, which spent the period largely dormant, the work of the Royal Navy’s small ships in 
fighting the little wars of Empire should be the focus of far greater research. 
The visible and secret influences of new technology 
Throughout the decade as it was busy maintaining the periphery of Empire, the China 
Station was not a constant, un-evolving entity. The Admiralty were receptive to using 
technology as a means of prolonging the effectiveness of the gunboat bluff and sometimes 
actively encouraged the use of new equipment as a means of reducing the cost of such 
duties. While this thesis shows that new technology did often help the Royal Navy, the 
impact was far outweighed by the significant improvements in equipment available to 
China’s armies and pirate bands. As a result, the effectiveness with which British gunboats 
could conduct their duties changed as the safety of their crews decreased even further. This 
is significant as it demonstrates that Britain’s military edge was not just being rapidly eroded 
at the top level, by major power arms races, but that it applied in general. Military aircraft 
and armoured vehicles were formidable new threats to second tier powers, insurgents, and 
bandits, but Britain’s technological advantage was on the wane. Just as the mass-availability 
of modern weaponry after the First World War contributed to violence and revolutionary 
activity in Eastern Europe during the 1920s, it also played a key role in changing the balance 
of power in East Asia.2 
                                                          
2 Gerwarth, The Vanquished, p.9. 
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Amid those dangers human factors rose to the fore. Aggressive or unstable junior officers 
were placed in high-risk, high-pressure situations, sometimes culminating in truly 
catastrophic consequences, such as at Shamian Island and Wanxian. This thesis argues that 
gunboat diplomacy had already reached its crisis point well before the clashes of 1926, 
partly as a result of those human factors. The violent events that resulted were therefore 
symptoms and not the cause of the collapse of Britain’s Victorian imperial approach to 
China. Reviewing the violence seen at Shamian, Wanxian, and Nanjing also highlights the 
importance of human and technical factors in determining the wider course of Anglo-
Chinese relations during the period. The situations arose as a result of British imperial 
policy, but the outcomes were dictated by local factors. These fit into two main categories – 
a lack of adequate equipment, and a failing outdated structure for controlling and 
supporting individual commanders. 
While the overall balance was not in the Royal Navy’s favour, technology did enable them to 
do more with less, prolonging Britain’s ability to maintain the status quo for its outposts of 
informal Empire in East Asia. Not all the measures were primarily intended to improve 
productivity, with many peacetime benefits of new equipment tangential to their wartime 
purpose, particularly in the case of submarines and aircraft carriers. Radio equipment was 
the most significant of the enhancements, allowing the China Station’s submarines to ease 
the burdens on the surface fleet, for example, by patrolling for potentially pirated merchant 
ships. The Silent Service is rarely thought of as having been a tool for imperial policing, but 
submarines played a significant role by freeing up manpower for other duties. Quietly 
hunting potentially pirated vessels was also felt to offer more realistic exciting scenarios for 
preparing submarine crews for wartime, than pre-planned exercises with other Royal Navy 
warships. In this way, this thesis helps show the operational history of the Royal Navy in 
peace and war is not one of two separate stories, but heavily interlinked developments. 
The employment of new technology on the China Station during the 1920s has yielded 
perhaps the most controversial finding from this study. Britain’s first purpose-built aircraft 
carrier HMS Hermes was attached to the China Station nominally on imperial policing 
purposes, given its ability to transport hundreds of soldiers quickly against potential threats. 
Hermes’ deployment to East Asia took pressure off of the China Station’s surface fleet and 
also enabled aerial patrols to help avoid unwanted violent clashes. Despite achieving 
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temporary successes in that role, this thesis reveals that Hermes’ deployment had another 
hidden motive and one that the British government were eager to keep secret. Hermes 
delivered supplies and aircraft that would form the basis for converting Kai Tak in Hong 
Kong into a military airfield, in contravention of the Washington Treaty. 
In part Hermes’ secret mission emphasises the value the British government attributed to 
the Washington Treaty during the early 1920s, given Whitehall’s unwillingness to risk an 
obvious breach of its terms. There is no clear evidence as to whether the British government 
explicitly approved that decision, highlighting the sensitivity of the matter, although it 
seems unlikely that senior cabinet members were wholly unaware of what was happening. 
It also highlights that it was not just the Axis antagonists of the Second World War who 
quietly undermined the interwar peace and disarmament treaties in the pursuit of their own 
national interests. Additional examples are likely to be discovered in time, involving all the 
major powers, which will further emphasise the limitations of the interwar disarmament 
treaties. Questions are also raised by the increasingly open ways that Britain infringed on 
the clause restricting development of military bases beyond Singapore towards the end of 
the decade, before seeking its removal from the London Naval Treaty in 1930. In particular, 
this suggests that all was not quite how it seemed behind the British government’s official 
assertions that disarmament treaties remained a cornerstone of British foreign policy and 
grand strategy in that key period. 
A violent failure of tactical change - The end of gunboat diplomacy 
While the efforts to improve the efficiency with which the Royal Navy could defend Britain’s 
interests in East Asia were driven by economic necessity, wider changes in attitude towards 
the role of violence in imperial policing also took effect. In the aftermath of the First World 
War, public distaste for fresh conflict had an impact on the decisions made about how to 
defend Britain’s outposts of Empire. This thesis shows that there were also changes in the 
attitudes of naval personnel towards the use of lethal force against those who opposed the 
Empire. There was greater concern within the Admiralty about negative public reactions 
through heavy-handed actions, reflected in the stronger language and restrictions present in 
orders issued to the China Station over the decade. Indeed, this thesis highlights that while 
the 1926 December Memorandum marks when the British government was most concerned 
about violence on the ground, many of the rules for officers on the scene were simply 
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restatements of those already in place. This is of wider importance because it shows that far 
from being pushed into reducing the level of violence used in enforcing Britain’s foreign 
policy, the Royal Navy itself played an active role from early on in the process of change. 
The First World War may have catalysed a shift in attitudes within the Royal Navy towards 
imperial violence, but this did not prevent the evolution of a violent form of gunboat 
diplomacy in China. Initially, there was an attempt to return to pre-war tactics, focused 
upon coercive behaviour backed up by the threat of reprisals. Short, sharp bursts of usually 
excessive violence could reinforce the impression of power. The regular, sustained, and 
widespread clashes by 1926 however, exposed the reliance of interwar gunboat diplomacy’s 
on bluffing the Chinese population. Not even at its peak power could the British Empire 
afford to maintain the permanent levels of military force required, worldwide, to enforce 
such an approach. While there was no single climactic incident that heralded the end of 
gunboat diplomacy in China, the growing background crisis took its toll. 
The resulting pressure that junior officers were placed under, both in relation to anti-piracy 
work and countering threats against treaty ports led to some bending of the rules of 
engagement, while others either re-actively or pro-actively chose to employ the weapons at 
their disposal. As naval fusillades became more commonplace, the China Station’s gunboat 
flotilla slid from being a coercive force to one reliant upon the actual use of violence to 
achieve its aims. The Royal Navy recognised that the situation was unsustainable, but 
attempts to develop new strategies failed, largely due to the inability to lift the pressure 
from the officers attempting to implement them. It was a case of too little, too late. As a 
result, efforts to withdraw from commitments to the middle and upper Yangtze were 
undermined by individual officers taking alternative paths. This process was not helped by a 
consistent lack of adequate leadership by the Commanders-in-Chief between 1924 and 
1927. Rear-Admiral Sir Allan Everett suffered a mental breakdown, Vice-Admiral Sir Edwyn 
Alexander-Sinclair failed to communicate effectively with his officers, and Vice-Admiral 
Reginald Tyrwhitt’s mixed messages caused confusion. Ultimately, however, the disastrous 
attempts to up-date the Royal Navy’s approach to China during the period reflected deep-
set institutional flaws regarding the Service’s attitude towards peacetime operations. 
The complacency with which the Royal Navy fought the ‘little wars of Empire’ is visible in 
the progression of events towards the carnage at Shamian, Wanxian, and Nanjing, with 
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frequent contradictions between official policy, strategy, personal intent, and end-results. 
This highlights an area that requires greater research in general – the processes by which 
imperial policing led to mass-casualty clashes, particularly ones involving subjugated 
populations. Naval bombardments may have ended with similar results, but they occurred 
for a variety of reasons and were influenced by a range of factors including: breakdowns in 
mental health (Shamian), aggressive individual officers (Wanxian), inaccurate weaponry 
(Nanjing), limitations of equipment (Wanxian and Nanjing), and mistaken identity (Yangtze 
riverside engagements). Of particular significance is the finding that imperial identity and 
beliefs may have been a background catalyst in almost all such clashes, but it was usually 
only a secondary factor. In terms of causality therefore, aggressive conduct by British 
officers did not always result from those individuals intending to commit acts of violence in 
support of the Empire.  
The events of the 24 March 1927 at Nanjing provide a valuable case study for the historical 
caution required when assessing casualties resulting from politically contentious clashes. 
This thesis has shown that Captain England did not order his men to bombard the city 
directly on the first day of the incident, as has sometimes been suggested, but instead 
targeted a sparsely populated area on the extremity of Nanjing.3 His behaviour the following 
day in threatening to punitively bombard the city and the general impression given by a 
major warship firing towards Nanjing have clouded our understanding of the incident. By 
looking in detail at the events of the 24 March, it is possible to say that if reports of 2,000 
civilian deaths that day are accurate, the majority did not result from British actions, 
although the numbers are likely to be higher than British claims at the time. Captain England 
had the intent and opportunity, but the evidence suggests that the most likely locations for 
civilian casualties were in areas either under machine-gun fire from American warships or 
where fighting occurred between rival groups of Chinese troops. 
Those are relatively modest changes in our understanding of the events that day, but 
represent valuable lessons in the need for objective and detailed assessment of such horrific 
incidents. Indeed, while this thesis highlights that British responsibility for mass casualties at 
Nanjing has been overstated, the opposite is true in relation to Wanxian. Very few cases 
                                                          
3 E.g. Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, p.138; Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, p.50. 
Page | 271  
 
offer sufficient evidence for historians to say with certainty the precise number of people 
killed and attribute direct blame for their deaths. What these cases show, however, is that 
there is usually enough material to challenge second-hand accounts, providing more 
accurate assessments, and in doing so present more nuanced explanations for who was 
responsible and why.  
China’s role in Britain’s regional relationships with other navies 
Along a similar line, by looking at a broad selection of events in China this thesis also adds 
greater depth to our understanding of the Royal Navy’s relationships with the navies of 
other powers. The 1920s did feature considerable top-level wrangling between the world’s 
major navies over arms limitation treaties, particularly between Britain, the USA, and Japan. 
From an operational point of view, however, there was a slightly different story. On the 
peacetime frontline on China’s coastline and waterways, away from the diplomatic 
wrangling, foreign warships and their crews could operate really quite closely. To a large 
extent this camaraderie resulted from their mutually exposed location, separated by 
considerable distances from other warships flying the same flag.  
British and American crews in particular appear to have regularly interpreted their official 
orders in favourable ways for their local counterparts - for their friends. A social rivalry 
between Royal Navy and US Navy crews was tolerated, even encouraged at times, but the 
regular hosting of Anglo-American boxing tournaments, dinners, cinema nights, and drinking 
sessions built a special connection. There was no official ‘Special Relationship’ and there was 
greater friction than between British and Dutch crews, but in times of crisis co-operation 
was generally given as freely as possible within the confines of official instructions and 
sometimes beyond them. In effect, an informal understanding was reached between the 
two navies that could be compared to the so-called ‘good cop – bad cop’ routine. Britain 
was already unpopular and so the Royal Navy could and would act aggressively to defend 
Anglo-American interests. Conversely, the US Navy was willing to use its neutrality as a 
calming influence at ports, even if it could not promise to defend actively the civilians or 
property of other nations if violence erupted. That is extremely significant when assessing 
many of the events around China during the late 1920s, particularly in terms of intent and 
the extent to which official foreign policies were actually adhered to on the scene. Indeed, 
however quickly the wartime alliance may have been abandoned in favour of official 
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antagonism at a senior level, the bonds between the two institutions and their crews 
remained. 
The Royal Navy’s relationship with the Imperial Japanese Navy is even more complicated 
than might be assumed from top-level debates. There was a general trend of worsening 
attitudes between British and Japanese service personnel in China, in keeping with existing 
understanding of the period. This seems to have been driven, by the official orders given to 
Japanese commanders as the IJN’s rigid command structure left individual officers little 
room for manoeuvre. In contrast, Royal Navy officers were afforded greater freedom to act 
on their own initiative, despite the gradual shift towards centralisation. The positive or 
negative outcome of individual Anglo-Japanese interactions was therefore heavily 
influenced by the attitude of the British officer concerned. While this does not 
fundamentally change our understanding of the relationship between the two powers in the 
period, it raises the possibility that poor inter-personal relations may have undermined top-
level cooperation. This would take further investigation to confirm, but it does add a human 
angle to existing debates about the failure of joint military efforts between Britain and Japan 
in China. 
Worsening relations between British and Japanese officers serving on the Chinese coast 
came against a background decline in the two countries’ overall relationship. The Royal 
Navy’s top-level planning for a potential war with Japan also involved China, to an extent 
not previously acknowledged. Fortifying Singapore, securing naval superiority in the South 
China Seas with the battle fleet, and America’s potential stance were all significant in 
Britain’s grand strategy for East Asia. What this thesis shows, however, is that the Admiralty 
believed that the most likely triggers for a war between Britain and Japan would be related 
to China. Moreover, given geographic considerations, the Chinese coast would play a pivotal 
role in the outcome of any such conflict. What this shows is that the existing debates 
surrounding the speed with which the battle fleet could be assembled at Singapore are to 
an extent misaligned.  
With hindsight, what happened at Pearl Harbor does raise questions as to whether this 
China-focused strategy took too much comfort from the low likelihood of a successful 
surprise attack. Likewise, based upon the events of 1927 in China, Britain’s intelligence 
capabilities in East Asia were insufficient for the task of informing and forewarning the China 
Page | 273  
 
Station. The core strategic plan, however, was predicated on a reasonable assumption that 
major Royal Navy warships would already be heading east, before a Japanese campaign 
against Britain began, even if it was not the full battle fleet. The weakness in Britain’s plans 
for countering Japan during the 1920s and early 1930s was not therefore one of timing and 
logistics. Instead, we should be focusing upon the lack of long-term planning in the years 
after the First World War, given that the steady planned growth in Japanese naval power 
was always going to neutralise Britain’s core strategy by the mid-to-late 1930s. 
Contemporary discussion about deflecting Japanese aggression into China and vague 
allusions to possible Anglo-American alliances suggest an unwillingness to confront the real 
challenge, and that mentality of denial perhaps now requires further research. 
This thesis also shows how the second stage of Britain’s East Asia strategy, an attempted 
blockade against Japan, was likewise built around China. If the first leg was intended to 
prevent Britain losing the war, this was the phase that would decide whether the war could 
be won. This again adds a new angle to existing debates, particularly those exploring why 
Britain continued to commit to the defence of Hong Kong during the period, along with the 
contested status of Herbert Richmond as one of the great naval thinkers of his time. In 
terms of Britain’s strategy for action off the Chinese coast, Richmond was certainly a 
talented analyst, but one who matured the fruits of Leveson’s imagination. Holding 
Singapore might prevent Britain from losing the war, but the fate of Hong Kong would 
decide whether Britain could force Japan to terms. The cold, but calculated, decision to post 
a garrison was made with the belief that it might hold Hong Kong just long enough for relief 
against Japan and would deter Chinese aggression. The loss of that force would not 
compromise Britain’s wider strategic position, but its potential success could lead to victory. 
Bell’s discussion of Britain’s continued garrisoning of its ‘Exposed Outpost’ is certainly valid 
for the 1930s, by which point the equation had swung further in Japan’s favour. During the 
1920s, however, while the balance of naval power was still on the Royal Navy’s side, that 
was not an overly reckless gamble. 
Much of this new argument runs in parallel with Christopher Bell’s discussion of Hong 
Kong’s position over the interwar period as a whole, but goes a step beyond Andrew Field’s 
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argument.4 China was not just a potential trigger for war, nor a passive playground for the 
imperial powers, but it formed an integral part of the Navy’s plans. This went far beyond a 
‘deflection’ strategy of encouraging Japanese expansion in Northern China, to occupy their 
resources and extend supply lines. Even during the mid-1920s, when the Guomindang was 
felt to represent the most immediate threat to Britain’s informal empire in East Asia, the 
Royal Navy was already considering whether the same group might be able to help. In 
effect, key commentators within the Royal Navy had adopted the spirit of ‘my enemy’s 
enemy is my friend’. While this did not initially prompt formal discussions with the 
Guomindang or other warlords, the Navy was planning around the belief that some degree 
of modest, indirect assistance was likely. This highlights that while the Admiralty was 
disinterested in many imperial policing duties in China, it was interested in the role China 
could play in a future major conflict, whether in a passive or active capacity.  
Discussion about the role China could play in a war against Japan also re-aligns how we 
approach Britain’s strategic situation in the 1920s, and particularly its policy towards China. 
In a search for potential allies to brace Britain’s position in East Asia, there were few 
alternatives other than China. Britain’s potential European allies no longer wielded 
significant clout in the region. Likewise, few Royal Navy commentators felt the USA could be 
wholly relied upon, given the latter’s stance during the First World War and official policy 
towards the defence of the treaty ports. Against that background, the lack of a clear central 
strategy for developing a positive relationship with China and reluctance to change the 
nature of Britain’s informal empire, take on even greater significance. It was always unlikely 
that China would become a full British ally, given deep-set conflicts over extra-territorial 
rights, the Shanghai International Settlement, and particularly Hong Kong’s future. The 
British Empire may have been the global superpower, but the failure to update imperial 
priorities in East Asia contributed directly towards revealing many of the Royal Navy's 
shortcomings. Political disinterest in the periphery of the Empire and anti-communist 
paranoia created an environment where the Royal Navy’s efforts to develop an effective 
long-term strategy were overlooked complacently in favour the forlorn hope of maintaining 
the status quo. 
                                                          
4 Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’, 61-88; Field, Royal Navy Strategy, pp.53-64. 
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Summary: The Royal Navy’s peacetime frontline 
The key message from throughout the study is that the 1920s Royal Navy, its role in 
maintaining the British Empire, its organisation and culture, and even the attitudes of its 
personnel all present a complex picture, not easily reduced to a straightforward narrative. 
The Admiralty and many of its officers were nominally dismissive of its peacetime, lower-
level work in imperial policing, particularly using gunboats. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy 
and those same individuals threw men, materiel, and energy into the task. Gunboat service 
itself was generally mundane and likely to hinder an officer’s career, and yet it increasingly 
put those crews in the path of extreme danger, moreover in circumstances where decisions 
made by a young lieutenant could have a significant impact on the future of the British 
Empire in East Asia. While efforts have been made to understand what civilian 
Shanghailander officials thought, how that affected their decisions, and how it contributed 
to clashes with Chinese protestors, no study has previously treated Royal Navy personnel as 
individuals. Inspector Everson and the other leading actors in the Louza shooting, for 
example, have been assessed as humans with all their flaws, whereas Lieutenant Faure, 
Lieutenant Commander Acheson, Captain England, and their colleagues have been hidden 
by their uniforms.5 This study highlights for the first time that they were all very different 
individuals and their actions came with personal as well as diplomatic consequences. 
Alcoholism, drug addiction, chronic injuries, forced retirement, and demotion were to greet 
those key protagonists in the aftermath of their actions. 
The Royal Navy could and often did adapt quickly, readily, and logically in the face of 
opportunities and challenges, but at times it was also guilty of complacency and resistance 
to change. Anti-intellectualist sentiment was a contributing factor to some failures, along 
with factional friction between networks of officers. Indeed, many existing arguments over 
anti-intellectualism in the interwar Navy have elements of truth. A diverse range of attitudes 
were displayed across the Service, with personal views and loyalties influencing the 
willingness of individual officers to adapt to new proposals and tactics. There were unifying 
elements, however, common to the majority of officers, including a crucial and consistent 
lack of urgency to make changes, which stemmed in part from dismissive assumptions about 
                                                          
5 Bickers, Empire Made Me, pp.164-172; Bickers, Britain in China, p.4; Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, 
pp.166-171; Fung, Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, pp.40-42; Osterhammel, ‘China’, p.652. 
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Asia itself. Some officers were overtly racist and many displayed subtler orientalist attitudes, 
although they were far from universal. Of particular importance, however, was the way 
almost all Royal Navy officers failed to appreciate how quickly East Asia was modernising, as 
a result of underlying national and racial assumptions. 
Perhaps the central conclusion is that the interwar Royal Navy involved considerably more 
than just the much-studied battle-fleet. That may seem an obvious statement to make, but 
this thesis serves as a reminder that the Royal Navy’s smaller warships were heavily 
employed maintaining the British Empire, even if contemporary and subsequent debate has 
focused upon capital ships. For the China gunboats, that task generally involved a rather dull 
existence, but one where crews developed lasting bonds with their US Navy counterparts. 
At times it placed the servicemen in positions as dangerous as any seen in wartime, 
highlighting that peace was not always peaceful for Britain’s armed forces. Indeed, the 1927 
crisis pushed the Navy close to a war footing, as a variety of factors combined to put the 
Service in the path of the Guomindang’s Northern Expedition. For the imperial history of 
Britain’s relationship with China, this thesis has shown that the Royal Navy was not just a 
uniform and blunt tool of empire. Similarly for the naval history, the China Station played a 
complicated part in the British Empire’s evolving relationship with China and events in China 
had a significant impact upon Britain’s grand strategy for East Asia. Indeed, individual 
officers serving on the China Station and the equipment available to them were often far 
more significant, in their influence upon events, than distant diplomats and politicians. 
Sometimes for better, sometimes for worse. The slow evolution of the China Station during 
the 1920s was central to both how long the British Empire’s informal interests in East Asia 
could be maintained and to the viability of the Empire’s strategic defence. Those priorities 
were not always aligned, but they were interlinked, and so should be our study of the two. 
  
Page | 277  
 
Appendix 1: Categories of warship with examples 
 
Battlecruiser – HMS Hood (Special Service Squadron Flagship) 
Length: 860 foot 
Displacement: 41,200 tons 
Armament: 8 x 15” main guns, 12 x 5.5” guns, and 4 x 4” AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 31 knots 
Full complement: 1,430 
Aircraft Carrier – HMS Hermes (China Station 1925-1926 and 1926-1928) 
Length: 600 foot 
Displacement: 10,850 tons 
Armament: 6 x 5.5” guns, 4 x 4” AA guns, and 15 aircraft (in the 1920s) 
Maximum design speed: 25 knots 
Full complement: 565 (excluding aircrew) 
Heavy Cruiser – HMS Hawkins (China Station Flagship 1919-1927) 
Length: 605 foot 
Displacement: 12,110 tons 
Armament: 7 x 7.5” main guns, 8 x 3” AA guns, and 2 x 2pdr ‘Pom Pom’ AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 30 knots 
Full complement: 732 
Light Cruiser – HMS Carlisle (China Station 1919-1928) 
Length: 451 foot 
Displacement: 5,240 tons  
Armament: 5 x 6” main guns, 2 x 3” AA guns, 4 x 3pdr guns, and 2 x 2pdr ‘Pom Pom’ AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 29 knots 
Full complement: 375 
Destroyer – HMS Wanderer (China Station 1926-1928)  
Length: 300 foot 
Displacement: 1,110 tons  
Armament: 4 x 4.7” main guns and 2 x 2pdr ‘Pom Pom’ AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 32 knots 
Full complement: 134 
Pre-WW1 Destroyer – HMS Otter (China Station 1900-1914)  
Length: 214 foot 
Displacement: 335 tons 
Armament: 1 x 12pdr (3”) main gun and 5 x 6pdr guns 
Maximum design speed: 30 knots 
Full complement: 70 
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Sloop – HMS Bluebell (China Station 1922-1927) 
Length: 262 foot 
Displacement: 1,200 tons  
Armament: 2 x 3” main guns and 2 x 3pdr AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 17 knots 
Full complement: 77 
River (Heavy) ‘Insect Class’ Gunboat– HMS Cockchafer (China Station 1920-1937) 
Length: 237 foot 
Displacement: 645 tons  
Armament: 2 x 6” main guns and 2 x 3” AA guns 
Maximum design speed: 14 knots 
Full complement: 53 
Upper Yangtze Gunboat – HMS Woodlark (China Station 1900-1928) 
Length: 145 foot 
Displacement: 150 tons  
Armament: 2 x 6pdr (2.2”) guns 
Maximum design speed: 13 knots 
Full complement: 25 
West River ‘Heron Class’ Gunboat– HMS Robin (China Station 1900-1928) 
Length: 108 foot 
Displacement: 85 tons  
Armament: 2 x 6pdr (2.2”) guns 
Maximum design speed: 9 knots 
Full complement: 25 
Submarine – L20 (China Station 1919-1929) 
Length: 239 foot 
Displacement: 890 tons (surfaced) 
Armament: 1 x 4” gun and 6 torpedo tubes 
Maximum design speed: 17 knots (surfaced) 
Full complement: 38 
Submarine Depot Ship – HMS Titania (China Station 1919-1929) 
Length: 350 foot 
Displacement: 5,250 tons 
Armament: 2 torpedo tubes and small-arms 
Maximum design speed: 14 knots 
Full complement: 239 
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Appendix 3: Warship prefixes 
Royal Navy - HMS 
US Navy - USS 
Imperial Japanese Navy - IJN 
French Navy - FS 
Italian Navy - RN 
Netherlands Navy – HNLMS 
 
Note: IJN is used over HIJMS for simplicity, and the modern NATO designation FS is used for France as the 
Marine Nationale does not use a prefix.  
Seniority 




Brotherton Library Archive, Leeds: 
Unpublished memoirs of Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) Edward Barraclough RN. 
Diary of the journalist Arthur Ransome. 
Papers of Lieutenant-Commander Meredith Spalding RN. 




Hathi Trust Digital Library (Original copies held by University of Michigan): 
Annual Reports of the Navy Department (USN). 
 
Imperial War Museum, London: 
Papers of Lieutenant (later Admiral) William Andrewes RN. 
Papers of Commander (later Captain) Paul Berryman RN. 
Papers of Sub-Lieutenant (later Captain) Douglas Claris RN. 
Diary of Lieutenant (later Commander) Charles Drage RN. 
Unpublished memoirs of Lieutenant Commander Brian Dean RN. 
Papers of Lieutenant J.W. Edwards RN. 
Unpublished memoirs of Ordinary Seaman G.T. Weekes RN. 
Diary of Paymaster-Commander (later Rear-Admiral) Hugh Miller RN. 
Papers of Lieutenant-Commander (later Captain) Reginald Ramsbotham RN. 
Papers of Leading Seaman William Roberts RN. 
Oral History Interview Series. 
Papers of Commander (later Admiral) Cecil Talbot RN. 
 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (King’s College London), London: 
Papers of Midshipman (later Admiral) Philip Burnett RN. 
Unpublished memoirs of Captain Francis De Winton RN. 
Papers of Captain (later Admiral) Sir Gerald Dickens RN. 
Papers of Midshipman (later Commander) Lawrence Humphreys RN. 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. 
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National Maritime Museum, London: 
Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl David Beatty RN. 
Papers of Commodore (later Admiral) Harold Baillie-Grohman RN. 
Journal of Commander (later Captain) Edward Jukes-Hughes RN. 
Papers of Commander (later Admiral) Louis Keppel Hamilton RN. 
Papers of Commander (later Admiral) Cedric Holland RN. 
Papers of Commander (later Admiral) Arthur Peters RN. 
Papers of Admiral Herbert Richmond RN. 
Royal Navy War College, Greenwich Papers. 
Navy Lists. 
 
National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth: 
Diary of Chief Petty Officer Douglas Poole RN. 
Papers of Midshipman Leonard Sheppard RN. 
Photograph album of H.J. Wright RN. 
Assorted Royal Navy official paperwork. 
 
Naval History and Heritage Command - www.history.navy.mil/our-collections: 





North China Herald. 
Nottingham Evening Post. 
The Hong Kong Daily Press. 
The Hong Kong Telegraph. 
The New York Times. 
Western Morning News. 
 
Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection - https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/: 
Historic maps of China. 
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Royal Marines Museum, Southsea: 
Diary of Marine W.J. Greenland. 
Photograph album of Marine W.S. Phillips. 
Photograph album of Major Frederick Burden RMLI. 
 
Shanghai Municipal Archives, Shanghai: 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps Papers. 
Shanghai Municipal Council Papers. 
The Municipal Gazette. 
 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London: 
China Association Collection. 
Papers of Sir Guy Francis Acheson. 
 
The National Archives, London: 
Admiralty (ADM): 1, 53, 116, 125, 137, 196. 
Air Ministry (AIR): 5. 
Cabinet (CAB): 2, 23, 24. 
Foreign Office (FO / FCO): 93, 141, 228, 371, 373. 
Government Code and Cypher School (HW): 12. 
Maps - Rolled (MR): 1. 
Security Service (KV): 3. 
Treasury (T): 1, 162, 225, 265. 
War Office (WO): 33, 106.  
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